



THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF THE SPANISH NATION: A DISCOURSE-BASED APPROACH

BY

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ABSTRACT

This thesis analyses Spanish nation-building from a social-constructionist perspective assuming that nations are historically evolving social constructs and that nationhood is a largely modern phenomenon with pre-modern antecedents. A theoretical model for studying nationhood is proposed based on a critique of nationalism theories, Giddens's social structuration model (Giddens 1984) refined by Sewell (2005); modernisation theories and discourse analytical approaches. A discourse-oriented methodology is proposed: Spanish nation-building, conceptualised as semiotically-mediated social action situated across time-space, is analysed nomothetically and ideographically, both in its broad historical context and in connection with recent narratives extracted from a large purpose-built corpus of newspaper articles. Several factors behind Spain's problematic nation-building are identified in the socio-historical analysis: an unyielding geography inhibiting communications, a long history of political and cultural fragmentation, a late and uneven modernisation and the lack of hegemonic national narratives in the context of a long history of confrontation between different identities. The corpus-based discourse analytical approach employed in the latter part of the analysis illustrates the potential offered by corpus-assisted discourse studies in social research, revealing that a widely-accepted Spanish identity discourse from the centre's perspective has not yet emerged.

Keywords: Spanish nation-building, social constructionism, socio-historical analysis, corpus-based discourse analysis.

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INTRODUCTION

Nationhood has long been a controversial issue in Spain. Spain's national configuration and State model are divisive issues among political parties and citizen groups, especially in Catalonia and the Basque Country. Linz (1973 p. 99) illustrates the situation well: "Spain today is a State for all Spaniards, a Nation-State for a large part of the population and only a State but not a nation for important minorities." The solution proposed in the 1978 Constitution of a State composed of "nationalities and regions with their own personality" has not brought the debate to an end (Aja, 1999; Sosa Wagner & Sosa Mayor, 2006). Spain has become a highly de-centralized country divided into seventeen autonomous communities, each with its own parliament, government and administration, and enjoying ample financial autonomy. However, growing federalization has not tempered nationalist demands on the periphery for home-rule nor satisfied an increasingly anxious and distrustful Spanish nationalism. On the contrary the support for Catalan and Basque nationhood has grown (García Ferrando et al, 1994) while recent developments, such as the controversy surrounding the reform of the Catalan Statute, the solid nationalist majorities in regional elections in 2012 and the plans for a referendum on Catalan self-determination are being met with growing calls for re-centralization coming from "Madrid" (Del Pino, 2013).¹ All this should be placed in the broader context of globalisation revealing the inadequacy of the current Nation-State system (Bell, 1987; Castells, 2000a; Bottery, 2003), substantial changes in the composition of Spain's population in recent years due to immigration (Balfour &

¹ An example of this trend is the manifesto of "Foro de la Sociedad Civil" advocating a unitary Spain and the abolition of the autonomies. www.abc.es/espana/20130123/abci-foro-sociedad-civil-estado-201301212221.html (retrieved on 23-1-13). Another example is the growing support for a centralized State outside Catalonia and the Basque Country. http://politica.elpais.com/politica/2013/05/03/actualidad/1367606811_475357.html (retrieved on 4-5-13).

Quiroga, 2007) and a prolonged and virulent economic crisis which may destabilise Spanish society and trigger significant changes in how Spain is conceived (Juliana Ricart, 2012).

Despite extensive research across various disciplines, the concept of nation has proven exceedingly difficult to pin down. The lack of an all-encompassing theory capable of explaining the various national manifestations and the phenomenon of nationalism and its causes continues to obscure the debate (Balfour & Quiroga, 2007). In the Spanish case, the focus has usually been on analysing nationalism on the periphery and its relationship with the State while Spanish nationalism and Spain's problematic nation-building have been largely overlooked (De Riquer i Permanyer, 2001). Assuming that nations are not external realities independent of human experience and that their existence is contingent upon human intervention, this thesis examines Spanish nation-building employing a theoretical model interdisciplinary in nature and largely based on the social constructivist paradigm, which conceives nations as discursive constructs: the product of semiotically-mediated social practices situated across time and space operating simultaneously at various scalar levels. Such a model addresses the protean complexity of nation-building by combining the nomothetic analysis of social structures and processes over the *longue durée* with the ideographic study of concrete social practices at specific points in time-space.

Due to space limitations, the focus is on Spanish nation-building from the perspective of the centre. The first two chapters are theoretical. Chapter 1 reviews the literature on nationalism and nation-building. Based on these insights, a theoretical model for studying the discursive construction of the Spanish nation is proposed in chapter 2. In chapter 3, this discursive construction is placed in its broad historical dimension. I explain how a complex geography

and a long history of political and cultural fragmentation marked the expansion of the State and the development of the national mode of organization prior to the emergence of a Spanish nationalist project. Then I analyse how the attempts to build a politically and culturally homogeneous highly centralized Nation-State during the 19th and 20th centuries were hindered by a weak State not fully capable of nationalizing the masses in the context of Spain's complex transition from world empire into territorial nation, a prolonged political and economic crisis and a late and uneven modernisation.

Chapters 4 and 5 discuss recent national narratives extracted from a large corpus of newspaper texts. These narratives can be considered part of the “discursive re-invention” of Spanish identity after Francoism, “trying to reconcile traditional narratives based on myths of common origin and continuity with a rapidly changing social, economic, and political environment where they have less and less meaning” (Balfour & Quiroga 2007, p. 6). Corpus-based discourse analysis employing corpus linguistics techniques is introduced as a valid alternative for social research. It is shown how this method can provide a much-needed quantitative dimension for empirically-based social research enhancing the representativity of the data and minimising the bias in our analysis. In view of Spain's complex historical evolution and the present state of affairs, conclusions on how the discursive construction of the nation may evolve, shortcomings of the present study and areas for further research are outlined at the end.

CHAPTER 1: A CRITICAL REVIEW OF THE THEORIES OF THE NATION AND NATIONALISM

Introduction

This chapter critically reviews the various theories of the nation and nationalism which have dominated the academic debate. The study of nationhood has been characterized by lengthy disputes between competing paradigms, with entrenched positions that have often threatened to bring the discussion into deadlock. These disputes have prevented the formulation of an all-encompassing theory of the nation and nationalism, colouring the debate with complexity and protean elusiveness, partly rooted in the tensions between the particular and universal aspects of such theory (Finlayson, 1998). In view of these obstacles, the aim of this chapter is to identify the strengths and weaknesses in the different theories before proposing a methodology for researching the concepts of nation and nationalism in the context of contemporary Spain in chapter 2. No methodology can be put forward without some prior understanding of the object of study. Therefore, this chapter discusses the ontological nature and the origins of “the nation” and outlines possible directions for research.

1.1. On the nature, origins and antiquity of nations


We have lived in a national world for a long time and yet the concept of nation has proved exceedingly difficult to grasp. There is an ample body of literature dealing with theories of the nation and nationalism coming from a variety of disciplines: political science, geography, international relations, law, cultural anthropology, social psychology, political philosophy, sociology, history, etc. Yet, as Treanor (1997) argues, this plurality has not led to greater theoretical innovation as a result of a considerable overlap and duplication of concepts by theories developed within the narrow limits of the different fields. Let us leave aside some

theories which do not treat the phenomenon holistically, such as those looking at nationalism as a form of political extremism (Connor, 1994; Mudde, 1996), as a kind of substitute religion (Gentile, 1996; 2006) or in connection to gender (Enloe, 2000; Yuval-Davis, 1997). If we concentrate on more all-encompassing theoretical stands, we are left with three fundamental paradigm debates, as identified by Smith (2000):

- a. The nature and origin of the nation and nationalism.
- b. The antiquity or modernity of nations.
- c. The role of nations and nationalism in historical and especially recent social change.

Depending on the viewpoints adopted in relation to these issues, Smith distinguishes four parameters of understanding of nations: primordialist, perennialist, modernist and ethnosymbolic. A fifth theoretical paradigm, “Post-Modernism” or “Social-Constructionism”, could be added to this list, given the fact that Smith identifies this position in his works and dedicates ample space to criticising it. Yet, Smith considers that such an account “remains too fragmentary and sketchy as yet to merit the designation of ‘paradigm’” (Smith 2001, p. 57) and so he treats it as a variant of the modernist paradigm. Day and Thompson (2004) on the other hand distinguish between “classical” and “post-classical” theoretical approaches to the nation and nationalism. The former would include the four paradigms identified by Smith while the post-classical label refers to those approaches influenced by social constructionism. These post-modern approaches are also characterized by being less concerned with the *longue durée* and with grand theories, favouring socially situated forms of theorizing which emphasize the active role of social agents in constructing nationalism and national identity.

Having once been the preferred paradigms, Primordialism and Perennialism have been abandoned in favour of modernist tenets now dominating the debate. Yet, despite their decreasing popularity in academic circles, primordialist and perennialist views are commonly found in the discourses of the media and the citizenry. Some authors prefer to see Ethnosymbolism as an emerging paradigm while others argue that it is a reformulation of the perennialist views (Hearn, 2006). Smith favours a sharp distinction between Primordialism and Perennialism on the basis that the former “stands outside historical time, being coeval with humanity” (Smith, 2004, p. 5). In view of this, I propose to place these parameters along a continuum delimited by two poles: so called “given-ness” and “invented-ness”, as illustrated in figure 1.1.



Main theoretical paradigms on the nature of nations and nationalism

“Given-ness” refers to the extent to which theories take the existence of nations either as natural objective phenomena predating history (Primordialism) or as ancient historical artefacts (Perennialism). Despite their ontological differences, Primordialism and Perennialism share some common traits in that they see nations as ‘cultural givens of social existence’ (Geertz, 1973). In both cases one is necessarily born into a nation and it has been that way for at least as long as there are historical records. “Invented-ness”, on the other hand, would pertain to those theories claiming that nations are not only human creations, but also recent ones: nations are seen as products of modernity, whichever way this is defined. While

social constructionists share the modernist idea of the nation being recently created, they emphasize the study of nationalism as a form of discourse. This discursive approach has led some authors to questioning the objective reality of the nation and nationalism, placing this theoretical strand at the far end of the invented-ness scale. Smith (1986; 2000) argues that Ethnosymbolism does not dispute the modernist claim that nations are not to be understood as objective external realities. However, ethnosymbolists tend to tone down the idea of nations being radically modern, suggesting that while Nation-States may well be modern creations, they have pre-modern antecedents.

The next sections review the main tenets posited by these theories followed by a critique of their theoretical validity and methodological adequacy as far as the study of the nation and nationalism is concerned.

1.2. Primordialism

Primordialism proclaims that nations are essentially organic and whole, belonging to the state of nature rather than being human creations. This is basically an organicist concept of the nation as opposed to a voluntarist one: “one is born into a nation and is indelibly stamped with its character and genius for life” (Smith, 2000, p. 6). The epistemological distinction between “brute facts” and “social” or “institutional facts” may prove useful here (Searle, 1969; 1995; Lakoff, 1987; Stubbs, 1996). Based on the premise that reality does not depend on external facts but can also be socially constructed, Searle (1995) proposes a classification of objective facts into two main categories: On the one hand, there are so-called “brute facts” which exist independently of human experience. Examples of brute facts are mathematical theorems, or the notion that the earth revolves around the sun. On the other hand, Searle (*ibid*)

identifies other type of facts, “social or institutional facts” that rely on human thought for their existence. For instance, the fact that Spain is a constitutional monarchy belongs to this category.

Primordialist definitions are at the root of nationalist ideology. Their premises are that:

- (i) Nations are brute facts which can be defined in terms of seemingly objective external categories such as culture, ethnicity, religion, a common language, shared history and heritage.
- (ii) Cultural boundaries should coincide with political ones. In other words, each cultural unit aspires to having its Nation-State.

Despite its flaws, one should recognize some value in Primordialism, rooted in what Geertz (1973, 2000) calls ‘the givens of human existence’. Culture, for instance, is one of these givens. One cannot deny that humans are naturally social creatures and that this intrinsic need for socialization results in the formation of cultural groups across space and time. Furthermore, as Guibernau argues:

A common culture favours the creation of solidarity bonds among the members of a given community and allows them to imagine the community they belong to as separate and distinct from others (Guibernau, 2001 p. 79).

However, one should not conflate this universal need to belong with the actual realizations of this cultural imperative, which are contingent and transient. A look at the world around us in connection with the primordialist premises presented above reveals that it is not possible fully to explain nations by simply using categories such as the ones mentioned above (Kohn, 1944; Hayes, 1960; Nairn, 1977; Carretero y Jiménez, 1977), nor does it seem clear why

Nation-States should be understood as culturally homogeneous entities. First of all, categories such as culture, language, ethnicity or shared history are problematic for a number of reasons: they are “fuzzy, shifting and ambiguous, and as useless for purposes of the traveller’s orientation as cloud-shapes are compared to landmarks” (Hobsbawm, 1990, p. 6). So, when linguistic, historical and cultural differences are put forward in support of a particular political agenda, controversy naturally arises.

Let us illustrate this fuzziness by examining examples extracted from the Spanish context. These tend to be based on ethno-linguistic criteria given the decline in importance of markers like religion or race, formerly the defining feature of Basqueness in the theories of Basque nationalism (Arana, 1965; Laínz, 2004). If one analyses the concept of *Països Catalans*, this notion seems to be constructed on the basis of language, culture, politics and history to a lesser extent. Advocates of this term consider part of the *Països Catalans* all the territories where Catalan is the indigenous language, including the former Principality of Catalonia, that is, the current Spanish Autonomous Community of Catalonia plus Northern Catalonia - now in France-, the Autonomous Communities of Valencia and Balearic Islands, the territory of La Franja, currently belonging to Aragon and Andorra. Catalanist aspirations are regularly echoed in the discourse of the Catalan Government and the nationalist organisations in atlases, weather reports, calendars, etc.² This is something that many Valencians reject as “Catalan imperialism” and has led to antagonistic identity narratives.³ Figure 1.2 illustrates some of these differences:

² See for instance the culturcat website: <http://www20.gencat.cat/portal/site/culturacatalana> (retrieved on 16-10-2012).

³ For instance, Valencian major Rita Barberá has recently argued that Catalonia systematically tries to Catalanise Valencian people although the latter have resisted that: www.abc.es/20121016/local-comunidad-valenciana/abci-catalanizacion-valencia-201210161305.html (retrieved on 16-10-2012).

Figure 1.2.



Conflicting identity discourses: “*Països Catalans*” or “Catalan imperialism”?

In view of this, one wonders who is right and who is wrong in this dispute about what constitutes ‘a Catalan’. Are Valencians part of the Catalan people or do they constitute a separate one? When examining the arguments coming from both sides, one can see how organicist conceptions based on culture, language and ethnicity are not as straight forward as nationalists claim: Where do we draw the line between Catalan or Valencian cultures? Are Valencian and Catalan the same language? If so, is Valencian a dialect of Catalan? One cannot deny the close relationship between the linguistic varieties spoken in the territories we call “Catalonia and Valencia” (Moreno Fernández, 2005). They all constitute varieties derived from Latin that share a similar linguistic substratum. So similar, in fact, that to a great extent they are mutually intelligible. Extent appears to be the key in this discussion: One can certainly speak of a close relationship between the “Catalan” varieties spoken within

the present-day Catalan territory, or the different *fablas* in Valencia. But to *a certain extent*, we can also speak of some relationship between Valencian, Catalan and other varieties commonly ascribed to other Romance languages such as Castilian or French. After all, are not these also mutually intelligible, albeit to *a lesser extent*? Clearly the problem comes from the fact that there are no universally recognized criteria in distinguishing languages from dialects.

This issue is further complicated by the fact that cultural and linguistic categories should not be treated aprioristically, due to the ample evidence of direct intervention by elite groups in conforming them. A look at how languages evolve reveals that what we understand by Catalan, Euskera or Castilian is not the product of random and independent linguistic evolution but largely the result of the standardisation policies of government agencies and cultural elites. So much so that one may argue that rather than being part of the nature of things, languages and cultures are largely artificial creations used to help construct historical formations such as nations, classes, genders and races (Crowley, 1996). *Batua*, the chosen standard for Euskera, is a good case in point. Given its recent, and therefore easily traceable history, one cannot deny the fact that *Batua* did not have any speaker until it became the sanctioned standard variety in the mid-1970s. From then on, it began to be increasingly used in the media, the administration as well as at schools in spite of the protests by its detractors, who claimed that *Batua* was at times hardly intelligible with some of the Basque historic dialects (sic).⁴

The case of a community defined in terms of shared history is equally problematic because it

⁴ Basque purists such as Oskillaso and Múgica argued that an invented language would end up killing the authentic Basque dialects (see www.absoluteastronomy.com/topics/Batua) (retrieved on 8-10-2012).

is also difficult to draw the line between history as a more or less objective narrative of shared past and history as a tool utilised by the State in reinforcing national identity (Álvarez Junco, 2001). The work “*La construcción de las historias de España*” (García Cárcel, 2004b), which provides an overview of the evolution of historical narratives in Spain since the 16th century, constitutes proof of the difficulties one encounters in trying to produce an objective national history. Similar evidence comes from the various historical narratives in the Spain of the autonomies which are being employed as ideological tools in alternative projects for the political organization of Spain (*ibid*).

All this evidence indicates that the cultural elements identified by nationalist ideologues are not part of the nature of things, nor do they seem easy to define. Our final argument against Primordialism questions the second premise formulated before, namely that of nations being culturally homogeneous entities. In fact, a cursory look at our world reveals that culturally, ethnically and linguistically homogeneous Nation-States have constituted the exception rather than the norm (Hall, 1996): if we were to define a nation as a “stable community of individuals of a same ethnic group who share the same language and/or a same religion and/or a same culture”, then how do we explain the existence of multi-ethnic and multi-cultural nations such as the United States of America? Or how do we explain nations as small as Switzerland, which have four official languages as well as a variety of religious traditions. What to say about nations such as India or China, which constitute a mosaic of languages, ethnic groups, cultures and religions?

History also shows that national realities are far from being the immutable and eternal entities nationalists portray. In fact, Nation-States may rise, grow, evolve, split and disappear.

A look at the map of Europe over the last 200 years confirms the contingent nature of nations. How many Nation-States universally recognised by international treaties have split or have joined others to form new national bodies? The fact that the idea of Spain is being questioned by many Basques and Catalans but also accepted by equally significant portions of these societies demonstrates that nations cannot be simply treated as “brute facts”, definable in terms of allegedly objective markers like language, culture, history, religion or ethnicity. On the contrary, nations are best understood as “social facts”; that is, as human constructs that have no independent existence outside human experience.

Undoubtedly, such constructs cannot be built out of nothing. Markers such as the ones mentioned will constitute some of the building blocks of these national constructs. But these are not given facts of nature, as primordialists claim, but assumed givens that “rest on perception, cognition and belief” (Smith 2000, p. 21). They belong to the realm of ideology, belief and even desire and are perhaps best explained in terms of national identity. This synthesis is well captured in Kohn’s distinction between an organicist conception of the nation and a voluntarist one (Kohn, 1944), where rather than being born into a nation and being indelibly stamped by its character, one chooses to belong to one and re-affirms this pledge in what Renan (1954) termed as a daily plebiscite in his often-cited address.

In conclusion, the analysis of the ontological nature of nations indicates that contrary to the primordialist premises, nations are best understood as social facts because they cannot be conceived independently of human experience. Primordialism may be appealing to nationalists and readily accepted by people because its conception of the nation rests on universals like descent, identity, culture or territoriality common to all humankind. But when

it comes to explaining the origins of specific nations, Primordialism proves “to have either a flawed theory or none and little or no history, being reductionist (socio-biology) or largely speculative or ahistorical (cultural Primordialism)” (Smith, 2001 p. 61). So, if nations are human constructs, it remains to be seen when and how these were created. This is the main bone of contention among the other theoretical paradigms of nationalism identified by Smith.

1.3. Perennialism

Perennialist theorists attenuate the claims of Primordialism by granting that nations may not be part of the state of nature nor be inherent to the human condition. Yet, perennialists believe that nations are as old as history. They may concede that nationalism, understood as the deliberate movement to awaken nations, could be a recent phenomenon. But the nation itself is something immemorial (Smith, 2000). Accordingly, nations are not necessarily the product of nationalism but already existed before this ideology emerged in modern societies. Smith distinguishes between two versions of Perennialism. There is “recurrent Perennialism”, where nations are considered “a recurrent, but not necessarily a continuous phenomenon throughout history” (Smith, 2004, p. 9). These are the views advocated by Armstrong (1982) in *Nations before Nationalism*, which “portrays the nation as a recurrent form of community, with particular nations emerging and disappearing in every period of history” (Smith, 2004, p. 9). Although Armstrong admits that modern Nation-States may differ from their pre-modern counterparts due to the influence nationalism exerts on the former, for him there are no fundamental differences between modern nations and pre-modern ones. In both cases, Smith argues, Armstrong sees ethnicity, “the cluster of shared sentiments, attitudes and perceptions of ethnic groups, and the myths, symbols and codes that guard their borders as the cement that has maintained group identity over very long periods of time” (*ibid*, p. 9).

Another kind of perennialist approach identified by Smith is “continuous Perennialism”. This is a historicist view that emphasizes some kind of continuity between modern Nation-States and their medieval precursors. The advocates of continuous Perennialism see the nation as a historical construct, as the result of evolution over the *longue durée* rather than just as a product of modernity. The question of evolution versus creation has been at the crux of the debate between modernists and perennialists, for instance, in the discussion between Gellner and Smith on the issue of whether nations have navels or not (Gellner 1996, Smith 1996). Perennialists conceptualise the nation in evolutionary terms whereas modernists opt for creationism. Somewhere in between are the ethnosymbolist views advocated by Smith, as we shall see later. In their evolutionary account of the formation of nations, Perennialism emphasizes historical detail as well as the importance of cultural factors like religion, language, myth, custom, art and historical memory, rather than political, social or economic factors, preferred by Modernism.

In the Spanish context, the works of philosophers Bueno (2005) and Marías (1985) as well as some initiatives promoted by scholars under the auspices of Spain’s *Real Academia de la Historia* represent these views. Bueno’s thesis is that Spain and the Spanish nation are not myths or post-modern illusions, as peripheral nationalists argue. While acknowledging the emergence of Spain as a political nation centred in the idea of sovereignty which dates back to the Constitution of Cádiz in 1812, Bueno defends that the Spanish nation predates the modern Nation-State and can be found in its existence as a historical reality. Similarly, Marías core argument is what he calls “*razón histórica*” where the Spanish nation is

conceived as historical project gradually built, layer after layer, as a result of a vast process of incorporation.

The position of historian García Cárcel (2002) could also be considered perennialist with some caveats. He acknowledges the significance of concepts such as “the invention of tradition” as a powerful tool often used by nationalist ideologies in nation-building. Yet, he argues that the idea of invented traditions has often been abused by scholars holding a view of history that is excessively biased towards the contemporary which ultimately has brought along a certain degree of distortion to what he calls “historical reality”. Ultimately García Cárcel aligns with Américo Castro’s thesis that Spain as a nation is the product of a long and complex historical evolution rather than a modern invention (Castro, 1954):

Para comprender la problemática de la articulación nacional hay que remontarse más allá del presente escenario en que se han instalado las supuestas <<invenciones>>de la nación española, el siglo XIX: No creemos que pueda hablarse de la nacionalización española como un fenómeno característico del siglo XIX preparado por el Estado en colaboración con unas élites y que presuntamente se impone a una sociedad vacía de identidad (García Cárcel, 2002, p. 10).⁵

Personalmente estoy tan en contra del esencialismo de la España eterna como de la invención de una España como artificio del Estado liberal del siglo XIX. Considero, como Américo Castro, que España es una realidad histórica larga en el tiempo y de proceso evolutivo difícil (*ibid*, p. 16)⁶.

Perennialist accounts may be rich in historical detail but often lack theoretical acumen in that they fail to explain how and why nation-building actually takes place. Advocates of Modernism have warned us of the dangers associated with having history as practically the

⁵ In order to understand the problem of national articulation one should go beyond the current scenario in which the so-called inventions of the Spanish nation have taken root, namely the 19th century: We do not believe in the idea of Spanish nationalisation as a typical 19th century phenomenon orchestrated by the State in collaboration with some elites that is imposed on a society apparently lacking an identity.

⁶ Personally I am as much against the essentialist idea of an eternal Spain as against the invention of Spain by the liberal State in the 19th century. Like Américo Castro, I consider that Spain is a lengthy historical reality, the result of a complex evolution.

sole argument in support of the existence of nations. There is the risk of falling into a similar tautological pitfall as Primordialism by taking for granted the given-ness of the nation on the basis of historical narratives which are repeated like mantras. Going back to the Spanish case, we can see how some authors employ evidence extracted from old chronicles, literary texts and other historical documents to support their claims of a Spanish nation predating modern times: Suárez Fernández (2000; 2005) points to the days of Hispania as Roman province and suggests the existence of a certain idea of Spain gradually evolving ever since. He uses abundant documentary evidence dating back to the medieval period in support of his main thesis: that in spite of their political fragmentation, the Christian kingdoms in Medieval Spain identified themselves with a primeval Hispania, lost after the Moorish invasion and happily recovered as a result of the on-going Reconquista, where Roman *ius*, a certain degree of linguistic uniformity and Christian heritage appeared fused.

In a similar and yet more cautious line, García Cárcel speaks of *Hispania Romana*, at least in the beginning, as having no identity other than the one derived from its geographical and administrative nature. Yet, he argues, one does not need to wait for the 19th century to realize that this geographical space recurrently identified as such in Spanish history is being gradually filled with political and cultural content. Unlike Suárez Fernández, he sounds more ambiguous on the issue of Visigoth Spain having a more or less defined Spanish identity. While he acknowledges the recurrent image of a glorious Visigoth Spain being evoked during the *Reconquista*, he gives more weight to the fragmented political nature of Spain at the time:

El sueño de aquel pasado glorioso visigodo, que intermitentemente sale a la superficie a lo largo de la Reconquista, fue sin duda un estímulo de cara a la colaboración de los reinos cristianos frente al enemigo musulmán. Pero posiblemente fue más un producto del imaginario interesado que un ejercicio de la memoria

racional. La realidad plural de los diversos reinos era lo que contaba (García Cárcel 2002, p. 19).⁷

García Cárcel agrees however with Suárez Fernández on the fact that the neighbouring European powers did tend to perceive Spain in more unified terms than the “Spaniards” themselves:

La pluralidad española fue interpretada en términos de singularidad siempre desde fuera (*ibid*, p. 19).⁸

In this regard, he echoes Suárez Fernández’s references to the Spanish nation in various Flemish commercial documents from the 14th century and even more importantly, the fact that the kingdoms of Portugal, Castile, Navarre and Aragon agreed to appear united under the term “Spanish nation” and share a single vote in the Council of Constanza in 1415 (Suárez Fernández, 2000). Both authors also agree on how important the matrimonial alliances between the different kingdoms became in cementing a sense of national unity based on the dynastic principle:

Los linajes reinantes fundían su sangre hasta un punto tal que, llegado un determinado momento, se entendió que una sola dinastía reinaba en toda España (Suárez Fernández, 2000, p. 35).⁹

Yet, García Cárcel draws a fine distinction between the territorial unity finally achieved under the Catholic Monarchs and the idea of “national unity”, as the following quote shows:

La España de los Reyes Católicos estaría marcada por la conciencia de que los reinos de España tenían ahora un gobierno único, de que existía la <<monarquía de España>>. Ese sentido unitarista político- que desde luego nunca puede adquirir el

⁷ The dream of a glorious Visigoth past emerging from time to time throughout the *Reconquista* undoubtedly constituted a stimulus against the Muslim enemy. But this was perhaps the product of ideological interest rather than an exercise of rational memory. The plurality of the various kingdoms was what really counted.

⁸ The Spanish plurality was always interpreted as singularity from the outside.

⁹ The reigning lineages interbred up to the extent that it was understood that a single dynasty reigned all over Spain.

rango de unidad nacional- tuvo ilustres representantes en la segunda mitad del siglo XV, dentro y fuera del ámbito castellano (García Cárcel 2002: 20).¹⁰

There seem to be evident problems with trying to explain the origins and evolution of the Spanish nation on the sole basis of these narratives. One could question the extent to which the documents where the nation is mentioned are truly representative of the social milieu at the time or if on the contrary, the concept of a Spanish nation as mentioned there is ancillary to the context of enunciation associated with such documents. In other words, in their defence of the historical reality of the Spanish nation in pre-modern times, are those historians accurately interpreting Spanish nationhood or are they looking at this issue selectively?

Other problems associated with perennialist narratives have to do with their social penetration and with the difficulties in distinguishing historical fact from myth. Modernist authors point out that only a minority of the population was literate in medieval times. So one may question the extent to which this rudimentary idea of Spain was present outside the discourse of the elites. One probably has to wait till the spread of literacy and the consolidation of a State education system to assume some kind of widespread national conscience among the masses. Also, as many perennialists admit, it is often difficult to separate fact from myth in this kind of historical narratives, where national origins are situated in a remote past permeated by legends, ancestral stories and foundational myths. Such idealizations abound in nationalist discourse. In the Basque case, this has been studied by Juaristi (1987; 1997; 2002) and Laínz (2004). According to Juaristi, some of the myths

¹⁰ The Spain of the Catholic Monarchs was aware of the fact that the kingdoms of Spain had a single “government”, that there was a “Spanish monarchy”. This sense of political unity -that can never reach the status of national unity (sic)- had illustrious advocates during the second half of the 15th century, both in and outside Castile.

behind the construction of a Basque nation are the idea of *Euskera* being older than any other known language. Other contributing elements to the Basque mythical universe are the ethnicist mystifications in the writings of Romantic authors like Chaho and Navarro Villoslada, where we are introduced to an idealized universe based on fantastic descriptions of popular culture. Laínz (2004) also discusses some of the foundational myths in the Basque *volkgeist* enunciated by Arana, such as the medieval battle of Arrigoriaga, allegedly resulting in a confrontation between the Basque people and the Spanish aggressors, or the myth that the Carlist Wars were actually fought in defence of Basque independence.¹¹

The idea of Spain as a nation is not devoid of similar fantasies. National histories by Modesto Lafuente or Patxot y Ferrer, citing 16th century authors like Juan de Mariana or even going as far back as St. Isidore of Seville's "*Laudes Hispaniae*", also take for granted the idea of a Spanish nation existing since antiquity, embedded in stories permeated by fantasy. We are told, for instance, about the mythical foundation of Spain by a Biblical patriarch named Tubal, a grandson of Noah. Spain in these stories is portrayed as an Eden peopled by model Spaniards, soon to be perturbed by waves of "foreign invasions" and the evolution of the Spanish nation is presented as a succession of paradises, losses and redemptions, the latter being justified by the great virtues that characterize Spanish people (García Cárcel, 2004b). Álvarez Junco (2001) reminds us of the dangers behind the selective interpretation of national narratives where myth and historical fact can hardly be separated.

¹¹ Rooted in the traditionalist reactionary ideology in defense of Absolutism, the origins of Carlism date back to the 1820s. Associated with the *Partido Apostólico*, an extreme clerical party opposed to Liberalism, Carlism did not recognize Isabel II, Fernando VII's daughter, as queen of Spain and supported prince Carlos María Isidro de Borbón and his descendants as legitimate monarchs, participating in a series of civil wars known as "Carlist Wars: 1833-1840; 1846-1849 and 1872-1876. Carlism remained influential throughout much of the 19th century in northern Spain, mainly in Navarre, the Basque Country and in areas of Aragon and Catalonia. Carlist volunteers actively participated in the Spanish Civil War (1936-1939) in support of Franco. The Carlist Movement was amalgamated with the Falange by a decree issued on the 19th April, 1937. Carlism has lost much of its support in recent decades. See Canal (2004).

The main purpose of these histories may not be a wish to understand the past but rather the political concern of reinforcing national identity. All in all, history may be constructed in the service of nationalist ideology.

Another risk associated with Perennialism is that it over-emphasizes the ideas of evolution and historical continuity underestimating the discontinuities found in many of these so-called historical realities across different periods; for instance the profound differences between modern Nation-States and pre-modern polities. One could argue that the modern concept of the Nation-State based on the principles of sovereignty and citizenship as well as on a high level of social organization is substantially different from pre-modern models based on highly fragmented societies and a patrimonial conception of the State. Given the politically and economically fragmented nature of “Spain” in medieval times and given the existing differences in laws, customs and even languages in the various -and let us not forget- independent Christian kingdoms, one has reasons to suspect that a super-ordinate idea of Spain linked to a primeval past was far from mature.

In conclusion, compared to Primordialism and its dogmatic presupposition of the existence of nations, the contribution of Perennialism to explaining the national phenomenon is more cogent, though not free from flaws. Perennialism has thrown some light on the origins of a certain idea of nation, particularly in the European context, but has proved weak in theorizing how nation-building actually took place. Also, in assuming some kind of continuity between pre-modern and contemporary concepts of the nation, a certain degree of caution is necessary since the further we cling to the past in trying to explain the idea of Spain, the greater the difficulties we face. Concepts as complex as this one fade away as a

result of historical discontinuity and tend to be mixed with mythical elements. At the same time, we also run the risk of looking at the past through modern glasses and reach hasty conclusions on the basis of conceptual paradigms not fully developed until modern times.

The next sections in this chapter are dedicated to modernist theories of the nation, which have constituted the dominant paradigm recently, and to social-constructionist approaches, seen by some as a variant of Modernism. Ethnosymbolism will be covered after that, as it constitutes a reaction to Modernism and Social-Constructionism. Conclusions will be drawn on how insights from these theories can be used in outlining a theoretical approach for this thesis.

1.4. Modernism

Modernist theories rest on two main assumptions:

- (i) Nations are not objective external realities belonging to the state of nature, nor a universal necessity as primordialists claim. Neither, are nations as old as history as perennialists believe. Rather, nations are created constructs, recent in nature and novel in character.
- (ii) Nations and nationalism are the product of modernisation and as such do not require pre-modern antecedents.

From being considered human creations it does not follow that nations should be considered a mere ideological illusion. This has been a common accusation by critics of social constructionism, to be discussed later. Rather, modernists conceive nations as human constructs, as collective creations engendered by nationalism under a series of conditions grouped under the concept of “modernisation”. This excludes the possibility of nations being

primordial entities but, more importantly, it also argues against the possibility of nations being some product of historical evolution: as Gellner (1996) argues, “nations have no navels.” Nations did not evolve from some pre-national antecedent. On the contrary, nations were created by nationalism in recent history. When exactly? No agreement exists regarding the time of “creation”. Some authors point at the system of Nation-States emerging in Europe as early as 1648, the date of the Peace of Westphalia (Tilly, 1975). Others, like Gellner (1996) or Hobsbawm (1990), link nation-building more closely to the rise of nationalism in Europe and propose later dates. Gellner dates this phenomenon towards the end of the 18th century while Hobsbawm suggests the 19th century as the time in which the system of Nation-States crystallised.

The premise that nations are the product of modernisation is not exempt from controversy according to Smith (2000). As we shall see, one could explain modernisation as a highly complex process in which various catalysts intervene. The remaining of this section reviews the contributions made by prominent modernist authors followed by a discussion on the validity of the modernist paradigm as a whole in explaining the nature and origins of nations.

Elie Kedourie

Kedourie’s work represents one of the first attempts to explain the origin of nations from the modernist perspective (Kedourie, 1993). Based on the assumption that nationalism is a doctrine invented in Europe in the early 19th century, Kedourie traces the intellectual and social foundations of nationalism to the Kantian concept of ‘autonomy of the will’ reformulated by Fichte as ‘collective will’. This is where ideas like national sovereignty and the right to self-determination, as enshrined by the French Revolution, stem from according

to this author. As far as the social causes of nationalism is concerned, Kedourie postulates that such doctrine represented a revolutionary and subversive answer by European bourgeois intellectuals who felt excluded by the Absolutist State from the power that they felt they deserved as a result of their enlightened education.

Ernest Gellner

Kedourie's views were criticised by Gellner on several accounts. Gellner dismissed the Kantian connection in the origins of nationalism arguing that the autonomy of the will applied to individuals and not to groups. More significantly, he argued that Kedourie's intellectualist explanation of the nationalist phenomenon was misleading because nationalism was not just an erroneous theory that could be disproved and discarded. Rooted in a socio-anthropological perspective with functionalist underpinnings, Gellner's account constitutes one of the best articulated and comprehensive theories coming from the modernist camp (Gellner, 1964; 1983; 1996; 1997). In his view, nations and nationalism are the necessary product of a radical socio-cultural transformation sparked by industrialisation. This process consisted of a shift from the modes of production of agrarian societies to those of industrial societies, which required a novel form of social organisation: the Nation-State. For Gellner, nationalism is a political principle which maintains that similarity of culture is the basic social bond and the Nation-State can be explained in terms of the association of culture and polity. He claims this association only emerged in modern times, as a result of the changes brought by industrialisation. Therefore, he argues, nations and nationalism are quintessentially modern.

Gellner roughly divides human history into three periods: foraging, agrarian and scientific-

industrial. The foraging period was characterised by the absence of State. Instead, we had small wandering groups of hunters and food collectors organised under rudimentary forms of political leadership. These were societies characterised by the absence of a “high” codified script-linked culture. Here, one cannot speak of a relationship between polity and culture because neither of them existed. During the agrarian stage, an enormous population increase occurred as a result of the developments in food production and storage techniques. This in turn led to significant changes in the division of labour and more complex forms of social organisation. Now the State existed and so did cultural differences. In a sense, nationalism would have been possible. However, according to Gellner, it did not prevail because a view of the world which advocates that a legitimate political unit is the one formed by anonymous members of the same culture had no place in agrarian societies:

These are hierarchically organised societies, with each stratum and its members jealously guarding its standing and its privileges and eager to differentiate itself from lower strata which would, given the chance, usurp some of its perks (Gellner, 1997, p. 19).

Culture, rather than uniting, separates social classes in agrarian societies and aims at perpetuating such separation:

The characteristic political unit of the agrarian age is either considerably smaller than the limits of a culture -city States, village communities, tribal segment- or very much larger: Culturally eclectic empires which have no reason whatsoever to limit their expansion when they encounter linguistic or cultural boundaries (of which they may be wholly ignorant, and to which they are indifferent). The most characteristic political unit of the agrarian age tended to make joint use of both these principles: a trans-ethnic empire would be superimposed on sub-ethnic communities, which it used as its local agent, tax-collector and deputy (*ibid*, p.21).

Industrialisation brought along new modes of production as well as new forms of social relation. Industrial societies rely on continuous economic and scientific development rather than on stable technologies. Because of this need for perpetual growth, industrial societies

cannot have the kind of stable occupational structures typical of the agrarian age. Instead, these are highly mobile, meritocratic societies which require universal literacy as a result of their inherent mobility and the increasingly semantic nature of work. As a result of this, homogeneity of culture becomes the new political bond:

The mastery of a given high culture (the one used by the surrounding bureaucracies) is the pre-condition of political, economic and social citizenship (*ibid*, p.29).

A key notion in Gellner's theory is the idea of "uneven development" as a basis for nationalist mobilisation. The importance of this notion resides in two incontrovertible facts: on the one hand industrialisation did not spread simultaneously or uniformly throughout Europe. On the other hand, one can easily appreciate different stages of cultural and political development across the different European States at the time of the nationalist explosion. Gellner (1983) illustrates his idea of uneven development with the allegory of Ruritania vs. Megalomania: the Ruritanians represent one of the many peasant ethnic groups confined within the territory of Megalomania. They speak more or less related dialects, the "Ruritanian language", used in informal communication among villagers, while the Ruritanian aristocracy prefers the language of the Megalomanian court. The 19th century sees a rapid expansion of the population in Megalomania accompanied by industrialisation in some parts of the empire, while Ruritania remains much underdeveloped. As many Ruritanian peasants seek work in Megalomania, many assimilate into the dominant language and culture of Megalomania in spite of the discrimination they face. Yet, in the midst of profound social and economic changes in Megalomania, a nationalist movement sprouts in Ruritania spearheaded by intellectuals inspired in Ruritanian folklore and *petit-bourgeois* dreaming of becoming powerful bureaucrats, ambassadors and ministers in a Ruritanian State.

Gellner's notion of uneven development shares some common ground with alternative modernist theories of the nation adopting a neo-Marxist perspective that emphasise the importance of economic transformation in explaining the origin of nations, notably Nairn's notion of "uneven development" or Hechter's concept of "internal colonialism" (Nairn, 1977; Hechter, 1975). Yet, in Gellner's case, uneven development plays a secondary role to industrialisation and is actually used better to articulate his views on the rise of nations and nationalism in the context of the profound socio-cultural and economic differences existing in Europe throughout the 19th century. In other words, industrialisation and the socio-cultural changes derived from this process constitute the cornerstone in Gellner's theory while uneven development is used to accommodate grand theory with historical facts.

Accordingly, Gellner (1997) distinguishes four main time zones in the configuration of Europe's Nation-State system: zone 1 is situated along Europe's Atlantic coast. Here, he argues, "State and culture were living together in kind of customary marriage for ages, long before the Age of Nationalism, and long before the internal logic of modern society decreed that the couple were meant for each other" (*ibid*, p. 51). Zone 2 roughly corresponds to the territory of the Holy Roman Empire. While a high culture had been available among both Italians and Germans for long, no solid State fabric was ready for the marriage between culture and polity to take place. Zone 3, Eastern Europe, was even more problematic. Here, in Gellner's view, there was neither a consolidated State nor established national cultures. So, one could easily predict a violent and brutal process when nationalism spread, as eventually happened. Finally, Zone 4 corresponds to the area that was once under Bolshevik rule. Due to the special circumstances derived from Communist rule, nationalism was held in check for

decades and finally exploded in various forms after Communism fell.

While insightful, Gellner's grand theory of nationalism has not been exempt from criticism from alternative versions of the modernist paradigm and from the ethnosymbolist camp. I discuss modernist critiques of the model in this section and deal with Ethnosymbolism later on. Modernist authors have questioned Gellner on five main accounts:

- (i) Contradictory in terms;
- (ii) Excessively reductionist;
- (iii) Chronologically problematic;
- (iv) Excessively abstract and deterministic;
- (v) Too general.

Hearn detects inconsistencies in Gellner's story of uneven development. He argues that Gellner's model effectively results in two different theories of nationalism with fundamentally different causes that at times may contradict each other: a functional nationalism resulting from industrialisation (Megalomania) and a reactive nationalism originating in societies not yet industrialised (Ruritania):

On the one hand, Gellner conceives of nations as functional requirements of modern industrialized social life, and nationalism is the process that renders the necessary functional adjustment. On the other hand, the paradigmatic historical process of nationalism for Gellner was a reaction to uneven development, the encounter between Ruritania and Megalomania [...]. Now, these two theories of what happened are not incompatible, and Gellner observes that in some cases people were fairly passively incorporated into the new industrial order, and in others were provoked to mobilize nationally against another dominant nation. But neither are they logically interdependent. One can reasonably imagine a world in which all people are either assimilated into the new functional order or exterminated, with no successful reactionary movements, or one in which all nationalism begins with such reactions, not against new industrial societies, but against exploitative imperial regimes. Obviously Gellner is obliged to tell his bold story in this dual way because it broadly corresponds to the historical record. As a descriptive summary of world history it is

very powerful. But as a theoretical whole it is somewhat puzzling, because one gets a sense from Gellner that both these processes – functional integration and reaction to exclusion- are at the heart of the matter (Hearn, 2006, p. 99).

Hearn argues that at the root of this contradiction lies the stadial view of history, “imagined as a series of plateaux connected by steep transitional periods” (*ibid*, p.106), typical in modernist accounts of the nation. Such a view, partly driven by our cognitive need for simplification, does not fit well with the idea of a rapidly changing world according to Hearn. For Hearn, modernity is characterized not by stability but by instability “in the form of a series of accelerating directional trend, driven especially by capitalism” (*ibid*, p.115). He proposes to rethink the whole idea of uneven development “recognizing it as a more general and on-going aspect of life under capitalism, rather than as a threshold to a stable modern State” (*ibid*, p. 115).

One could argue that the paradox in Gellner’s notion of uneven development is accentuated by the narrow functionalist model proposed, because although industrialisation in Megalomania may indirectly trigger a nationalist reaction in peasant Ruritania, this phenomenon can no longer be explained in terms of the functional needs of modern industrial societies, precisely what Gellner has been telling us all along. This takes us to the second criticism we may raise against Gellner. In view of the alternative explanations provided by fellow modernists, one may accuse Gellner of excessive reductionism and oversimplification in explaining the rise of nations as the sole result of industrialisation. To be fair, reductionism is an accusation we could raise against practically all modernist -and non-modernist- accounts. We should also point out that Gellner does acknowledge the possibility of other factors having an influence in the rise and spread of nationalism, such as the impact of the Protestant Reformation had in helping to bring about nationalism (Gellner,

1983). Yet, Gellner does not integrate these other factors into his theory, which remains narrowly focused on functional aspects associated to the process of industrialisation. Thus, Gellner has been criticized for underestimating the role of the State in nation-building (O'Leary, 1998), while various authors have sought to redress the balance by explaining the role the State has played in shaping modern societies. For instance, Bendix (1978) emphasises the transformation of political authority from the patrimonial rule of the kings to the bureaucratic rule of States, a process he situates at the centre of modernisation. Whereas in the *Ancien Régime* the king's authority derived from divine sanction and the precedent of tradition, in the modern State legitimacy is defined in terms of popular consent. Breuilly (1996) has also sought to emphasize the role of the State in his conception of modernisation by explaining the nature of the modern State in terms of a shift from a corporate to a functional division of labour. He argues that in modern societies the economic, political and cultural needs of individuals are no longer met through single corporate organisations such as guilds, peasant communities or religious orders. Instead, these needs are met by separate, function-specific institutions like trade unions, political parties, schools or universities, increasingly placed under the realm of an expanded State. National identity, according to Breuilly, replaced corporate ties acting as a bond between individuals in a changing society. Similarly, Giddens has stressed the role played by an increasingly powerful State in the spread of nationalism as a worldview and in the transformation of pre-national State models:

Nationalism is the cultural sensibility of sovereignty, the concomitant of the co-ordination of administrative power within the bounded Nation-State. With the coming of the Nation-State, States have an administrative and territorially ordered unity which they did not possess before. This unity cannot remain purely administrative however, because the very co-ordination of activities involved presumes elements of cultural homogeneity. The extension of communication cannot occur without the 'conceptual' involvement of the whole community as a knowledgeable citizenry. A nation State is a 'conceptual community' in a way in which traditional States were not (Giddens, 1987, p. 219).

Tilly (1975) provides an interesting coda to these theories. He emphasises the role of an expanding State as one of the pillars of modernity by linking the origins of modern Nation-State to the increasing economic and military competition among Western European States that occurred between 1500 and 1700. He argues that as a result of this competition, States tried to extract more resources from their subjects in order to fund their military expansion. The peasantry and the cities resisted such policies while the competing States sought to weaken their position and increase their resources through the development of commercial agriculture, trade and the manufacturing industry. In Spain's case, we can find evidence in the political evolution of Imperial Spain in line with Tilly's theory, especially during the reign of Phillip IV. Elliott (1984; 1986; 1990) and Kamen (2003) have offered interesting insight on the fragmented nature of a State as geographically spread and constitutionally diversified as the Spanish Monarchy. Analysing Elliott's account of the Catalan Revolt against Phillip IV, one may consider the attempts by Olivares's administration to homogenise what in practice was a conglomerate of kingdoms and establish a more centralised model inspired in the laws and customs of Castile. This constitutes an important milestone in the consolidation of a Spanish national identity.

Other authors have complemented Gellner's generalizations on modernisation by emphasizing the role played by enlarged systems of communication in the development of mass national cultures. According to Deutsch (1996) community and culture are part of the same phenomenon. A community is formed by individuals who have learnt how to work together by sharing the ability to communicate effectively. Deutsch links his ideas on communication with the processes of social mobilization associated with the expansion of markets, industries and cities as well as with mass literacy. One advantage this model offers

is that it outlines a structural and quantitative approach to the study of nation-building.

A third type of criticism raised against Gellner is derived from the fact that industrialisation may have come too late to have been the main and only cause of nationalism (Mann, 1992) and that there is ample evidence showing that early industrialization was compatible with high illiteracy levels among the masses (Guibernau, 1996). This does not invalidate the idea of industrialisation having a decisive influence on the spread of nationalism and the consolidation of the Nation-State system. Yet, it offers additional proof against a narrow functionalist theory like Gellner's and reinforces the need to explain nationalism not only as the result of a complex cluster of factors but also in relation to concrete empirical evidence extracted from historical records. In this respect, Bell (2001) argues that the French countryside had not undergone widespread industrialisation in the late 18th century and that most *patois-speaking* peasants were still poor and illiterate at the time. So, the changes in worldviews already present in the public discourse at the time need to be explained by factors other than those advocated by Gellner.

In rejecting Kedourie's intellectualist explanation of the origins of the nation, Gellner questions the role played by nationalist ideologues in nation-building placing all the emphasis on top-down complex macro-processes like industrialization. Nationalism thus becomes a form of social identity that is functional for life under the novel conditions derived from industrialisation, where specific forms of nationalist discourse are denied any lasting influence in the shaping of events:

[Nationalist] thinkers did not really make much difference. If one of them had fallen, others would have stepped into his place [...] No one was indispensable. The quality of nationalist thought would hardly have been affected much by such substitutions [...] Their precise doctrines are hardly worth analysing. We seem to be in the

presence of a phenomenon that springs directly and inevitably from basic changes in our shared social condition, from changes in the overall relation between society, culture and polity. The precise appearance and local form of this phenomenon no doubt depends a very great deal on local circumstances which deserve study; but I doubt whether the nuances of nationalist doctrine played much part in modifying those circumstances (Gellner 1983, p. 124).

This position has been criticized by Hobsbawm (1990) among others for being excessively teleological and deterministic. For Gellner, nationalism appears to be the inevitable consequence of the socio-cultural forces unleashed by industrialisation, to the point that he underestimates the role played by the State and by capitalist elites in the social construction of a nationalist worldview through discourse. One final criticism we may raise against Gellner without abandoning the modernist paradigm derives from the fact that he seems concerned only with explaining the origins and spread of nationalism in general terms and that he has little to say about the specific manifestations of this phenomenon:

[...] if nationalism is a general phenomenon, covering a whole variety of nations, quite obviously it cannot be explained by the reasons operating internally within each national movement: These reasons must be specifically related to each nation and its culture; they cannot apply generally, otherwise there could hardly be *rival* nationalisms. So the general explanation cannot be internal to the cultures concerned: It must stand outside them and explain why, in general, cultures have become a political principle, a principle of the delimitation of political units (Gellner 1997, p. 95).

One may turn this argument around and argue that precisely because there are indeed rival nationalisms one cannot simply obviate those factors specifically related to each nation and culture. One needs to explain why multiple and often opposing forms of national identity have risen in Spain. An adequate balance between the general and the specific appears necessary.

Eric Hobsbawm

Hobsbawm coincides with Gellner in many things. Both see nations as a result of the complex transformation called modernisation. But while Gellner places the emphasis on industrialisation and downplays the role of nationalist narratives in nation-building, Hobsbawm's emphasis is on capitalism. Hobsbawm also attaches greater importance to national identity, considered some sort of invention, an ideological illusion engineered by the State and by those elites benefiting from the capitalist system. Hobsbawm advocates a theoretical model that not only takes into account some of the abstract structural changes identified by Gellner but also the existence of a complex discursive process leading to the social construction of a nationalist worldview. This process, according to Hobsbawm, operates both from the bottom-up – out of raw materials like language, religion and descent – as well as from the top-down, by the discursive practices of States, political and economic elites seeking to homogenise their subject populations in order to improve governance and favour capitalist development. A key concept identified by Hobsbawm in relation to this top-down process is that of “the invention of tradition”, which he defines as follows:

A set of practices, normally governed by overtly or tacitly accepted rules and of a ritual or symbolic nature, which seeks to inculcate certain values and norms of behaviour by repetition, which automatically implies continuity with the past (Hobsbawm, 1983 p. 1).

Hobsbawm distinguishes three overlapping kinds of invented traditions: “(i) those establishing or symbolizing social cohesion or the membership of groups, real or artificial communities, (ii) those establishing or legitimizing institutions, status or relations of authority and (iii) those whose main purpose was socialization, the inculcation of beliefs, value systems and conventions of behaviour” (*ibid*, p. 9). The difference between invented traditions, customs and routines is that the former have a ritual and symbolic function as well

as an ideological purpose: to manipulate the masses in order to fabricate national cultures and encourage national loyalties:

And just because so much of what subjectively makes up the modern 'nation' consists of such constructs and is associated with appropriate and, in general, fairly recent symbols or suitably tailored discourse (such as 'national history'), the national phenomenon cannot be adequately investigated without careful attention to the 'invention of tradition' (*ibid*, p. 14).

On account of his Marxist inclinations, Hobsbawm is quick to point the finger at the bourgeois State and the capitalist elites as key agents behind the creation and spread of invented traditions. Yet, while explaining such practices in terms of the ideological manipulation they represent, Hobsbawm intuitively acknowledges the fact that the most successful examples of invented traditions are precisely those which exploit practices which meet a felt -albeit not necessarily a clearly understood- need among particular bodies of people. Unfortunately, he does not discuss the extent to which the general acceptance of a new construct or a new discursive practice may depend on contextual factors such as a perceived conceptual vacuum or the existence of a previous discursive foundation on which new constructs and practices can take root. These are issues which other authors have considered in their theories (Anderson, 1991; Bell, 2001). All in all, one is left with the impression that while constituting a valid approach in the study of nationalism invented traditions pose some shortcomings. First, one cannot easily differentiate between invented traditions and other discursive practices aimed at fabricating national identity. Second, it may be useful to look at such discursive practices as links in a long chain of previous historical constructs rather than as isolated practices, as this may throw some light on whether some constructs can achieve a greater degree of recognition than others. Nevertheless, Hobsbawm's model has the advantage of combining complex structural processes such as capitalist expansion with less abstract discursive practices susceptible to grounding our

analysis on a more solid and empirically verifiable level.

Let us conclude by highlighting the strengths and weaknesses of the modernist theories analysed so far before introducing the modernist social-constructionist account. Modernism constitutes a solid theoretical body supported at times by compelling empirical evidence in spite of the deficiencies in the individual accounts and the contradictions between them. These contradictions prove that the origins of nations and nationalism represent an extremely complex phenomenon with multiple layers and complex links of causes and effects which prove difficult to disentangle: The ideology derived from the Enlightenment (Kedourie, Bell); the social changes derived from industrialisation (Gellner) and/or capitalism (Hobsbawm); the growing importance of social communication (Deutsch); the spread of printing and literacy (Anderson); the rise of the bureaucratic State (Bendix, Breuilly, Giddens); the social changes brought by Protestantism (Anderson) and the gradual withdrawal of God from human affairs (Bell); Habermas's idea of an emerging bourgeois public sphere (Bell) and so on. All this reveals the lack of a unified totalising theory within the modernist paradigm, something which should be taken as a warning in our search for a plausible explanation of the origins of nations and nationalism. One only has to consider Greenfeld's explanation of the origins of nationalism to see the extent of this problem (Greenfeld 1992; 2001). She turns much of Gellner and Hobsbawm's argumentation upside down by proposing that instead of having material and economic processes driving ideological ones, it was the nation - understood as a novel ideological construct originated in 16th century England- that drove the modern quest for endless material growth and gave rise to the spirit of capitalism.

A second problem with modernist theories is the tension between those accounts which

explain the origins of the nation in a top-down fashion placing the emphasis on complex structural processes and those theories which concentrate on bottom-up evidence extracted from nationalist narratives. The former often lead to teleological and deterministic analyses which overlook the differences between concurrent nation-building processes whereas the latter place excessive emphasis on the particular and the anecdotal. A theoretical model that combines the analysis of higher-order structural factors with the study of the multiple and often competing nationalist discourses existing in Spain is not only more congruent in empirical terms, but also appropriate to our research objectives.

A final criticism against modernist theories is that they often reject the idea of historical evolution having played a significant role in the constitution of modern Nation-States. This in principle may sound counterintuitive to many. For if nations are just modern inventions like the steam engine, as modernists claim, why is it so difficult to establish exactly when, how and why nations were actually invented? This is at the root of the ethnosymbolist critique to Modernism as we will see later on.

1.5. Social constructionism

Social constructionism shares the central postulates of Modernism, namely the belief that nations are recent human creations as well as the product of modernisation. This fact, as well as certain disdain towards post-modern subjectivism, has led some authors to consider social-constructionist theories an extension of the modernist paradigm (Smith, 2001). Others have argued that post-classical approaches to nationalism based on social constructionism merit a separate categorization on the grounds that many of these authors question some of the fundamental methodological and epistemological tenets postulated by classical social

theory, including Modernism (Day & Thompson, 2004). The concept of ‘social constructionism’ was first suggested by Berger and Luckmann (1967) and is based on the premise that “all knowledge, and therefore all meaningful reality as such, is contingent upon human practices, being constructed in and out of interaction between human beings and their world, and developed and transmitted within an essentially social context” (Crotty, 1998, p. 42). One difference between social-constructionist approaches and most modernist theories is a renewed emphasis on the centrality of social agency in nation-building at the expense of the more abstract structural processes outside human control typical of some grand modernist narratives. Thus, nations and nationalism are understood as “something people create together rather than as phenomena over which they have no control” (Day & Thompson, 2004, p. 16).

This mode of theorizing has led to greater emphasis on the role played by discourse in nation-building and to a focus on different narratives of national identities which are jointly constructed by the various stakeholders during intricate processes of negotiation (Wodak et al, 1999). A positive outcome of this bottom-up discursive approach to the study of the nation and nationalism has been its strong empirical value, although the existence of contested national narratives might sometimes give the impression of fragmentation and certain theoretical chaos. In some extreme cases however the social constructionist approach has led to subjectivism, since for some authors the nation and nationalism are no longer perceived as objective social realities but as discursive formations belonging to the realms of subjective consciousness and perception (Calhoun, 1997). Far from being considered real, the nation is seen as something contingent upon social practices, discourses and representations, “an illusory or spurious community, an ideological smokescreen” (Brubaker,

1996, p. 15). For other authors, nations become like narrative texts or cultural artefacts subject to continual renegotiation and reformulation which can be deconstructed at will or considered obsolete in a global post-modern world (Hall, 1996).

Given the different degrees of subjectivism found among social constructionist theories of the nation, one can propose a weak versus a strong version of this theoretical paradigm (Holstein & Miller, 1993). Following Miller (1995) I would reject any strong reading of social constructionism on the ground that even though nations can be partly understood as contingent discursive constructs subject to continual processes of negotiation and reflection, to a large extent, they can also be treated as substantive entities and sociological realities, resulting from the continuous reproduction of social practices according to certain patterns. I will now review the work of modernist authors influenced by weaker versions of social constructionism and illustrate how these ideas can prove useful in designing a methodology for researching the nation and nationalism.

Benedict Anderson

Several theories have explained the modern origin of nations in connection to new ways of understanding the world. Benedict Anderson's *"Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism"* constitutes one of the most influential and thought-provoking accounts to date. Anderson's point of departure is that in the face of their assumed "given-ness" and the deep emotional attachments they arouse, nations and nationalism cannot be adequately explained in terms of ideology. Instead, Anderson proposes to categorize them, along with kinship and religion, as "cultural artefacts of a particular kind" (1991, p. 4).

Nations constitute imagined political communities- imagined as both inherently limited and sovereign. They are imagined because “the members of even the smallest nation will never know most of their fellow-members, meet them, or even hear of them, yet in the minds of each lives an image of their communion (Ibid. p.6).

Having established a working definition of nations, Anderson analyses how they have come into being and how the construct has evolved. In a Foucaultian fashion, he argues that nationalism has to be “understood by aligning it, not with self-consciously held political ideologies, but with the large cultural systems that preceded it, out of which – as well as against which- it came into being”, namely the religious community and the dynastic realm (*ibid.* p. 12). It is the gradual decline of these two cultural systems, which began in the 17th century, what gave way to a conceptual vacuum to be filled with the cultural artifact called ‘nation’. New worldviews based on the idea of nations and nationalism begin to emerge in conjunction with the gradual erosion of a supranational Christian identity – a religiously imagined community, in Anderson’s terms- and with the progressive decline of the absolutist dynastic regimes. For Anderson, this process does not entail the supersession of religion by nationalism. Rather, it can be better explained in terms of a realignment of concepts and categories that echo Foucault’s notions of discursive formations and shifts in the orders of discourse (Foucault, 1972).

Anderson explains the decline of the imagined religious communities and the crisis of the dynastic realm in terms of “the dusk of religious modes of thought” as well as by the decline of a legitimate and divinely ordained hierarchical system that would lead to the transformation of absolute monarchies into national monarchies, a prelude to the collapse of the dynastic realm and the emergence of the concept of national sovereignty. Among the factors behind this decline he includes the growing cultural relativism caused by the effects

of the great explorations and voyages of discovery, which proved to the European people that alternative ways of life were possible. He also mentions the crisis of a supranational Christian identity triggered by the differences between Catholics and Protestants, the decline of Latin and the spread of the vernacular tongues associated with the rise of printing capitalism. Another key factor identified by Anderson has to do with a shift in how humans perceive time, which eventually made it possible to imagine the nation. He argues that the medieval Christian conception based on the idea of “simultaneity-along time” was replaced by the modern idea of a “homogeneous, empty time”. In the old notion of time, past and future events could not be linked either temporally or causally because they were simply explained in terms of God’s Will. Events were not understood in chronological terms because the past prefigured the future and the future fulfilled what was announced and promised in the past. Accordingly, Anderson argues, the notion of ‘meanwhile’ could not be of real significance. In contrast, in the modern notion of time, simultaneity is explained not in terms of prefiguring and fulfillment but by temporal coincidence, measured by clock and calendar. Now, according to Anderson, the idea of “a sociological organism moving calendrically through homogeneous empty time”, the idea of a nation “conceived as a solid community moving steadily down (or up) history” becomes imaginable:

An American will never meet, or even know the names of more than a handful of his 240,000-odd fellow-Americans. He has no idea of what they are up to at any one time. But he has complete confidence in their steady, anonymous, simultaneous activity (Anderson 1983, p. 26).

Daniel Bell

Bell (2001) fleshes out Anderson’s thesis -that of national consciousness emerging amid the decline of imagined religious communities and the crisis of the dynastic realm- in his account on the rise of nationalism in 18th century France. According to Bell, the idea of the

nation as a political construct was made possible by a combination of religious, philosophical, political and material changes that together gave way to a fundamental shift in how educated men and women saw the world around them. On the one hand, Bell emphasises the decreasing influence of religion in society in terms of what Gauchet (1997) called “the disenchantment of the world”:

Gauchet argues that the long-term historical ‘trajectory’ of Christianity has consisted of a steady intensification of the perceived separation between the human and the divine. By the end of the seventeenth century (‘the point... where specifically Christian history comes to a halt’), at least for the most advanced Christian thinkers, God has become an absolute, wholly alien Other, entirely apart and withdrawn from the human world (Bell 2001, pp. 27-28).

But by the end point of Christian evolution ... the world had become a place which could be apprehended on its own terms and also, crucially, transformed on human terms, allowing mankind to develop new forms of knowledge, a new relationship with nature and –especially- a new politics. ‘God’s difference’, Gauchet writes, ‘leaves the human community completely to itself’, with the result that ultimately, all power now has to derive legitimacy from that community. The familiar modern distinction between the ‘religious’ and the ‘secular’ was being born (*ibid*, p. 28).

Bell also explains how “God’s withdrawal from the world” and the gradual interiorization of religious belief - that is, the relegation of religion to the private consciences of individual believers- made it possible for the French to perceive the world around them in novel terms. In addition to religious and philosophical changes, he points at the transformation of the material world: “How the progress of transport and communication, of administrative and commercial practices, and the dissemination of printed matter” may have indirectly led to “new conceptual means of discerning and ordering the world” (*ibid*, p. 33). He pays particular attention to “the rise of the bourgeois public sphere”, theorised by Habermas (1989), arguing that the development of this new form of communication and association independent from the traditional circuits of power allowed private individuals to subject all forms of authority to critical reason.

Bell maps out all these conceptual changes along the public discourse of the epoch, providing compelling empirical evidence in support of his thesis. His point of departure is the emergence of relatively new concepts such as “*société*”, “*civilization*”, “*patrie*”, “*nation*” and “*public*”, which allowed people to “imagine an arena of harmonious human coexistence whose principles did not ultimately derive from the dictates of an (increasingly absent) God” (*ibid*, p. 36). He shows that these new concepts were not only present among the *philosophes* and the early opponents of Absolutism, but that they also featured prominently in the patriotic discourse articulated by the old regime in the contexts of a constitutional crisis and the Seven Years War against England. In essence, Bell’s study reveals the links between complex structural changes operating at a macro-level and concrete textual evidence from 18th century public discourse. In doing so, he traces the evolution of the monarchical form of government in 17th and 18th century France from a strictly patrimonialistic conception of power where the king acts as a semi-feudal lord in a divinely ordained system to a proto-national monarchy with sovereignty emanating from below in a world ordained according to the laws of nature. Having removed God from earthly affairs, it became possible for the people in France to see the nation rather than the king as the only source of sovereignty. Once Pandora’s Box was open, the monarchy had two options left: reinvent itself or die. Bell provides compelling evidence of the monarchy attempting to reposition itself by means of some kind of proto-nationalist discourse. The execution of citizen Louis Capet in the guillotine on 21 January 1793 in front of a cheering crowd reveals the failure of the monarchy’s attempt.

José Ramón Recalde

Despite an unequivocally modernist influence and a title with clear social-constructionist underpinnings, Recalde's study, "*La construcción de las naciones*" (1982), is not easy to classify according to the theories discussed so far. The solid and well-articulated account presented in this book incorporates many insights from different paradigms while addressing some of the contradictions derived from them. Recalde first defines nations as human creations while emphasizing their sociological reality. He argues that these are real communities and that their characterization as nations is basically a nationalist decision. But nationalism does not create nations *ex nihilo*. Rather, it shapes pre-existing communities formed on a territorial and cultural basis into nations. Sometimes the national substratum is a cultural group. Other times it may be a community of citizens of a State where several cultures co-exist. Recalde distinguishes several stages in the nation-building process. The first of these stages is the development of "a national mode of organization", understood as a long historical process of social transformation and modernisation initiated before the emergence of the Nation-State. The national mode of organization constitutes the structural basis upon which nationalist ideologies operate to construct the nation. However, in order to accommodate the fact of "uneven development" discussed by Gellner, Recalde proposes two paths in the construction of the nation. One is a slow process of transformation where the nationalist ideology operates on the basis of a national mode of organization previously constituted. This can be found in Europe's old Nation-States like France, England or Spain. Another one is a rapid process typical of decolonized territories where the constitution of the national mode of organization and the influence of nationalism usually co-exist.

Recalde uses Marxist and functionalist analyses to illustrate the transformation of traditional societies in Medieval Europe. The former are more Eurocentric and place stronger emphasis

on economic aspects whereas the latter pay equal attention to political and cultural aspects. Both kinds of analyses explain the emergence of the national mode of organization as the result of the transformation of the old feudal order alongside two converging processes: a longitudinal one centred on socio-economic aspects and a transversal process where the changes in economic structures apply to other social relations. At an early stage this results in the emergence of a mercantile economy, growing urbanization, the growth of transportation and communications, the development of State armies as well as an increasing bureaucratization of the State apparatus whose political realisation was the Absolutist State. Other factors taken into account are technological developments, the spread of literacy, linguistic standardization and growing secularization. At the end of this modernisation process, with the transformation of mercantilism into industrial capitalism, we see the emergence of the national mode of organization, which constituted the structural basis upon which nationalist movements operate in designing and communicating their specific nation-building projects. The second stage in the nation-building process according to Recalde is the appearance of nationalism, defined as “*una práctica de objetivos políticos y de contenido ideológico, que pretende establecer formas de autonomía para los miembros de una colectividad que titula <nación>*”¹²(*ibid*, p.39). While acknowledging that nations are the product of nationalist mobilization, Recalde considers that nationalism does not entirely create nations. Rather, nationalism shapes into nations communities already present in the national mode of organization.

Recalde distinguishes two further phases in the construction of national communities. One is the formulation of a nationalist ideology by elites where a community is selected according

¹² A practice of political objectives and ideological content whose aim is to establish forms of autonomy for the members of a community defined as a <nation>

to specified criteria –language, race, culture, citizenship- and political goals are formulated. This is more visible in the case of rapid processes of nation-building where a prior political foundation did not fully exist. The second phase consists in the transmission and diffusion of the nationalist message and the subsequent nationalization of the masses in terms of identification and participation, accompanied by the effective organization of the society in national terms: politically, administratively etc.

In conclusion, Recalde offers a well-articulated and coherent account of the origins and formation of nations which captures the complexity of the nation-building process adequately and proves insightful in proposing a valid methodology for the study of nations and nationalism. His suggestion that nationalist action operates on the basis of a mode of national organization previously constituted proves very useful in harmonizing the perennialist idea of the nation as the product of historical evolution with the modernist conception of the nation as a recent creation. At the same time, this theory provides some insight on how better to articulate the distinction between macro structural processes of modernisation and micro aspects related to specific nationalist discourses, something rare in many of the modernist accounts discussed so far.

Michael Billig

Billig (1995) has studied the daily reproduction of the nation through discourse. In analysing how national communities come to be imagined, he argues that identity understood in social-psychological terms alone cannot adequately explain how national communities are actually constructed: to call nationalism an identity or tie offers little explanation because it does not specify how identity operates and how it is reproduced. Billig proposes instead to

conceptualize national identities as forms of social life constructed and reproduced through discourse. These are essentially products of the age of the modern State which have brought an ideological transformation of common sense. While Billig recognizes the existence of highly visible discourses which consciously exalt the nation during national celebrations and patriotic ceremonies of remembrance, his focus is on subtler forms of flagging the nation. He takes Renan's concept of the daily plebiscite into a new dimension by arguing that nations are reproduced daily in banally mundane ways through multiple forms of semiosis: for instance in the flags presiding official buildings, in bank notes and coins or in newspapers articles and TV programmes where the deixis of homeland is embedded in their narrative, such as in the maps of weather reports, in the construction of 'us' versus 'them' in sports news which take for granted the existence of our nations. As the result of this routine unquestioned reminder, Billig argues that nationhood is naturalized through *habitus* (Bourdieu, 1977; 1990), making people forget that their nations are not natural givens, *topoi* beyond argument, but historical constructs created by people. Billig's exploration of how banal nationalism contributes to the subtle daily reproduction of the nation through discourse brings to centre stage the importance of the Gramscian notion of hegemony in the discursive construction of established nations (Gramsci, 1971), while providing additional justification for a theoretical model which situates the notion of discourse at the centre of the nation-building process. At the same time, it provides compelling evidence in support of those who argue that despite the visible influence of globalization in transforming people's worldviews, one should not rush into the conclusion that nationalism may be disappearing from our lives any time soon.

1.6. Ethnosymbolism

Anthony D. Smith

This theoretical paradigm is situated in between Perennialism and Modernism. Yet, if one looks at the trajectory of Smith, its chief advocate, it becomes clear that Ethnosymbolism constitutes a reaction to some of the core tenets of modernist thought by re-formulating an old perennialist argument, namely the importance of history in explaining the origin of nations. Ethnosymbolists concede that nationalism is a modern phenomenon and that to a large extent Nation-States are the product of modernity. Yet, they stress that nations cannot be entirely explained as something created *ex nihilo* in modern times, that many nations clearly have pre-modern antecedents and that is necessary to place the phenomenon of nations and nationalism within a wider historical perspective. In doing so, ethnosymbolists acknowledge that many of the features of modern nations, like a mass public culture and education system, a unified economy and a developed State guaranteeing common rights and duties to all citizens are essentially modern. However, they stress that these elements alone cannot adequately explain what nations are. We also need to consider those subjective elements related to collective cultural identity and sentiment often predating modern times. Among such elements they emphasize the importance of ancestral myths, symbols and memories as the main building blocks of ethnic identity. Only if we take into account such elements- they argue- can we explain the strong allegiance people demonstrate towards their country and the emotional attachments that nations evoke, as well as the fact that in legitimating their nation people often refer to its “ancestral past”. Chief among these symbolic elements is the “mythomoteur”, or constitutive political myth of the ethnic polity.

In suggesting that many modern nations are partly shaped by pre-modern ethnic sentiments

and structures, ethnosymbolists propose the concept of *ethnie* as an earlier social category having several things in common with nations, such as myths of common ancestry, shared historical memories, some elements of shared culture, a link with a homeland and a measure of solidarity among its members (Smith 1986; 2000; 2004). They also stress that those generic features of *ethnies* are largely subjective, although their social reproduction may render some degree of objectivity:

It is of course a moot point how far this individuality is a purely subjective phenomenon, how far, that is, we are dealing with the *sense* of common ethnicity rather than any 'objective' ethnic reality. For the purposes of the analysis that follows, such 'reality' as we shall impute to *ethnie* is essentially social and cultural: the generic features of *ethnie* are derived less from 'objective' indicators like fertility, literacy or urbanization rates [...] than from the meanings conferred by a number of men and women over some generations on certain cultural, spatial and temporal properties of their interaction and shared experiences (Smith, 1986 p. 22).

Following Frederik Barth, Armstrong argued that distinctive clusters of these symbolic components mark out and guard the boundaries of *ethnies*. Such symbolic clusters are both subjective, in their reference to individual perceptions and beliefs, and objective because their patterning produces a structure of social relations and cultural institutions that persist across the generations, independent of any individual beliefs and perceptions (Smith, 2000 p. 66).

Likewise, the constitutive elements of these myth-symbol complexes are never static, as they are constantly being reproduced and reinterpreted. Yet, according to Smith, such reproduction and reinterpretation is constrained by the internal dynamics of such processes:

[...] this 'nation-building activity operates within a definite tradition; it is not made over entirely anew by each generation, but inherits the mythologies and symbolisms of previous generations. A new generation may come to reject the interpretation of its predecessor, and question its values, myths and symbols, forsaking its holy sites for new ones and replacing its golden ages and heroes by others; but all this questioning and replacement is carried on within definite emotional and intellectual confines, which constitute far more powerful and durable barriers to the outside than any physical boundaries (Smith 1986, p. 206-207).

In spite of the alleged connections between *ethnies* and nations, ethnosymbolists do not see this relationship simply as an evolutionary process, given the discontinuity and change

between pre-modern ethnic communities and modern Nation-States (Smith, 1996; Hutchinson, 1994). They do not suggest there is a one-to one relationship between each modern nation and 'its' antecedent ethnies for a number of reasons: On the one hand, there is evidence of contemporary nations having incorporated elements from various ethnies over a long period of time, as in the cases of England, France or Spain. On the other hand, most Nation-States tend to be multi-ethnic (Smith, 1986; 2000). Rather, the relationship between nations and ethnies is far more nebulous and complex: after the first nations were built by State elites on ethnic foundations, the ethnic model became increasingly popular (Smith, 2004).

One may be inclined to infer from the above discussion that Ethnosymbolism has clear social-constructionist underpinnings. Given its emphasis on the mythical and symbolic aspects of ethnicity and the assumption that ethnies or nations are not 'objective realities' -brute facts in Searle's terms- but 'socio-cultural realities', one might expect an explanation of the origins of such 'realities' based on discursive practices that give shape to a particular worldview shared and reproduced by ethnic or national groups along the lines expressed by Billig among others. On the contrary, Smith attacks social-constructionism arguing that theories such as Hobsbawm's, that tend to explain the nation as a social construct fabricated by elites and a text to be narrated (or deconstructed), are incompatible with the sociological reality of nations and nationalism, an idea he adopts from his master-and-antagonist Ernest Gellner (Smith, 1996; 2000). Such views can be certainly expected in Gellner's case, given his functionalist inclinations, his neglect of nationalist discourse and his preference for a broad explanatory model with deterministic views. In Smith's case it all seems rather contradictory. As we have seen, he insists that the ancestral myths, symbols and shared

memories that constitute essential features of ethnies and nations are largely subjective and dynamic socio-cultural 'realities'. If that is the case, one may argue that the most plausible explanation for the creation and evolution of such myths, symbols and memories is through discourse. Yet, most Ethnosymbolists do not seem interested in pursuing that direction of inquiry. For them, such subjective elements associated with the nation seem something taken-for-granted and so the creation and reproduction of these myth-symbol complexes remain largely unexplained, as if myths, symbols and memories were some sort of pre-established 'perennialist dogma'.

Conversi's study of Catalan and Basque ethno-nationalisms is a case in point when it comes to illustrating the shortcomings of Ethnosymbolism (Conversi, 1997). While being insightful in his analysis of the differences between Basque and Catalan identities and in showing how these identities have evolved over time, one often gets the impression that Conversi accommodates facts according to an ethnicist agenda. First, in his analysis of Catalan and Basque nationalist mobilisation, the question of Spanish national identity is subdued, if not overtly ignored when discussing the origins and spread of nationalism in Catalonia and the Basque Country. This is quite remarkable considering that many people in those territories acknowledge a dual identity -Spanish and Catalan or Basque- (Linz et al, 1986; Pérez-Díaz, 1996; Moreno, 2001; Magone, 2004; Balfour & Quiroga, 2007). Also, Conversi has considerable difficulty in defining the nation, arguing that "one cannot define something whose purpose is to define," while such ontological problems seem to go unnoticed in the case of ethnic groups:

In their reach for some form of self-determination, nationalists use the instrument of the 'nation' as an ideological vehicle. It is exactly the latter's situational, transitory and instrumental value which makes it so difficult to define. The nation cannot be defined because its purpose is to define. It is a conceptual tool and a boundary

perception through which an ethnic group (sic) wishing to be represented in a State attempts to establish and define its own space of action. Central to this definition is the demarcation of a territory through an ideal reference to a historical past” (Conversi 1997, p. 7).

The Basques have long been identified as a separate people by foreign travellers, classical writers and local scholars. Prehistoric evidences of what were probably the ancestors of today’s Basques are plentiful in several caves and archaeological sites found in the region (Collins 1986: 16-30). Roman historians and Greek geographers, such as Strabo, recorded their existence as early as 7CE with the name of ‘Vasconians’. The Romans never succeeded in subduing them or absorbing their culture, nor did the Visigoths, the Muslims, the Franks or the Normans (sic) (*ibid*, p. 44).

Descriptions like the above about the Basques reveal the extent to which ethnic arguments are left largely unexplained in this kind of research, as one can easily produce similar generalizations about alternative constructs like the Spaniards supported by different historical narratives. Even worse, such generalizations are often made in an amateurish fashion resulting in an oversimplification that at times may border on gross distortion of historical fact. For instance, the “explicit link” between ancient Vasconians and modern Basques does not agree with the fact that the *gens Vasconum* occupied what nowadays we know as Navarre plus some areas in west Aragon and north-east Rioja, while the current Basque territory was inhabited by the *Autrigones*, *Caristii* and *Vardulii* (Sánchez Albornoz, 1973; Vaca de Osma, 1995). Another example of historical distortion in the pursuit of an ethnic agenda can be seen when Conversi downplays the importance of the Carlist movement in the whole of Spain arguing that “at their height, the Carlist wars were almost exclusively fought on Basque territory” (Conversi, 1997, p. 46): while one needs to acknowledge clear ideological links between Carlism and Basque nationalism as formulated by Arana, one cannot interpret a dynastic conflict and a series of civil wars confronting absolutism and liberalism in ethnic terms (González Antón, 2007).

In conclusion, Ethnosymbolism represents a positive reaction to some perceived excesses of Modernism in that it acknowledges the fact that nations are largely modern creations and yet some of the raw materials employed in their conceptualization are not necessarily modern. This is something not only intuitively plausible but also empirically objective, given the historical evidence presented by many theorists. Another important contribution of Ethnosymbolism is the importance attached to myths, symbols and shared memories in shaping national identities together with the recognition that these are largely subjective as well as dynamic cultural realities. However, in dismissing Social Constructionism as post-modern sophistry, Ethnosymbolism stops short of explaining how the actual process of nation-building operates. It seems to me that the ‘sociological reality of nations and nationalism’ is not necessarily incompatible with a social-constructionist model centred on the idea of the nation as a discursive construct. Smith seems to be equating Social Constructionism, understood in fairly radical terms, with a post-modern viewpoint that stresses the feebleness of our modern world as a result of the idea that everything can be questioned -and deconstructed- provided that our objections stand the test of reason. Smith mounts his criticism of Social Constructionism by arguing that Hobsbawm’s prediction of the death of nationalism and nations has come to nought. He also attacks Hobsbawm’s idea of the nation being the product of elite manipulation and on the basis of these arguments he concludes that the idea of nations being socio-discursive constructs is untenable. Admittedly, Hobsbawm may have underestimated the resilience of the nation when predicting that nations will be consumed in the fire of modernity once nationalist discourse is deconstructed, as if such deconstruction merely rested on the concerted effort of post-modern intellectuals or globalised capitalist elites. It is true that identity discourses have become more hybrid and that national identities have lost ‘symbolic capital’ in the era of globalization, thanks to the

growth and consolidation of transnational political and economic superstructures, to the rapid spread of Internet virtual communities, to education systems more sensitive towards global concerns rather than national ones or to the spread of English as a global language, among other factors (Pujolar, 2007; Muehlmann & Duchêne, 2007). Yet, to proclaim the demise of the Nation-State may be premature at this stage, given that nationalism continues to play an important role nowadays (Hutchinson, 1994; Day & Thompson, 2004) and considering that there are other options at hand, for instance a discursive realignment of nationalism leading to a transformation of the concept of Nation-State into something more congenial with the processes of globalization (Özirimli, 2005) or the increasing banalisation of the national discourse (Billig, 1995).

Elite manipulation and the role States play in ‘educating’ their citizens are important factors in explaining any discursive shift. Such processes have been widely documented and analysed, but as Hobsbawm himself admits these are not all-powerful mechanisms because “the most successful examples of manipulation are those which exploit practices which clearly met a felt- not necessarily a clearly understood- need among particular bodies of people” (Hobsbawm 1983, p. 307). As such nations can be understood as historically evolving artefacts constructed discursively across generations on the basis of old myths, symbols, memories, invented traditions as well as a great number of socially reproduced practices associated with our everyday life, from sports events to weather reports or school curricula, to name a few.

In treating discursive constructs as something ethereal, ‘not quite real’ in sociological terms, critics of social constructionism overlook the fact that language is inextricably woven into

the fabric of life: ever since the first sparks of reason began to enlighten the human mind and the faculty of language emerged, one can say that the world of ‘brute facts’, language and thought have gradually become so entangled that they cannot be treated as separate objects of inquiry. Such entanglement has grown spider web-like alongside increasing abstraction in our worldview, particularly since writing began to appear in ancient agricultural societies. As Halliday (1978; 1992) has indicated, such process of abstraction is reflected in the evolution of the lexicogrammar of languages through the emergence of new semiotic modes; for instance in the grammar of the nominal group in which things are construed as commodities that can take on value, can be itemized and drawn up in lists. Such features, according to Halliday, emerged as nomadic populations began to settle and agricultural practices became widespread, as a result of an increasing need to classify things in terms of more complex taxonomies. As technological advancement continued and the need for abstraction increased, the grammar evolved once more by incorporating mechanisms such as grammatical metaphors that allow us to turn actions into nominal processes, a trend that shows no signs of abating. In short, one can say that language, as our main semiotic system, construes our world, in that this world is hardly definable as an external reality independent from language and thought (Lemke, 1989).

1.7. Conclusion

This chapter has critically reviewed the most important theories of the nation and nationalism aiming to elucidate how the national phenomenon can be best studied on the basis of existing accounts. Let us outline a working explanation of the nation and nationalism before a methodology for researching the Spanish nation is discussed in chapter 2. It has been argued that nations are not timeless objective external realities that exist independently of human

experience. Rather, nations are social facts whose existence is grounded in human intervention. This is something most theories acknowledge despite their differences: perennialists and ethnosymbolists conceptualise this human intervention placing the emphasis on constitutive myths, symbols and memories. Modernist theorists speak of imagined communities, industrialization, mass education, elite narratives or invented traditions.

When examining the ontological nature of such human intervention, one can see a great degree of commonality in all these theories because myths, symbols, memories, invented traditions, imagined communities and narratives can all be best explained by adopting a social-constructionist paradigm which conceives such human intervention as a discursive process. Gellner's modernist perspective constitutes a partial exception to this because he does not pay attention to micro aspects such as concrete national narratives and prefers to explain the origins of nations as the necessary -and inevitable- consequence of abstract processes grouped under the label of 'modernisation' that operate at a structural level. It has been argued that despite offering good insight, this theory proves to be not only reductionist but, more importantly, excessively abstract and deterministic because it cannot explain how the Spanish nation differs from other national constructs. Hobsbawm's model offers the advantage of incorporating the analysis of concrete narratives combined with the complex structural processes identified by Gellner while Recalde's suggestion that nationalist action usually operates on the basis of a mode of national organization previously constituted provides a useful framework for accommodating top-down structural processes and bottom-up instances of nationalist action as part of a more comprehensive and empirically sounder account of the origins and constitution of the nation.

In view of this, I propose to explain nations as “socially constructed socio-cultural artefacts of a particular kind” assuming that nations are discursively constructed and that they constitute historically evolving artefacts, although their evolution is never random but subject to certain constraints inherent to the discursive process out of which they sprout. This does not make nations less sociologically real or less durable, given the fundamental inseparability between language -our main semiotic tool- and ‘meaningful reality’ already discussed and given that “whatever their origins and the extent of mythologizing that go into their making, nations assume a life on their own in time. They are home to the manifold social ties their members develop and the locus of their hopes and dreams [and so] they are very real as aspects of lived experience and bases for action” (Özkirimli 2005, p. 166). As Miller (1995) argues, even if nations are not real in the same way as volcanoes and elephants – that is, having an existence independent of people’s thoughts about them- it is still possible to conceive of a ‘common public culture’ shared by members of a nation. For this reason, like some classical theorists, it is possible to speak of nations as substantive entities to some extent (Day and Thompson, 2004).

The Nation-State is largely a modern construct, as recognized by modernists and by ethnosymbolists. Given the profound historical discontinuity and change between pre-modern and modern communities Smith rejects the idea of modern nations being the direct product of “slow, gradual, incremental growth from rude beginnings” (Smith 1996, p. 385). The Nation-State can be understood as the ultimate result of nationalist mobilization in the form of discourse, which gradually gained ground towards the second half of the 18th century and became widespread during the 19th century. However, this does not mean that all

the building blocks in the national construct should be considered modern: Braudel (1981) has stressed that historical change is never a unidimensional phenomenon operating at a single time scale. On the contrary, both rapid and slow change is present in any social phenomenon and nation-building is not an exception. Any plausible explanation of the origins of the nation and nationalism should reflect the complex nature of this change. Ethnosymbolists have argued that some conspicuous building blocks of the nationalist discourse, such as foundational myths, symbols and memories, as well as many early expressions of national sentiment, are not necessarily modern in many cases. There is also evidence coming from historical documents that a certain idea of Spain was visible, at least among the social elites, long before the advent of nationalism.

Recalde (1982) reminds us that the structural basis upon which nationalism operates can be understood as the result of a long evolutionary process of social transformation broadly defined as modernisation. Modernisation provided the foundation for the emergence of a national mode of organization presided over by the State. This national mode of organization constituted the social foundation upon which the nationalist ideologies formulated by the State elites acted, creating national narratives. Once these narratives diffused among all the echelons of society they gave rise to national identities, understood in terms of collective forms of self-identification of the people with the Nation-States. That was the case with slow nation-building processes such as that of Spain, where nationalist action operated upon the basis of pre-modern ideologies and historical constructs like the Absolutist State.

In conclusion, the construction of the nation is carried out discursively, meaning that each process of nation-building is the result of social practices being enacted and reproduced

across time and space. As Dieckhoff and Gutiérrez (2001) argue, national identities do not sprout spontaneously or locally. They are acquired by social actors through a process of ritualization aimed at constructing socially functional communities within a given territorial sovereignty, as a condition for implementing legal equality among its citizens and achieving common goals, such as a functioning labour market and a well-structured society. This process of nation-building requires substantial institutional support, for instance through State bureaucracies, school systems, cultural campaigns, the mass media, etc. People are made to believe that they share the same ancestry and destiny and feel that they are united through powerful emotional ties as a distinct collectivity both appreciative and protective of its history, heritage, territory and culture. The specific nature of these social practices may vary not only from place to place but also from time to time. This not only explains why Spain or the USA can be very different in nature, for instance in terms of how their political institutions operate or how their national narratives are constructed, but also why Nation-States are better understood as contingent, historically-evolving artefacts. That is why Spain nowadays is different from Spain during Franco.

All this may help reconcile some of the contradictions between Perennialism and Modernism exposed before to the point that one may conclude that while modern creations, nations are not just constructed *ex nihilo* in modern times. In any case, one feels that the debate between creationism and evolutionism in the case of the nation is no longer productive once we admit like Özkirimli that the extent of the invention and/or reconstruction not only may vary from case to case but also that “what matters most is not the presence of pre-modern cultural materials but the ways in which these are selected, used and abused by nationalists, and this necessarily reflects present concerns” (Özkirimli, 2005, p. 38).

CHAPTER 2: SOME THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS ON NATION-BUILDING AND A METHODOLOGY FOR ANALYSING THE DISCURSIVE CONSTRUCTION OF THE NATION

Introduction

It has been concluded so far that nations are best understood as socially constructed artefacts built chiefly in modern times as a result of the nationalist mobilization which started towards the end of the 18th century, in the context of a complex process of social transformation known as modernisation. Modernisation provided the foundation for the discursive construction of the nation, as national narratives -myths, symbols, histories, etc.- promoted by the State and the elites diffused shaping national identities. However, not all the building blocks of the nation are necessarily modern, as ethnosymbolists have argued. In fact, it is in the nature of social change that new constructs like nations are seldom created *ex nihilo* but emerge from the transformation, reproduction and combination of prior constructs such as cultural communities, ethnic ties, pre-modern polities, language or religion (Smith 1986; 2000; 2004).

Based on these premises, this chapter has two purposes. One is to provide a theoretical foundation for explaining the discursive construction of the nation, particularly in the context of modernity. The second purpose is to derive a discourse-oriented methodology for the study of nation-building grounded on this theoretical apparatus. Given the protean complexity of this object of study, it is advisable to adopt a problem-oriented approach inspired in the “conceptual pragmatism” advocated by Mouzelis (1995) and Wodak (2001b) and strike a balance between theorization and practicality in terms of research scope. I shall

thus strive to ground my research methodology on as sound theoretical underpinnings as practicable while trying to confine the discussion to my intended object of study.

In the first part of the chapter, I review the work done in various fields of the social sciences as well as in history, discourse and language studies, which may help us develop a theoretical model for studying how nations are constructed discursively. The focus of this model will be on nation-building as a recursive process rather than on the nation as a finished product, since nations are better understood as contingent as well as historically evolving constructs rather than static phenomena. In doing so, I explain how the various theories of the nation and nationalism discussed before may provide some insight on how this discursive construction may operate. Next, I will discuss Giddens's theory of social structuration and some of the literature on modernity and its consequences and illustrate how many insights from these accounts can be applied in developing a theoretical model for the analysis of nation-building. In the second part of the chapter, I first provide a working definition of "discourse" as it applies to nation-building and then outline a methodology for the study of this phenomenon. In outlining such methodology, I first review the relevant literature on discourse and society under the conditions brought by modernity, with special reference to the work done in the area of Critical Discourse Analysis. I conclude by proposing to combine corpus-based discourse analysis with the historical examination of social structures and processes implicated in nation-building as a suitable means of studying the discursive construction of the nation in Spain.

2.1. Analyzing the discursive construction of the nation

Two methodological perspectives can be derived from the theories of the nation reviewed in chapter one. On the one hand, one could focus on the different national narratives present in numerous discursive domains (political, economic, cultural, legal, historical, symbolic, journalistic etc.), on how these narratives have been constructed over time and how they have shaped Spanish identities. This would be a bottom-up text-centered perspective emphasising the study of the particular, a methodological approach based on hermeneutic practices grounded in a strong empirical foundation. Wallerstein (1991) calls this approach the “idiographic mode of analysis”, typically used in historical or ethnographic research. On the other hand, like Gellner and other theorists, one could concentrate on the top-down analysis of social structures present in the historical processes commonly associated with the emergence of the modern Nation-State under labels such as modernisation and industrialization. The assumption here is that generalizations that lead to broad theorization are more important than fine historical detail or concrete narratives, often treated as anecdotal by the proponents of this top-down approach. Wallerstein refers to this kind of methodology as “nomothetic”, commonly used in various disciplines of the “social sciences”, such as sociology or economics.

Following Hobsbawm (1990), I shall argue that an adequate theory of the discursive construction of the nation should aim at incorporating both perspectives. This combination of idiographic and nomothetic methodologies has also been advocated by Wallerstein (1991; 2004) in his call for the abolition of the disciplinary divide between history and the social sciences. Whether one opts for interdisciplinary accommodation or a more radical unthinking of the paradigms which have constituted the basis of social and historical research, this

combination of nomothetic and idiographic approaches is plagued by difficulties. For instance, in examining nation-building, one inevitably confronts what Stubbs has called “the major intellectual puzzle in the Social Sciences”, that of “the relation between the micro and the macro” (Stubbs, 1996, p. 21). Such relationship involves the connection between individual instances of discourse and underlying processes: how is it that routine everyday behaviour can create and maintain social institutions like the nation over long periods of time. The study of such connections “poses some exceedingly difficult sociological and philosophical problems, concerning the relation between micro-semiotic events and macro-social structures. These problems relate to the basic task of social science: the problem of order and a theory of organizations” (*ibid*, p. 52). Confronted with the enormous complexity of such task, Stubbs argues that scholars have opted for delimiting their research territory by withdrawing into dangerous dualisms: *Langue* vs. *parole*, competence vs. performance, social vs. individual. Once such dualisms have been established, the preferred approach has consisted in disregarding the micro in favour of the macro, the instance in favour of the system, in order to avoid the hazards of being labelled anecdotal or unscientific. Thus, the result of taking refuge in idealizations such as the “*langue*” or “the social” has often been the neglect of empiricism by not giving sufficient emphasis to empirical data.

Without claiming to be able to solve these problems entirely satisfactorily, I shall argue that in studying the relation between the micro and the macro one ought to overcome some of the limitations derived from the prevailing disciplinary division in the humanities and social sciences and yet strive to avoid the methodological pitfalls that tend to undermine many multidisciplinary approaches. We need to be aware that the theoretical foundations of interdisciplinary approaches relating the linguistic analysis of text to social structures and

processes are patchy, due to the existing research gaps between disciplines that lead to largely unresolved issues. Stubbs (1996) highlights this problem when he talks of sociolinguistics not having developed a theory of social structures and institutions, autonomous linguistics not having a theory of agency, the social sciences lacking a theory of action or speech act theory not having incorporated a theory of institutions and power.

The following sections in this chapter will review some of the literature in the areas of social sciences, discourse analysis and linguistics, which may help us develop a suitable methodology for the study of the discursive construction of the nation. The first of these methodological building blocks is the theory of social structuration as originally developed by Giddens (1979; 1984; 2005) and further refined by Sewell (2005). The second source of inspiration is an analysis of modernity and its consequences with special emphasis on those pertaining nation-building (Giddens, 1990; Harvey, 1989; Hall et al, 1996; Wallerstein, 1991, 2004). A third theoretical source is based on a critique of the theories of language and society developed under the labels of Discourse Analysis and Critical Discourse Analysis by authors like Fairclough (1989; 1992; 1995; 2007), Wodak (1999; 2001b) and Blommaert (2005), followed by some discussion on how corpus linguistics can contribute to developing a more cogent methodology for the study of language in society in general and nation-building narratives in particular. Arguably, these methodological building blocks combined capture the complexity of the national phenomenon by connecting “the micro” and “the macro” and considering a variety of social processes involved in nation-building.

2.2. The structuration of society

Giddens provides a general theory of social structuration and change contributing to overcome the dualism between the macro and the micro by redressing the balance between individual agency and social structure (Giddens, 1979; 1984; 2005). This is achieved by means of a well-articulated critique of structuralist and functionalist paradigms on the one hand and interpretative sociologies inspired in hermeneutic traditions of thought on the other. Giddens's initial premise is that the differences between these theoretical perspectives in social science are not epistemological but ontological in nature. On the one hand, structuralist and functionalist approaches, which focus on the social whole at the expense of its constituent parts, tend to favour structure over human action and emphasize the constraining qualities of such structure. This results in excessively deterministic views of how social structuration operates with social actors being often treated like pawns at the mercy of "macro" structural processes that leave no room for individual action. On the other hand, Giddens contends that interpretative sociologies, which focus on human action and meaning and neglect structural concepts and constraints in the explication of human conduct, also fail to capture the complexities of social change by making of subjectivity the "preconstituted centre of the experience of culture and history" (Giddens, 2005 p. 122): if interpretative sociologies "are founded upon an imperialism of the subject, functionalism and structuralism propose an imperialism of the social object" according to Giddens (*ibid*, p. 123).

Giddens rejects the idea of social structure being something external to human action, constraining the free initiative of independently constituted subjects. Instead, human agency and social structure should be understood as logically implicated in each other, not as a

dualism but as a duality. This duality of structure which constitutes the cornerstone in Giddens's theory is conceptualized in terms of a dialectical relationship between human action and social structure, as illustrated in Table 2.1.

Table 2.1.

Structure(s)		System(s)		Structuration
Rules and resources, or sets of transformation relations, organized as properties of social systems		Reproduced relations between actors or collectivities, organized as regular social practices		Conditions governing the continuity or transmutation of structures, and therefore the reproduction of social systems

The duality of structure in Giddens' structuration theory (Giddens, 1984, p.25)

In Giddens's view, structure (i.e. "the macro") should be conceptualized as "recursively organized sets of rules and resources" generally independent of time and space and "marked by the absence of the human subject" (*ibid*, p.25), where rules are defined as "techniques or generalizable procedures applied in the enactment/reproduction of social practices" (Giddens, 2005 p. 133) and resources as "media through which power is exercised as a routine element of the instantiation of conduct in social reproduction" (*ibid*, p. 128). Giddens further distinguishes between "structures of signification", associated with modes of signifying and meaning constitution, "structures of domination", involved with the authorization and allocation of power resources, and "structures of legitimation", connected with normative regulation and sanctioning. At the other end of the spectrum we find the social systems which "comprise the situated activities of human agents reproduced across time and space" (Giddens, 1984 p. 25). Social systems are not only empirically observable but also quantifiable. The relationship between structures and systems can be described as a dialectical one because on the one hand, social actors constantly draw on rules and resources

in their day-to-day activities. On the other hand, with their actions, social actors reproduce such rules and resources. Social agency is associated with power in Giddens's view: "to be able to act otherwise means being able to intervene in the world or to refrain from such intervention, with the effect of influencing on a specific process or State of affairs" (*ibid*, p. 14).

One implication derived from the idea of duality of structure is that the structural properties of social systems exist only in so far as forms of social conduct are continuously reproduced across space and time, a process Giddens calls "regionalization of action". Furthermore, structures are not to be equated solely with constraints, in the structural-functionalist fashion. Rather, structures can be both constraining and enabling. Therefore, for Giddens, the basic domain of study of social science is neither the experience of the individual actor nor the existence of any form of societal totality, but empirically-observable social practices ordered across space and time. This approach reconstitutes macro-sociology upon radical empirical micro-foundations.

A potential problem with Giddens's social structuration theory is his concept of "reflexivity of action", a natural outcome of a social theory in which the individual is said to take center-stage and where human action is at the heart of social configuration. As stressed before, Giddens rejects the structural-functionalist idea of human behavior being the result of forces that social actors neither control nor comprehend, arguing instead that social subjects know far more about the reasons behind their actions and the consequences derived from such actions than structural-functional sociologists will ever acknowledge. Based on this premise, Giddens proposes a theory of human agency in terms of different degrees of

consciousness: discursive consciousness, practical consciousness and the unconscious or unintended. By discursive consciousness he means “the kind of knowledge social actors are able to explain using words”, whereas practical consciousness is defined as “tacit knowledge that is skillfully applied in the enactment of courses of conduct, but which the actor is not able to formulate discursively” (Giddens, 1979. p. 57). The unconscious is explained in Freudian terms while the unintended refers to consequences of social action which are not foreseen by the social actors.

Leaving aside the issue of where to draw the line between these categories of consciousness, which may also result problematic, the idea of incorporating the principle of reflexivity of action into a general theory of social structuration constitutes “a necessary complication” given all the problems that this brings if one wants to postulate a model of social analysis constructed upon radical empirical foundations. For reflexivity of action ultimately belongs to the realms of cognition and individual intentionality and as such it is essentially unobservable (Teubert, 2010), unless some form of elicitation is provided in the form of what Giddens calls “discursive consciousness”. So, it is not surprising to see how the unconscious and the unintended are eventually brushed aside by Giddens as “methodological givens” together with institutionalized properties of the settings of interaction once empirical analysis enters the scene:

Those who take institutional analysis to comprise the field of sociology *in toto* mistake a methodological procedure for an ontological reality [...] if the study of unintended consequences and unacknowledged conditions of action is a major part of social research, we should none the less stress that such consequences and conditions are always to be interpreted within the flow of intentional conduct (Giddens, 1984. p. 285)

And he adds:

The analysis of strategic conduct means giving primacy to discursive and practical

consciousness, and to strategies of control within defined contextual boundaries. Institutionalized properties of the settings of interaction are assumed methodologically to be 'given'. We have to take care with this, of course, for to treat structural properties as methodologically 'given' is not to hold that they are not produced and reproduced through human agency. It is to concentrate analysis upon the contextually situated activities of definite groups of actors (*ibid*, p. 288).

Drawing on the work by Giddens (1979; 1984) and Bourdieu (1997), Sewel (2005) elaborates on the concepts of structure introduced by those authors. He clarifies some of the aspects which remain excessively abstract –if not largely undefined- in the theories of the above mentioned authors. Sewel's theoretical model also provides additional room for the play of human agency in the constitution of our world and makes it possible to explain social change – even sudden historical shift- while overcoming the conceptual division between semiotic/linguistic and material models of structure. Sewel starts by reiterating the importance of structure as a central concept in social science. However, like Giddens, Sewel argues that structure, usually conceptualized as primary, hard and immutable reality in the structuralist and functionalist traditions, results in models of social life which are excessively rigid and deterministic, where events and processes are often considered secondary and superficial and thus, the role played by human agency in social structuration and change is often underestimated. All this rigidity derived from an excessive emphasis on the macro, makes it difficult to explain social change according to Sewel, because structure far too often implies stability- if not social stasis- and therefore change in structural discourse ends up being “located outside of structures, either as a *telos* of history, in notions of breakdown, or in influences exogenous to the system in question” (Sewel, 2005 p. 144). Sewel proposes a model of structure in which “knowledgeable” and “enabled” human agents “are capable of putting their structurally formed capacities to work in creative or innovative ways” to the extent that “if enough people or even a few people who are powerful enough act in

innovative ways, their action may have the consequence of transforming the very structures that gave them capacity to act” (*ibid*, p. 146).

Sewel’s critique of Giddens’s structuration theory is centered various points. On the one hand, Sewel contends that the notion of structure in Giddens’s model remains vague and largely unexplained: for Giddens, structure is said to be rules and resources which govern social systems, the latter being defined as patterned intertwining and relatively bounded social practices linking persons across time and space. Unlike the patterned social practices that make up social systems, structure has a virtual existence for Giddens. That is as far as Giddens goes in explaining structure. He does not provide examples of rules and his definition of resources as anything that can serve as a source of power in social interactions remains uninformative and poorly theorized according to Sewel.

Sewel modifies Giddens’s notion of structure by proposing a sharper distinction between the concepts of rules and resources which conform such structure. Inspired by cultural anthropology, Sewel conceptualizes rules as cultural schemas having only a virtual existence. Like Bourdieu’s *habitus* such schemas are considered to reside in the minds of human agents and manifest themselves in the form of generalizations in the enactment and reproduction of social practices which give shape to social systems. This cognitive explanation of structure proposed by Sewel presents similar problems to those already observed in Giddens’s notion of “reflexivity of action” or in Teubert’s understanding of “intentionality”: as such they belong to the realm of the mind and remain unobservable unless they manifest themselves as social action. All one can do is to treat them as methodological givens in a general theory of social structuration. Resources, however, are no longer considered virtual by Sewel but

“actual media and outcomes of the operation of structure” which empower or regenerate schemas. Sewel also rephrases Giddens’s distinction between “authoritative” and “allocative” resources calling them “human” and “non-human”, a terminology he considers less arcane. For instance, State bureaucracies or armed forces would be some key human resources employed in the discursive construction of the nation while road systems, communication networks or school curricula would constitute non-human resources in Sewel’s model. Sewel also proposes to treat the pairing of schemas and resources as a duality rather than a dualism in order to prevent what he calls the “*de facto* idealism that continually haunts structuralism” and save the theoretical premise of the duality of structure: “structure, then, should be defined as composed simultaneously of schemas, which are virtual, and of resources, which are actual” (*ibid*, p. 152). Therefore, schemas should be understood as the effects of resources in the same way that resources have to be considered the effects of schemas.

Another contribution by Sewel is aimed at overcoming the theoretical rigidity typical in structuralist explanations of society so that the possibility of social change can be safely built into the concept of structure and social actors can be given due credit for their action. Sewel proposes five axioms: the multiplicity of structures, the transposability of schemas, the unpredictability of resource accumulation, the polysemy of resources and the intersection of structures. By multiplicity of structures Sewel means that societies are based on practices which derive from many distinct structures which tend to vary significantly between different institutional spheres and do not necessarily operate in harmony and in unilinear fashion. Kinship structures, for instance, have different logics and dynamics than those of religious structures, productive structures or educational structures. This means that structures associated with processes like nation-building may lead to sharply conflicting

claims and empowerments. This would explain why structures which once led to the emergence of national markets during the early stages of modernisation may now be undermining the Nation-State in an increasingly globalized world. Castells (2000a) provides another example of misalignment of structures associated with the nation, namely how economic processes are increasingly articulated at a global scale whereas identities remain tied to national and sub-national scales.

Another implication derived from this multiplicity of structures is that the practices of knowledgeable social actors employed in the constitution of society should be understood in less rigid terms than those implied in Bourdieu's notion of *habitus*. Social actors in Sewel's model are understood to be "capable of applying a wide range of different and even incompatible schemas and have access to heterogeneous arrays of resources" (*ibid*, p.155). Furthermore, the schemas to which social actors have access should be understood not only as generalizable to a variety of contexts but also as transposable. The implication is that schemas are not automatically transferred from one case to another. On the contrary, the range to which certain schemas can be applied is something which cannot be determined in advance by social scientific analysts but is rather determined case by case by social actors.

Sewel also sees resource accumulation as something unpredictable, this being a natural consequence of the generalizability and transposability of schemas. History is full of examples of such unpredictability. For instance, it has been argued that one significant consequence of Franco's aggressive *españolismo* has been a crisis of Spanish nationalism and a revival of peripheral nationalisms after 1975, when Spanish identity became closely associated with Francoism (de Riquer i Permanyer, 1996; Álvarez Junco, 2002). Resources,

on the other hand, are never entirely unambiguous. Sewel gives the example of how the physical layout of a factory embodies and therefore instills capitalist notions of property relations while at the same time can make us aware of the social and collective character of production and in doing so, undermine the capitalist notion of private property. Similarly, the display of a national flag may be considered banal in some contexts or understood as provocation in others. Finally, Sewel understands structures as intersecting with each other in both their schema and resource dimensions:

[...] not only can a given array of resources be claimed by different actors embedded in different structural complexes (or differentially claimed by the same actor embedded in different structural complexes), but schemas can be borrowed or appropriated from one structural complex and applied to another (*ibid*, p. 157)

In conclusion, Sewel's elaboration of Giddens's theory of structuration clarifies many key concepts which remain rather obscure in the latter's account. It also refines the important notion of structure by making it less predictable and by further reinstating the role of social agents who appear capable of exerting some degree of control over the activities in which they are involved. At the same time, it makes it less awkward to explain social change over time by avoiding the rigid causal determinism derived from the concepts of structure proposed by Giddens and Bourdieu.

2.3. Modernisation and the nation

It has been emphasized that nations are essentially modern creations although some of their building blocks may not be entirely modern. It is time to explain what modernisation precisely entails and the effects this complex process of social transformation had in the emergence of societies politically organized as Nation-States before discussing how modernisation affected nation-building in Spain in chapter three. Giddens (1990) defines

modernity in connection with the modes of social organization which emerged in Europe from the 17th century onwards and which subsequently became widespread in their influence throughout the world as they developed and consolidated. In his view, modernity radically altered all traditional forms of social order in unprecedented ways. On the one hand, the transformations brought by modernity have resulted in forms of social interconnection which span the globe. On the other hand, such transformations have altered in many ways some of the most intimate and personal aspects of our life. For Giddens, some of the defining characteristics of modernity have been the accelerated pace of social change and the broad scope of such change, together with the emergence of radically new forms of social life such as “the political system of the Nation-State, the wholesale dependence of production upon inanimate power sources or the thoroughgoing commodification of products and wage labour” (Giddens, 1990. p. 6).

For Wallerstein (1991; 2004) modernity is associated with the emergence of capitalism around the 16th century in Europe and its subsequent expansion worldwide. He also argues that the Nation-State, which has traditionally been the main focus of inquiry in the social sciences, should be abandoned in favour of a larger analytical unit called “world-system” because in his view, the Nation-State does not constitute an autonomous society that develops over time. A similar conclusion is reached by Giddens (1990). He contends that the concept of society as a bounded system -the traditional focus in sociology in the era of Nation-States- should be replaced by the analysis of social life across larger spans of time and space. For different reasons, Laclau and Mouffe (2002) propose substituting society as a basic unit of analysis for a notion of the social as discursive space. They argue that social practices cannot be articulated within any fixed self-defined totality but that they are better

defined by their contingent and ambiguous nature.

A world-system is defined as “a spatial/temporal zone which cuts across many political and cultural units, one that represents an integrated zone of activity and institutions which obey certain systemic rules” (Wallerstein, 2004, p. 17). Insofar as they are systemic, world-systems are constantly being reproduced through the cyclical processes governing them. But world-systems should also be understood as historical phenomena in that they are also constantly evolving, they have beginnings as well as ends. This is due to the fact that all geohistorical social systems carry contradictions which at some point will lead to their demise according to Wallerstein.

A defining structure of modernity has to do with how time and space are organized in modern societies as opposed to how these parameters operated in pre-modern forms of social organization, such as European medieval agricultural communities (Karsten, 2013). Theories of spatial politics in the field of social geography speak of “the territorialization of political power”, understood as the production and transformation of State space where State spatiality is conceived in dynamic terms, not as a pre-given and fixed geographically-bounded realm for the enactment of social relations but as one of the constitutive dimensions of these social relations. As Brenner et al argue:

States are not simply located ‘upon’ or ‘within’ a space. Rather, they are dynamically evolving spatial entities that continually mold and reshape the geographies of the very social relations they aspire to regulate, control, and/or restructure (Brenner et al, 2003 p. 11).

This dynamic reorganization of time-space is also at the center of Giddens’s theorization of modernity and is equally emphasized in Wallerstein’s world-systems theory, where it is

argued that the analysis of time-space has been conspicuously absent from social theory, as if time-spaces were invariable external realities within whose frames social reality resides. On the contrary, as Wallerstein argues, time-spaces should be understood as “constantly evolving constructed realities whose construction is part and parcel of the social reality we are analyzing (Wallerstein, 2004, p. 22).

A key concept in theorizing this historical transformation of State space is that of geographical scale, considered to be socially constructed as both a platform and a container of all collective social action. It is argued that the scalar organization of State space is never fixed forever. Rather, it has been redesigned and restructured throughout history as societies undergo complex processes of transformation (Smith, 2003). Before Nation-States emerged as the preferred locus of social activity alongside capitalist expansion and industrialization, there had existed other forms of territorialization such as city-States, empires, the medieval State system and Absolutism. Social activity in these pre-national forms of territorialization was predominantly enacted at the local and regional scales: although time calculation in the form of calendars was already a common feature in traditional societies, time- usually perceived in imprecise and variable terms- was always linked with space in people’s minds. Furthermore, space was practically undistinguishable from place: both space and place were necessarily understood as the physical setting of all social activity given that humans had not yet made sufficient progress in controlling nature and overcoming the space barrier (Braudel, 1981). That in turn meant that all social interaction in pre-modern times usually required the co-presence of social actors as opposed to what occurs in post-modern societies. That was still the time of the “here” and “now” in a society alien to telecommunications, advanced transportation networks and urban forms of life, largely composed of illiterate people. That

was a world in which the idea of the “absent” was hardly conceivable, where communities like nations were basically unimaginable (Anderson, 1991).

Giddens uses the term “distanciation” to refer to this re-ordering of time-space characteristic of modern times while Harvey (1989) and McGrew (1996), call it “time-space compression”. These two terms in fact refer to the same phenomenon: a progressive conquest of space which has torn down all spatial barriers, where space has been annihilated through time. Giddens argues that one of the key events which marked the beginning of this distanciation -or compression- of time and space was the invention of the mechanical clock and its diffusion towards the late 18th century: “The clock expressed a uniform dimension of ‘empty’ time, quantified in such a way as to permit the precise designation of ‘zones’ of the day (e.g. the working day)” (Giddens, 1990. p.17.). Similarly, as Harvey (1989) and Escobar (2003) indicate, this gradual transformation of space can be appreciated in how map-making evolved from the fantastic allegorical depictions of the medieval times to the increasingly objective descriptions during the Renaissance era of explorations and the far more accurate drawings found in the era of the Enlightenment, not to mention the effect instruments like GPS have had in the re-organization of time-space recently. In fact, maps from the Enlightenment onwards became essential tools in the re-ordering of space as they came to define land property rights, established territorial boundaries, domains of administration and social control and showed communication routes with growing accuracy. More importantly for the purposes of this research, the rationalization of space through maps allowed for a certain conception of “the other” to emerge in connection to space:

[Maps] also allowed the whole population of the earth, for the first time in human history, to be located within a single spatial frame [...]. It was within the confines of such a totalizing vision of the globe that environmental determinism and a certain conception of ‘otherness’ could be admitted, even flourish. The diversity of peoples

could be appreciated and analyzed in the secure knowledge that their 'place' in the spatial order was unambiguously known (Harvey, 1989. 249-250).

A progressive rural exodus leading to growing urbanization together with the development of increasingly sophisticated communication systems and transportation networks constituted key factors in this radical re-ordering of time-space. All this has led in modern times to a gradual lifting of social relations from local contexts of interaction requiring the physical co-presence of social actors and their restructuring across larger spans of time-space, a process Giddens calls "disembedding". Typical disembedding mechanisms are the creation of symbolic tokens such as money:

Money is a mode of deferral, providing the means of connecting credit and liability in circumstances where immediate exchange of products is impossible. Money, we can say, is a means of bracketing time and so of lifting transactions out of a particular milieu of exchange. More accurately put, in terms introduced earlier, money is a means of time-space distanciation. Money provides for the enactment of transactions between agents widely separated in time and space (Giddens, 1990 p. 24).

Another disembedding mechanism was the establishment of expert systems supporting broad areas of the material and social environment in modern societies, closely associated with the spread of literacy among the masses and State-building during modern times. These are defined by Giddens as "systems of technical accomplishment or professional expertise that organize large areas of the material and social environments in which we live today" (*ibid*, p. 27). Expert systems play a decisive role in what Giddens calls "the reflexive appropriation of knowledge", that is the process by which "the production of systematic knowledge about social life becomes integral to system reproduction, rolling social life away from the fixities of tradition" (*ibid*, p. 53). Trust plays an essential role in how all these disembedding mechanisms operate. Such trust is not vested in individuals but in abstract capacities according to Giddens: when people use money tokens in lieu of payment, it is considered

acceptable not because of the trustworthiness of the individual who made the payment but because money as a system of payment is trusted as a result of public confidence in the issuing government. Similarly, one could argue that the main function of expert system groups such as notaries public and other kinds of State bureaucrats is to institutionalize trust as an abstract capacity so that any social action, from the making of a will to the purchase of a property can be entrusted.

In his theorization of modernity, Wallerstein (2004) distinguishes two types of historical world-systems: world-empires and world-economies. He argues that what characterises our modern life has been the capitalist world-economy, a system not bounded by a unitary political structure whose *raison d'être* is the endless accumulation of capital. For the first time in history, an economic world-system has prevailed over alternative systemic forms such as world-empires, which in the past had always ended up absorbing world-economies *manu militari*. Thus, capitalism began to emerge as the sole dominating historical system on earth towards the end of the 19th century when capitalists achieved State-societal power in key States across the world. Some of the key institutions in the capitalist world-system are the markets, the firms producing goods and services which compete with each other in those markets as well as the households, the social classes and the various identity groups of many sorts. Another important institution has been the Nation-State and the interstate system, comprising States situated at the core of the system as well as in its periphery.

Capitalist expansion has had a dual dimension for Wallerstein. On the one hand, there has been a geographical spread from the core of the capitalist world-system towards those regions originally situated in the periphery of capitalism. The defining factor in this

dichotomy of core-periphery is none other than the degree of profitability of the production process, something directly related to the extent to which the markets are controlled by quasi-monopolies. This idea of monopolization at the core end of the capitalist world-system may sound strange to some, for it goes against the free market principle, considered by Wallerstein one of the most deeply-rooted myths in modern societies. In fact, capitalist producers always prefer monopolies because they are far more conducive to profit than free markets, for in a totally free market the buyers would be able to bargain down the sellers to lesser profit and that would render impossible the endless accumulation of capital. Quasi-monopolies however always dry up in the end and what today is a core product or service will eventually become a peripheral one in the future. There have been numerous examples of this transfer in recent years: from ship-building to call services or car making. On the other hand, capitalist expansion has also been the result of the increasing commodification of products and processes which once were situated outside the realm of the capitalist way of doing things. The development of new financial products and accounting practices in the context of emerging disciplines like financial engineering (Beder & Marshall, 2001) and the growing commodification in areas such as biotechnology and education constitute examples of this (Hanson, 1999; Prudham, 2007; Hendrickson & Heffernan, 2002; Shumar, 1997).

As this process of capitalist expansion was chiefly structured at the geographical scale of the Nation-State during the early stages of the internationalization of commercial capital (Hobsbawm, 1990; Nairn, 1977; Arrighi, 2010), the Nation-State became towards the 18th century a key institution within the capitalist world-economy, where “national capitals and their attendant political frameworks in the Nation-State emerged as a vital geographical

means for coordinating and arbitrating economic competition between capitals at the global scale” (Smith, 2003 p. 229). The extent to which capitalist expansion led to the emergence of a fully-fledged national mode of organization in Spain characterized by the predominance of the national scale in the regulation of social action during the 19th and 20th centuries will be a central theme in chapter three.

However, this restructuring of social relations, then being increasingly centered at the national scale, did not eliminate prior scalar levels of social structuration, due to the fact that “scales do not exist in mutual isolation, but they are always interconnected in a broader, often-changing inter-scalar ensemble (Brenner et al, 2003 p. 16). This is a common pattern in many processes of structural change where previous structures seldom disappear altogether. Rather, they survive embedded or latent within newly emerging structures to even re-emerge and play again a significant role in locating social action if required by the new socio-political conditions. Thus, many daily reproduction activities in the form of face-to-face transactions continued to operate at the local scale while the regional scale also remained latent, often as a residual subnational expression within the geographical scale system to re-emerge once more as an alternative platform for social action in the form of a new regionalism, as many of the processes previously regulated at the national scale become organized at a supra-national level (Lipietz, 2003; Keating, 2003) and new forms of governance which emphasize multi-scalar networks and partnerships at the expense of nationally rooted bureaucracies sprout (Goodwin and Painter, 1996; Jessop, 1998). The Spanish Autonomies and the European Union Committee of Regions constitute good examples of these re-emerging regionalizing trends at various scalar levels (Aja, 1999; Loughlin et al, 2001).

Capitalism and industrialism constitute two separate and yet related organizational dimensions which have played a decisive role in conforming modernity according to Giddens. The former is defined as a “system of commodity production centered upon the relationship between private ownership of capital and propertyless wage labour” (Giddens, 1990 p. 55). Capitalism, which relies on production for competitive markets, constitutes the main axis of the class-based societies prototypical of modern times. Industrialism, on the other hand, is chiefly characterized by “the use of inanimate sources of material power in the production of goods, coupled to the central role of machinery in the production process” (*ibid*, p. 56). These phenomena of capitalist expansion and industrial development have been linked to the consolidation of the Nation-State system in the theories of Gellner (1983; 1997) and Hobsbawm (1990), among others, as we have seen before. One of the central arguments in Gellner’s theory of nationalism is that the shift from the modes of production typical of agrarian societies to those of modern industrial societies required a novel form of social organization, the Nation-State, where homogeneity of culture constituted the basic social bond.

Due to their inherently expansionist character, however, capitalism and industrialism are globalizing forces in essence and cannot be confined to bounded social systems like the Nation-State, at least not over extended periods of time. On the contrary, it can be argued that from their early origins, capitalism and industrialism have aimed at being international in scope. Certainly, these two phenomena did once align closely with the social and administrative system of the State at earlier stages in history in conforming what Recalde (1982) calls “the national mode of organization”, thus making some territories more viable as

Nation-States than others according to Hobsbawm (1990). But in spite of these close connections, capitalism, industrialism and the Nation-State should in principle be explained and analyzed separately in Giddens's view.

Wallerstein (2004) conceives the network of sovereign States as a key institution of the capitalist world-system. He argues that States have contributed to structuring the world-capitalist system in a number of ways. States have been largely responsible for setting the rules for the transfer of commodities, capital and labour across international borders as well as the rules regarding property rights, employment and employee compensation within their respective territories. States have decided on the kinds of economic processes that should be monopolized, the extent of this monopolization and the regulation of taxation. Also, States have determined the costs firms must internalize when doing business in their territory and may lobby in favour of companies established in their territory before other States.

Elaborating on the idea of the State as a territorially-bounded "power container" for the enactment of social relations, coined by Giddens (1985), Taylor (2003) distinguishes four basic functions of States corresponding to four different phases of development. First, the establishment of the Westphalian order in 1648 consolidated the State as power container, increasingly unrivalled within its territory in virtue of the principle of non-interference in other State's affairs. This not only contributed to weaken other rival powers within the State's territory, chiefly the aristocracy and the church, but also accentuated the centralizing and homogenizing trend already present since the emergence of Absolutism where the State began to act "like a vortex sucking social relations to mould them through its territoriality"

(Taylor, 2003 p. 102). Good examples of this trend in the Spanish context are the attempts by Olivares, as early as 1624, to establish a more centralized State largely inspired in the customs and laws of Castile; or the Nueva Planta decrees under Philip V (1707-1716), to be discussed in chapter 3.

Second, the State developed into a “wealth container” as the capitalist world-economy emerged in the form of mercantilism. The State became intimately associated with an economy which the State itself managed as State exchequers played the role of tax collectors and military procurers and began to operate as economic facilitators. Economic policy was then a key component of State development and economic warfare in the form of protectionism was widely practiced. The third phase saw the transformation of the State into a Nation-State, a cultural container based on ideas like people’s sovereignty and citizenship, derived from the French and American revolutions where national identity replaced religious and local identities as a mechanism for integrating individuals into a socially-constructed national community incorporating them into the political arena. Nationalism promoted a common culture as a necessary bond between nationals, not only as a basis for national identities but also as a means to facilitate the operations of the national economies. Furthermore, the national community became inextricably linked to the land it inhabited and the concept of territoriality changed radically: “from being parcels of land transferable between States as the outcome of wars, all territory, including borderlands, became inviolate (*ibid*, p. 106). The fourth phase saw the establishment of the State as a social container as a result of the progressive democratization of the society and the re-distribution of wealth that took place in the second half of the 20th century in the developed world as capitalism further expanded. The essence of this new construct was:

[...] to treat the people of a State as a society, a cohesive social grouping that constituted a moral and practical social system. That is to say, the State had a moral obligation to look after its people (provide a social safety net) and a practical task of making sure the society functioned properly (prevent a breakdown of social order). In this way, the idea of society became coterminous with the sum of persons living within a State's territory (French society, British society, American society, etc.): States had become the social containers of our world (*ibid*, p. 107).

Giddens (1990) and Wallerstein (2004) coincide in explaining the modern Nation-State in terms of the coordinated control a State administration is able to achieve over a bounded territory and a population. This is a phenomenon unprecedented in history, since pre-modern States were not able to exercise the kind of social control typical of modern societies where most aspects of social life are tightly regulated. Such capacity of control exercised by the State in turn relies upon the development of surveillance capabilities and control mechanisms unthinkable in pre-modern societies due to the lack of resources and capabilities. Surveillance and control mechanisms have enabled the State to regulate the activities of its citizens in practically every aspect of social life nowadays, from political participation and everyday legal activities to economic transactions, cultural life and so on. This kind of surveillance and control may often be exercised directly –even forcefully- as in the many instances discussed by Foucault (1967; 1977) such as prisons, schools and open workplaces. The existence of armies and police forces constitute an important aspect of this direct control by the State of the means to exercise violence on others. More often though, surveillance and control by the State are exercised indirectly and proactively through mechanisms like the control of information in the media and the education of the masses aimed at achieving cultural hegemony, as Gramsci (1971) reminds us.

Laclau and Mouffe (2003) highlight the centrality of discourse in the operationalization of hegemony, understood as the transformation of a particularity into the representation of a

universality transcending it. They contend, however, that such hegemonic universality is never achieved for good because the discursive space in which hegemonic relations are established is inherently unstable, always subject to transformation, derived from its fragmented and incomplete nature, and contestation in the form of antagonistic forces entering the discursive space. This transient and precarious nature of hegemony can be seen in how modern States aim at turning individuals into nationals in what Renan (1954) called the nation's "daily plebiscite", achieved through a process of ideologization based on the construction and diffusion national narratives which shape national identities. Wallerstein (2004) identifies three main nationalization mechanisms: the State school system, service in the armed forces and public ceremonies. Other less explicit mechanisms employed in mass-nationalisation consist in situating many events reported by the media in a nationally-bounded discursive space, as Billig (1995) reminds us. Whether these nationalization mechanisms have operated successfully in Spain and the extent to which hegemonic national narratives have been articulated in the national arena will be examined in chapter three.

Arguably the State has become a "leaking power container" (Taylor, 2003) or -in Ulrich Beck's words- a "Zombie" (Sorensen & Christiansen, 2013), as a result of its dwindling sovereignty. Whereas the prevailing order of things decades ago was significantly centered in a Nation-State which controlled its national market, the situation has changed dramatically with most States increasingly under the pressure of transnational market forces. In the face of this challenge, one alternative would be the reconfiguration of the State by transferring significant parts of its power to larger political entities like the EU (Hettne, 2000; Castells, 2000c). A bleaker outcome would be a governance vacuum leading to the break-down of the

current State model (Beck, 2000; Strange, 2000). This structural shift is in turn re-shaping the conceptions, discourses and communication practices of people all over the world as Kress (2010) reminds us. The disruptive effects global capitalism is having on national economies, to the point of making many Nation-States increasingly irrelevant -at least economically- no doubt confirms the globalizing nature of capitalism and industrialism as well as the internal contradictions of the capitalist world-system. This also justifies the need to treat these forces separately from the phenomenon of the Nation-State.

In conclusion, the study of nation-building has to be placed in the context of modernity, a way of life whose main features have been a profound reorganization of time-space and the capitalist world-economy initiated around the late Middle Ages with the dissolution of the feudal world and which eventually made the socio-political institution of the Nation-State viable towards the second half of the 18th century. As usually happens with structural transformations, such re-organization of time-space however did not erase the pre-existing scales at local and regional levels, which co-existed since then with the newly emerging national scale. In time, the Nation-State model spread across the world, its centrality growing exponentially as a result of an ever increasing time-space distancing, made possible among other things by the developments in technology, transportation and communications. All this enabled the State to rule over people's lives in ways that would have been unthinkable only decades ago. This modernisation process has in turn resulted in the development of highly interconnected culturally convergent urban societies where individuals have become necessarily more dependent on each other. This shift in the modes of social relations, accompanied by a growing secularization, once opened the way for alternative forms of identity to emerge and thus the seed of nationalism found fertile soil in which to thrive.

Nevertheless, the capitalist world-economy and the process of time-space distancing, which at one point in history made it possible for the mode of national organization to prosper, have continued with their relentless development. There are growing signs that the Nation-State system is becoming increasingly dysfunctional in a global capitalist era dominated by the Internet where time has finally been abolished (Castells, 2000a) and where alternative discourses now coexist with those developed by nationalism (Machin & Van Leeuwen, 2007). It is certainly too soon to say what may eventually become of identity discourses, cultures and State institutions like the Spanish nation, nor is the role of social research of this kind to predict the future. Nevertheless, everything seems to indicate we have entered a period of transition and that new forms of political organization are radically transforming the world of sovereign States as we know it nowadays. All these issues will be examined briefly in the conclusion of this thesis in connection with the Spanish nation.

2.4. A discourse-oriented model for the study of nation-building

It has been emphasized that nations are historical products as well as social constructs and that nation-building is carried out discursively, in terms of social practices situated across time-space. According to the moderate version of social constructionism adopted, nations can be partly considered substantive social facts shaped by the continuous reproduction of certain discursive practices. At the same time, nations can be partly seen as contingent products, given that the discursive practices which shaped them may change or even disappear over time. It has also been stressed that the discursive construction of the nation operated on two fronts: it shaped the national mode of organization, that is, the social basis upon which nationalism operated. It also led to the creation and diffusion of narratives constituting national identities. Given this centrality granted to discourse in nation-building,

it is important to define what discourse means in the context of the present research. In this section I propose a working definition of discourse and outline a theoretical model for explaining the discursive construction of the nation based primarily on the insights of Giddens's theory of social structuration. The model proposed incorporates Sewel's contribution to such theory as well as some key ideas on modernity and its consequences, one of which has been the emergence and consolidation of Nation-States across the world as key institutions of a broader world-capitalist system.

Defining "discourse" is not easy. Indeed, the concept of discourse has proved difficult to conceptualize because it often means different things for different scholars. Fairclough (1992), Blommaert & Bulcaen (2000) and Schiffrin et al (2001) distinguish various categories of definitions. In the narrowest sense discourse is defined as text, more specifically as text beyond the sentence level. This way of conceptualizing discourse is more amenable to the kind of focused idiographic linguistic analysis placing the emphasis on the description of text, mostly in its written variety. It does not pay much attention to alternative –and complementary- forms of semiosis commonly found in communicative exchanges; it does not venture much into the analysis of context and it may even tend to avoid the formulation of generalizations about the language system or about the social aspects of language use. In a second category of definitions, discourse is understood in much broader and imprecise terms, as "language in use" or as "practice", generally meaning that the analysis of discourse should not be reduced to the –chiefly descriptive- linguistic analysis of text. It should also include the nomothetic –partly descriptive but also partly interpretive- study of "context" and discuss for instance the conditions for the production, circulation, distribution and consumption of texts and the phenomena of intertextuality and


interdiscursivity. This broader category of discourse is more accommodating with the work done in the emerging area of multimodal discourse analysis which in part exposes the limitations of a monomodally conceived world where language is perceived as the only means of encoding meaning in human communication (Kress & Van Leeuwen, 2001; 2006; Kress, 2003; 2010; Levine & Scollon, 2004; O'Halloran, 2004; Jewitt, 2009).

The issue, therefore, is which of these two approaches to discourse best captures the complexity of the phenomenon of nation-building as theorized before. The principle of conceptual pragmatism invoked earlier on dictates that the working definition of discourse adopted should be applicable to all key aspects of nation-building. It should be able to account for the emergence and development of the national mode of organization, the social milieu where nationalist movements operated with great or little success. Also, this working definition of discourse should explicate the elaboration and diffusion of nationalist doctrines in the form of narratives which formed the basis of Spanish identities. Arguably a narrow language-based definition of discourse which disregards other forms of semiosis and ignores extra-linguistic factors described as context cannot satisfactorily explain the discursive construction of the nation in all its complexity. This is so because social action in nation-building may not always be accomplished linguistically. What is needed, therefore, is a broader social-semiotic approach to communication understood as multimodal semiotic work carried out in the domain of the social, often involving speech or written text but also gesture, action or even image, colour or music (Kress, 2010). Accordingly, discourse should be defined in broader terms for the purpose of this research: as social practice, in the form of material action operating across time and space, which is semiotically mediated. Naturally, language –spoken or written- continues to be the primary tool in human communication

despite the growing importance of multimodal forms of semiosis in an age dominated by computer technology. This means that any material practice implicated in nation-building which may have been originally enacted through non-linguistic means – a military parade, an exhibition in a museum, a financial transaction- may likely end up being reported as text in the form of a news report or in face to face conversation.

As Blommaert (2005) argues, this richer notion of discourse is by no means an unproblematic one. It requires complex forms of analysis and exposes the limitations of linguistic evidence in explaining the discursive construction of the nation in its totality. At the same time, it reveals the need for discourse analysis to become an interdisciplinary field of scholarship where semiotic work and social practice can be linked. Furthermore, given the conceptualization of social structuration as a duality- and not a dualism-, the study of the discursive construction of the nation should be based neither on the experience of individual actors, nor should it presuppose the existence of any form of societal totality. It should be centred instead on the analysis of social practices ordered across time-space. That in turn implies that the focus of such analysis should never be the nation as an end product, be this the result of the narrated experiences of individual actors or of agent-less structural processes involving material changes, but rather the focus should be on nation-building understood not only as a historical phenomenon but also as an on-going process recreated by reflexive social actors which constantly reproduce the structural conditions which make nation-building possible. Figure 2.1 illustrates how this discursive construction of the nation may operate according to the theory of social structuration expounded by Giddens (1984; 2005).

Figure 2.1.



The discursive construction of the nation

At the basis of this complex process we find innumerable micro-events and event-chains (i.e. a series of associated actions taking place at one single point in time such as a military parade, a New Year celebration, a football match, etc.). Such micro-events are situated along multiple domains of social action which may stand in relative isolation with respect to each

other or crisscross in ways which are not always predictable. Some of the key discursive domains and typical events associated with the discursive construction of the nation are listed on table 2.2:

Table 2.2.

Discursive domain	Event type
Symbolic	i.e. flags, anthems, military parades, national day celebrations, the bull road sign, sports events, souvenirs for tourists, landmarks, archetypal places, etc.
Cultural	i.e. literary works, musical pieces, movies, pictorial artworks, museums, tourist brochures, national character stereotypes, sense of humor, etc.
Educational	i.e. School curricula, teacher training courses, textbooks, lessons, etc.
Economic	i.e. The issuing of State debt, financial transactions, company mergers, working schedules, product sales, etc.
Media & Communication	i.e. Newspaper articles, TV programs, news bulletins, weather maps, etc.
Legal	i.e. Laws, court procedures, etc.
Political	i.e. Speeches, demonstrations, meetings, policy documents etc.
Historical	i.e. Historical narratives in books, textbooks, novels, movies, etc.

Some discursive domains at the micro-level of nation-building

This list is not meant to be an exhaustive one. It simply illustrates some aspects of discourse traditionally implicated in nation-building in different areas of social research, those of politics (associated with the State), economics (associated with the market) and sociology (associated with civil society). Wallerstein argues that such disciplinary division does not correspond to social reality, as the phenomena dealt within these separate boxes are “so closely interrelated, that each presumes the other, each affects the other, each is incomprehensible without taking into account the other boxes” (Wallerstein, 2004, p. X). Micro-events such as those listed above have contributed in one way or another to the

construction and daily reproduction of the nation as an imagined community. As such, they represent “segments of the respective societal ‘reality’ which contribute to constituting and shaping the ‘frame’ of discourse” (Wodak 2006, p. 177). Some of these micro-events are customarily interpreted and reproduced in the media according to specific conditions for text production and reception that determine not only what is likely to be published but also how the news would be constructed. However, there are also many micro-events that are seldom newsworthy. These are key elements in what Billig (1995) has fittingly called “the banal reproduction of the nation” which often escapes the attention of the very participants in the event: from a history lesson in a school to a casual conversation in a cafe; or a flag being waved at a public building.

Regardless of their media impact, micro-events constitute some form of semiotically-mediated material action. They can be realized linguistically, through written or oral text, and/or by other semiotic means (bodily action, images, motion pictures, etc.). They constitute rich material for empirical observation and analysis thanks to the fact that they operate at the lowest scale in what Wallerstein (1997) has called “episodic geopolitical TimeSpace” or what scholars of the *Annales* School call “*l’histoire événementielle*” (Braudel, 1969). As such, micro-events are clearly situated across time-space and so they can be precisely located and dated. They usually have recognizable agents behind them (individuals, institutions or both) and are also easily quantifiable. The domains of social action where these micro-events occur are never self-contained. Rather, these are interrelated in dynamic ways. Connections between them are in constant flux and as such they are not predictable. We have seen how the axioms of multiplicity of structures and transposability of schemas account for this unpredictability. As Sewel (2005) explains, the structures behind

specific social practices do not necessarily operate harmoniously and in a unilinear fashion, while the schemas associated with such practices are not automatically transferred from one instance to another. Take, for instance, the boycott of Catalan cava in 2004-2005 after Carod-Rovira, a supporter of Catalan independence from Spain, called for Catalonia to boycott Madrid's bid for the 2012 Olympic Games in response those who opposed the reform of the Catalan Estatut, echoed also in the international press.¹³ It was reported that this boycott had a negative impact on the sales of cava and other Catalan products throughout the Spanish territory which lasted for months. Here we can see how a form of social action initially operating at the symbolic level derives in material processes with clear economic implications as well as symbolic ones.

Micro-events may take place once although they may be reproduced by social actors giving rise to complex networks. I will call these event networks “processes.” Processes usually operate at the meso-structural level, an intermediate stage between micro-events and macro-structures. As such, meso-processes are often readily identifiable. They can be roughly allocated in time-space although we may not be able to date them as precisely as micro-events, unless these are triggered by something remarkable such as an act of terrorism with significant repercussions (i.e. the September 11th attacks) or a regime change (i.e. the political transition in Spain after Franco's death). Being complex networks of events, they are less amenable to idiographic analysis. Agency here is diluted, quantification is often problematic and so is explanation, since processes usually operate along complex chains of causes and effects situated across different fields of action. A case in point is the formation of modern Nation-States where different theories have placed the emphasis on different

¹³ www.nytimes.com/2006/03/13/international/europe/13spain.html (retrieved on 27-8-11)

causes, a process so complex that one cannot easily determine what constitutes a cause or an effect. Thus, whereas Gellner (1983; 1997) or Hobsbawm (1990) see material and economic processes driving ideological ones, Greenfeld (1992; 2001) sees things the other way around. A more recent case of such kind of process related to this research is the de-centralization Spain has undergone in recent decades including the re-alignment of power structures alongside the devolution of powers from the State to the regions, the emergence of new social actors at the regional level and the growing differentiation in regulatory frameworks. While in the case of micro-actions the focus is usually at the lowest time-space scale, meso-processes are best explained in terms of historical cycles, so called “conjunctures” (Braudel, 1969) situated in cyclo-ideological time-space (Wallerstein, 1997).

The structural resource of power plays a key role in determining which events are more likely to be reproduced and which are not. Sometimes the pervasive influence of power leads to processes being carefully regulated, meaning that the reproduction of an event can be the result of established regulatory frameworks which may define to the minutest detail how certain things should be done. Other times processes result from the reproduction of certain events under less strict regulatory conditions, for instance, the ways national symbols are displayed during football matches, where power may still be enacted albeit in a less ordered fashion.

The concept of hegemony as developed by Gramsci (1971) constitutes an important dimension of power where a cultural, intellectual or moral leadership replaces domination as the form of social and political struggle. In any case, independently of whether it is plain domination or subtle hegemony that is constraining or enabling social action, each

micro-event carries different weight according to the power invested in it. Blommaert explains the unequal capacities of the different social actors using the notion of “voice”, defined as “the way in which people manage to make themselves understood or fail to do so” (Blommaert, 2005. p. 4). Voice in turn largely depends on the discursive resources at the actors’ disposal and the conditions of use specific to the contexts in which the communication event occurs. For instance, the government’s decision to place a flag in the centre of Madrid is very different from an individual’s decision to do the same in a balcony at home. In principle, the more an action is reproduced, the higher the chance its constitutive principles become perpetuated and naturalized.

The macro-levels of the discursive construction of the nation are represented by structures, highly abstract agent-less phenomena situated at the *longue durée* (Braudel, 1969) or at the higher level of “structural”/“eternal” time-space (Wallerstein, 1997), a scale where change proceeds so slowly that it may appear almost timeless. As we have seen before, structures in this discursive construction consist of a duality of virtual cultural schemas and actual resources, including human and non-human, which both enable and constrain social action at the micro and meso levels. Structures also vary in terms of depth and breadth in the impact they exert on social action. Deep structures are derived from quasi-static principles and they hardly change over time. Often they can be considered almost like “States of being” or “facts of life”. Macro-structures and micro-actions are also understood as being dialectically related (Fairclough, 1992; Giddens, 1984) since micro-actions are not only shaped by structures but also contribute to constituting and reproducing these.

A key structure involved in the constitution and reproduction of nation-building is “identity”, understood here in general terms: that ineluctable “need to belong” inherent in the social nature of human beings, something Fishman (1980) has associated with ethnicity and kinship and Guibernau (2001) relates to culture. It has been stressed that identity, once closely associated with another structure, “religion”, particularly during pre-modern times (Pérez Vejo, 1999; Bell, 2001), acquired the form of “national identity” after the transformation of the religious being defined by Gauchet (1997) in terms of the “disenchantment of the world”, a process which in Spain’s case was particularly problematic in view of the resistance it generated, as we will see in chapter 3. This disenchantment arguably led to the transfer of some religious features into the newly-emerging identities contributing to the sacralisation of the nation (Gentile, 1996; 2006; Mosse, 1990). Culture and power are two other basic structures in the configuration of social life and constitute essential pillars of any nation-building process together with economic structures related to phenomena such as capitalism and industrialization which have been traditionally linked with the emergence of the Nation-State system. Another structure has to do with the ways we relate to our physical surroundings and how this shapes the way we construct our world, a notion analysed in Braudel’s study of the formation of the French nation (Braudel, 1988) or implicit in Giddens’s notion of time-space distancing (Giddens, 1990). We have seen before how the local was practically the only realm available for social action to be enacted in pre-modern times and how time-space distancing gradually grew accompanied by processes such as urbanization, linguistic standardization, the spread of literacy, the development of an industrial economy and of transportation networks, all of which are directly related to the emergence and consolidation of the national mode of organization.

Implicit in the historical dimension of nation-building is the notion of change and how change operates in the context of the social structuration framework detailed above. Change is hardly observable at the highly-contingent micro level of analysis, unless sufficient time has passed between the event and its interpretation. This is because the episodic time-space frame in which micro-actions operate does not provide a sufficiently broad perspective to help us differentiate between the anecdotal and the consequential. Most change at the upper levels of analysis in the discursive construction of the nation takes place gradually, if at all. The higher we go in the structuration scale, the slower change occurs due to the inherently pervasive nature of structures. Sometimes old practices and concepts once being constantly reproduced by social actors may alternate with new ways enacting things. A good case in point is how the current state of distanciation enables the enactment of social action at both the local and global levels of time-space when a few decades ago social action usually took place at the local level. Other times the old may slowly fade away into the realm of history after being substituted by the new. Often though, these old ways do not vanish without a trace. Rather, they may be assimilated within new processes and structures according to their own inner logic until all connections between the old and the new may be forgotten. On occasion change may occur abruptly as a result of transformation at the higher levels of the structuration scale due, for instance, to the emergence of new resources in what I would call “structural shift”. Structural shift can be defined as highly-salient processes involving the upper levels of structuration which may lead to dramatic change in the discursive construction and reproduction of social life. These are situated in what Wallerstein (1997) calls “transformational TimeSpace”. Some cases of structural shift may be connected with key historical processes which can be dated quite precisely, such as the development of the Internet. Alternatively structural shift may be associated with processes which can only be

dated approximately, such as capitalism or the emergence of the Nation-State system. Their significance resides in that they induce change at higher-order time-space scales to the point that they make such change irreversible. A recent example of macro-structural shift is the ever-growing heterochrony, and heterotopy, we experience in our daily lives as a result of technological developments in the area of communication (Lemke, 2000) making imagined spaces greater than the nation increasingly salient in our daily lives, be this the result of large economic transactions spanning the globe within milliseconds in computerized high frequency trading where nations are being auctioned at the markets on a daily basis; or our daily global communication through social networks. Regardless of whether the old Nation-States will be consumed in the fires of modernity (Hobsbawn, 1990) sandwiched between the local and the global, the impact of this shift is already obvious in many spheres of daily life, as manifested in the growing multi-scalarity in many world affairs (Fairclough et al, 2007). This has led some authors to highlight the growing inadequacy of the Nation-State arguing that “it is becoming too small for the big problems of life and too big for the small problems of life” (Bell, 1987 p. 14).

Examining the impact of historical change in national narratives, the notions of monologism and dialogism originally theorized by Bakhtin (1981; 1986) and further refined by Crowley (1996) may prove useful, as these concepts provide an adequate framework for analyzing change in the various national narratives situated across time-space. Monologic forces are said to be centripetal and homogeneising in nature while dialogic forces are characterized by being centripetal and heterogeneising. Depending on which of these forces prevails at a certain point in time, Bakhtin (1981; 1986) distinguishes three different States: monoglossia, polyglossia and heteroglossia. Monoglossia would be naturally associated with monologic

forces, polyglossia with dialogic ones and heteroglossia would result from the synthesis of these two opposing forces. Crowley (1996) argues that there are significant differences in how Bakhtin conceptualizes monologism and dialogism at different stages of his work. On the one hand there is the idealized viewpoint commonly found in Bakhtin's early writings where the relationship between monologism and dialogism is conceived in purely chronological and static terms, where there is an implicit notion of teleological progression from what Bakhtin then considered an inferior worldview of monologism to a superior one of dialogism. This idealist account is replaced in Bakhtin's later works by what Crowley calls a more politicized version of the relationship between monologism and dialogism, conceived now as a dynamic ideological struggle presided by power, in which the status and position of particular monological and dialogical forms of discourse are always at stake. In the context of this power struggle, monologism and dialogism are said to be in constant conflict in discourse with the States of monoglossia, polyglossia or heteroglossia no longer being conceived teleologically nor being idealized in terms of absolute bad and good, as had occurred in the earlier versions of Bakhtin's theory:

Under the influence of the politicized conception of these terms, the relations between monoglossia, polyglossia and heteroglossia appear very differently. Rather than conceiving of these terms as referring to chronological stages of linguistic being which occur in an irreversible teleological process, the politicized standpoint takes them as forms of representations of language engendered by social and historical conflict. This means that rather than their evolution being guaranteed, with progress from the least good (monoglossia) to the best (heteroglossia), their appearance depends upon the contingencies of history and the balance of forces at a particular point (Crowley, 1996 pp. 36-37).

In other words, monoglossia, polyglossia and heteroglossia are no longer perceived as fixed stages in linguistic evolution and they are stripped of any moral connotation as a result of Bakhtin's theoretical shift. In Crowley's view, this also opens the way for less abstract analyses of language where historical specificity can be adequately emphasized.

On the basis of this semiotically complex notion of discourse and the multi-scalar model of structuration proposed above, the study of the discursive construction of the nation requires an interdisciplinary methodology combining idiographic and nomothetic modes of analysis which help us address the micro-macro gap, considered by many the major intellectual puzzle in the Social Sciences. Much of the work currently done under the labels of Discourse Analysis (DA), and especially Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA), is clearly positioned along these methodological lines. I examine next some of the prospects and problems associated with these fields of inquiry and explain how a corpus-based discourse analytical approach can minimize some of their methodological shortcomings.

2.5. Discourse analysis and the study of society

Discourse Analysis has emerged as an important area of inquiry in the social sciences adding a strong interdisciplinary flavour to some of the research carried out in disciplines traditionally perceived as independent fields of research: linguistics, semiotics, literary studies, psychology, sociology, social policy, cultural studies, anthropology, philosophy, and more recently, law, history, historiography, mass communication or artificial intelligence, to name some of the areas that have adopted some form of Discourse Analysis as a methodology (Jaworski & Coupland, 1999); (Wetherell et al, 2001); (Schiffrin et al, 2001), (Billig, 2003). According to Van Dijk (1985), the roots of modern Discourse Analysis can be traced to various developments which took place across several fields of the humanities and social sciences in the 20th century, starting from the work of Russian Formalists (Propp's work on the morphology of the folktale) and Czech Structuralists in the 1920s, followed by the work of French Structuralists and semioticians (Lévi-Strauss's structural analysis of

culture and his analysis of myths, or the work of Barthes and Todorov in semiotics), anthropologists and linguists (Hymes, Malinowski, Firth, Sapir) in the 1960s. What many of these works had in common was an interest in linking the analysis of language in use with the study of the social, cultural and historical contexts in which texts are produced. This also coincided with the emergence of functional linguistics as an alternative paradigm to the idealised and abstract models of linguistic research represented by the Saussurean tradition and Chomskyan linguistics. While emphasizing the study of parole and the social dimension of language, these functional approaches often stressed the need to go beyond the sentence in doing linguistic analysis.

Coinciding with the “linguistic turn” in the humanities and social sciences which recognized the centrality of language as a structuring agent (Clark, 2004), the 1970s saw the publication of the first studies in which discourse analysis was explicitly identified as an “independent orientation of research within and across several disciplines” (Van Dijk, 1985 p.4), while new discourse-oriented theoretical paradigms emerged in areas like sociolinguistics (Labov, Sacks, Schegloff), pragmatics, speech act theory (Austin, Grice, Searle), linguistic anthropology (Gumperz, Hymes) and psycholinguistics (Kintsch, Rumelhart). A subsequent development took place in the late 1970s and early 1980s with the emergence of critical linguistics (CL) and Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) as distinct area(s) of inquiry within the more general discourse analysis paradigm. These new critical approaches shared with traditional methods of discourse analysis a focus on text as the basic unit of study and the Hallidayan idea of language as social semiotics. Yet, they differed from previous work in that they attempted to marry linguistic analysis from a functional perspective with social theories centred on the notions of power and ideology, inspired in the Neo-Marxist critical

theory of society as formulated by the Frankfurt School of Marxism, French Structuralist and Post-Structuralist theories (Althusser, Derrida, Barthes and Foucault) as well as Habermas's notion of 'universal pragmatics' emphasising the fundamental role that language-based social interaction plays as a mechanism for domination and social force (Hammersley, 1997); (Wodak & Meyer, 2001c).

Language use is never neutral according to CDA. It is shaped by complex relations of power and ideology said to govern all social practices. Such power relations are not always apparent to discourse participants since they remain hidden in the course of everyday social interaction. In consequence, one fundamental function of critical approaches to discourse analysis is to uncover "the structural relationships of dominance, discrimination, power and control as manifested in language use" (Wodak & Meyer, 2001c). Pennycook argues that the main difference between non-critical and critical approaches to discourse analysis rests in the shift from description to explanation: the focus is no longer placed on exploring how language is used beyond the sentence level but rather on Foucault's idea of "why at a given time, out of all possible things that could be said, only certain things were said" (Pennycook, 1994. p. 116). Despite interpreting discourse in terms of a dialectical relationship with social practice in which "discursive practices shape reality and at the same time are shaped by reality" (Fairclough, 1992 p. 60), it is society that is placed in the driver's seat by CDA (Teubert, 2010), as CDA works from top to bottom: from the social to the textual (Martin & Wodak, 2003). Ultimately, CDA aims at going beyond the notion of just "doing discourse analysis with an attitude" (Van Dijk, 2001b). Its goal is to bring about social change that starts by making the dominated aware of their condition (Van Dijk, 1985; 1993); (Pennycook, 1994).

This is why the tension between the macro and the micro levels of analysis is more patent in these critical versions of discourse analysis and the ways CDA has addressed this tension has led to much criticism. CDA has been accused of numerous methodological flaws in how the linguistic analysis of individual texts is linked with the study of social practices and structures. By focusing mainly on the analysis of the social context in which discursive practices are embedded, CDA often fails to provide sufficient empirical evidence on the linguistic side on how these discursive practices are enacted on a daily basis. CDA researchers are said to underemphasize the study of significant amounts of text and choose texts for analysis on the basis of exceptionality, if not convenience, rather than representativeness (Stubbs 1996), arriving at “premature conclusions about the significance of poorly described linguistic behaviour” (Bell, 1991 p. 215) and building an “elaborate theoretical and interpretive superstructure upon the frailest text-linguistic foundations” (Toolan, 1997 p. 93).

In a related type of criticism, CDA practitioners have been accused of ideological bias and teleological fallacy in interpreting individual texts on the basis of pre-conceived ideologies where the analyst often conflates text analysis with social explanation. Leading advocates of traditional approaches to discourse analysis have emphasized that no contextual categories such as power or ideology should be aprioristically imposed on the linguistic analysis of text or talk. Rather, sociocultural interpretation should strictly derive from the actual linguistic analysis in the texts. Otherwise social commitment may be compromising scholarship. This issue has been at the root of some heated academic debate: “Widdowson versus Fairclough” (Widdowson, 1995; 1996; 1998); (Fairclough, 1996), “Schegloff versus Wetherell and Billig”

(Schegloff, 1997; 1998; 1999); (Wetherell, 1998); (Billig, 1999a; 1999b); or “Tyrwhitt-Drake versus Flowerdew” (Tyrwhitt-Drake, 1999); (Flowerdew, 1999). As Widdowson argues, CDA takes for granted specific ideological constructs that are not empirically accounted for as if they could be read off straight from the texts. By producing alternative, and equally plausible, analysis to one of Fairclough’s texts, Widdowson successfully manages to equate the interpretation typically practised in CDA research to the approach employed in literary criticism, thus throwing into question the whole methodological apparatus of CDA.

In response to this accusation, CDA advocates readily admit that:

The application of contextualisation criteria is less strict in CDA than in other approaches such as CA [Conversation Analysis] and that [in CDA] there is no hesitation in examining text and context separately [...]. Once a feature of context has been observed, postulated or otherwise identified, CDA may be used to explore whether or how such a feature affects, or is affected by, structures of text and talk (Van Dijk, 1999 p. 460).

Furthermore, CDA scholars confess their pride in being biased (Van Dijk, 2001a) arguing that no research approach can ever be entirely neutral in terms of ideology (Billig, 1999a; Fairclough, 1996). In their view, CDA does not (and should not) preclude the possibility of alternative interpretations of texts, provided that these can be judged plausible (Flowerdew, 1999). Another common reaction from the CDA side is that in pragmatics and sociolinguistics research, context variables are somewhat naively correlated with an autonomous system of language (Wodak, 2001a); (Kress & Hodge, 1979); (Van Dijk, 1999) because these approaches tend to ignore the fact that texts are always ideologically loaded (Fowler, 1996); (Fairclough, 1996).

Yet more revealing and incisive criticism on the nature of CDA's ideological bias has come from Hammersley where he discusses the philosophical foundations of CDA and argues that a critical approach geared to serve a specific political agenda is nothing but controversial: "CDA does not only adopt a critical stance towards research products but also towards the social phenomena it studies. As a result, the criteria that guide this criticism are not just cognitive but also valuational" (Hammersley, 1996 p. 240). One should be ready to concede that no entirely objective analysis may be possible in social science research because such analysis will inevitably be constructed from a particular rhetorical standpoint. Yet, objectivity is a matter of extent. The fact that it cannot be achieved in absolute terms should not prevent us from seeking more scientific ways of analysing and interpreting texts. Individual texts may offer multiple interpretations. One way of justifying our interpretation is to have more comparison across texts, something CDA often fails to do (Stubbs, 1997).

A third type of criticism is connected with how the interdisciplinarity advocated by CDA practitioners is actually implemented in their research. Interdisciplinary work is often presented in deliberately vague terms in CDA and given the heterogeneity of theories and methodologies employed in this field it seems difficult to classify CDA as an independent area of study:

Indeed, heterogeneity of methodological and theoretical approaches represented in this field of linguistics would tend to confirm Van Dijk's point that CDA and CL 'are at most a shared perspective on doing linguistic, semiotic or discourse analysis (Wodak, 2001a p. 2).

Undoubtedly CDA has set itself an enormous task in trying to analyse the connection between language use and social theory. Such a task requires broad research aims and categories of analysis as well as a strong interdisciplinary vocation. But this should not mean

one should uncritically embrace interdisciplinarity without carefully considering the methodological challenges of interdisciplinary work. This is because different disciplines may not share similar goals or epistemological foundations and may tend to utilize different methods of data collection and analysis. In view of the unbridled eclecticism demonstrated in its research and disparity of methodological approaches employed, sometimes without any rigour, CDA has been accused of “not having any metamethod [and] no way of separating the correct and the useful from the banal” (Frawley, 1987 p. 363). Admittedly, no single discipline or methodology can handle this micro-macro relationship between language use and social practice satisfactorily. This requires some mediation across disciplinary domains not exempt from problems, as CDA practitioners have occasionally acknowledged (Wodak, 2001a). In addressing such problems, they advocate an integrated model of interdisciplinarity where different disciplinary approaches are treated as interdependent in the context of problem-oriented research (Weiss & Wodak, 2003). And yet one cannot fail to notice how methodological caution in cross-disciplinary work is easily overlooked in some CDA research where loud calls for taking discourse analysis beyond linguistics into the realm of social theory serve to mask mediocre research build upon the frailest of empirical foundations.

One final type of criticism against CDA has to do with the lack of a diachronic dimension in most of the work (Toolan, 1997; Blommaert, 2005). This is so despite the fact that it is not possible to demonstrate large-scale social practices and processes on the basis of empirical data not only restricted in size and scope, as we have seen before, but also in time range (Blommaert & Bulcaen, 2000). The discourse-historical approach developed by Wodak and her associates (Wodak, 1995; Van Leeuwen & Wodak, 1999) constitutes an important

exception. For instance, in their study of Austrian national identity Wodak et al (1999) aimed at tracing the intertextual history of phrases and arguments. The method combined the linguistic analysis of original documents, ethnographic research about the past, in the form of interviews with war veterans, and the analysis of contemporary news reporting and political discourse. Nevertheless, one can say the incorporation of historical research and/or the diachronic analysis of intertextuality is fairly rare not only in CDA but also in other forms of discourse analysis.

Many of these methodological shortcomings found in CDA could be addressed by introducing a corpus-oriented discourse analytical approach combining the more qualitative top-down analysis prevalent in discourse studies with the quantitative empirically-driven analysis of corpus linguistics (CL). First, CL tools help us reduce our cognitive bias when doing discourse analysis (Baker, 2006). The methodology employed in CL favours objectivity in that at the starting point of our analysis, data are not selected in an “*ad hoc*” fashion by the analyst in order to confirm existing biases. Second, the use of a corpus enhances the representativity of our data by bringing a quantitative dimension to our analysis. CL tools allow us to gain a much firmer grasp on the analysis of intertextuality patterns and trends than the intuitive and impressionistic methods so often employed in CDA. Hundreds of concordance lines no doubt provide a much more compelling evidence of underlying hegemonic discourses than isolated examples, allowing us to make reliable generalizations about language use (Stubbs, 1997). Third, while revealing what is typical in a particular discourse, corpus data can unveil the existence of counter-examples that may constitute proof of resistance discourses and can help us discriminate between what may be hegemonic from what may be anecdotal or counter-hegemonic. Fourth, the use of CL offers the benefit of

providing a more standardized method of analysis instead of the more “*ad hoc*” approaches often found in CDA. This way CL contributes to enhance the replicability of methods of analysis and the reliability of results (Stubbs, 1996; 1997). Finally, corpus-based studies have the potential of providing a much needed diachronic dimension to the analysis of discourse. Incorporating this historical dimension to discourse analysis is important because discourse and society are not static constructs. They evolve over time.

CL approaches are not free from methodological weaknesses and risks, though. The first problem every corpus linguist confronts has to do with corpus design, as the results of our research are only as good as the corpus one has utilized (Sinclair, 1991). Basic issues such as the size of the corpus, its contents (the extent to which those contents are relevant and balanced or whether the corpus has been compiled for the purposes of the research or a publicly available corpus has been employed); whether the corpus has been annotated or not etc., can be critical. Practical considerations such as the material and human resources, copyright issues or the timeframe available for research always condition the content and the size of the corpus, especially if one is compiling one’s own corpus. Another important consideration has to do with the purpose of our research. Arguably, producing a dictionary requires a type of corpus very different from the one we would need to study the construction of Spanish identities. Tidier purpose-built corpora may offer some advantages over larger reference corpora in studying how specific social practices are enacted through text. Being more homogeneous, they minimize the effects of contextual differences enhancing the quantitative analysis of relevant discursive features. They also facilitate the diachronic analysis of intertextual patterns and trends in relation to key historical events adding considerable explanatory power to our analysis. Tidiness and tightness, however, should not

constitute an excuse for *ad hoc* approaches in corpus compilation. As far as possible, when compiling a corpus, one should avoid the problems associated with corpus-based research approaches, “a methodology that uses corpus evidence mainly as a repository of examples to expound, test or exemplify given theoretical statements” (Tognini-Bonelli, 2001 p. 10) and comply instead with the criteria of corpus-driven research “where the corpus is used beyond the selection of examples to support or quantify a pre-existing theoretical category” (*ibid*, p. 11). In other words, texts should not be selected by the researcher on the basis of personal preference or convenience, as often happens in CDA, but rather should be chosen according to standard objective contextual and linguistic criteria. In view of this, a compromise solution has been adopted in selecting the texts for the corpus, making use of categorisations such as source, genre, year of publication and main discursive space and employing a lexical search query to minimise bias (see pages 241-242).

Another problem is the excessive dependence CL has on lexical evidence in doing DA, where the node word and its collocates often constitute the starting as well as the end point of the analysis (Koller & Mautner, 2004). Arguably, some forms of discourse may be more amenable to the kind of phraseological quantitative analysis CL provides than others. Also, if we limit our analysis to words and phrases, we run the risk of misjudging the impact of certain themes because these can be realized through different vocabulary or we may overlook linguistic phenomena operating beyond the delicate level of lexis, such as transitivity, modality, stance, recurrent *topoi*, etc. (Stubbs & Gerbig, 1993). While concordance analysis may reveal the existence of such phenomena, one may need to broaden the scope of the analysis to the level of whole-text for more accurate assessment to take place. A third type of risk associated with quantitative discourse analytical approaches is conflating

sheer frequency with hegemonic discourses (Baker, 2006). We should take into account that different texts carry different weight depending on “who says what” and that sometimes what remains unsaid is more important than what is said because a hegemonic discourse can be more powerful when it is taken for granted and is not contested. A case in point would be Billig’s work on Banal Nationalism (Billig, 1995). Also, corpus-oriented studies often neglect broader aspects typical of qualitative approaches such as the conditions of production and reception of texts or the analysis of genres.

In conclusion, all this points towards a need for combining the quantitative empirically-driven analysis of CL with the more qualitative top-down analysis prevalent in discourse studies. However, since the qualitative methods of CDA may often be at odds with the predominantly quantitative methodology employed by CL (Orpin, 2005), we need clearer guidelines to help us integrate both approaches effectively and make best use of the synergies such integration may generate. While corpus-oriented discourse analysis can enhance objectivity and help reduce the gap between the textual and the social, it needs to be supplemented with the study of the historically evolving contextual milieu in which text production and reception is situated. Also, social practice at the macro level cannot be adequately explained through bottom-up empirical analysis due to its sheer complexity. Its constitutive processes and structures are the result of complex chains of causes and effects operating at higher levels of time-space. As such, they may be analysed nomothetically but cannot be explained ideographically because they defy quantification. This does not undermine the potential corpus-based discourse studies offer for a more solid empirical foundation in social science research. The last section summarizes the main conclusions

reached in this chapter and outlines a methodology for studying the discursive construction of the Spanish nation.

2.6. A methodology for analysing of the discursive construction of the nation

It was concluded in chapter one that nations are social constructs and that nation-building is carried out discursively. It was also argued that the discursive construction of the nation as a historical process occurred in modern times, although not all its building blocks are necessarily modern. This chapter has presented a theoretical model to explain how this discursive construction of the nation operates. Let me summarize what has been said before outlining a methodology for the study of nation-building in Spain.

Nation-building is said to be enacted discursively, in terms of observable social practices situated across time-space. Such practices consist of multimodal semiotic work structured at different levels which in turn operate at different scales according to Giddens's theory of social structuration. At the lowest level we have myriad micro-events and event chains, such as the regular presence of flags in official buildings. Events such as these are enacted by reflexive social agents across dynamically inter-related social domains. The continuous reproduction of micro-events gives rise to processes operating at the meso-structural level in the timescale of conjuncture: see, for instance, the decentralization process Spain has experienced after 1975. At the macro level of structuration, we have highly abstract agent-less phenomena situated at the *longue durée*, such as time-space distancing, identity or territorialization. As Sewel (2005) explains, structures such as these consist of a duality of virtual cultural schema and actual resources which both enable and constrain social action at the meso and micro levels. Ideographic analysis, based on first-hand experiences grounded

on a strong empirical basis, is the preferred method in studying micro-events. Meso-processes are less susceptible to idiographic analysis than micro-events because they may operate along complex chains of causes and effects situated across different realms of the social, while the analysis of macro-structures can only be nomothetic, based on deductive generalization and rational argumentation.

Nation-building resulted from two inter-related phenomena. The first of these was the profound socio-economic changes of structural nature defined as “modernisation” leading to the emergence of a national mode of organization. A defining structure of modernisation was the progressive distancing between time and space where social action increasingly transcended the realm of the local. This turned nations into imaginable communities where the State was able to exercise its homogenising action over a territory in different phases, described by Taylor (2003) as “power container”, “wealth container”, “cultural container” and “social container”. Another key process of modernisation was the rise and consolidation of capitalism and industrialization in which Nation-States have operated as key political units. The second phenomenon implicated in nation-building was the nationalist mobilization led by the State and its elites which resulted in the emergence and diffusion of national narratives giving rise to more or less hegemonic identity discourses.

On the basis of these insights, I propose a discourse-oriented methodology to study nation-building in Spain combining the historical analysis of social structures, processes and events implicated in this construction with the study of national narratives during specific periods. Such a methodology would integrate the nomothetic and idiographic modes of analysis enabling me to test hypothesis and draw generalizations based on concrete empirical

evidence. On the one hand, I will examine the specific conditions present in the historical development of the national mode of organization in Spain, with particular emphasis on the effects derived from State-building and modernisation. This will consist of a critical review of historical accounts of Spanish nation-building and modernisation. The approach adopted here will be predominantly nomothetic given the structural complexity and higher level of abstraction of the phenomena being examined, although the discussion will be illustrated with concrete evidence from different periods. On the other hand, I will research the nature and level of nationalist mobilization by examining the construction of national narratives and analyse the extent to which more or less hegemonic nationalist discourses have led to the emergence and consolidation of specific forms of Spanish identity. In researching this aspect of nation-building, I will combine the nomothetic analysis of the historical conditions present in the formulation of such narratives with the idiographic commentary of such narratives based on concrete examples. This broader historical analysis will be complemented with a more focused quantitative empirical study of recent national narratives from the Spanish press. The idea is to triangulate the qualitative analysis of national narratives against a “quantitative snapshot” of how these narratives have been constructed in Spain in recent years based on data extracted from a large corpus of newspaper articles.

As argued before, this corpus-oriented discourse analytical approach can be a valid methodology for text-based analyses of social issues as it addresses some of the methodological shortcomings derived from alternative methods of discourse analysis and discourse-based historical research: it provides an objective method of text selection enhancing the representativity of our data; it offers a standardized replicable method of linguistic analysis and it allows us to make reliable generalizations about language used

based on large amounts of data, revealing what is typical in a discourse without neglecting the existence of counter-examples which may constitute proof of anecdotal or counter-hegemonic discourses. Ideally this corpus-based approach to text analysis should be applied to different historical periods. This is not possible due to the limitations in the scope of this research. The hope is to lay the foundation for future studies where the present findings could be contrasted against additional evidence.

I provide in chapter three a historical introduction to the development of the national mode of organization in Spain and I discuss the extent to which more or less consolidated Spanish identity discourses could emerge during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries by reviewing the work of historians, economists, sociologists and political scientists, with particular emphasis on macro structures and processes supplemented with concrete examples from specific periods. In Chapters four and five the emphasis will be on the micro. I will concentrate on the corpus-based discourse analysis of recent national narratives in the Spanish press. The approach adopted here will combine the more quantitative, lexically oriented methodology of corpus linguistics with the qualitative analysis of entire texts. Such approach is said to help us minimize the micro-macro gap by favouring objectivity and representativity and providing a more balanced and comprehensive method of linguistic analysis at different levels.

CHAPTER 3: THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE NATION IN SPAIN, A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

Introduction


This chapter discusses the historical process of Spanish nation-building from a broad social-semiotic perspective, examining two key phenomena implicated in the discursive construction of the nation, as theorized by Recalde (1982). The first one is the development of the national mode of organization, a concept influenced by Gellner's modernisation theory (Gellner, 1996; 1997). It can be defined as the social structures, institutions, processes and practices which emerged across different territories in Europe as a result of the dissolution of the old medieval world. On the one hand, the national mode of organization brought a re-configuration of the geographical scales in which key social practices were enacted, from the local to the national. On the other hand, it constituted the *milieu* upon which the second phenomenon implicated in nation-building operated: that of nationalist mobilization in the form of narratives which constituted the basis of national identities. Recalde (1982) stresses that while the national mode of organization prepared the ground for the formation and diffusion of national identities, it did not pre-determine any concrete forms of nationhood, which ultimately depended on the consolidation of institutions associated with hegemonic discourses of the nation over a bounded territory. That explains why in the Spanish case we have seen competing national identities.

In Spain, as in the case of the old political constructs described by Hobsbawm (1990), State-building went hand in hand with the development of the national mode of organization. Spain can be considered a political and territorial nation sprouting from a State which

emerged as the old medieval polities were transformed into absolute monarchies during the 15th and 16th centuries (de Blas Guerrero, 1989; García Cárcel 2002). That State began its transformation into a Nation-State mainly towards the second half of the 18th century as a result of the discursive processes and practices which continue nowadays as nation-building in Spain is being reproduced, and also contested, on a daily basis through social action structured at different scales, as theorized by Giddens (1984).

Based on this assumption, I will discuss the development of the national mode of organization and nationalist mobilization along the phases identified by Taylor (2003) inspired in the metaphor of the State as a “container”, gradually capable of articulating an increasing number and variety of social relations within a bounded territory (Sack, 1983; Johnston, 1991). I will examine the extent to which this complex process of territorialisation was accomplished successfully in Spain while acknowledging that State-building should be studied as part of a broader phenomenon of time-space re-organisation associated with the expansion of the capitalist world-system along the three globalization phases identified by Karsten (2013): terrestrial, industrial and electronic globalization. My discussion will be centred in the nomothetic analysis of the more general aspects of Spanish nation-building illustrated with concrete examples from different periods. Figure 3.1 illustrates the main phases of this territorialization characterized by the growing presence of the State in regulating increasingly homogenized social practices.

Figure 3.1.



Phases in the discursive construction of the nation

This transformation cannot be conceptualized in linear terms but in progressively incremental ones. Hearn captures the essence of this cumulative view of social evolution advocated here:

The story of our social evolution is not so much one of progressing through stages, marching from one social form to the next, but rather one of overlaying of older forms with newer ones, such that principles that were once dominant in governing human behavior are not so much replaced as encysted within new and more complex forms, in which what were once minor principles (centralized redistribution, market exchanges) become dominant ones (Hearn, 2006 p. 65).

Accordingly, structures like geographical scales do not vanish over time. Rather, once a different scale emerges as the preferred locus for the enactment of social practices, such as those implicated in nation-building, the alternative scales where those practices were previously anchored may become less active, although they may be re-activated in future if circumstances demand so. First we see States emerging as power containers out of the fragmented medieval polities during early modern times. Anchored in the local scale, the medieval order was characterized among other things by a fixed hierarchical God-ordained society; by a patrimonial idea of the polity rather than a socio-cultural one; by the co-existence of royal and seigneurial powers where the king was *primus inter pares*; by the prevalence of local laws, taxes and customs; by great cultural and linguistic diversity and by the prevalence of religion in conforming identities. Initially we see how the power of the king grows at the expense of the nobility and the State appears increasingly able to maintain peace within its territory and wage war outside its borders in competition with rival States, thanks to its ability to collect taxes and mobilize its subjects for service in the army.

A second phase during the early modern period saw the State expanding as a wealth container as the capitalist world-economy emerged, first as mercantilism and later

transformed into industrial capitalism. This marked the beginning of a process which culminated in the establishment of national economies in the context of an increasingly centralized State based on a more cohesive legal and governance framework in the regions; greater territorial control supported by a growing bureaucracy, an army as well as a growing urbanization resulting from the rural exodus supported by better communications and transport infrastructure.

In the third phase the State expanded into a “cultural container”. People were assimilated into a national culture as a result of the nationalist mobilization articulated by the State and by the elites captured in national narratives. The formation of national identities followed the sequence of penetration, integration, participation and identity (Linz, 1973), also made possible by the spread of literacy among the masses and the growing secularization of the society, where the Christian God co-existed with a secular god in many people’s hearts: that of the fatherland, its symbols and myths. Various institutions and institutionalized practices would play a key role in the nationalization of the masses. One was the education system, responsible for establishing a national curriculum chiefly aimed at turning individuals into nationals. Another one was a conscript army where patriotic values were promoted among people irrespective of their social class and geographical provenance. The mass media also contributed to the construction of national identities in a visible way, by narrating the nation according to their ideology, and in a covert way, by situating their discourse at the national scale.

The Nation-State would assume the role of “social container” towards the second half of the 20th century. This was the result of the progressive democratization of the State and the

re-distribution of wealth made possible by capitalist expansion in the era of the welfare States, thanks to a more efficacious taxation and a greater emphasis on social cohesion in State policies. The culmination of this process however has seen the supremacy of the Nation-State being questioned after the re-scaling of economic practices at the trans-national level, something that will be briefly discussed in this thesis.

The central argument presented in this chapter partly deviates from those who regard construction of the nation in Spain as an outright failure (Colomer, 2006; 2008). A moderate position is adopted where Spanish nation-building is conceptualized as weak and problematic:

Spain therefore is a case of early State-building where the political, social and cultural integration of its territorial components –nation-building- was not fully accomplished (Linz, 1973 p. 33).

Spain's deficient nation-building is made evident by the emergence of alternative nationalisms in Catalonia, the Basque Country and, to a lesser extent, Galicia during the second half of the 19th century and their consolidation after that. These centrifugal movements, which have co-existed with different discourses of Spanish nationalism since the 19th century, regained strength after Francoism and have pursued alternative national projects in the regions under their influence which are antagonistic to those advocated by mainstream *españolismo*.

In the following sections, I discuss some inter-related structures and processes influencing the discursive construction of the nation in Spain. I start by analysing the role played by geography in nation-building. I explore, in connection with this, the geographical and cultural concept of *Hispania* in Spanish historiography as an important component of

identity discourse. I will also discuss the following factors implicated in the problematic process of national construction in Spain:

1. The failure in constructing a viable unitary State during the 18th and 20th centuries despite repeated attempts, rooted in the different political and social configurations of the Spanish kingdoms in medieval times; the continuing political separation of the Crowns during the Habsburg period, and the complex transition from a world empire into a Nation-State experienced in Spain.
2. The problematic process of economic and social modernisation as the *Ancien Régime* was substituted by a modern society with a liberal system of property rights and a truly national community slowly emerged as a result of industrialization, developments in transportation and communications, urbanization, mass education and the increasing bureaucratization of the State. It will be argued that Spain's modernisation was late in comparison to that of most European countries and also uneven, due to the decline of the Castilian centre in favour of the periphery.
3. The lack of consensus on a hegemonic national discourse beginning with the failed liberal revolution during the nineteenth century, accompanied by a highly contested secularization process. This resulted in antagonistic national identity discourses at the centre and at the periphery which continue to exist nowadays.

3.1. Geography and nation-building in Spain

Geography constitutes a key structure in any territorialization process of nation-building characterized by the increasing ability of the State to exercise its control over a bounded territory, regulating and integrating social practices. As Braudel (1988) and Weber (1976)

emphasise with reference to France, geography conditioned how human action transformed what originally was a conglomerate of loosely connected peoples, once subjects of one king, into a modern community of citizens with equal rights and duties, conscious of constituting a nation. The role played by geography in Spain can be examined along the same lines. Juliana Ricart (2012) argues that Spanish nationalization has been weakest on the periphery, in what he calls “*España foral*” and “*España asimilada*” (Figure 3.2).

Figure 3.2.



España uniforme, España foral and España asimilada (Source: Juliana Ricart, 2012)¹⁴

Spain shares with Portugal the Iberian Peninsula, surrounded by the Mediterranean Sea, the Atlantic Ocean and the Bay of Biscay and separated from France by the Pyrenees. Spain is the second largest country in Western Europe after France, with a total area of 505,370 sq.

¹⁴ Uniform Spain, foral Spain and assimilated Spain.

km¹⁵. Figure 3.3 shows the map of the Iberian Peninsula. Whereas the Pyrenees practically sever Spain from France with their imposing height, there is no apparent natural border between Spain and Portugal. Far from that, the Iberian Peninsula appears as a distinct and yet highly complex unit, as Spain and Portugal share rivers, mountain ranges, climates and a similar rural structure. This geographical substratum can be analysed in connection with the opposing tendencies towards political unity and atomization present throughout history in the context of a problematic historical process of Spanish nation-building.

Figure 3.3.



Physical geography of the Iberian Peninsula¹⁶

In fact, the Iberian peninsula had already been identified as a geographical entity throughout Antiquity under a variety of names (Benito Ruano, 1998): *Anaku*, *Meschesch*, *Tarschisch*,

¹⁵ The world Factbook, Central Intelligence Agency 2012 (retrieved on 18-5-12)

¹⁶ Source: NASA visible earth (retrieved on 18-5-12)

Hesperia, *Ophioussa*, *Iberia*, *I-schephan-im* and eventually, in Roman times, *Hispania*, divided into three provinces around 27 B.C (figure 3.4) and later on into five provinces (figure 3.5).


Figure 3.4.



Roman Hispania circa 27 B.C.¹⁷

¹⁷ Source: http://bib.cervantesvirtual.com/portal/antigua/img_hispaniaromana.shtml (retrieved on 18-5-12)

Figure 3.5.



Roman Hispania between the 3rd and 5th centuries A.D.¹⁸

The concept of Hispania also appears in early narratives like Isidore's *Laus Hispanie* where the virtues of a land blessed by nature inhabited by noble people are exalted in the context of an identification of Hispania with the *Regnum Gothorum*, a connection also found in the works of bishop Julián de Toledo (circa 642-690) (García Moreno, 2005). The idea of *la pérdida de España*¹⁹ after the Muslim invasion in 711 and the Re-conquest initiated with the legendary battle of Covadonga reinforced the identification between Hispania and Visigoth Spain proclaimed in the *Chronicon Albeldensis* and the Chronicle of *Alfonso III*, where the Kingdom of Asturias is considered the continuation of the Visigoth monarchy (Suárez Fernández, 2005; Benito Ruano, 2005). In view of this, it has been suggested that this geographical concept of Hispania dating back to ancient times could constitute the basis for defining complex historical realities like that of Spain as it is understood nowadays (Ladero

¹⁸ Source: www.regmurcia.com/servlet/s.SI?sit=c.373,m.2916&r=ReP-26546-DETALLE_REPORTAJES (retrieved on 19-5-12)

¹⁹ The loss of Spain.

Quesada, 1994; 1998). This is the argument of those scholars associated with a perennialist conception of nationhood, claiming that a certain idea of Spain as a historical and cultural community was already present in people's minds, at least amongst an elite, long before the modern Spanish Nation-State emerged (Castro, 1954); (Marías, 1985); (Comellas & Suárez Fernández, 2003); (Bueno, 2005).

As discussed before (pp. 17-18), much of the evidence presented in support of this evolutionary view of nationhood comes from the analysis of how the concept of Spain was formulated in the medieval chronicles of the different kingdoms in the Iberian Peninsula (Maravall Casesnoves, 1954); (Suárez Fernández, 2000; 2005); (Valdeón Baroque, 2005). González Antón (2007) argues that the formulation of such a concept was by no means univocal. Rather, its nature was often overarching and polysemic, usually referring to a particular kingdom which was considered part of a broader historical and cultural reality pre-dating the Muslim invasion. In other words, the medieval Spanish kingdoms tended to be perceived as parts of a diverse Spain where political, juridical and cultural differences reigned. Interestingly, the fact that Portugal was an integral part of Hispania is conveniently overlooked in many perennialist accounts of Spanish nationhood where history is seen as an uninterrupted continuum and crucial differences between periods are usually minimized, if not blatantly ignored. In fact, in the last 1,300 years, we only see a relatively brief period of political union of all the territories once constituting Hispania: when the kingdoms of Castile-Leon, Aragon, Navarre and Portugal were ruled by the same kings between 1580 and 1640. Although the discourse of a hypothetical Iberian Union has resurfaced from time to

time among Portuguese and Spanish groups over the last two hundred years or so,²⁰ the fact that such union never materialized, and also the fact that Spanish nationhood remains a controversial issue within Spain, can partly be explained by this tension between unity and diversity rooted in Iberian geography.

Despite enjoying a certain sense of unity derived from its relative geographical isolation from the rest of Europe, there are also features in the geography of the Iberian Peninsula which inhibit communication, favouring diversity and fragmentation: the average altitude of the peninsula, 660 meters compared to France's average of 340 meters, makes Spain the second highest territory in Europe after Switzerland (López Gómez 1998). This no doubt conditioned the development of an efficient transportation system in Spain, as the markedly different profiles of the railway connection between Paris and Madrid illustrate (figure 3.6).

Figure 3.6.



Topographic profile of the railway Paris-Madrid via Irun (López Gómez, 1998)

²⁰ The last time it was a survey conducted at the University of Salamanca where one out of three Spaniards and almost 40% of the Portuguese asked would support an Iberian Union. Source: <http://www.elmundo.es/elmundo/2009/07/28/espana/1248786026.html> (retrieved on 21-5-12).

Similarly, inland communications have traditionally been inhibited by a lack of navigable rivers and failed canal-building projects during the 18th and 19th centuries, due to poor planning or financial problems. If we add to this the fact that Spain's modernisation process lagged behind the general trend in most European countries during much of the 19th and 20th centuries, to be discussed later on, one may assume how this combination of geographical and economic factors played a significant role in the comparatively weak nationalization of Spain. As Ruiz explains:

Look at a map of Spain and you will see a series of subregions in which political, linguistic, social and cultural boundaries run parallel to the geographical contours of the land. Follow the slopes of the mountain ranges, the edges of the great plains and the courses of the rivers, and you will find the topographical features sorting themselves into subdivisions which often (but not always) coalesce into particular political entities, or which, in an age of fragmented political autonomy, become individual Spains within the larger context of the peninsular State (Ruiz, 2001, p. 11).

3.2. Early State-building and the emergence of the national mode of organisation (1469-1716)

This section discusses the transformation of the atomized polities which emerged in the Iberian Peninsula during the *Reconquista* into pre-national forms of Statehood. This process became apparent during the second half of the 15th century, continued with mixed results during the Habsburgs and intensified with the Bourbons during the 18th century. The last decades of the 15th century and the opening years of the 16th constitute an important milestone. Many of the changes, and also continuities, occurring then shaped for better or worse the nature of what would become the modern Spanish nation. On a positive note, as Elliott insightfully argues, Spain's old-age shortcomings, its geographical obstacles, its fragmented and complex nature, suddenly seemed to have been overcome and what for so

long had largely been a mere geographical expression, was transformed into an historical fact:

For a few fabulous decades Spain was to be the greatest power on earth. During those decades it would be all but the master of Europe; it would colonize vast new overseas territories; it would devise a governmental system to administer the largest, and most widely dispersed, empire the world had yet seen; and it would produce a highly distinctive civilization, which was to make a unique contribution to the cultural tradition of Europe (Elliott, 1990 p. 13).

And yet, despite the positive effects brought by Spain's ascension to the world stage in terms of political, economic and military power, I will argue that further to the obstacles posed by an intricate geography, the development of the national mode of organization was affected by a number of factors: One of these was the deeply-rooted differences between Castile and Aragon concerning their distinct political and social configuration and their often contradictory historical evolution. Such differences and contradictions did not abate with the union of the Crowns under the Catholic Monarchs. On the contrary, they continued as a result of their preservationist policies and those of the Habsburgs, despite some timid attempts to bring the administration of the realms closer (Sánchez Albornoz, 1973). Another factor was the dynamics generated by Spain's imperial status, still rooted in many respects in a pre-modern patrimonial conception of the State (Bernal, 2005). These dynamics were not always conducive towards greater political integration within Spain as we will see.

García Cárcel (2002, p. 9) uses the expression "*España horizontal*" to describe this period of "federalism and pluralism" under the composite monarchy of the Habsburgs, as opposed to the "*España vertical*", the centralized Castilian-centred model inaugurated with the

Bourbons in 1716.²¹ This idealized interpretation of horizontal Spain, shared by Lluç (1999), has been questioned by González Antón (2007) who considers that García Cárcel sees federal pacts, regional liberties and constitutional government versus centralism and Absolutism where he should have seen the resistance of the local oligarchy rooted in a feudalizing horizontal model against modern Absolutism, which González Antón considers part and parcel of the State-building process leading towards the construction of the modern Nation-States. Regardless of which of the two interpretations one may prefer, García Cárcel's distinction between a horizontal and a vertical Spain remains valid in that it points to a multi-directional and contradictory process of nation-building.

At the start of this long transformational process we have a series of independent kingdoms which had originated in the Iberian Peninsula during the Christian expansion against Islam known as the *Reconquista* (figure 3.7). The *Reconquista* brought a sense of common purpose to the peoples of "Spain" who had joined forces against Islam. Testimonies in this respect abound: from the idea of "loss" and "recuperation" of *Hispania* found in medieval chronicles, to the various enthusiastic declarations of unity (González Antón, 2007). Take for instance the remark of the town councillors of Barcelona made in a letter to those of Seville on the occasion of the marriage between Ferdinand and Isabella: "now [...] we are all brothers" (Elliott, 1990 p. 24); or Joan Margarit i Pau's congratulatory words in the prologue of his *Paralipomenon Hispaniae*, dedicated to the Catholic Monarchs:

[...] con vuestro enlace matrimonial habéis devuelto aquella unidad que desde tiempos de los romanos y de los visigodos había perdido" (quoted in González Antón, 2007 p. 187); (see also Tate, 1954).²²

²¹ This was the year when the Nueva Planta Decree for Catalonia which sought to centralize Spain under the Castilian model was issued. Similar decrees had been issued in 1707 for Aragon and Valencia in 1707 and Majorca in 1715.

²² With your marriage you have restored that unity lost since the times of the Romans and the Visigoths.

Or, as Peter Martyr d'Anghiera remarked in a letter in 1489 after observing the Christian armies:

Who would have thought that the Galician, the proud Asturian and the rude inhabitant of the Pyrenees would be mixing freely with Toledans, people of La Mancha, and Andalusians, living in harmony and obedience, like members of one family, speaking the same language and subject to one common discipline? (López de Toro, 1953) (quoted in Kamen, 2003 p.17).

Figure 3.7.



The Iberian Peninsula: 1270-1492

Notwithstanding this sense of shared identity based on the idea of being part of an over-arching territorial, historical and cultural reality, these were, like elsewhere in Europe, socially stratified polities ultimately conceived as patrimonial States, where the kings saw their powers constrained by a powerful nobility and where the struggle for hegemony often resulted in matrimonial alliances between dynastic houses. Some effects of this lack of strong and centralized power were political atomization; the absence of a unified legal system; a fragmented economy and cultural heterogeneity, as illustrated by the fact that

linguistic borders were imprecise and that different codes were employed in the same territory depending on the context, the audience and the genre employed (Moreno Fernández, 2005).

The union between Castile and Aragon resulting from the marriage between Isabella and Ferdinand in 1469 represented an important step towards political unity although this was not yet the union of two peoples, something unimaginable in an epoch characterized by social fragmentation, but of two royal houses linked by close family ties.²³ Although they shared the same monarchs, Castile and Aragon retained their own institutions, political organizations and distinct ways of life. Historians generally agree that these long-standing differences between the kingdoms, together with their often contradictory historical evolution would hamper the process of building a unitary Nation-State attempted from the 18th century onwards.

When the dynastic union between Aragon and Castile materialized, it represented an unequal partnership on many accounts. The differences in size, demographics, social structure, political organization, economics, and historical trajectory between the two sides would condition the process of State-building in Spain for centuries to come. The kingdom of Castile was considerably larger and more populated than the Kingdom of Aragon. Its 378,000 Sq.-km. represented two thirds of the Iberian Peninsula, about three times the size of Aragon (Ruiz Almansa, 1943). Population estimates at the time vary considerably. In any case, even the most conservative figures leave no doubt as to the demographic imbalance between the two kingdoms. Comellas and Suárez Fernández (2003) estimate that Castile had

²³ Ferdinand and Isabella were in fact second cousins. Aragon had been ruled by a junior branch of the Castilian House of Trastámara since the compromise of Caspe in 1412, after the death of Martin I, the Humane, who had died sonless.

a population between 3 and 4 million by 1348 compared to 1 million in Aragon and 80,000 in Navarre. Alvar (1996) suggests a population for Castile of 4,300,000 (82%), 855,000 for Aragon (16%) and 100,000 for Navarre (2%) towards the beginning of the 16th century while Elliot (1990) estimates a population for Castile between 5 and 6 million inhabitants compared to 1 million in Aragon during the same period. By the end of the 16th century, Ruiz Almansa (1943) calculates a population of 8,304,000 (84.33%) for the kingdom of Castile, 1,358,000 (13.79) for the kingdom of Aragon and 185,000 (1.87%) for Navarre. The latter also suggests a higher population density for Castile (22 inhabitants per Sq.-km.), compared to 13.6 in Aragon, something difficult to imagine after the demographic shift of the 18th century which saw the displacement of the population from the centre to the periphery, as we will see later on.

Despite its social and political turmoil in previous decades, Castile's future would prove to be brighter than that of Aragon during the next two hundred years. According to Elliott (1990), Castile was then a flourishing society with a clearer sense of purpose, whose economy was being transformed by the growth of the wool trade. The reinforcement of royal power achieved by the Catholic Monarchs over the nobility and the Church finally brought peace and stability to the land, allowing Castile to unleash its potential at a time when the discovery of new lands opened the way for imperial expansion. Comparatively speaking, Aragon constituted "a society in retreat" after its conquests and economic empire had peaked. Despite being weak and exhausted after a long crisis, Aragon managed to preserve a constitutional system which prevented the kings from exercising the kind of powers they enjoyed in Castile. These differences in the social and political configurations between the two Crowns would condition the process of territorialization in Spain, as the State evolved

from the comparatively weak and atomized medieval structures to the more unified and centralized absolute monarchies of the early modern era.

The advancement towards Absolutism would continue with the Habsburgs coinciding with Spain's imperial hegemony in the 16th and 17th centuries. This transformation did not implicate a stronger articulation of society, which would remain politically fragmented and culturally heterogeneous for several centuries. Therefore, one cannot yet speak of modern national relationships but of the progressive expansion of an embryonic State built on royal authority and the establishment of a more vigorous political nexus between the monarchs and the territory. As an emerging urban bourgeoisie revealed the dysfunctionality of the old feudal links, royal authority rose above the power of the noblemen: the king became not only lord of vassals but also the holder of sovereignty (González Antón, 2007). This newly-acquired political power would alter the relationship between the monarchy and the territorial community governed by the king. The kingdom was progressively transformed into a sovereign territory conceived as indivisible.

According to the structuration model proposed before, this transformation occurred gradually. The old private feudal relationships co-existed with new practices until the former appeared obsolete and were overruled by State laws. More importantly, the transformation operated very differently in terms of fashion and pace in Castile and Aragon (Linz, 1973; Elliott, 1990; González Antón, 2007): in Castile, the expansion of the State brought higher levels of depersonalization and technification of political relations which secured the primacy of royal power through the formation of a modest bureaucracy responsible for administering the government and collecting taxes. This bureaucracy proved able to ensure the loyalty of the

towns and strengthen royal authority at the expense of the aristocracy. Rather than representing an entirely new creation, the institutions of the new State emerged from the transformation of existing ones. The new councils, a key element in the governance of the territory, evolved from the private royal councils of previous centuries. Controlled by the *grandees* earlier on, the councils became increasingly professionalized with the incorporation of jurists and officials faithful to the monarchy after 1480. The royal secretaries played a key role in the new administration. They liaised between the sovereign and the council, assisted in the preparation of meetings and advised the king on policy matters. At the municipal level, the expansion of the Castilian State was accomplished through the newly-created institution of the *Corregidor* towards the end of the 14th century (Bermúdez Aznar, 1974). Responsible for governing the towns, the figure of the *Corregidor* gained in importance under the Catholic Monarchs after being established in all major Castilian towns. Each *Corregidor* was assisted by a team of *Alcaldes*, *Alguaciles* and *Escribanos*²⁴ who helped establish royal authority throughout Castilian towns counteracting the influence of the nobility.

Another important development was the organization of the Treasury with its accountants and appointed officials supported by a tax system partly inherited from previous epochs: sales taxes, customs, local tributes and monopolies, as well as by contributions from the *Cortes*. A new system was established: private agents were no longer responsible for tax collection which became now the responsibility of the towns. Each town would pay the treasury an agreed amount and divide it among its dwellers. Despite the regional imbalances within the Crown of Castile,²⁵ the new fiscal policies strengthened the royal treasury which was increasingly able to collect more taxes at the expense of the aristocracy. Comparatively

²⁴ Mayors, mayor's assistants and notaries public.

²⁵ Galicia's taxes, for instance, remained under the control of a powerful local aristocracy.

speaking, the Crown's income in Aragon remained stagnant with a tax system anchored in old practices (Ladero Quesada 1973; 1982).

A third pillar in the expansion of the Castilian State was the constitution of an incipient security force and professional army. Founded in 1476, the *Santa Hermandad* was a rural militia responsible for combating banditry funded by general taxes. Each town was responsible for policing its territory and criminals were summarily judged locally. By 1493 the Crown also had a permanent cavalry corps, the "*Guardias de Castilla*", considered to be the first professional troops at the service of any monarchy in Europe. New royal ordinances in 1495-1496 opened the possibility of mobilizing one out of twelve men aged between twenty and forty-five and regulated the financing and organization of each military unit called *Tercios*, which soon acquired great prestige after a series of military victories in Europe. These changes signalled the end of the feudal army system paving the way for the State's monopoly on institutional violence at the expense of the aristocracy.

Also, the new Inquisition organized by the Catholic Monarchs would promote religious orthodoxy in order to achieve the religious unity necessary for the success of their State-building project. Based on the medieval Aragonese model established by the popes, the institution was introduced in all the other kingdoms. This was by no means done in a uniform fashion, as each kingdom had its own tribunal. Yet, the Inquisition would prove an important political tool for the expanding State to exercise its control over the different territories, despite the misgivings and resistance of the Church (Netanyahu, 1995; Kamen, 1998).

This bureaucratization and professionalization of the State was accompanied by a process of legal standardization as royal powers rose above local customs and regulations. The establishment of the *Audiencias Reales* as the highest courts in each realm strengthened the justice system in the kingdoms. Based on the model provided by the Royal Audiencia and Chancery of Valladolid in 1371, similar institutions were set up in Galicia (1479) and Granada (1505). They represented an important step towards the professionalization of justice and the elimination of private feudal justice. The first ordinance of the Audiencia of Catalonia dates back to 1483 and those of Aragon and Valencia begin to be organized towards 1507 and 1510. The system of Audiencias would spread throughout the kingdoms of Aragon and Castile, including the Indies, later on. Another step in this direction was the adoption of local *fueros* by neighbouring areas forming “families of *fueros*” and the revision and amalgamation of local usages by the Crown in order to promote legal standardization, a process which begun in the 13th century. A growing legal technification was achieved by the implantation of the old Roman law promoted by the monarchs and their jurists and opposed by the local aristocracy and the clergy. These constituted the initial steps towards the universalization of the law. Eager to preserve their ancient privileges, the local elites proclaimed the right to revolt against the king’s authority if the *fueros* and privileges granted in the feudal pact were not respected. The Crown’s policies prevailed at times; on occasion compromise was sought. But the process of political homogenization initiated at the time proved to be irreversible in the end (González Antón, 2007).

The State-building process outlined above differed greatly in the Crown of Aragon where a weaker monarchy proved unable to exercise a similar level of control over the privileged classes as in Castile. Aragon’s political fragmentation, where each kingdom preserved its

own political institutions and laws, further undermined the action of the monarchs, forced to deal with three separate parliaments. The monarchs often delegated their authority to their viceroys, appointed noblemen acting on their behalf who dealt with the institutions in each of the kingdoms (*ibid*). Acting separately in the kingdoms which formed the Crown of Aragon, the elites retained much of the control of the institutions while the Crown struggled to gain the support of royal-charter cities and towns. A bastion of the oligarchies and the urban patriciate, the Aragonese *Cortes* became the reverse of their Castilian counterpart where even the presence of nobles and clergymen became increasingly rare as early as the 15th century (Claramunt, 2004). By the time Ferdinand was proclaimed king, the power of the nobility, the clergy and the towns had been consolidated in practice as well as consecrated in their *fueros*. This status quo would continue during his reign and would be inherited by the Habsburgs.

In conclusion, the union of Castile and Aragon represented an important first step towards Statehood although it is too soon to speak of national unity. Spain constituted a political entity as far as it was ruled by the same kings, although each kingdom retained its political institutions, laws, customs and currency. There might have been a certain sentiment of belonging to a geographical and cultural community based on narratives of a Roman *Hispania* being recovered from Islam, at least among the intellectual elites.²⁶ But identity at the time was not yet centred in the nation. Furthermore the geographical barriers, primitive communications, low literacy rates and above all the functional needs of what still were highly-fragmented pre-industrial societies would constitute formidable barriers for the emergence of a more homogeneous national culture for centuries to come. Also, the

²⁶ In any case, the union of all the kingdoms which constituted Hispania only occurred between 1580-1640 when the Habsburgs ruled in Spain and Portugal.

differences in size, population, political institutions and historical trajectories resulted in an unequal union between the kingdoms. Better prepared to face the challenge at the time, Castile, like England, would be destined to play the leading role in Spanish nation-building while the peoples of Aragon would have to content themselves with a subordinate role.

State-building continued under the Habsburgs (1506-1700) coinciding with Spain's imperial adventure, a parallel process which would affect subsequent nation-building in significant ways. In general terms, the State model of Habsburg Spain continued to be that of the composite monarchy, based on the strict political differentiation of the Crowns of Castile and Aragon configuring Spain as a loose federation of kingdoms ruled by a single monarch. Testimony to this policy of *e pluribus unum* can be found in the advice of Charles V to his son Phillip II:

No conviene hacer apartamiento de los miembros que Dios quiso juntar en un cuerpo, entendemos de servirnos juntamente de todas las naciones de nuestros reinos y señoríos, guardando a cada uno de ellos sus leyes y costumbres (quoted in García Cárcel, 2004a p. 268).²⁷

Os aviso que en el gobierno de Cataluña seáis más sobre aviso porque más presto podríais errar en esta gobernación que en la de Castilla así por los fueros y constituciones todas, como porque sus pasiones no son menores que las de otros y úsanlas mostrar más (quoted in García Cárcel, 2004a p. 269).²⁸

The bureaucratization of the State continued with the creation of new institutions: in addition to the Councils of Navarre, Flanders, Portugal and Italy, the latter formerly integrated with Aragon, we see the creation of the important Council of State (1521) presided over by the king to deal with the most critical issues; a committee to deal with war affairs (1522), which

²⁷ It is not suitable to keep apart the limbs which God meant to join in a single body, we intend to be jointly served by all the nations in our kingdoms and dominions, preserving in each of them their laws and customs.

²⁸ I advise you to be especially careful governing Catalonia. You may err more easily in governing Catalonia when compared to Castile because of their *fueros* and constitutions and also because their passions are not less than other people's and they tend to exteriorize them more often.

would become the Council of War in 1586, also presided over by the king, and the Council of Finance (1523). The entire State apparatus would eventually be composed of fifteen councils, including the Royal Chambers of Castile and Aragon. There were also numerous technical committees, called *juntas*, which dealt with minor issues beyond the scope of the councils. The figure of the viceroy was also strengthened after they assumed the roles of Captain General and president of *Audiencia* in the territories under their control. More *Audiencias Reales* were established in Seville (1525), the Canaries (1526), Sardinia (1564), Sicily (1569) and Majorca (1571).

The expansion of the State took place at the expense of the local oligarchies who would continue resisting this process with mixed results, more successfully in Aragon than in Castile. González Antón (2007) considers the rhetoric in defence of the freedoms often employed by the *Cortes* in Aragon and Catalonia as intrinsically antimodern, being an attempt by the regional elites to preserve their feudal privileges against the growing Absolutism of the monarchy, considered by him a sign of modernity at the time. Other historians tend to see this process in more ambiguous terms when they emphasize the centralization and homogenization of the State to the detriment of regional differences and liberties. García Cárcel's (2002) dichotomy of "*España horizontal-vertical*" arguably reflects this alternative interpretation of a Spanish history from the periphery where Castilian Absolutism is contrasted with Aragonese contractualism. Regardless of the interpretation to one may subscribe, the important thing is that the wind was blowing in the direction of the monarch all over Europe and further centralization was to come.

As the State continued with its expansion, a growing *españolización* can be perceived in the political discourse at the time. Some of its building blocks were a common identity based on a lingua franca increasingly used across the different territories, a common religion and a shared historical narrative centred in Spain's providential mission as imperial power and bastion of the Catholic faith (García Cárcel, 2004a). However the survival of a patrimonial conception of the State and the lack of political reforms towards the unification of the different kingdoms in a single State hampered this homogenization (Elliott, 1984; González Antón, 2007). Castile's hegemony in this process of State-building continued with renewed strength not only thanks to its demographic and economic dominance, which grew further during the 16th century, but also as a result of Castile's newly found geostrategic advantage with the shift of international politics from the Mediterranean to the Atlantic. Castile's hegemony was enhanced with the monopoly in the American trade, becoming the sole recipient of the precious metals from the Indies, and its proximity to north-western Europe, a key source of fiscal revenue in the Habsburg Empire. This occurred as the Aragonese were often denied the right to colonize the Indies, formally annexed to Castile alone, and a good opportunity to foster national unity resulting from the close collaboration of all the peoples in the common task of colonization was thus forfeited (Elliott, 1990). The establishment of the court in Madrid and El Escorial during the reign of Phillip II would also place the government and symbolic centre of the Empire in Castile while the institutions of the composite monarchy were increasingly influenced by the Castilian model.

The consolidation of Castilian as the dominant language occurred during this time, paving the ground for its transformation into a national and international language, Spanish, as the decline of other romance languages accentuated. This was not only the result of Castile's

demographic superiority, political hegemony and economic prosperity. The early standardization of the language achieved after the publication of the first grammar in 1492 and the first orthographic rules in 1517 by Antonio de Nebrija and the growing prestige of Castilian as an international language of politics and culture with a rich literature constituted also important factors (Moreno Fernández, 2005). Other aspects in the growth of a common Spanish identity were the first steps towards the nationalization of the historical memory and the diffusion of a shared value system based on the Catholic ideal and Spain's imperial mission in the context of the Counter-Reformation. The publication of Juan de Mariana's *Historiae de rebus Hispaniae* in 1592, translated into Spanish in 1601, represented a milestone as the first history of Spain from its origins till the 16th century ever written. The histories of the Indies exalting the deeds of the conquerors also contributed to this historical memory. A new epic vision of Spain, “*martillo de herejes, luz de Trento, espada de Roma [...]*”²⁹, also emerged during the reign of Phillip II exalting Spain's providential role in the evangelization of America and the defence of Catholicism, contributing significantly towards the configuration of a budding Spanish identity. In any case, one cannot yet speak of a national identity in the modern sense because the concept of nation at the time had not yet acquired its political meaning. Two key ingredients of nationalism were still missing: the connection between an official culture and the State power and the idea of popular sovereignty. It is more appropriate to speak of a budding ethno-patriotism, a form of pride towards a particular ethnic or cultural community expressed in the context of an exaltation of a warring monarchy which constituted the cornerstone of this growing Spanish identity (Álvarez Junco, 2001). This link between monarchy and Spain, not yet apparent in the idea

²⁹ “Hammer of heretics, light of Trent, sword of Rome [...]”. This is a quote from Menéndez Pelayo's *Historia de los heterodoxos españoles* referring to this epoch. Published in 1880-1882, this is a key reference in the National-Catholic narrative of the Spanish nation.

of universal monarchy of Charles V,³⁰ will grow in importance during the Habsburg period as part of the legitimizing discourse of an expanding State. This can be perceived in the display of new symbols exalting Spanish history together with the traditional dynastic symbols of the Habsburgs in the new palace of Phillip IV (Brown and Elliott, 1980). Also, the notion of *limpieza de sangre*,³¹ which became widespread towards the second half of the 16th century, permeated the entire Spanish society, as the discrimination against Jewish and Muslim converts and their descendants became institutionalized.

Spain's imperial adventure coincided with these early stages of nation building. The relationship between the two phenomena has been analysed by Bernal (2005) in its political, social and economic dimensions. He concludes that Spain's imperial expansion represented to a large extent a missed opportunity for nation building because the empire arrived too early to be a catalyst in the nationalization process, resulting in an unfinished national project when the imperial distraction disappeared. The imperial project was born entangled in the archaic patrimonialism of the Habsburg monarchy inherited from the medieval period. Charles's empire was very much rooted in a dynastic, Christian and universalist conception of the world, in what Vilar (1962) called the "supreme stage of feudalism". Part of the empire may have ended up being Spanish but it started as Castilian, Aragonese, Austrian, German, Flemish, etc. according to the model of a composite monarchy (Kamen, 2003) (Figure 3.8).

³⁰ For instance, Charles V used the title "*Augustus Imperator Caesar*" far more often than "*Hispaniarum rex*" and avoided using the symbols of the Spanish kingdoms in his coat of arms.

³¹ "Cleanliness of blood."

Figure 3.8.



The Habsburg Empire of Charles V³²

Bernal (2005) argues that the empire functioned like another element of this composite monarchy characterized by a power system of indirect government. It was not a dependent empire but a negotiated one, which did not require a strong Nation-State, as was the case with Holland whose empire was built between 1576 and 1648 as it achieved its national independence. The Spanish empire was the prototype of a subordinated empire whose conquest was initially “outsourced” to the conquerors and then governed by the Crown through viceroys, officials and *Audiencias*.³³ The dynamics of power established in the context of the empire did not always act as unifying forces within Spain, partly because of Aragon’s exclusion from the colonization process and the dominating position of Castile

³² Source: www.rootsweb.ancestry.com/~wggerman/map/hapsburg.htm (retrieved on 8-7-2012).

³³ The Capitulations of Santa Fe signed in 1492 between Christopher Columbus and the Catholic Monarchs constitute a very good example of this subordination.

which often led to “the resentment of the Portuguese, the disappointment of the Catalan, the submission of the Aragonese, the privileges of the Basque and the appeasement of the rest” (*ibid*, p. 94).³⁴

From an economic perspective, the empire also failed to create the conditions for national unification, as Spain’s expansion was rooted in archaic medieval structures which led to economic inefficiency. Contrary to the English or Dutch mercantile colonial model associated with the rapid industrialization of those countries in the 18th and 19th centuries, the Spanish colonization over-dependended on mining and was closely linked to the international monetary economy. Relying almost exclusively on public credit to fund its wars, Spain was the only bullionist country in Europe, responsible for almost 50% of the monetary circulation between 1492 and 1740. As a result Spain became a victim of its own monetary wealth. Added to this was the dependence on European manufactures as a result of Castile’s incapacity to meet the economic demands of the colonies, largely due to its demographic weakness. In the end, the monarchy squandered the enormous resources of the Indies and enriched its European rivals without promoting any industrialization at home: “Spain was poor because Spain was rich” (Fuentes, 1999 p. 157). Bernal’s conclusion is that the construction of an integrated national State was never completed. Due to the financial, fiscal and credit characteristics of its relationship with the Indies, Spain ended up subordinating the economic interests of the metropolis to those of the colonies and the Spanish society eventually became a hostage of its own empire. Kamen’s vision of the empire seems to lead to a similar conclusion:

³⁴ My translation.

We are accustomed to the idea that Spain created its empire, but it is more useful to work with the idea that the empire created Spain. At the outset of our historical period, 'Spain' did not exist, it had not formed politically or economically, nor did its component cultures have the resources for expansion. The collaboration of the peoples of the peninsula in the task of empire, however, gave them a common cause that brought them together and enhanced, however imperfectly, peninsular unity (Kamen, 2003 p. XXV).

Spain's imperial adventure proved to be a fragile foundation for nation-building in the long run because it did not lead towards greater integration of the territories which constituted the composite monarchy. Rather, it led to the subordination of most territories to Castile. When the empire faltered because the costs of defending it became unbearable, not only would Castile pay a huge price for its leading role, but also the composite monarchy model would prove untenable. The crisis was already manifested in Olivares's attempts towards greater centralization in his famous memorandum of 1624 to Phillip IV:

Tenga VM por el negocio más importante de su Monarquía el hacerse Rey de España; quiero decir, Señor, que no se contente VM en ser Rey de Portugal, de Aragón, de Valencia, Conde de Barcelona, sino que trabaje y piense con consejo mudado y secreto, por reducir estos reinos de que se compone España, al estilo y leyes de Castilla sin ninguna diferencia, que si VM lo alcanza, será el Príncipe más poderoso del mundo.

(The most important thing in your Majesty's Monarchy is for you to become king of Spain: by this I mean, Sir, that Your Majesty should not be content with being king of Portugal, of Aragon, of Valencia and count of Barcelona, but should secretly plan and work to reduce these kingdoms of which Spain is composed to the style and laws of Castile, with no difference whatsoever. And if Your Majesty achieves this, you will be the most powerful Prince in the world) (quoted in Elliott, 1984 p. 200).

Another important step was Olivares's attempt to create a Union of Arms where the peoples of the composite monarchy would contribute to the defence of the empire, a burden which had been disproportionately shouldered by Castile. The plan met with the opposition of the Catalan *Cortes* and no agreement with the monarchy was reached. Only Aragon and Valencia supported the enterprise. The Catalan and Portuguese revolts of 1640 represented another milestone in this confrontation between the centralizing aspirations of the monarchy

and the socio-political structures inherited from the middle ages. Portugal would eventually achieve its independence while Catalonia would return to the Spanish monarchy after a short chaotic period of separation under the vassalage of France. The terms of the agreement secured by the Catalans included the Crown's renunciation of any centralizing reform. This situation continued during the reign of Charles II which according to Elliott (*ibid*) represented a golden age for provincial autonomy, characterized by a quasi-superstitious respect toward regional rights and privileges on the side of a Crown too weak to protest. This represented a pyrrhic victory by the Catalans, as the centralization of the State was simply postponed for some time.

While the political forces continued leading Spain towards greater centralization in line with the Castilian model, the economic and demographic tide was beginning to work against this. The failure to recover from the European economic crisis of the 17th century marked the beginning of Spain's centuries-old divergence from the western European capitalist core which would emerge after the crisis of the 17th century (Hobsbawm, 1965). This failure, comparatively more acute in Castile than in other territories, also marks the beginning of an economic and demographic shift from the centre towards the periphery, effectively reversing the trends of the 15th and 16th centuries. This shift has continued unabated until the present times:

This contrast between the economic and demographic behaviour of the interior and the coastal areas during the second half of the seventeenth century can be regarded as the starting point of the growing gap in economic development and wealth between the different regions of Spain. This gap continued to widen throughout the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries to the present day, with the end result that is exactly the opposite of the situation in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, when the interior was the richest, most developed part of the country (García Sanz, 1994 p. 14).

The crisis not only triggered a significant fall in agricultural production, a livestock crisis and the decadence of the Castilian centres of industry and commerce (*ibid.*), it also led to a sharp depopulation and deurbanization from which Castile would not recover. What had been the most populated region in Spain and one of Europe's most urbanized areas in the second half of the 16th century became towards the second half of the 17th a clear example of urban network collapse Gelabert (1994).³⁵ While admitting the existence of separate causes behind the crisis in individual cities, Gelabert (*ibid*) points to an overriding general explanation, namely the increasing fiscal pressure on Castilian cities resulting from the need to fund Spain's imperial adventure. This pressure led to mass migration from the cities to the countryside triggering a re-organization of the population into small and medium-size communities in order to escape the burdens suffered by the people in the cities. While some authors even speak of "refeudalization" (Atienza Hernández, 1994), others (Yun Casalilla, 1994) deny that possibility arguing that the crisis did neither lead to a fragmentation of the political system nor to a decrease of royal power. Yet, both authors concur that the crisis of the 17th century reinforced the links between the monarchy and the nobility and strengthened the control of the upper classes on the economy as a whole in Castile. This reverse in fortunes between Castile and the coastal regions would significantly hinder the centralizing nation-building project orchestrated from Madrid during the next centuries as we will see.

³⁵ Castile's population in 1700 was 5% less than that in 1591 and by 1789 there were fewer centres with a population of 2,500 and 10,000 inhabitants than there had been in 1591.

3.3. The construction of the Spanish nation in modern times: social transformations and State-building

This constitutes a period of dramatic change brought by modernisation as the national mode of organization, chiefly characterised by an expanding State and by the identification between polity and culture, became fully established. Significant structural transformations occurred: capitalist expansion triggered the decline of traditional atomized agricultural societies cemented on birth rights and entailed land, substituted by industrialized literate urban societies based on private property and profit accumulation, better connected through transportation and communications. The *Ancien Régime*, a rigidly stratified God-ordained social order presided over by the king and based on inherited legitimacies, was substituted by the “nation”, a cultural community where sovereignty resided in the people according to the Rousseauian principle of “collective will” (Recalde, 1982; Pérez Vejo, 1999). Also, capitalist expansion would chiefly operate at the national scale during this stage of modernisation.

Despite a strong centralizing drive after dynastic change, nation-building in Spain would be hindered by a problematic modernisation in the context of a complex transition from a world empire into a Nation-State. This would result in a weak State, despite the advances in State-building, still influenced by the inertias of Spain’s imperial model; a late and uneven industrialization; a shift in the country’s social configuration associated with demographic and economic trends and a highly unstable political climate characterized by a legitimacy crisis which ultimately prevented the formulation of hegemonic narratives of the nation.

The centralizing process initiated with the Habsburgs and interrupted after the 1640 crisis resumed with renewed strength with Phillip V of Bourbon after defeating the Austrian

candidate to the Spanish throne in the War of Succession (1701-1714). Castile had aligned with the French prince while Aragon opted for the Archduke Charles of Austria. The Bourbons promoted a series of reforms destined to modernize the State and raise Spain's international standing. The most important of these reforms were the Nueva Planta decrees (1707-1716) which suppressed the *Fueros* and the institutions specific to the Crown of Aragon and imposed a more uniform State structure in the territories of the Spanish Monarchy. Only the *Fueros* and institutions of the Basque Provinces and Navarre, allied with Phillip V in the war, were preserved. The decrees rationalized the State administration establishing three basic institutions in all the kingdoms of the Spanish Monarchy: the Captain General, the *Audiencia* and the *Intendencia* (Cánovas Sánchez, 1985). In substitution of the Viceroy, the Captain General became the most important political and military figure after the king in each territory. They headed the *Audiencias*, the army and directed the State apparatus. Royal orders were channelled through the *Audiencias*, also responsible for administering justice according to the Castilian model. The role of the *Intendencia* was the implementation of a tax system aimed at increasing the State revenue by promoting a more uniform contribution from the different territories, putting an end to the old privileges.

The Nueva Planta decrees also brought to an end a situation in which the subjects of a particular kingdom were considered foreigners in other territories of the Crown and were prohibited from occupying administrative positions. The laws of 1757 and 1765 promoting the free commerce of grain and other goods contributed to the creation of a more unified market and brought a new dynamism to the Mediterranean regions. Other measures in the same unifying direction were the production of maps detailing the situation of roads and a list of road works to be carried out ordered in 1718; the regulation of national post stages in

1720, the building of the first canals, the creation of royal factories and the first detailed national road plan in 1761 González Antón (2007). At the same time, Spain lost influence in Europe and increasingly directed its attention towards its American colonies. All the regions would now share the benefits of the colonial adventure after the removal of all restrictions and privileges enjoyed by Castile. This no doubt had important unifying effects. Although financial constraints often hampered these reforms, the unifying drive during this period of intensive reform and modernisation of the State is evident.

García Cárcel (2002) considers the idea of Nueva Planta as a symbol of the end of Catalan liberties after the Castilian annexation of Aragon a simplistic view because the old Castilian administration was also affected by the new fiscal measures and the deployment of *intendentes*. Although one may see a component of revenge against the Crown of Aragon for having supported the Austrian candidate in the war,³⁶ the declared objective of the decrees was to impose a homogeneous government across Spain where all the people would be subject to a common regime, the same laws and a single administration. As such, Nueva Planta represented a major step in the progressive conquest of the State by the monarch to the detriment of the old feudal privileges and customs. By effectively bringing the old composite monarchy to an end, the Nueva Planta decrees represented an important victory, albeit a temporary one as time would prove, of a vertical Spain over a horizontal Spain. Another sign of the affirmation of the monarchy were the regalist policies adopted in the dispute with the Church, which saw its political power diminishing in favour of the king. The expulsion of the Jesuits from Spain in 1767 represented a milestone in this process of

³⁶ The decree of the 29th June 1707 justified the new State organization arguing that the subjects of Aragon and Valencia had broken their allegiance to their legitimate king.

consolidation of the monarchy as the sole dominant power in the territory (González Antón, 2007).

This consolidation is accompanied by the early manifestations of a new conscience among the elites influenced by the ethno-patriotic discourse of the Habsburg period, where a uniform State is increasingly identified with a Spanish nation presided by the Monarchy (Fernández Sebastián, 1994). Álvarez Junco (2001) considers this to be beginning of the nationalization of culture in Spain enacted through the creation of collective narratives orchestrated by the State and the elites, a process which would peak during the 19th century as we will see. For instance, the phrase “*Reino de España*” became more widespread during the 18th century and was officially adopted under Jose Bonaparte.

Many signs of the transformation of the State into a cultural container can be found. One was the creation of institutions including academies and societies, some officially sponsored by the Monarchy. First, the Royal Library, founded in 1712, followed by the *Real Academia Española* (1714), aiming to promote the purity and elegance of the language. It contributed to the standardization of Spanish through the publication of dictionaries, grammars and orthographies.³⁷ A similar intention was behind the creation of the *Real Academia de la Historia* (1738) and the *Real Academia de las Artes de San Fernando* (1752) as instruments of a State embarked on a process of cultural reform and homogenization. *Sociedades de Amigos del País*, regional and local academies, clubs and *tertulias* were also established promoting culture, arts and science in an attempt to modernize the country (Enciso Recio, 1987a). They also promoted a discourse where Spain as an imagined community was

³⁷ The Academy's motto, “*limpia, fija y da esplendor*” clearly reflects this aim. Its first dictionary of authorities was published between 1726-1729.

reinforced. This is particularly noticeable in the newly-emerging historical and historiographical conscience in the context of an intellectual climate which emphasized a critical history against the fabulous narratives of the past, as exemplified by the work of Feijoo, Mayans and others (Mestre Sanchís, 1987). As Maravall Casenoves (1972) pointed out, this change of focus in the study of history reflected a shift in interpreting the world. The new authors speak of “Society” instead of using terms such as “Kingdom”, “State” or “Monarchy”. This broader new concept included phenomena such as “culture”, which featured increasingly prominently in the work of many intellectuals interested in exalting the glories of the Spanish nation, often confronted with the stereotypes of European writers ridiculing Spain as a backward decadent nation of religious fanatics and cruel barbarians incapable of any productive work.³⁸

As occurred with the collective past, literature also was re-interpreted in national terms with the publication of the first histories of Spanish literature following a similar trend in other European countries. The Rodríguez Mohedano brothers published theirs in 1766, soon followed by similar works by Lampillas (1778-1781), Juan Andrés (1782-1799) Masdeu (1783) and Capmany (1779-1792) (Álvarez Junco, 2001). Álvarez Junco (*ibid*) considers these Spanish intellectuals concerned with the country’s modernisation the first patriots. They not only showed pride in being called Spaniards but also considered their duty to serve their nation thorough their work. In doing so, they looked at Europe in search of solutions for Spain’s problems. In his “*Teatro Crítico Universal*” Feijoo proposes a new form of national conscience, more dynamic and critical with traditionalist views without blindly emulating European trends. Writing from the periphery, Mayans placed the emphasis in the

³⁸ See for instance Montesquieu’s Persian Letters, which prompted Cadalso’s response with his *Cartas Marruecas*.

achievements of Spain's golden age, from Cervantes to Vives, stripped of any superstitious inclination. One can often detect a certain tension in the discourse of many 18th century Spanish intellectuals and their modernizing intentions when confronted with Spain's backwardness. This is often reflected in their often ambivalent and anguished words, as in the following Statement by Phillip V's minister José del Campillo:

Voy a escribir de España, contra España y para España [...] Escribo de España lo que no quisiera escribir, escribo contra España porque la retrato tan cadavérica como hoy está, y escribo para España deseando sea lo que debe ser.³⁹

Other sign of this transformation of the State into a cultural container were the State policies promoting Castilian as a national language at the expense of regional languages. Before issuing the Nueva Planta decree in Catalonia, the council advised the king in a report dated the 13th June 1715 to impose the use of Castilian in the Catalan high courts in substitution for Latin,⁴⁰ tolerating the use of Catalan in the lower tribunals until the scriveners mastered the use of Castilian and to prohibit the use of Catalan in all primary schools and during religious instruction (Prats in Nadal et al, 1985). Similarly, a secret instruction to the *Corregidores* advised in 1716 “[poner] el mayor cuidado en introducir la lengua castellana para que se note el efecto sin que se note el cuidado” (Mercader Riba, 1961 pp.324-325).⁴¹ Although many of these recommendations were not detailed in the Nueva Planta Decree, there is no doubt that the promotion of Castilian as a language of prestige, and the *patoisation* of other languages, constituted a key aspect in the nationalization of Spain then.

³⁹ “I am going to write about Spain, against Spain and for Spain [...] I write about Spain what I do not wish to write, I write against Spain because I portray it as ghastly as it now is, and I write for Spain wishing that it becomes what it should.” Extracted from “España, despierta”. www.cervantesvirtual.com/obra-visor/espana-despierta--0/html/fef10658-82b1-11df-acc7-002185ce6064_1.htm (retrieved on 13-9-12)

⁴⁰ Verdicts used to be written in Latin until 1716 according to González Antón (2007).

⁴¹ Pay special attention to the introduction of the Castilian language and ensure the measure succeeds without attracting much attention.

Other important measures were the educational reforms of Charles III establishing a compulsory primary education for the first time in Spanish history in 1781. Intellectuals like Campoamor or Jovellanos promoted the education of the masses as an instrument of social cohesion and nationalization, leading to the foundation of new schools, the first initiatives regarding the standardization of the curricula and the recruitment of teachers and the introduction of textbooks, where Latin began to lose ground in favour of Castilian. As Iglesias Brinquis (1988) has stressed, this marks the beginning of “a national education” in Spain.

The growing popularity of the printed press was another factor contributing to the consolidation of Castilian as a national language (Enciso Recio, 1987b). Father Antoni Bastero, known for his support of the Catalan language, stated in 1726 that the true language of creation in Catalonia is none other than Castilian “*por ser aquel idioma en estos tiempos y casi desde que se hizo la unión de las dos coronas castellana y aragonesa, más común y general que el nuestro*”⁴² (Quoted in González Antón, 2007 p. 311). Similarly, Ballot i Torres, who authored a Catalan grammar, expressed in 1814: “*pera què voler cultivar la llengua catalana, si la de tota la nació és la castellana, la qual debem parlar tots los que nos preciam de veraders espanyols?*”⁴³ (*ibid*, p. 311). The words of another illustrious Catalan, Antonio de Capmany, who would participate in the elaboration of the first Spanish constitution in 1812, leave no doubt about the advances toward a national language which were taking place at the time, at least among the elite, when he expressed that Catalan “*es un idioma antiguo, provincial, muerto hoy para la república de las letras, idioma rancio y*

⁴² As this language is nowadays and ever since the union of the crowns of Castile and Aragon took place, more common and generalized than ours.

⁴³ Why should one wish to cultivate the Catalan language if Castilian is the language of the entire nation and should be spoken by all of us who proudly call ourselves true Spaniards?

semimuerto” and he speaks of “*mi celo nacional y mi amor a la lengua patria* [Spanish]” in the prologue of his French-Spanish dictionary (*ibid.* p. 311).⁴⁴ It is also true that some intellectuals defended the preservation of the regional languages, as in the case of Mayans, author of a Castilian-Valencian dictionary, lamenting at the same time what appeared to be their inevitable demise, given that they were scarcely used in formal situations.

The growing nationalization of Spain on the basis of identity can also be perceived in the apparition of new symbols. One was the adoption of an anthem after a grenadier march composed by Manuel Espinosa de los Monteros in 1761. A flag was first proposed for the navy in 1785 after a decree by Charles III and was adopted by the army in 1843. The instability of Spanish national symbols has been attributed to a problematic identity (Álvarez Junco, 2001), something to be explored later on. All in all the Bourbons carried out reforms which further consolidated the State and homogenized the territory, while new elements in the legitimizing discourse of the Monarchy were introduced: after being described as a great warrior, a legitimate prince and defender of the faith, the king was now portrayed as “the benevolent father of the nation” dedicated to the well-being and prosperity of his subjects. None anticipated that this new legitimizing discourse associated with progress and modernity would eventually conflict with the old ideas and that the foundations of the *Ancien Régime* would crumble as a result of the newly-emerging national identities (Álvarez Junco, 2001). In any case, despite these advances in the construction of the Spanish State, a thorough nationalization of the masses would have to wait until the 20th century when the obstacles present in the traditional social organization gradually disappeared and the national mode of organization was fully consolidated.

⁴⁴ Catalan is an ancient provincial language of no use nowadays in the republic of the letters, an antiquated and semi-dead language [...] my national zeal and my love towards the language of the fatherland [Spanish].

The cornerstone of the most widely accepted theories of the nation discussed in chapter 1 is the relationship between modernisation, understood as an all-encompassing process of social transformation, and the national mode of organization, the social basis upon which nationalist mobilization operated fostered by an expanding State. This process, documented by Weber (1976) in his study of the modernisation of France, involved the painfully slow transformation from what a Parisian visitor to the countryside in the 1840s considered “a country of savages”, a highly diverse and fragmented land and society (politically, legally, economically, demographically as well as culturally) into the more unified, modernized, culturally integrated and spiritually united nation of the early 20th century. The impact of modernisation in the nationalization of the Spanish people has been studied by Vincent (2007) or Fusi Aizpurúa (2000) among others. Others have concentrated on specific periods such as the Second Republic (Holguín, 2002) or have focused on particular aspects of the nationalization process such as national narratives (Álvarez Junco, 2001) and national education (Boyd, 1997). As Spain experienced a comparatively slower and more problematic modernisation than France, one may assume that the nationalisation of the masses would have been even more difficult in Spain’s case.

Given the complexity of modernisation, I can only outline its major inter-related dimensions. One of these is economic, involving a re-distribution in the use of productive factors (Sánchez Albornoz, 1985b). In traditional societies, largely based on subsistence agriculture, the reproduction of the economic system was sustained by entailed land and by labour with a limited use of capital. Modern societies are built instead on a market economy and the accumulation of capital, a system which only gained impetus with industrialization and the

development of communications and transport infrastructure. Another dimension is a demographic one, including a shift in the demographic patterns and a growing degree of urbanization (Nadal, 1984). The pattern of change involved first a drastic reduction of catastrophic mortality, caused by episodes such as epidemics, and then a reduction of ordinary mortality. A subsequent phase brought lower fertility rates which eventually led to the aging of the population, as life expectancy grew, and to a slowing down in population growth. The mass transfer of a population no longer threatened by impending death from the countryside into the cities brought along a new mentality blowing away the cultural barriers raised by isolation and illiteracy (Weber, 1976).

A related dimension is a political one, namely the transformation of the hierarchically ordained societies of the *Ancien Régime* into nations of citizens, a process inaugurated with the French Revolution. This political transformation re-defined how societies were conceived: the fragmented traditional societies structured in “Estates of the Realm” were transformed into more inter-connected systems ordained under the principle of effective identification of the individual with the nation, as defined by the identity markers promoted in the discourses of nationalist mobilization, usually under the tutelage of a State increasingly capable of ordaining the life of its citizens in economic, political and cultural terms. As we saw in chapter one (pp. 25-35), Gellner (1997) explains that this identification between polity and culture brought by nationalism constituted a functional requirement for the newly industrialized societies. A fourth cultural dimension completes the picture brought by modernisation. It led to greater homogenization of the population through the establishment of mass education, compulsory military service and conscript armies, the development of the

mass media, linguistic standardization and the adoption of shared cultural traits increasingly perceived as national characteristics.

Researchers generally agree that Spanish nation-building was hindered, among other things, by a deficient modernisation along the four dimensions outlined above. Opinions however vary regarding the extent to which modernisation failed altogether or merely stagnated in Spain during the era of nation-building and the causes behind this backwardness. Regarding economic modernisation, some of the most negative views are those held by Vicens Vives & Nadal (1969), Trebilcock (1981) and Berend and Ranki (1982), who consider that Spain suffered from an underdeveloped economy during the 19th century similar to that in third-world countries. A second group of researchers like Nadal (1975), Tortella (1972; 1973a; 1994) and Martin (1990) subscribe to the idea of failed industrialization in 19th century Spain. They argue that despite the early developments led by the Catalan cotton industry towards the 1840s followed by the Basque iron and steel industry in the second half of the century, industrialization never prospered in Spain as a whole, as the country was not able to provide the capital nor the markets for industrialization to develop. Thus, despite being considered among the first-comers to industrialization, Spain, with the exception of Catalonia, continued to be an overwhelmingly agrarian society towards the end of the century and what once had been a great empire, was relegated to playing a peripheral role during the capitalist modern era. In fact, one must wait, according to these authors, until the 1960s-1970s to see the beginning of full-scale industrialization.

A less negative view regarding Spanish 19th century economic modernisation is held by a third group of authors, including Prados de la Escosura (1988), Sánchez Albornoz (1985b)

and Ringrose (1996). They subscribe to the idea of “backwardness”, arguing that Spain experienced a late modernisation when compared with most European countries. And yet, despite this relative backwardness, which Prados conceptualizes in terms of a backward economy with low investment rates, not open to the rest of the world; a weak industry; an agriculture dominated by subsistence levels and a late demographic modernisation characterized by low education rates, it is argued that Spain experienced real economic growth in absolute terms during the 19th century, as reflected for instance in the evolution of the nation’s GDP. In other words, despite experiencing a moderate economic modernisation,⁴⁵ Spain clearly lagged behind most of Europe as it followed its own late modernizing path. Ringrose argues that this model of slow and yet sustained economic modernisation explains Spain’s “economic miracle” in the 1960s and 1970s much better, a phenomenon which, in his view, could not have happened without some prior development:

[...] by the early 20th century Spain, while clearly behind the advanced countries on many accounts, had long been following a recognizable variant of the European developmental path. Articulated without the use of national categories, the proposition being suggested says that Iberia was a long-term participant in the continent-wide process of accelerating economic expansion which began in the later seventeenth century (Ringrose, 1996 p. 31).

The development of a modern transport infrastructure constitutes a critical factor for economic modernisation as well as for nation-building. On the one hand it helps increase the size of the market promoting a greater division and specialization of labour. On the other hand, transportation development may have backward linkages (i.e. the growth in the demand of products such as coal, iron manufactures or construction materials) and forward linkages (i.e. the effects transportation has in other economic sectors; for instance in the technological innovations of the steel industry or the improved skills of the workforce)

⁴⁵ For Prados (1988) this economic modernisation was sustained and continuous, for Sánchez Albornoz (1985b) it constituted long-term growth but it was neither lineal nor sustained.

(Gómez Mendoza, 1985). Last but not least, transportation provides the necessary platform for the diffusion of new ideas and cultural practices which constitute key elements in the nationalization of the masses.

Gómez Mendoza (*ibid*) argues that Spain initiated the 19th century with a road system which was clearly inadequate for its economic modernisation: for instance, the French road network was eight times larger than its Spanish equivalent at the time. In addition to that, France had more than 11,000 kilometres of navigable rivers and canals compared with a few hundred kilometres in Spain. Also, most Spanish roads were poorly built, only apt for travellers on foot or for horses, becoming impassable after a few days' rain. Given the appalling condition of the road network, most goods were transported on mules. Early attempts to modernize the transport infrastructure failed due to the considerable financial constraints and the social instability Spain experienced with several wars during the 19th century. The most important developments took place in maritime transport with the improvements in ports, the growth in sailing and the introduction of steam boats towards the end of the 19th century.

The construction of the railway system took off with the *Progresista* government after a bill passed in 1855. Intended to promote economic development, the law led to large-scale investment thanks to the subsidies for the importation of transport materials and the State grants which reduced the risks (Tortella, 1994). Foreign capital constituted the lion's share of the railway investment, comparatively much larger than the capital invested in industry. Nadal (1975) estimates the investment in the railway to have been seven times that of the industry whereas Gómez Mendoza (1985) thinks it was fifteen or sixteen times higher. The

contrast with England, where according to Nadal (1975), the capital resources destined to the railway represented less than 70% of those in industry, is clear.

Despite these efforts, researchers tend to agree that the development of the railways, an essential feature in Spain's economic modernisation, did not contribute to the modernisation of the Spanish economy as much as it did in other parts of Europe. Tortella (1994) contends that the investment in the railway was accomplished at the expense of an industry which remained largely underdeveloped and thus the opportunity to invest in directly productive activities was lost. Nadal (1975) argues that Tortella's premise is dubious as it presupposes that industry would have received more investment if this had not been directed to the railway, something which may not have occurred given the low industrialization levels in many Spanish regions and given that most of the capital invested in the railway was foreign. In any case, researchers agree that the railway in Spain was built hastily and without adequate planning, without really taking into account the country's needs. In 1864, when the financial collapse of the railway was already in sight, the engineer Martínez Alcívar had alerted that:

Los transportes de poco sirven si no hay productos que transportar [...]. Es preciso crear estímulos muy poderosos y eficaces para el desarrollo de la producción industrial tan atrasada, tan abatida y postergada en España, aún en situaciones normales. Las vías férreas contribuyen a facilitar el aumento de la producción industrial; pero donde no existe, no la improvisan, como lo va demostrando la experiencia⁴⁶ (quoted in Nadal, 1975 p. 47).

Similarly, George Stephenson, an English railway pioneer, claimed in 1845 after visiting Spain:

⁴⁶ Transportation is not really useful if there are no products to transport [...]. It is necessary to create powerful and efficacious stimuli for the development of industrial production, so backward, depressed and delayed in Spain, even under normal circumstances. The railroad contributes to facilitating an increase in the industrial production; but it does not improvise this where it does not exist, as experience demonstrates.

I have been a month in the country, but I have not seen during the whole of that time enough people of the right sort to fill a single train (quoted in Nadal, 1975 p. 48).

The establishment of a modern communication platform is equally important in nation-building because it contributes to unifying the territory and homogenizing the people living there as result of a more efficient transfer of information. The improvement in communications in 19th century Spain is obvious. Take for instance the modernisation of the post system, which had been established in the 18th century, with the introduction of stamps in 1850. Another example of this modernisation was the construction of the telegraph network which began in 1853 followed by the telephone in the 20th century. In any case, despite the developments in transportation and communications and an on-going process of legal standardization,⁴⁷ Tortella (1994) argues that Spain did not have a national market during the entire 19th century as shown in the regional differences in the prices of basic products such as wheat and oil. Balfour concurs with Tortella arguing that:

Spain was a largely immobile country; until at least the 1920s, communications were very poor and villages and provincial towns were trapped in an inner-looking world oblivious to national issues (Balfour, 1997 p. 104).

In conclusion, independently of whether one adopts the view of underdevelopment, the idea of a failed industrialization or the notion of backwardness to explain Spain's 19th century economic modernisation, one thing seems clear: Spain at large continued to be a pre-industrial nation by the early 20th century lagging at least half a century behind the more developed European countries. Catalonia and some areas of the Basque Country constituted a partial exception. Catalonia was the only region in Spain whose economy was primarily based on manufacturing, having reached levels of employment in the industrial sector similar

⁴⁷ For instance, the Commerce Bills of 1829 and 1885, the regulation of the monetary system, the standardization of weights and measures, the gradual implementation of the metric system during the mid-nineteenth century, etc.

to those of Great Britain and much higher than those in France, Italy or Spain as a whole, as table 3.1 illustrates:

Table 3.1.

	Primary Sector	Secondary Sector	Tertiary Sector
Great Britain	6	54	39.5
Catalonia	27.5	53.5	19
France	35.5	38.5	26
Italy	47	35.5	17.5
Spain	48	34	18

Distribution in percentages of the working population according to sector, 1930-1931
(source: Gil Ibáñez, 1979)

Maluquer de Motes (1985) attributes Catalonia's successful 19th century industrialization to the developments which took place in the preceding centuries, notwithstanding the lack of natural resources such as iron ore and coal which made industrialization possible in other parts of Europe. Chief among these developments was the sustained agricultural growth in areas destined for export like viticulture, in the context of a society comparatively more egalitarian than the one existing in other Spanish regions at the time. This agrarian prosperity and the increase in exports provided the initial capital for investment in other areas of the economy and gradually contributed to the transformation of the Catalan region as an industrial base for textile production. As Martin indicates:

At the turn of the century, 59 % of the taxes paid to the government for all types of production emanated from the principality that possessed only a tenth of the national population and, like Lancashire in England, accounted for 90 % of the country's textile output. Industrial concentration provided Barcelona and other factory towns with high ratios of workers in their populations. Half of all inhabitants in Catalonia came to reside in Barcelona province as a result of the urbanization brought on by industrialization. By Spanish standards, the number of workers was exceedingly high, 117,000, or more than one-fifth of the city's half million residents, more than half of whom were employed in textile manufacturing (Martin, 1990 p. 19).

Some areas of the Basque Country also became industrialized towards the end of the 19th century thanks to a surge in mineral exports in high demand by the British steel industry (Fraile, 1985). The profits obtained were employed in creating a local steel industry which prospered partly thanks to Spain's protectionist policies. De Churrua (1951) estimates that the region produced 66.5% of the pig iron and 68.4% of the steel in Spain between 1900-1930, turning the Basque region into a key area in Spanish economic development: In 1939, the region housed only 3% of the Spanish population but was responsible for 6% of the entire Spanish GDP (Fraile, 1985).

The rest of Spain continued to be a pre-industrial society based on subsistence agriculture. This was particularly the case of the regions which had once belonged to the kingdom of Castile. Andalusia, which had previously benefitted from the colonial trade, remained underdeveloped when compared with the rest of Spain as a result of the deep-rooted inequality in the distribution of the land (Tedde de Lorca, 1985). Old and New Castile, excluding the city of Madrid, which continued to benefit from its status as Spain's political capital, not only faltered in their attempt to industrialize but also experienced economic regression, as some of its traditional sectors, like wool and handicrafts, lost ground in favour of Catalan wool and manufactures. As Sánchez Albornoz (1985a) explains, Castile's evolution during the 19th century and beginning of the 20th century resembles the more recent processes typical of the third world, as it became a captive market for the Catalan and Basque industries.

Spain's demographic trends, clearly connected with the country's economic backwardness analysed above, constitute another important factor in support of the idea of a late and

uneven modernisation influencing Spain's deficient and belated nation-building in modern times. There is widespread consensus that Spain underwent a late demographic modernisation compared to more developed European nations (Nadal, 1984); (Tortella, 1994); Pérez Moreda (1985). As Table 3.2 illustrates, the Spanish population grew at a slower pace than most European countries during the 19th century:

Table 3.2.

Country	Population (1800) (in mill.)	Population (1900) (in mill.)	Inc. %	Av. Inc. %	Death Rt. in 1900 ‰	Birth Rt. in 1900 ‰
Great Britain	10.9	37.0	239.4	1.230	18	29
Holland	2.2	5.1	131.8	0.844	18	32
Belgium	3.0	6.7	123.3	0.807	19	29
Sweden	2.3	5.1	121.7	0.800	17	27
Germany	24.5	50.6	106.5	0.728	22	36
Austria/Hungary	23.3	47.0	101.7	0.704	25*	35*
Italy	17.2	32.5	88.4	0.635	24	33
Portugal	3.1	5.4	74.2	0.557	20	30
Spain	11.5	18.6	61.7	0.482	29	34
France	26.9	38.5	40.6	0.341	22	21
Ireland	5.0	4.5	-10.0	-0.105	20	23

*Austria only.

Population growth and other demographic variables in Europe (Source: Tortella, 1994 p. 28)

The figures provided by Nadal (1984) in his longitudinal study do not differ significantly from those of Tortella. According to Nadal, the Spanish population grew considerably, albeit comparatively slowly, during the 19th century: between 1797-860, the yearly growth rate was 0.63% compared with 1.25% in England and Wales between 1795-96 and 1861; between 1860-1910 the Spanish rate was 0.49% while that of England and Wales between 1861-1911 was 1.18%. Also, whereas demographic modernisation in Western Europe occurred during the 18th century, the reduction of catastrophic mortality associated with epidemics, although

initiated in the 18th century, did not reveal itself in its full extent until the 1900s, after the diffusion of the smallpox vaccine. Similarly, ordinary mortality rates, especially infant death rates, did not drop significantly until the First World War. As late as 1900, Spain had a gross birth rate of 33.8‰, a death rate of 28.8‰ –compared with an average death rate in Europe of 18‰ and an average life expectancy of 35 years. The Spanish levels had already been surpassed in Scandinavia 150 years before, according to Nadal. This large difference in mortality rates could not be compensated by a relatively higher Spanish birth rate. On the contrary, the smaller growth in population experienced by Spain was made worse by the migration of Spaniards abroad.

Tortella (1994) and Nadal (1984) associate Spanish demographic evolution with economic and social backwardness, characterized by low agricultural productivity which often led to subsistence crises and epidemics, poor health and living conditions, a transportation network both expensive and underdeveloped and widespread ignorance. Sánchez Albornoz (1975) has identified another sign of Spain's belated demographic modernisation in the trend typical of Spanish peasants of getting married during spring, giving birth in winter, dying of gastrointestinal diseases in summer and of lung diseases in winter. Such a trend continued in Spain until the second half of the 19th century. Spain's socio-economic backwardness was also manifested in the high numbers of people employed in the agricultural sector: between 65% and 70%, a percentage which remained unchanged until the 1920s-1930s (Pérez Moreda, 1985).

Another sign was the slower degree of urbanization experienced during the 19th century, despite Spain's early urbanization in previous centuries. The migratory movements from the

countryside to the cities initiated during the 19th century did not increase sharply until the 20th century. Around 1800, only around 6% of the Spanish population lived in eight cities with more than 50,000 inhabitants, Madrid being the largest with over 150,000 people (Fontana, 2007). Towards the end of the 19th century, Spain had only two cities of around 500,000 inhabitants, Madrid and Barcelona, compared with twenty-five in Europe, out of which seven cities had more than a million inhabitants (Tortella, 1994). Table 3.3 shows the distribution of Spanish population according to town size and its evolution between 1900-1981. We can see that Spain underwent a strong urbanization during the 20th century: in 1900, 50.4% of the population lived in towns with less than 5,000 inhabitants and 78.4% in towns up to 20,000. By 1981, these percentages had dropped to 17.4 and 37.2 respectively while the proportion of people living in towns with more than 100,000 inhabitants had increased from 8.9% in 1900 to 42% in 1981.


Table 3.3.

	Towns/ number of inhabitants										
Year	1/ 1,000	1,001/ 2,000	2,001/ 3,000	3,001/ 5,000	5,001/ 10,000	10,001/ 20,000	20,001/ 30,000	30,001/ 50,000	50,001/ 100,000	100,001/ 500,000	>500,000
1900	14.8	12.7	9.3	14.0	16.9	10.7	4.7	3.0	4.6	3.2	5.7
1910	13.4	12.0	8.8	13.5	17.2	12.0	4.7	2.9	4.6	4.3	5.9
1920	12.0	11.2	8.5	12.6	17.0	12.4	4.5	3.6	5.6	5.1	6.8
1930	10.5	10.0	7.7	12.0	17.0	12.0	4.7	5.9	4.9	6.6	8.3
1940	9.5	8.8	6.9	10.8	15.1	12.6	5.6	5.7	5.3	10.8	8.3
1950	8.5	8.2	6.4	10.4	14.4	12.0	5.1	4.3	6.2	11.9	12.1
1960	7.5	7.0	5.5	8.9	14.3	11.2	5.9	4.0	7.5	13.6	14.2
1970	5.8	5.1	4.5	6.9	10.9	11.1	5.6	5.6	7.2	18.8	17.9
1981	4.6	4.0	3.6	5.2	9.3	10.5	6.2	5.2	9.3	22.3	19.7

Distribution of the population in Spain (%) according to town size, 1900-1981 (Sources: *Censo de la población y viviendas de España*, 1960, T. 1 pp. XXIII-XXXVIII and *Anuario Estadístico*, 1971, p. 54 and 1982, p. 64; quoted in Nadal, 1984, p. 230)

Similarly, literacy rates remained significantly low during the 19th century despite some improvements (figure 3.9). Less than 30% of the adult population was literate by 1860 and only 50% was literate around 1910.

Figure 3.9.



Illiteracy rates in various countries between 1850-1910 (Source: Tortella, 1994. P.12)

As we saw in the case of the economy, the demographic trends also presented considerable regional differences. There is consensus among researchers that only Catalonia achieved demographic modernisation during the 19th century at a pace which resembled more closely that in Europe's industrialized areas. The Catalan demographic growth between 1700-1850 resembled that of England and Wales despite a higher mortality rate. Tortella (1994) attributes this to higher birth rates in the context of economic expansion, as shown by the differences in the occupational structures of Catalonia and Spain. Whereas in Spain the

proportion of people in the agricultural sector remained around 65% of the total male working population during the entire 19th century, the percentage in Catalonia, especially in the province of Barcelona, not only stayed below 40% but also decreased throughout the century. As late as 1930, Spain still had 45.5% of its working population employed in the agricultural sector compared to 11.2% in the province of Barcelona (Pérez Moreda, 1985). Similarly, the Catalans represented 23.6% and 22.5% of the Spaniards working the commercial and industrial sectors by 1910 according to Tortella (1994). Nadal (1984) and Tortella (1994) also conclude that, as a result of the different levels of regional development and large-scale migrations within Spain and abroad, the demographic weight of Spanish regions shifted significantly during the 19th and 20th centuries (table 3.4):

Table 3.4.

Region	Total figures (thousands)					Percentages				
	1787	1860	1910	1970	1981	1787	1860	1910	1970	1981
Andalusia	1,804	2,967	3,839	5,971	6,442	17.6	18.9	19.2	17.6	17.1
Aragon	614	891	953	1,153	1,213	6.0	5.7	4.8	3.4	3.2
Asturias	346	540	685	1,046	1,127	3.4	3.4	3.4	3.0	3.0
Balearics	176	270	326	558	685	1.7	1.7	1.6	1.6	1.8
Canaries	167	237	444	1,170	1,445	1.6	1.5	2.2	3.4	3.8
New Castile	1,122	1,495	2,150	5,164	6,021	10.9	9.6	10.8	15.2	16.0
Old Castile	1,213	1,630	1,851	2,154	2,231	11.8	10.4	9.3	6.3	5.9
Catalonia	802	1,674	2,085	5,122	5,958	7.8	10.7	10.5	15.1	15.8
Extremadura	412	697	991	1,145	1,050	4.0	4.6	5.0	3.3	2.8
Galicia	1,340	1,799	2,057	2,584	2,754	13.1	11.5	10.3	7.8	7.3
Leon	620	851	1,003	1,172	1,110	6.0	5.4	5.0	3.4	2.9
Murcia	332	589	880	1,167	1,292	3.2	3.8	4.4	3.4	3.4
Valencia	792	1,276	1,704	3,073	3,647	7.7	8.2	8.6	9.3	9.7
Basque Country & Navarre	529	729	986	2,343	2,642	5.2	4.7	4.9	7.1	7.0
SPAIN	10,269	15,645	19,944	33,824	37,617	100	100	100	100	100

Regional distribution of Spanish population, 1787-1981 according to the census (Nadal, 1984)

The northern half and the centre of the country lost demographic weight during the 19th and 20th centuries in favour of the Mediterranean regions: Galicia, Asturias, the Old Castile and

Leon housed 34.3% of all Spaniards in 1787 compared with 28.0% in 1910 and 22.3% in 1981. In contrast with this, the Balearics, Catalonia, Valencia and Murcia represented 20.4% of Spain's inhabitants in 1787 compared with 25.1% in 1910 and 30.7% in 1981. Only Madrid and part of New Castile experienced significant growth. In fact, as Ringrose (1973, 1983) has argued, such growth mainly occurred at the expense of Castile's continuing decadence. The final outcome was the disintegration of Castile's former thriving urban network, a process initiated during the late 16th century which continued unabated in subsequent centuries. Nadal (1984) estimates that the city of Madrid had a population of 281,170 in 1857 compared with 3,188,297 in 1981, an increase of 1034%. In comparison, the surrounding provinces (Avila, Segovia, Guadalajara, Cuenca and Toledo) had 1,068,680 inhabitants in 1857 compared with 1,153,493 in 1981, an increase of a mere 8%. This resulted in a population density below 20 inhabitants per square kilometre in an area equivalent to 12% of the Spanish territory.

The picture emerging from the analysis of Spain's economic and demographic modernisation indicates that despite the advances in the expansion of the State since the 18th century, Spain's backwardness hindered the consolidation of the national mode of organization during the 19th and much of the 20th century. Comparatively speaking, Spain remained a pre-modern society during the entire 19th century and the first decades of the 20th, characterized by low industrial and agricultural productivity, poor communications, higher mortality and low literacy rates as well as low urbanization levels. These factors constituted formidable obstacles for the effective nationalization of the masses according to modernist theories of the nation: As Fusi Aizpurúa (1992; 2000) has emphasized, in many respects Spain may have been officially centralist in the 19th century but the life of the country still gravitated

around the local and regional scales, a phenomenon which may explain why the level of regional versus national consciousness continues to be an important factor in contemporary Spain (García Ferrando et al, 1994). The form of political clientelism known as *caciquismo*, which characterized Spanish politics at the time, represented a clear symptom of this localism derived from the State's inability to govern social processes at a national scale (Fusi Aizpurúa, 1990; Storm, 2004). *Caciquismo* in turn thrived under the lack of a concerted policy for nation-building on the part of the State and its elites which in turn encouraged social passivity, turning potential citizens into mere clients (Vincent, 2007). The situation described by Holguín in her study of the *misiones pedagógicas* as a tool for the nationalization of the masses in republican Spain reveals that as late as the 1930s people in rural areas in many parts of the country remained cut off from the rest of the world as a result underdevelopment:

Like the Soviet Union and Mexico, Spain had to deal with the problems of land reform, economic disparities between urban and rural areas, rampant illiteracy, limited numbers of qualified teachers and technicians, a poor infrastructure, ethnic differences, and a popular religiosity that, according to revolutionaries impeded progress [...]. Although Shulgin was discussing the conditions in Soviet Russia, he could just as easily have been talking about contemporary Spain, where cosmopolitan city-dwellers visited the cinema, listened to the radio, and participated in political life, while many people in rural areas had no experience with electricity whatsoever, struggled to earn their daily bread, and had minimal contact with the political ideas emanating from the metropolis (Holguín, 2002 pp. 52-53).

The marked regional differences in Spain's social modernisation observed above further complicated Spanish nation-building as Castile, the driving force of the process, lost part of its economic and demographic weight in favour of the periphery, especially the more industrialized and culturally thriving Catalonia. This economic subservience and relative social backwardness of Castile was not accompanied by political subordination as Madrid retained much of its political power, albeit at a cost: this misalignment between economics

and politics would be at the root of many conflicts in Spanish contemporary history, including Spain's unresolved national construction plagued by competing nationalisms at the centre and the periphery.

3.4. The construction of the nation in modern times: national identities

I have discussed the difficulties for the national mode of organization to consolidate in Spain during the transition from the *Ancien Régime* to the modern State. These difficulties not only resulted from a late and uneven economic and social modernisation. They were partly motivated by the country's intricate geography, its long history of cultural diversity and political fragmentation and by Spain's imperial "distraction." This section mainly analyses the role of politics in forging a Spanish identity and the extent to which identity could diffuse as a result of the nationalization of the masses orchestrated by the State and the elites, a process which took centre stage during the 19th century, as the State became a cultural container. Despite the claims portraying nations as brute facts or quasi-eternal entities, these culturally homogeneous societies evoked by the nationalists did not exist. They had to be constructed through social mobilization (Deutsch, 1966; Recalde, 1982), including the objective process of State expansion known as territorialization as well as the subjective process of participation and identification aimed at the political and cultural integration of the people expressed through shared national symbols and narratives (Jusdanis, 1990). Recalde (1982) argues that once the structural basis for the effective identification with a particular nation is in place, the decision to construct the nation, Spanish or Catalan, is largely subjective. This implies, as Vincent (2007) and de Riquer i Permanyer (2001) have suggested, that the nationalist challenges coming from the periphery towards the end of the 19th century cannot be interpreted as primordial ethnic identities surfacing through the cracks

of a largely artificial Spanish State. On the contrary, Basque and Catalan nationalism constituted a reaction in response to the incapacity of the State to construct an integrative nationalism capable of uniting people around a shared national project. The rest of this chapter is dedicated to analysing the difficulties in trying to build a truly national State in Spain during the 19th and 20th centuries.

Researchers agree that Spain suffered from weak nationalization during the 19th and 20th centuries notwithstanding the expansion of the State and its growing influence in people's lives (Linz, 1973); (de Riquer i Permanyer, 1996a, 2001); (Fusi Aizpurúa, 2000); (Álvarez Junco, 2001); (Fontana, 2007); (González Antón, 2007); (Vincent, 2007). This can be attributed to various factors: first, in line with Spain's late modernisation thesis, the State generally lacked the means to exert its influence in society during a period characterized by economic underdevelopment and prolonged debt crisis. Second, despite attempts aimed at constructing a national culture and a symbolic universe, there was not clear and consistent mass-nationalization in the long run, partly due to the shortcomings of Spanish Liberalism. Third, in marked contrast with the colonial expansion in other European nations, Spain saw its influence at the world stage greatly diminished during a period marked by the loss of its Empire and the absence of external threats following the Napoleonic War. Fourth, and perhaps more crucially, Spain's weak nationalization can also be attributed to its long-lasting and partly unsolved "legitimacy problem": as Weber (1993) has emphasized, every form of power needs to achieve widespread recognition and acceptance in order to perpetuate itself. That was not possible in Spain, riddled during much of its recent history with attempts by one faction to construct a Spanish nation at the expense of others. Consequently, a series of competing and often irreconcilable national identities were constituted across two main axes,

one being a traditionalist-conservative versus a liberal-progressive *españolismo* (i.e. right versus left) and the other Spanish nationalism versus Catalan and Basque nationalism (i.e. vertical versus horizontal Spain).

De Riquer i Permanyer (2001) distinguishes three periods in the construction of a Spanish identity during the 19th century: an early phase between the early 1800s and the end of Espartero's regency (1843), a second stage occupying much of Isabella II's reign and the six years of democratic governments following *La Revolución Gloriosa* (1844-1874) and a third phase from the restoration of the monarchy in 1875 to the 1898 crisis. The early stages in the construction of a modern Spanish identity coincide with the collapse of the *Ancien Régime* in the wake of the Napoleonic invasion. Only then the term "*Nación*" would become politicized (García Cárcel, 2004b) and the budding ethno-patriotism of the 18th century headed by the monarchy and orchestrated by the elites began to be expressed in unequivocally national terms, at least by some of those who led the resistance against the French. The political crisis after the abdications of Charles IV and his son in favour of Bonaparte followed by the French invasion and the popular uprising of the 2nd May across Spain had resulted in a power vacuum. As Artola Gallego (1999) stressed, the people reacted by effectively upholding the sovereignty relinquished by the king with his abdication. Then, when the insurrection needed to be institutionalized, the provisional *Juntas* which were formed constituted a remarkable political innovation without any clear link with the institutions of the *Ancien Régime*. One cannot detect a widespread national conscience among the masses who took part in the uprising. In fact, due to the confusion reigning at the time, the calls to rise against the French invader were mixed. Contemporary accounts indicate that calls were often made in defence of the Catholic faith and the Absolute

Monarchy rather than the still unfamiliar nation.⁴⁸ This may explain the enthusiastic popular support towards Absolutism when Ferdinand VII returned to Spain in 1814.⁴⁹ Rather, the liberal revolution that followed the uprising was the work of the modernizing elites which made use of the crisis to construct a novel political edifice by re-interpreting the notion of sovereignty in national terms:

[...] Hundido el Estado, se hizo preciso organizarlo de forma improvisada, a partir de una serie de juntas locales, que más tarde se coordinaron en un organismo central, el cual a su vez convocó unas Cortes, institución que no se había reunido –salvo con funciones protocolarias- desde hacía siglos. Las élites modernizadoras aprovecharon aquella ocasión para imponer un programa de cambios sociales y políticos. Y la manera de defender la competencia de aquel organismo para tal función reformadora consistió en lanzar la idea revolucionaria de nación, titular de la soberanía en el momento en que faltaba el monarca (Álvarez Junco, 2001 pp. 129-130).⁵⁰

The national idea embraced by these liberal elites in legitimizing the war against the French would become the founding myth of an emerging social order consecrated in the 1812 Constitution. Sovereignty would no longer be the patrimony of the monarch but of the nation, vaguely understood in terms of citizenship rather than in ethnic terms, as the inclusion of the American creoles suggests:

Art. 1. La Nación española es la reunión de todos los españoles de ambos hemisferios.
Art. 2. La Nación española es libre e independiente, y no es ni puede ser patrimonio de ninguna familia ni persona.
Art. 3. La soberanía reside esencialmente en la Nación, y por lo mismo pertenece a ésta exclusivamente el derecho de establecer sus leyes fundamentales.⁵¹

⁴⁸ The testimonies of friars Rafael de Vélez, Simón López and Manuel Amado adhere to this view (see Álvarez Junco, 2001).

⁴⁹ The cry “*vivan las caenas*” (long live the chains) became popular at the time in support of Ferdinand’s decision to ignore the 1812 liberal Constitution.

⁵⁰ Once the State had collapsed, it became necessary to organize it in an improvised manner on the basis of a series of local *juntas* which later were coordinated around a central organization which convened a *Cortes*, an institution which had not been called up –except for protocol purposes- for centuries. The modernizing elites made use of the occasion to impose a programme for social and political change. And their way of justifying the powers of that institution for their reforming purposes was to launch the revolutionary idea of the nation as the holder of sovereignty at the moment when the monarch was missing.

⁵¹ Art. 1: The Spanish nation is the joining of all Spaniards from both hemispheres. Art. 2: The Spanish nation is free and independent and is not and can never be the property of any family or person. Art. 3: Sovereignty resides essentially in the nation and thus only the nation has the right to establish its fundamental laws. (Source: http://www.congreso.es/constitucion/ficheros/historicas/cons_1812.pdf) (retrieved on 8-11-12).

This marked the beginning of the liberal narrative of the nation, rooted in the principle of people's sovereignty. Adhering to the modernizing agenda of the Enlightenment, the liberal intelligentsia understood the nation in secular terms. They however disregarded the Enlightenment's elitism and cosmopolitanism in favour of the new romantic vision which granted the people a central role. This mythologisation of the *populus* was necessary for the liberal bourgeoisie to affirm their political rights. National sovereignty became identified with the medieval liberties of Castile and Aragon suppressed by the first Habsburgs, accused of having brought Absolutism. The war against the French was portrayed as "a War of Independence" where Spaniards had risen against tyranny: not only Napoleon's tyranny, but also the tyranny of those opposed to the will of the nation. The phrase "*españoles, ya tenéis patria*"⁵², proclaimed by Argüelles during the inauguration of the Constitution in Cádiz, captured the essence of this liberal conception of society founded upon the revolutionary concept of nation (Lario, 2012).

Following France's example, another aspect of the liberal narrative consecrated in the Constitution was the aspiration towards a uniform culturally homogeneous centralized nation which would abolish regional differences and privileges. This desire led to the rejection of federalism, perceived as a step towards future disintegration (Álvarez Junco, 2001; de Riquer i Permanyer, 2004). At this stage, unitarism received considerable support from the Catalan bourgeoisie, implicated as they were in defending a Spanish national market for their industry (García Cárcel, 2004b). Despite the legal and administrative homogenization accomplished since the Nueva Planta decrees, the authors of the 1812 Constitution found the Spanish nation terribly fragmented and lamented the excessive cautiousness with which

⁵² Spaniards, you now have a fatherland.

homogenization had been carried out in the past. Even before the Cortes met, Jovellanos proposed to achieve “*la más perfecta uniformidad*” across the territories.⁵³ The most radical proposal came from Agustín de Foronda, suggesting to divide Spain in eighteen square sections, called number one, number two, etc. instead of Biscay, Andalusia, etc., as a way of achieving a more perfect unity (Maravall Casesnoves, 1977). Quintana, another key figure at the Cortes, called for a Constitution which:

Hiciera de todas las provincias que componen esta vasta Monarquía una Nación verdaderamente una [...] En ella deben cesar a los ojos de la ley las distinciones de Valencianos, Aragoneses, Castellanos, Vizcaínos: todos deben ser Españoles (see *Semanario Patriótico*, Madrid IV, 22-IX-1808 (quoted in Guerra, 1992 p. 233)).⁵⁴

Similarly, Egaña compared the situation before and after the Constitution:

La Nación estaba enteramente separada, desunida y dividida. Cada Provincia tenía sus leyes y fueros particulares, su gobierno y administración peculiar. Unos ciudadanos gozaban de derechos y privilegios que otros no conocían [...] No había entre nosotros una verdadera asociación política. Por fortuna, con la Constitución todo ha mudado. Ya no subsisten los fueros y leyes particulares de las provincias: para toda es uno mismo el gobierno y uniforme la administración. Todos están sujetos a la misma ley y todos llevan igualmente las cargas del Estado. Todos pertenecemos a una familia y componemos una sola sociedad. La máquina del Estado rueda ya sobre ejes propios para la buena y legítima dirección del movimiento político. Los Españoles, constituidos imperfectísimamente en el antiguo régimen y reducidos de algunos siglos a esta parte a cultivar, manufacturar, traficar y combatir en provecho y gloria de uno solo, formamos ya un verdadero cuerpo político y somos realmente una Nación libre, independiente y soberana. (*Correo de Vitoria* No. 7, 11-I-1814 pp. 49-50 (quoted in Fernández Sebastián, 1994 pp. 59-60).

(The Nation was completely separated, disunited and divided. Each Province had its own laws and specific *fueros*, its own government and its own administration. Some citizens enjoyed rights and privileges which others did not have [...] There was not among us a true political association. Fortunately everything has changed with the Constitution. There are no longer *fueros* and specific laws in the provinces: the government is the same one for all and there is a uniform administration. We are all subject to the same law and the same State obligations. We all belong to one family and form a single society. The State machine already moves on its own axles for the good

⁵³ “The most perfect uniformity”. He did so in a report of the Central Junta (see Artola Gallego, 1959 p. 267).

⁵⁴ Would make of all the provinces which are part of this vast Monarchy a truly single Nation [...] There shall cease from a legal point of view the differences between Valencian, Aragonese, Castilian, Biscayan: everyone should be Spaniard.

and legitimate governing of the political movement. Spaniards, which used to be imperfectly constituted during the *Ancien Régime*, reduced for centuries to farming, manufacturing, trading and fighting for their own benefit and glory, now form a true political body and we are a truly free, independent and sovereign Nation).

This liberal idea of the nation would be rejected as a dangerous innovation threatening to dissolve the traditional God-ordained society by the supporters of the *Ancien Régime*, headed by the clergy. The conflict between secularizing liberal nationalism and the ideologies of reaction, first Absolutism and later on National-Catholicism, partly explains the lack of a hegemonic national narrative during the 19th and the 20th century, one of the causes behind Spain's weak mass-nationalisation. This also explains phenomena like clericalism and anti-clericalism in all their manifestations: in the press, the literature, the symbols and ceremonies, the protests and the violence which characterized Spanish life during much of the 19th and 20th centuries (Díaz Mozaz, 1976; Caro Baroja, 1980; Raguer Suñer, 2001; Figuero, 2001).

While the liberals portrayed the nation as the legitimizing myth of the “War of Independence”, the absolutists viewed the conflict as a struggle in defence of religion, the monarchy and the tradition, as reflected in cries such as “¡Viva María Santísima, viva Jesucristo, viva su fe, su religión, viva Fernando VII, mueran los franceses!,”⁵⁵ heard in Andalusia in 1808. This idea of a crusade against Jacobin atheism is also reflected in the words of Father Simón López labeling the French troops as the forces of revolution: “coaligación de los impíos, incredulous, deístas, ateístas, herejes, apóstatas de la Francia y

⁵⁵ “Long live the most holy Virgin Mary, long live Jesus Christ, long live His faith, His religion, long live Ferdinand VII, death to the French!” (Source: R. Vélez “*Preservativo contra la irreligión*”, Cádiz 1808. Quoted in Álvarez Junco, 2001 p. 305).

de la Europa toda” intent on “*arruinar el Trono y el Altar*”⁵⁶ (Álvarez Junco, 2001 p. 123).

It would take the conservative forces several decades to assume the dissolution of the old order, accept the idea of “nation” and begin to elaborate a national narrative according to their worldview because:

La idea de nación llevaba en germen una legitimación laica, autónoma, del Estado, cosa, en principio, poco grata a oídos eclesiásticos, como eran los de casi todos los ideólogos del conservadurismo hispano del momento (ibid p. 306).⁵⁷

Accordingly, at the time of the first Carlist War (1833-1840) the liberal troops were labelled “*nacionales*” and their Carlist counterparts “*absolutistas*” or “*apostólicos*”: the nation remained the monopoly of the liberal elites who would embark on the elaboration of a narrative and symbols in pursuit of their nation-building project. That involved radical changes in the society, namely the substitution of the inherited legitimacies in a God-sanctioned natural order by a new world organized according to nations which presumably had existed since the dawn of history. This was the task historians, writers and artists embarked on: creating a new mental universe in substitution of the old one where reality was re-interpreted through the national perspective. Paradoxically, nations were being presented as natural realities when in fact they were being constructed, as Alcalá Galiano made clear stressing the need to “*hacer a la nación española una nación, que no lo es ni lo ha sido hasta ahora*.”⁵⁸

Although the elaboration of national histories started late in Spain, the work of Modesto

⁵⁶ “alliance of impious, unbelievers, deists, atheists, heretics, apostates of France and the entire Europe intent on ruing the Throne and the Altar”.

⁵⁷ The idea of nation carried with it a secular and autonomous legitimation of the State, something in principle not really acceptable to the clergy, who were the chief ideologues of Spanish conservatism at the time.

⁵⁸ “Making of the Spanish nation a single nation, something which is not at this moment nor has it been until now”. See Alcalá Galiano, A. (1955) “Índole de la revolución de España en 1808, 1839” (in *Obras Escogidas*, Vol. II pp. 309-325. B.A.E.)

Lafuente, Patxot i Ferrer, Cabanilles, Gebhardt or Cánovas, among others, contributed to the construction of a collective memory which could accommodate the emerging Nation-State (López-Vela, 2004). Lafuente's *Historia General* was particularly influential in this respect, epitomising the liberal narrative of the nation. Lafuente starts by portraying Spain as an almost timeless historical reality in a world governed by Divine Providence. Following the well-known sequence of paradise, fall and redemption of the narratives at the time inspired in Isidore's *Laudes*, he begins by describing Spain as an Eden peopled by tribes of Celts and Iberians, considered "the first Spaniards". The narration unfolds with the Roman conquest, which in his view gave unity and culture to Spain and brought Christianity to the land. The arrival of the Visigoths after the Roman decadence gave rise to the foundation of the nation according to Lafuente, as these gave Spain laws and celebrated religious assemblies still admired by all. Spain would then suffer from the foreign Muslim invasion whose response was the "Re-conquest", defined as a struggle for Spain. The reign of the Catholic Monarchs constituted a key moment of unprecedented success in the history of Spain leading to its political unity. Unfortunately, such success would be followed by a period of decadence inaugurated with the arrival of the foreign Habsburg dynasty. This negative opinion towards the Habsburg, blamed for abolishing popular liberties, bringing Absolutism, the rule of the Inquisition and social involution to Spain is typical of liberal narratives of the nation which in turn tended to praise the Bourbons, particularly Charles III, as modernizing reformers. The portrayal of Phillip II as a the paradigm of Absolutism and religious fanaticism, the mythologisation of the Castilian *Comunero* movement and the Aragonese resistance against Habsburg Absolutism are central features in these narratives. The opposite view is held by conservative historians who praise the Habsburgs for their identification with religion and consider the Bourbons a foreign dynasty which introduced harmful reforms in government

and culture, alien to Spanish tradition, as we will see. The War of Independence naturally constitutes another high point in the liberal narrative, as the liberties suppressed at Villalar and Zaragoza were reborn.⁵⁹ As López-Vela (*ibid*) argues, Lafuente portrays the events associated with the War of Independence as a national revolution rather than a social one:

Rara vez se ha visto tanta unidad en la variedad. Desaparecieron al pronto y pareció haber borrado como por encanto las jerarquías sociales; y es que la patria que se iba a defender no es de nobles ni de plebeyos, no sólo es de los ensalzados ni sólo de los humildes; la patria es de todos, es la madre de todos (Lafuente, M. Historia General de España, Vol. XXVI, pp. 265-266).⁶⁰

The work of historians was complemented by that of academics, writers, painters, sculptors, musicians, etc., which had embarked on the nationalization of the culture since the 18th century, although the bulk of their work would take place in the following century: “they imagined reality in national terms. They invented and re-constructed history and made it national” (Álvarez Junco, 2001 p. 239). This nationalizing zeal dominated emerging disciplines like archaeology or ethnography. It also led to the first histories and compilations of Spanish literary classics, where a Spanish literature with specific characteristics, different from other literatures, was presented. Early examples were the works of the Rodríguez Mohedano brothers (1766) or Antonio de Capmany’s “*Teatro histórico-crítico de la elocuencia española*” (1786) among others. Also, Spanish historical themes began to be introduced, particularly in theatre. During the second half of the 19th century around one hundred plays inspired by Spanish history were staged: “*Numancia destruida*” by López de Ayala, “*Doña María Pacheco*”, by García Malo, “*Guzmán el Bueno*” by Nicolás Moratín, etc. Clearly the elites understood the didactic purpose of their work, in line with

⁵⁹ Reference is made here to the battle of Villalar (1521), where the Comunero revolt came to nought, and the attacks against the Aragonese fueros (1591) in connection with the Antonio Pérez affair.

⁶⁰ One has rarely seen so much unity in the midst of variety. Social hierarchies suddenly disappeared as if by magic; since the fatherland they all were defending does not belong to the noblemen nor to the commoners, it not only belongs to those exalted but also to the humble; the fatherland belongs to all, it is everyone’s mother.

Hobsbawm's notion of the invention of tradition, as the words of Antonio de Capmany exhorting writers to nationalize the masses indicate:

[...] ejercitar su talento en letrillas y romances populares que despertasen ideas de honor y patriotismo, refiriendo proezas de esforzados capitanes y soldados en ambos mundos, ya contra indios, ya contra infieles, ya contra enemigos de España en África, Italia y Flandes, pues hartas ofrece la historia. Y con estos cantares, repetidos en bailes, en plazas, fiestas y teatros, se daría sabroso pasto al pueblo, y se despertaría de su actual indolencia (Antonio de Capmany, "Centinela contra los franceses" (quoted in Álvarez Junco, 2001 p. 232).⁶¹


The dramas of Zorrilla would represent the culmination of this romantic reconstruction of the past in "Spanish terms", where a profoundly conservative image of Spain which transcends time is established (*ibid.*). A number of moral features would be consecrated as part of this Spanish canon: the fighting spirit of the Spanish race, as exemplified in the absolute contempt towards death;⁶² an aristocratic vision of the world rooted in the concepts of honour and lineage, together with a profound monarchism and religiosity associated with Catholicism. The work of painters and sculptors also contributed to the construction of a Spanish worldview. Traditional religious themes or those inspired by Greco-Roman mythology were often substituted by scenes from Spanish history, as academies and other official institutions organized contests and exhibitions to promote patriotism. "Historical" paintings, starting with Goya's series dedicated to the 2nd May events, would dominate the scene during the 19th century, creating a narrative which enabled people to imagine the world through Spanish eyes. In 1856, the *Real Academia de San Fernando* inaugurated a series of "national exhibitions" dominated by Spanish historical paintings like "*Don Pelayo en*

⁶¹ Exercise their talent in lyrics and popular poems which would provoke sentiments of honour and patriotism, narrating the deeds of valiant captains and soldiers in different worlds, against Indians or infidels, against the enemies of Spain in Africa, Italy and Flanders, as history offers us plenty of choice. And with these songs, performed again and again in dances, public squares, celebrations and theatres, the people could be instructed and awoken from their current indifference.

⁶² This contempt towards death is clearly visible in the narratives of the Spanish Foreign Legion, one of the most extreme manifestations of Spanish nationalism.

Covadonga” (figure 3.10). Other works illustrated the liberal narrative of the nation with politically-charged themes like the *Comuneros* or even more contemporary topics connected with the struggle against Absolutism, like the Execution of Torrijos, remembering the liberal uprising against Absolutism in 1831 (figure 3.10). This interest in national themes would begin to fade away towards the end of the 19th century when the avant-garde movements entered the scene, although the nationalization of the arts continued with the publication of the first histories of Spanish art (Álvarez Junco, 2001).

Figure 3.10.



“Don Pelayo en Covadonga”, by Luis de Madrazo (1855)⁶³

⁶³ Source: http://bilder-geschichte.blogspot.hk/2011_12_01_archive.html (retrieved on 22-11-12)

Figure 3.11.



“Execution of Torrijos and his companions on the beach in Malaga” by Antonio Gisbert (1888)⁶⁴

Nationalism had mixed success in the musical scene. Theatre regulations prohibited in 1807 “*cantar y bailar piezas que no sean en idioma castellano y actuadas por actores y actrices nacionales, o naturalizados en estos reinos*”⁶⁵ (Álvarez Junco, 2001 p. 260). Towards the 1830s there were repeated calls advocating a Spanish national opera and the production of musical works in Castilian, followed by the contribution of composers like Hilarión Eslava, Soriano, Gaztambide or Barbieri in search of Spain’s musical essence. The efforts to promote a national opera continued with the inauguration of Madrid’s *Teatro Real* in 1850 and the launching of a magazine, *La Opera Española*, in 1875. The initiative never really bore fruit as the public continued to prefer Italian works. The success of zarzuelas compensated somehow for the failure in establishing an operatic tradition. Numerous zarzuelas showcasing Spanish customs and manners were produced and staged from the second half of the 19th century onwards. The identity values portrayed, however, could hardly convey the

⁶⁴ Source: cgfaonlineartmuseum.com (retrieved on 22-11-12).

⁶⁵ Singing and dancing pieces which were not in Castilian or were not performed by national actors and actresses or by those naturalized in these kingdoms.

exalted ideals of patriotism found in many operas at the time, given the low-class themes and characters of many zarzuelas. One has to wait for the work of composers like Falla, Granados and Albéniz for a repertoire of Spanish national music to be recognized internationally (*ibid*).

All in all, the creation of a mythical and symbolic apparatus on which to assert the nation was attempted and partly accomplished, as the State and the elites collaborated in constructing a Spanish cultural edifice through the nationalization of the past, the arts and even the sciences. The nationalization of the masses however was weak as a result of Spain's deficient economic and social modernisation, analysed before; Spain's decline as a world power and relative lack of external threats; a weak debt-ridden State incapable of funding its nation-building initiatives and a legitimacy problem rooted in a prolonged political instability where no hegemonic national construct could take root.

The liberal revolution faltered from the start bringing nation-building to standstill when nationalism was spreading throughout Europe. The Constitution was promptly abolished and the *Ancien Régime* temporarily restored. Firmly opposed to the liberal national project, the Church would constitute the main support of the reactionary forces (de Blas Guerrero, 1996). The next decades would be marked by political instability. The ship of the State would drift between Absolutism and Liberalism in the midst of frequent uprisings and government crises, while the Empire crumbled with the independence of the Americas.⁶⁶ What this situation revealed was a “nation in the making”, presided by a weak debt-ridden State incapable of penetrating its society. It also revealed a former world power “in retreat”, no longer able to

⁶⁶ The Battle of Ayacucho (1824) marked the end of the Spanish American Wars of Independence. Spain's American Empire was reduced to the islands of Cuba, Puerto Rico, finally lost after the “1898 disaster”.

engage in major wars or external ventures at a time when other European nations were undergoing a colonial expansion which brought them prestige strengthening their nation-building efforts.⁶⁷ Worse still, Spain was not only economically and socially backward but also politically divided as the right and the left struggled to control the State. After Ferdinand VII's death, the first Carlist War (1833-1839) inaugurated a long period of social strife punctuated by political crises and civil wars which would characterise Spanish life during the 19th and 20th centuries, constituting a fertile ground for a culture of violence as legitimacy could not be achieved through victory in the political arena. The “*nación cainita*” of “*las dos españas*” was emerging, preventing the consolidation of any hegemonic national project.⁶⁸

In exchange for not having external wars, Spain had civil wars (three in the nineteenth century, and a terrible one in the twentieth), which have exactly the opposite effect to external conflicts: they destroy the unity of the social body, instead of being a reinforcing factor. Not only did Spaniards not fight united against anyone; they also fought a great deal against each other. The Spanish State was in a chronic political crisis, its legitimacy being constantly questioned during a period of at least seventy years (1808-1875): from liberal to autocratic periods, from one dynasty to another, from a monarchical constitution to a republican one, from a unitary Republic to a federal one. Revolutions and civil wars made it difficult for any government to have stability, legitimacy and the means to imprint any deep cultural mark on Spanish society (Álvarez Junco, 2002 p. 23).

The second phase in nation-building identified by de Riquer i Permanyer (2001) was equally problematic. The fate of the *Ancien Régime* had been sealed after the first Carlist War. Yet the climate of national rupture created by the conflict made the liberal State headed by a young queen largely unprepared for the task particularly fragile. The threat of Carlism continued during most of the century with numerous uprisings and two more wars (1846-1849 and 1872-1876) until the movement's decline accelerated by the *integrista* split

⁶⁷ Lord Salisbury's famous speech on May 4, 1898 epitomizing Spain as a “dying nation” clearly reflected Spain's decline as a world power.

⁶⁸ Cainismo, understood as fratricidal violence and the violent betrayal of one's compatriots, has been frequently used in many accounts of Spanish contemporary history.

in 1888. A recognizably modern society based on private property instead of birth-rights began to emerge in the 1830s with land confiscations affecting mainly the Church and the municipalities. Although the nobility lost their jurisdictional rights, they generally managed to retain their properties. The political control of the State would remain in the hands of a wealthy land-owning oligarchy in detriment of the emerging industrial bourgeoisies of Catalonia and the Basque Country, the only territories where some economic modernisation had occurred (*ibid*).

As the liberal regime moderated its stance, the nationalist discourse evolved diluting its democratic and civic connotations and becoming more authoritarian and ethnocentric. The Liberal camp split between Moderates, Progressives and Democrats while sectors of the conservative right gradually came to accept the idea of the nation.⁶⁹ Formerly rejected as a dangerous innovation of atheist philosophes and regicides bent on destroying a God-sanctioned traditional order, the nation would be incorporated into the counter-revolutionary discourse of conservative intellectuals, previously based on religion and dynastic rights.⁷⁰ This shift can be appreciated in the contrasting narratives of Donoso Cortés and Jaime Balmes (Álvarez Junco, 2001): the former, epitomizing the old counter-revolutionary stance of obdurate resistance against the forces of modernity, was naturally suspect of anything national. The latter, perhaps recognising the demise of the *Ancien Régime*, aimed at re-constituting the social order by preserving religion and monarchy, presenting them as consubstantial with the nation.

⁶⁹ This phenomenon was commonplace across Europe as Hobsbawm (1990) has pointed out.

⁷⁰ See, for instance the writings of Father Alvarado and Fray José de Cádiz against Liberalism echoing French counter-revolutionary authors such as Barruel and De Maistre (Gregorio Alonso, unpublished paper: http://sas-space.sas.ac.uk/4135/1/LIA_Atlantic_Catholic_Citizenship_Alonso_18.04.12.pdf, retrieved on 21-12-12).

This shift in the conservative discourse led to a re-interpretation of Spanish history initiated by Cavanilles, Belmar, Ferrer de Couto, Monreal y Ascaso and Merry, among others. The National-Catholic narrative of the conservative reaction would be systematised in Menéndez Pelayo's "*Historia de los heterodoxos españoles*" (*ibid*): following the scheme of paradise, fall and redemption, this account placed the emphasis on religion as the nation's kernel. If what had defined the liberal narrative was the idea of a perennial nation, the true historical subject in the conservative narrative was God's people, represented by the Church. For the liberals, the episodes of crisis had coincided with the loss of national liberties under the Habsburg yoke, while the War of Independence, portrayed in quasi-epic terms, symbolised the recovery of those liberties and the nation's rebirth. For the Catholic conservatives, the reigns of Charles V and Phillip II had epitomized the triumph of the faith, when Spain "*evangelizadora de la mitad del orbe [...] martillo de herejes, luz de Trento, espada de Roma [...]*"⁷¹ had fulfilled her historical destiny. This paradise had been lost with the arrival of weaker rulers and, later on, with the alien Anti-Christian ideology of the Enlightenment which had separated religion from politics. In their view, the War of Independence had been above all a crusade in defense of Catholicism against impious ideologies contrary to Spain's true spirit.

The rapprochement between the State and the conservative forces led by the Church took centre-stage during two decades of Moderate rule led by Narváez and O'Donnell's Liberal Union, a centre-party formed by lukewarm Moderates and rightist Progressives.⁷² The attempts by all to articulate a stronger national identity would be marred by the failure to

⁷¹ "Evangeliser of half of the globe [...] hammer of heretics, light of Trent, Rome's sword" (quote extracted from the Epilogue of "*Historia de los heterodoxos españoles*") (http://bib.cervantesvirtual.com/servlet/SirveObras/07927287699833781846746/p0000032.htm#I_345), retrieved on 21-12-12).

⁷² This period started in 1843 and ended in 1868. The Progressives only governed between 1854-1856.

cement governance on political stability channelled through citizen participation and solid political parties. Politics would continue being characterised by the military's interference in civil affairs and by frequent government crises triggered by coups or palace conspiracies. Between 1834-1875 Spain had seventy governments lasting on average less than seven months each. Twenty-nine of these governments were presided by military figures (García Madaria, 1982). As Balmes famously put it in 1846:

It is not that the civil power is weak because the military power is strong but rather that the military power is strong because the civil power is weak [...] The political parties have alternated periods in power; but none has succeeded in building a civil power (quoted in Payne, 1967 p. 25).

The Constitution of 1845 effectively renounced national sovereignty establishing that the legislative power resided in the *Cortes* and the monarch. The new electoral law further limited voting rights to roughly 100,000 wealthy proprietors, excluding the middle and lower classes from participation.⁷³ The Concordat of 1851 proclaimed Catholicism as Spain's official religion. This was aimed at mending the relationship with the Church, badly damaged as a result of the liberal policy of disentanglement (Fontana, 2007). In exchange, the Church accepted the State's secular jurisdiction and some idea of national sovereignty diluted as it was in the new Constitution (Vincent, 2007). The expansion of the State continued with the establishment of new institutions and the attempts to further regulate people's lives in the spheres of law and order, taxing and education. Unlike the short-lived changes of 1822, aimed at suppressing the old kingdoms, the territorial re-organisation proposed by Javier de Burgos in 1833 would survive with minor modifications until 1978 (Figure 3.12). The State's presence also grew with the articulation of the territory in *Ayuntamientos* and *Diputaciones* and the establishment of civil and military governors

⁷³ "At national level, after 1846, parliamentary suffrage encompassed a mere 1 per cent of the population after 1846" (Vincent, 2007 p. 24).

appointed by the central government in each province. The creation in 1848 of the new departments of commerce, education and public works also contributed to the expansion of State bureaucracy. A custom and excise police, the *Carabineros*, and a coastward organized by the State were established to combat smuggling and privateering. More crucially, the Civil Guard, a militarised police force, was founded in 1844 in substitution of the local militias to combat brigandage and defend private property across Spain, beginning to reach rural areas which had remained largely unattended before (Ballvé Mallol, 1987). Finally, the various codifications of criminal and civil law and the law of public order granted the State ample powers of territorial and societal control. For instance, the law of public order made it possible for civil governors to declare a “state of alarm” if there was suspicion that public order was being compromised. If matters got worse, the “state of war” could be declared and command be handed onto the military.

Figure 3.12.



Territorial division of Spain (1833-1978)

An ambitious fiscal reform was launched in 1845 aimed at leveling the disparate regional burdens and establishing Spain's first comprehensive system of direct and indirect taxes: a graded land tax, taxes on urban rents and commercial profits and a stamp duty. The reform, however, did not increase the number of tax-payers given the State's proverbial inability to permeate society and private life at the time. Measures like the creation of a national statistical office (1846) or a commission responsible for cartographic, census and fiscal functions (1856) represented steps in this direction. However, the plans to create a fiscal register were soon abandoned and substituted by a much less efficient system based on personal declarations of wealth which led to widespread cheating. Other important measures towards financial unification were the adoption of the decimal monetary system (1848) and the introduction of a national currency, the peseta (1868), (González Antón, 2007).

Spain had ceased to be a maritime power after Trafalgar (1805), having lost the capacity to defend its Empire. The country turned inwards after the American wars of Independence and would not embark in any major international conflict. This absence of external threats, a consequence of Spain's increasing irrelevance internationally, hindered Spanish nation-building as it limited opportunities for communal identification (Álvarez Junco, 2001; de Riquer i Permanyer & Ucelay-Da Cal, 1994). Even worse, Spain suffered a series of devastating civil wars proving that Spaniards not only failed to unite against others but chose to fight each other instead. O'Donnell's government policy between 1858-1863 aimed at re-establishing Spanish prestige seeking a more prominent role in international affairs. This resulted in a series of small-scale conflicts in Cochinchina, Morocco, Mexico, Dominican Republic and Cuba where Spain could exercise its muscle against suitably weak rivals. These interventions generated ephemeral waves of patriotic enthusiasm in the press and among the

public which distracted the attention of the military, busy as always plotting to bring down governments. Eventually, Spain did not gain much from these ventures, which only made the country's inability to compete in the international scene more evident. The threat to the authoritarian Moderate regime grew in the 1860s due to a profound financial crisis and the expansion of left-wing organizations caused by an increasing politicization of the working classes. The 1868 revolution would dethrone Isabella without bringing the much needed stability. The murder of Prim, who had lead the revolution, anticipated even greater instability: Amadeo of Savoy's short reign would be followed by the First Republic (1873-1874) which introduced federalism for the first time in Spain. Three concurrent conflicts (the third Carlist War, the Cantonal Revolution and the Cuban War) would bring the collapse of the State in the midst of revolutionary strikes, coups and declarations of independence of various territories across Spain (Figure 3.13).

Figure 3.13.



Carlist and Cantonalist conflicts (1873)⁷⁴

⁷⁴ See <http://murzainqui.blogspot.hk/2012/10/espana-como-siempre.html> (retrieved on 1-1-2013).

The Bourbons would return in 1875 after yet another coup. Stability had become an over-riding goal after decades of political turmoil and the growing social agitation which accompanied the rise of the working classes (Martin, 1990). The Restoration had been conceived by Cánovas, its political architect, to guarantee stability at the expense of real democracy. The regime would provide a “functional and modernizing form of government”, at least until 1898. It would survive multiple crises until 1923, while ensuring legality at the expense of compromising the legitimacy required for an efficacious nationalization of the masses (Vincent, 2007). The 1876 Constitution re-affirmed the Moderate-inspired principle of shared sovereignty between Crown and Parliament now divided into two chambers, where the newly-created Senate became a bastion for the oligarchies and the remains of the *Ancien Régime* (Álvarez Junco, 1997a). An executive-led State with a centralist vocation was established on the basis of the peaceful turn in office of two parties: Cánovas’s conservatives and Sagasta’s liberals. The State would continue with its expansion beginning to assume its modern form and penetrating, despite chronic debt problems, new spheres of social relations. This was mainly achieved through legislation and the creation of new institutions populated by a growing bureaucracy. The Civil Code (1889) and the establishment of the modern judicial system provided the basis for the administration of justice to become a State monopoly. The monopoly of banknotes granted to the Bank of Spain (1874) encouraged the widespread use of the peseta. The establishment of new ministries like Public Instruction (1900), services such as post and telegraphs (1889) and State corps of lawyers, custom inspectors, tax collectors, auditors, public notaries (1881-1886) also illustrate this growing presence of the State (Vincent, 2007).

Notwithstanding the State's expansion and relative modernisation,⁷⁵ its presence in society appeared as heavy and yet weak (Vincent, 2007). While political decision-making took place in the cities, Spain continued to be a predominantly agrarian poorly-communicated country with low literacy levels and sharp social differences, “*un país de centralismo oficial, pero de localismo real*” (Fusi Aizpurúa, 2000 p. 165).⁷⁶ The State's lack of social penetration, despite the growing concentration of power at the centre, was compensated by a complex network of patronage, *caciquismo*, through which centrally-made decisions were passed onto the regional and local levels of power for further implementation. In many respects, considerable power remained in the hands of a local oligarchy more interested in maintaining their privileges than in modernizing politics while the State never really succeeded in “touching all its citizens directly” (Schubert, 1990 p. 184). The end result was a system constructed upon a disenfranchisement of the citizenship, what de Riquer i Permanyer (2001) calls “*desmovilización ciudadana*”, which hindered the on-going nationalisation of the masses. Or, in Vincent's words, this weak and yet heavy State presence “meant that Spain developed into a heavily ruled society in which few people obeyed the rules, at least not at petty, quotidian level” (Vincent, 2007 p. 57):

Caciquismo was, in some respects, simply a means of conducting business. If the central State had neither the economic resources nor the democratic legitimacy to ensure the impersonal operation of government and the rule of law, it nevertheless had to find a way of ruling. Co-opting established local elites by a process of reward and then making them integral to the way government functioned, confirmed its oligarchic nature. The caciques constrained the actions of ‘elected’ deputies, ensuring that parliament would not pass unwanted legislation and that any reform measures that did get through the system would not hurt the dominant elites. (Vincent, 2007 pp. 74-75).

Ostensibly meritocratic but actually oligarchic, the regime came to depend on keeping established elites in power. Elections were held, but nothing depended on their outcome. Electors were enfranchised, but the governing parties continued to function as clientelist retinues. Newspapers were published, but political decision-making remained an

⁷⁵ Álvarez Junco (1997) describes the Canovite system as neither traditional nor modern: a competitive oligarchical monarchy undergoing modernisation.

⁷⁶ “A country of official centralism and yet real localism”

internal, elite affair. The growth of publishing, journalism, and urban cafés led to the concomitant growth of a public sphere, but politically informed comment and debate simply existed alongside (and outside) the government's accepted channels of communication (Vincent, 2007 p. 57).

Plagued by chronic funding problems, the State also showed little interest in pursuing a concerted mass-nationalisation policy. Key instruments identified by Weber (1976) in France were not efficaciously employed in Spain. Despite an early interest in establishing a public education system, little was achieved (Boyd, 1997); (Álvarez Junco, 2001). The preface of the 1812 Constitution had already specified the need for public education as a priority for mass-nationalisation. Subsequent plans were produced in 1813, 1820-1823, 1834 and 1845 without results. The *Ley Moyano* (1857) finally unified public instruction under the shared control of the State and the Church. Three levels were established: elementary education for all Spanish children aged between six and nine would be provided at schools in towns of more than five hundred inhabitants. Secondary education would be taught at schools in provincial capitals. A handful of universities at regional capitals would offer degrees while doctorates were only granted at Madrid's *Universidad Complutense*. As the State did not have sufficient resources, no provision for funding was made. Responsibility was passed onto the *Ayuntamientos*. Consequently, the law ended up being freely interpreted, if not largely ignored. It would take over 100 years for the State to be able to fund schooling as regulated in 1857. Education remained the privilege of a few, illiteracy being widespread in many parts of the country (see figure 3.9. p. 75), failing to eradicate regional languages and to disseminate a homogenizing national narrative.⁷⁷ This vacuum left by the State continued being filled by the Church, keener on producing Catholics rather than nationals. In fact, the

⁷⁷ Although the number of monolingual speakers was falling in Catalonia, Galicia and the Basque Country, around 54% of Basques still spoke their language in 1868 (Vincent, 2007). According to Marfani (2001) the sociolinguistic processes which took place in Spain during the 19th and 20th centuries promoted diglossia rather than the Castilianisation those areas where other languages were used.


percentage of Catholic schools rose from 10% in 1860 to 30% in 1920 (Álvarez Junco, 2001). One needs to wait till the creation of the lay *Institución Libre de Enseñanza* in 1876 for the Church to find a true competitor in educating Spaniards.

Military service constituted another missed opportunity for nation-building. In contrast with France, where universal conscription contributed greatly to the nationalisation of the citizens, the Spanish system facilitated the exemption from the military service for a fee, effectively discriminating between rich and poor. This system turned the army into “an enemy of the lower classes” (Costa Pinto & Nuñez Seixas, 1997), failing to fulfill the unifying role the army played in other European States.⁷⁸

The elaboration and diffusion of national symbols in the form of flags, anthems, monuments, street names, festivities, ceremonies, etc. was often carried out in an erratic, discontinuous and even contradictory fashion (Álvarez Junco, 2001). Limited funding and insufficient motivation played a role on this. On occasion, a more inclusive national discourse was sacrificed as governing factions took the opportunity to promote their own political agendas. A red and yellow flag for the navy, described in a decree by Charles III as “national”, was adopted comparatively early (1785) (Figure 3.14). Its use, in combination with other symbols, spread during the Napoleonic War. It was adopted by the Liberal militias while Ferdinand VII minimized restricted its use to the navy (Centro de Estudios Políticos y Constitucionales, 2000).

⁷⁸ The Barcelona riots in 1909 known as “the tragic week”, which started when a group of conscripts to be sent to Africa revolted against the government, constitute a good example of the disaffection of the lower classes towards the system (See Connelly Ullman, 1968).

Figure 3.14.



Navy flags (1785)



National flag (1843)



Carlist flag



National flag (1931)



National flag (1945-1977)



National flag since 1981

Examples of flags used since 1785⁷⁹

The Liberals adopted the red and yellow flag during the first Carlist War while the Carlists chose the Burgundy Cross. The use of the red and yellow flag was extended to the army in 1843. The symbol had become quite popular by the 1860s and was used as a national flag by

⁷⁹www.ejercito.mde.es/unidades/Madrid/ihycm/Actividades/cursos/vexi-historia-bandera.html (retrieved on 7-1-13)

the revolutionaries in 1868 while Carlist supporters continued using the Burgundy Cross. With time the Left supported the inclusion of a third colour (purple, in remembrance of the *Comuneros*) in the national flag. That symbol would be officially adopted during the Second Republic and substituted again, after Franco's victory in the Civil War, by the red and yellow flag, this time with Imperial Eagle, the columns, the yoke and arrows and the legends "*plus ultra*", in remembrance of the Spanish expansion across the world, and "*Una, Grande y Libre*", Falange's motto. Most of these elements have disappeared from the current Spanish flag, now displaying the Crown's coat of arms, the columns and the legend "*plus ultra*".

Like the flag, the anthem has been controversial and seen multiple changes during its relatively short history. First called "*marcha de honor española*" in a decree on 3 September 1770, it was subsequently renamed "*marcha real*", after being played in before the monarchs in official events, and finally "*himno nacional*" in a decree by Franco in 1937 (Fernández de Latorre, 2000). It was officially declared Spain's anthem in 1908. However, it was substituted by Riego's Anthem during the liberal triennium (1820-1823) and the two republics (1873-1874 and 1931-1939). The anthem has no lyrics, although Otazú suggests there have been up to thirty-two different versions during its relatively short history.⁸⁰ This has often been attributed to the difficulties in agreeing on its content:


Este pertinaz mutismo, pues, no me parece fortuito: el himno nacional es la expresión de que los ciudadanos toman la palabra y asumen su apropiación del Estado, autocelebrándose en la comunión de unas palabras patrióticas. Pues bien, nada parecido se había producido en la España del tránsito del siglo XVIII al siglo XIX, ni se produjo posteriormente en un país cuya historia proporcionó pocas oportunidades al ciudadano para que se apropiase de la palabra pública (Serrano, 1999 p. 112).⁸¹

⁸⁰ See [www.arbil.org/\(79\)himn.htm](http://www.arbil.org/(79)himn.htm) (retrieved on 2-8-12). The most recent versions were produced in 2007, under the initiative of the Spanish Olympic Committee, and in 2012, by popular singer Joaquín Sabina.

⁸¹ This persistent silence does not seem fortuitous: the national anthem is the expression of the citizens' raising their voices and assuming their appropriation of the State, congratulating themselves by sharing some patriotic words. Well, nothing of the sort had taken place in Spain during the transition from the 18th to the 19th century.

In fact, the overt display of Spanish identity has been considered politically incorrect in recent decades, a consequence of the appropriation of national symbols during Francoism (Balfour & Quiroga, 2007; Laínz, 2004). Consequently, Spaniards have tended to avoid displaying the flag, and even the use of the word Spain, until recently, while regional symbols have flourished (Figure 3.15):

Figure 3.15.



A cartoon ridiculing the attitude towards the flag after Spain's victory in the FIFA World Cup in 2010⁸² compared with the proud display of the Catalan flag at the *Camp Nou*

The commemoration of events and festivities remembering the nation has also been inconsistent throughout Spanish history (Serrano, 1999). Despite its potential to unite

It did not occur either later on in a country whose history provided few opportunities for the citizens to own the public discourse.

For more discussion on the instability of Spanish national symbols, see Solé Tura, J. (1997) ¿Qué historia? *El País*. 6-11-97 http://elpais.com/diario/1997/11/06/opinion/878770804_850215.html (retrieved on 7-1-13).

⁸² See <http://www.miclonmalvado.com/> (retrieved on 7-1-13).


Spaniards of different ideologies, the 2nd May never really took off: the *Cortes* declared it “a day of perpetual national mourning” in 1814 but the idea was shunned after the absolutist restoration. By mid-19th century, the feast was celebrated mainly in Madrid, being even shunned by the moderate governments for being “too liberal”. The centennial of the “discovery of America” by Columbus was first commemorated in 1892. The celebrations were then criticized by republican, socialist and anarchist organizations who accused Spain of destroying and enslaving indigenous peoples. A government decree declared the 12th October a national feast in 1918. The fact that it coincided with the religious celebrations of *El Pilar*, provided certain ambiguity to the commemoration from the beginning. To this day, 12th of October celebrations are more prominent in embassies and consulates abroad than within Spain.

The construction of a capital city worthy of that name constituted another important symbol of statehood offering great opportunities for the nationalisation of space in the form of commemorative monuments, street names etc. Despite Madrid’s unrivalled status as Spain’s political capital, it took a long time for the city to become an important economic centre like Barcelona or Bilbao. Madrid remained small compared with major European capitals during much of the 19th and 20th centuries not approaching 1 million inhabitants until the 1930s (Vincent, 2007). From being a small, cramped insalubrious place during much of the 19th century, the city began to expand significantly during the reign of Alfonso XII (1874-1885) with the construction of new *barrios*, larger avenues and the erection of luxurious buildings, all inspired by Hausmann’s Paris. Opportunity finally rose for the symbolic nationalisation of space which had been advocated by Mesonero Romanos during the 1930s (Serrano, 1999): old street names were changed; some places were named after national heroes; monuments

celebrating the nation were erected. Yet, in Madrid, as in the rest of Spanish cities, a thorough nationalisation of the space never really prospered due to a general lack of enthusiasm and the often contradictory policies adopted. Street names and monuments often changed together with governments while in cities like Barcelona the nationalisation of space soon began to contradict the discourse of the State.

All in all, Spain's problematic nation-building during the 19th century had resulted in a fragile identity as no hegemonic national narrative could be consolidated. Towards the end of the century, increasingly antagonistic discourses had been established (Figure 3.16). On the vertical axis, the two main Spanish national narratives were the Progressive liberal account, rooted in the secular ideas of the Enlightenment and the Jacobin-inspired concept of the nation of the 1812 Constitution, and the conservative National-Catholic account where the nation was primarily identified with religion. This second narrative, influenced by the pre-national discourse of the *Ancien Régime*, had been adopted by the Moderate Right and the Neo-Catholics (Álvarez Junco, 1997b).

Figure 3.16.



Antagonistic discourses of the nation during the 19th century

On the horizontal side there was the Spanish Progressive Federalist discourse of the Republicans and *Iberistas*, the pre-national Carlist discourse of the *Foralistas* and the newly-emerging regional/national identity discourses in Catalonia, the Basque Country and, to a lesser extent in Galicia, where language differences and a strong regional culture had survived Spain's incomplete nationalization process. Outside this national framework there were internationalist discourses which rejected the idea of the nation such as Anarchism.

Linz (1973) and de Riquer i Permanyer (2001) detect the first signs of Catalan disenchantment towards the second half of the 19th century in the midst of the revival of Catalan language and culture known as *Renaixença*, when an increasingly frustrated industrial bourgeoisie which had originally supported the nationalist project of the Liberal Revolution became estranged from what they perceived as an archaic, culturally-aggressive, Castilian-centred mass-nationalisation where the more entrepreneurial modernising social model of Catalonia had been subordinated to the agrarian and commercial interests of the Spanish oligarchies:

However, between the middle and the turn of the [19th] century, one variable changed: different segments of Catalan society, first the upper bourgeoisie and later the middle classes, thought that a more effective solution could be found within the regional framework by administrative and political self-government and even within a Catalan state built on the basis of nationalism. Frustrated in an effort to gain power in Madrid, the Catalan bourgeoisie dreamed of power in Catalonia [...] (Linz, 1973 p. 57).

Paradoxically, the elites in Spain's most modernised territory seemed conspicuously uninfluential in Spanish politics then:

Entre 1814 y 1900 sólo hubo 3 catalanes que fueran jefes del gobierno español (Prim, Figueras y Pi i Maragall, los tres en el Sexenio) cuando el número de gabinetes que se constituyeron en ese largo periodo de tiempo fue de 115. El número de ministros catalanes fue tan sólo de 22, sobre un total de casi 850, es decir, poco más del 2,75 por 100, cuando Cataluña representaba casi el 10 por 100 de la población española. Y de estos 22 ministros casi la mitad -10- lo fueron también durante el Sexenio y sólo 3 durante la primera etapa de la Restauración. Me parece que estas cifras se comentan por sí solas (de Riquer i Permanyer, 2001 p. 82).⁸³

Catalan frustration began to be expressed in the form of anti-centralist calls against the

⁸³ Between 1814 and 1900, there were only 3 Catalans at the head of the Spanish government (Prim, Figueras and Pi i Maragall, the three of them during the Democratic Six-year period) when there were 115 governments formed during this long period of time. There were only 22 Catalan ministers out of nearly 850. That represented little more than 2.75%, when the population in Catalonia represented 10% of Spain's population. And out of these 22 ministers, nearly half of them -10- were in office during the Democratic six-year Period while only 3 served during the early stage of the Restoration.

Castilian acculturation of Catalonia⁸⁴ and it gradually evolved into a dual patriotism which favoured the construction of “*una España plural*” compatible with the old allegiance towards a Catalan fatherland (Fradera, 2000). With time, the Catalanist modernising agenda would re-surface in the form of a new discourse, “*regeneracionismo*”, portraying the Catalan nation as a modernizing agent within a pluralist Spanish State, defined by Ucelay-Da Cal (2003) as “Catalan imperialism”. This hesitancy in Catalan politics between leading Spanish regeneration in their own terms and seceding from Spain would remain a constant in the discourses of Cambó and, more recently, Durán i Lleida and *Unió Democràtica de Catalunya*.

The origins of Basque nationalism are different. The national creed first took root, during the second half of the 19th century in the context of Biscay’s rapid modernisation, among a reactionary urban *petit-bourgeoisie* which had supported Carlism and the *Fueros* abolished in 1876. Its prophet, Sabino Arana, elaborated an identity centred on race, language and religion which idealised a traditional rural culture threatened by industrialisation and immigration. With time, this radical Aranist discourse would co-exist in the Basque Nationalist Party (PNV) with the more pragmatic approach of the *Euskalerriacos*, supportive of Basque autonomy within the Spanish State (De Pablo & Mees, 2005).

The “1898 Disaster”, where Spain lost its remaining colonies in a war against the USA, would constitute the climax of this identity crisis. Spain had become a residual power during the 19th century following the loss of its empire, its prolonged political instability and a series of devastating civil wars, while other countries had grown stronger with industrialisation.

⁸⁴ See for instance the comments by Joan Mañé i Flaquer, director of *El Diario de Barcelona*, complaining in 1856 that Catalonia was being treated as a colony by Spain (de Riquer i Permanyer, 2001 p. 84).

Cánovas had famously captured the inferiority complex of the nationalising elites affirming that “*son españoles los que no pueden ser otra cosa*”⁸⁵ (Álvarez Junco, 2001 p. 573). A sense of decadence was already present in works like Garrido’s “*La regeneración de España*” (1860), Mallada’s “*Los males de la patria*” (1890) or Isern’s “*El problema nacional y sus causas*” (1897). However, the final realisation of Spain’s downfall would come once news of the destruction of its navy arrived. The media’s patriotic enthusiasm and jingoism at the start of the conflict had been a gross underestimation of America’s might. A wave of pessimism and self-deprecation ensued, where Spain appeared to be “*sin pulso*”, as Silvela, soon to be appointed Prime Minister, lamented in the press.⁸⁶ All seemed to confirm Spain was one of the dying nations alluded in Lord Salisbury’s earlier speech.⁸⁷ While Álvarez Junco (1997b) argues that this prostration mainly affected the centralist elites, it meant that the nationalising efforts had not gone altogether in vain: compared with the reaction of the same elites after Ayacucho (1824), when the loss of the empire had gone practically unnoticed, the outcry in 1898 could only mean that defeats were now being interpreted in national terms, as collective failures of the nation, not as a loss of territory by the monarch.

The hopes for political stability and national consolidation raised by the Restoration had vanished in the midst of a profound crisis. Spain had lost a captive market for its manufactures, something which above all damaged the interests of the Catalan industrialists. Yet, the country’s economy would recover from the blow thanks to the repatriation of capital from the former colonies, the growing trade with Europe and the devaluation of the peseta (Vincent, 2007). More crucially, the crisis affected national identity. Spain’s defeat had occurred precisely at the height of colonial expansion in the world, “when the possession of

⁸⁵ Spaniards are those who cannot be anything else.

⁸⁶ See www.xtec.cat/~jrovira6/restau11/silvela.htm (retrieved on 15-1-13).

⁸⁷ Lord Salisbury’s speech at the House of Lords on May 4, 1898.

colonies was regarded as the bench-mark of a nation's fitness to survive" (Balfour, 1997 p. 49). There was also a crisis of legitimacy as the oligarchic regime built on the peaceful turn in office of conservatives and liberals became widely questioned:

The events of 1898 dealt the Restoration system a fatal blow. Pork barrel politics cannot operate without a barrel of pork and the loss of the colonies had, in effect, killed the fattened pig. Virtually every part of these once stable relationships came under challenge: the relationship between the centre and periphery, the role of the people as opposed to their elite representatives. The absence of national representative structures –above all national political parties- made it hard to address these questions. Faith in the Restoration system ebbed away and, as it did so, the legitimacy of the entire governing system came into question, for the Spanish State was peopled by the very same caciques who were increasingly blamed for Spain's ills (Vincent, 2007 p. 82).

Social mobilisation grew amidst criticism of the regime, cultural introspection and calls for Spain's modernisation and Europeanization. A growing social unrest linked to an increasingly organized worker's movement would threaten the established order, a phenomenon echoed in the press at the time as "*la cuestión social*" (Balfour, 1997). On the vertical axis of the nationalist discourse, this mobilisation was manifested in the movement of *Regeneracionismo*, the work of the *Institución Libre de Enseñanza* (ILE) and the literature of the *Generación del 98*. *Regeneracionismo* started as a progressive cause seeking to reform and modernize society. Considering Spain as a problem, a disease-ridden organism in need of treatment, much in line with the Herderian nationalism and the social Darwinism *en vogue* at the time, authors like Costa, Picavea, etc.⁸⁸ would diagnose the disease: backwardness, *caciquismo* and oligarchy among others, and propose measures to modernise the country's economy and society in order to Europeanize Spain: as Ortega y Gasset put it "*España es el problema, Europa la solución*"⁸⁹ (quoted in Ochoa de Michelena, 2007 p. 197). The ILE focused on reforming education as a means of national regeneration emphasising scientific

⁸⁸ See, for instance, Picavea (1899) and Costa (1900) and (1902).

⁸⁹ Spain is the problem, Europe the solution.

thinking, modern pedagogy and secularism while the authors of the *Generación del 98* would add to the Regenerationist preoccupation for Spain a renewed interest in Spain's *volkgeist* dominated by the nostalgic imagery of Castile.⁹⁰

Regeneracionismo also influenced the discourse of Catalan nationalism on the horizontal axis. Catalanism shared with mainstream *Regeneracionismo* the idea of Spain's national crisis and failed modernisation. However, the solutions proposed were markedly different (de Riquer i Permanyer, 2001): in Spain, *Regeneracionismo* had become inward-looking, Castilian-centred, thus forfeiting once again the possibility of a pluralistic nation capable of bringing together different regional sensitivities. This can be perceived in the compulsive preoccupation with Castile found in the authors of the *Generación del 98* or in the views of prominent Regenerationist like Ortega and Azaña, and their insistence on Castile's role in achieving Spanish unity.⁹¹ The Catalan elites conceived Spain's regeneration in terms which were markedly different. Their emphasis was on constructing a Catalan nation "de-Castilianising" Catalonia to make it European, so that Catalonia could play a leading role in modernizing and constructing a new Spain, conceived as "*un conjunto de pueblos diversos, de variadas identidades, unificados por un Estado común*" (*ibid* p. 207). In comparison, Basque nationalism appeared more reactionary and detached from Spanish affairs given the emphasis placed on race and religion in its discourse and the radical anti-Spanish diatribes of its founder.

This tension between Castilian-centred unitarism and Catalan-led pluralism symbolized in

⁹⁰ See, for instance, Maeztu's "hacia otra España" (1899); Unamuno's "En torno al casticismo" (1902); or Azorín's "Castilla" (1912).

⁹¹ See, for instance, Ortega y Gasset's "España invertebrada" (1921). Azaña's national discourse evolved from his initial support of Catalanist demands to what Contreras (2008) calls "desencuentro" –disagreement–.

the idea of Spain as a “nation of nations” remains unsolved, as we will see in chapters 4 and 5. After the reform of the *Estatut* derailed in 2010 when the Spanish Constitutional Court declared 14 articles unconstitutional and re-interpreted another 27 articles of the Catalan text, the number of Catalans questioning the viability of a Catalan nation inside the Spanish State has grown significantly.⁹²

This painful soul-searching no doubt stirred some consciences. Everyone seemed to demand regeneration but none agreed on how to proceed. Traditionalists would re-interpret regeneration as a need to return to Spain’s Catholic roots, a view defended from church pulpits, Jesuit schools and the ACNP (*Asociación Católica nacional de Propagandistas*) against the secularising agenda of the progressive Regenerationists and the ILE (Vincent, 2007). The regime of the Restoration would survive another 25 years tainted by crisis (34 governments between 1902 and 1923; the Tragic Week riots in 1909; the military defeat at Annual in 1921) and failed attempts of political reform, most notably conservative PM Antonio Maura’s “revolution from above”, aimed at diminishing the influence of the caciques and revitalising parliamentary politics without relinquishing control of the society by the State (Vicens Vives, 2012). This resilience can only be explained by the dynamics in a society not yet modernised (Balfour, 1997) and the flexibility of a system capable of accommodating opposition politics, and above all politicians, at the expense of the precarious nationalisation of the masses (Vincent, 2007). The Canovite system would eventually succumb to yet another military coup (1923). By then, the oligarchic system of dynastic parties had become untenable due to the growing demands for reform and the advancement of mass politics. The monarchy would take refuge in a military dictatorship

⁹² See http://sociedad.elpais.com/sociedad/2012/07/08/vidayartes/1341770195_120279.html (Retrieved on 26-2-14).

with Regenerationist aspirations, another missed opportunity which would eventually lead to the Second Republic in 1931.

The mass-nationalisation effort after 1898 had come too late, as alternative peripheral nationalisms continued to spread among regional elites. A new idea of Spain as an aggregate of nations integrated in one single State had gained ground in the country's most developed and dynamic regions. Catalan and Basque nationalists would launch alternative nation-building projects as their presence grew in *Ayuntamientos*, *Diputaciones* and new institutions like Catalonia's *Mancomunitat*, threatening the balance of power in the restored monarchy:

[...] a partir de 1901, los partidos dinásticos serán totalmente barridos de la vida política barcelonesa. Primero, y de forma muy rápida, perderán la representación en las Cortes. Así, si entre 1876 y 1899 en la ciudad de Barcelona habían sido elegidos un total de 41 diputados dinásticos (21 liberales, 19 conservadores y 1 independiente) frente a tan sólo 11 no dinásticos (8 republicanos y 3 posibilistas), en cambio en el periodo 1901-1923 se elegirán un total de 79 no dinásticos (38 de la Lliga Regionalista, 37 republicanos, 3 carlistas y 1 independiente) y un solo diputado dinástico, un liberal elegido en 1901. Y en el ayuntamiento de Barcelona a partir de 1905 ya no será elegido ningún concejal dinástico (de Riquer i Permanyer, 2001 p. 181).⁹³

The lack of a hegemonic narrative on the vertical axis of the discursive construction of the nation further undermined Spanish nationalism. De Riquer i Permanyer (1996a; 2001) distinguishes four main trends in *españolismo* towards the 1920s and 1930s:

- A conservative nationalism, staunchly monarchist, ultra-Catholic and anti-democratic,

⁹³ From 1901 onwards, the dynastic parties would be swept away from Barcelona's political scene. First, and very rapidly, they would lose their Parliamentary seats. Thus, a total of 41 dynastic MPs (21 Liberals, 19 Conservatives and 1 independent) had been elected in the city of Barcelona between 1876 and 1899 compared with 11 non-dynastic MPs (8 Republicans and 3 compromising ones). Subsequently, between 1901-1923, a total of 79 non-dynastic MPs were elected (38 members of the Lliga Regionalista, 37 Republicans, 3 Carlists and 1 independent) and only 1 dynastic MP, a Liberal elected in 1901. And in Barcelona's City Council, not a single dynastic councillor would be elected after 1905.

opposed to the liberal parliamentary system. Its origins can be traced back to Carlism. Re-formulated as Catholic traditionalism by Donoso Cortés, Menéndez Pelayo and Vázquez de Mella towards the second half of the 19th century, it was further developed by Maeztu and *Acción Española*. The State was seldom conceived in staunchly unitarist terms, leaving some room for a diluted regionalism in the administration and respect for the *fueros*.

- The aggressively unitarist, anti-separatist nationalism of the military and the *Falange*, advocating a strong centralist State. Like traditionalism, it opposed political parties and parliamentary democracy. However, it did not make of Catholicism and monarchism a central point of its discourse, despite neither being genuinely secular nor republican.
- The democratic secularising progressive liberal nationalism associated with the republican Regenerationists led by Ortega and Azaña. Their attitude towards Basque and Catalan nationalism was usually more pragmatic and tolerant than in other trends, something which can be attributed to political opportunism in De Riquer i Permanyer's view.
- The Jacobin nationalism of the working-class leftist parties which supported a strong interventionist State as the main instrument of social reform. Profoundly egalitarian, this current was naturally suspect of any policy which could undermine State power and vehemently opposed the Catholic ideology of the right, including the PNV.

These trends in Spanish nationalism would co-exist during much of the 20th century. They influenced each other occasionally and usually competed for a hegemony which was never achieved despite certain discourses being dominant during prolonged periods such as Francoism. Religion and its role in society would constitute the main bone of contention as a

result of the confrontation between Liberalism and Traditionalism took centre-stage in the early 19th century. In fact, no other European country saw a resistance towards secularisation as powerful and determined as Spain's at the time (Vincent, 2007). The Catholic revival towards the end of the 19th century would lead to a bitter confrontation between anti-clericals and clericals during the early 20th century whose climax would be the anti-clerical violence during the Republic and the Civil War. At the same time the nationalisms on the periphery would challenge the discourses from the centre without being able to defeat them altogether. Ultimately, this failure in constructing a widely-accepted national identity on the vertical and horizontal axes can be attributed to a crisis of legitimacy. Indeed, Spanish contemporary history is riddled with attempts to construct a society where one particular way of conceiving the nation has been imposed on others, often violently.

The Dictatorship of Primo de Rivera (1923-1930), a counter-revolutionary initiative of the military and the conservatives with the monarch's compliance, aimed at reforming the State following the collapse of the Canovite system. Initially portrayed as a transitory military-led fix with Regenerationist aims,⁹⁴ the initiative evolved into an attempt to articulate a national project rooted in National-Catholicism. The government, supported by the *Unión Patriótica* –the Dictatorship's only party– and the militia of the *Somaten*, embarked on the nationalisation of the masses with a discourse which combined the critique of the Restoration's parliamentary regime with the traditionalist anti-Liberal ultra-Catholic discourse of Menéndez Pelayo and Vázquez de Mella and the statist centralist authoritarian ideology of the military and Fascism. Its ideologues (Maeztu, Pemán and Pemartín) advocated a historicist and organic conception of the *patria*, said to have become a nation as

⁹⁴ Primo de Rivera was portrayed by its supporters as the much-needed “iron surgeon” advocated by Joaquín Costa towards the end of his life (see Mateos de Cabo, 1998).

a result of Spain's Christianization and political constitution as a Monarchy. The notion of popular sovereignty remained conspicuously absent from a discourse which, borrowing Ortega's idea of Spain as a collective enterprise, proposed a recipe for national regeneration combining a return to Spanish traditions and Catholic roots with the promotion of technological advancement which would cement the expansion of the Nation-State (Quiroga Fernández de Soto, 2006).

Spain's pressing need for regeneration was justified with a dualist discourse where the mythical narrative of Imperial Spain, cemented after the Re-conquest with the unity achieved under the Catholic Monarchs and the Conquest of America, the epitome of Spain's civilising mission, was confronted with the *Anti-España*, characterising those periods where the true nationalising forces had been neglected, plunging the nation into decadence. Thus, the triumph of the anti-Spanish secularising forces of *afrancesados* and liberals had ultimately led to the disaster in 1898 and the threat of fragmentation caused by separatism. This renewed emphasis on unitarism and uniformity would lead the ideologues of *Primoriverismo* to question the regionalism previously endorsed by Carlists and Catholic reactionaries alike.

La teoría de “las dos Españas” había nacido fruto de la interpretación maniquea que del pensamiento ilustrado y liberal habían hecho los absolutistas españoles durante la última década del siglo XVIII y primeras del XIX. En esta interpretación la patria se identificaba con la religión, y la España “tradicional” encarnaba el Bien absoluto, mientras que los liberales e ilustrados españoles se igualaban al Mal absoluto. Éstos eran descritos el “enemigo interior”, “antiespañoles” que actuaban dentro de la conspiración universal de las fuerzas del Mal contra el Bien, dentro de un esquema reaccionario que gustaba de la apelación al mito frente a la argumentación racional (ibid. p. 49).⁹⁵

⁹⁵ The theory of “the two Spains” had been born out of the Manichean interpretation of the ideologies of the Enlightenment and Liberalism made by Spanish Absolutists during the last decade of the 18th century and the first decades of the 19th. According to this interpretation, the fatherland was identified with religion and “traditional” Spain embodied absolute Good, while Spanish liberals and the enlightened represented absolute Evil. These two were described as the “internal enemy”, “Anti-Spanish” who participated in the universal conspiracy of the forces of Evil against Goodness, according to a reactionary schema which preferred myth in favour of rational argumentation.

La toma de postura es clara: el regionalismo “natural”, definido en términos meramente culturales, al mezclarse con elementos políticos liberales ha dado lugar a una “herejía nacionalista”, por lo que el regionalismo se considera peligroso para la unidad nacional. La nación como ser orgánico no puede ser cuestionada por sus partes (ibid p. 39).⁹⁶

Influenced by Fascism, Primo’s authoritarian regime embarked on a regeneration programme aimed at modernising the country and nationalising its people. This programme included the reform of the education system, the administration, the army as well as the development of infrastructure, agriculture and industry alongside protectionism, with measures such as the building of thousands of schools, roads, railways, airports, bridges and socializing policies aimed at addressing class conflicts providing an alternative to capitalism and socialism. The dictatorship would secure the collaboration of the Socialist Party and the UGT for some time.

These modernising initiatives were accompanied by a mass-nationalisation policy and the persecution of peripheral nationalisms: a decree against separatism, the suppression of the *Mancomunitat*, the State monopoly of textbooks, the imposition of Castilian in all schools, the promotion of feasts and symbols like the *Día de la Hispanidad* or Barcelona’s *Pueblo Español* etc. (Vincent, 2007).⁹⁷ By 1928, support for the regime was clearly dwindling. The 1929 crisis would deliver a fatal blow to the dictatorship’s modernization and nationalisation project, leading to the growth of Republicanism and left-wing parties. Also, the dictatorship’s anti-regionalism produced the opposite effect, leading to a greater identification of the people with regional and nationalist alternatives to unitarist *españolismo*.

Worse still:

⁹⁶ The position adopted is clear: “natural” regionalism, defined in cultural terms, had combined with liberal political elements giving birth to a “nationalist heresy” and thus, regionalist should be considered a threat to national unity. The nation, as an organic being, cannot be questioned by its parts.

⁹⁷ The celebration of the “*Día de la Hispanidad*” on the 12th of October had been declared a national feast in 1918. The miniature village of “*El Pueblo Español*” was built with the occasion of the Universal Exhibition celebrated in Barcelona in 1929.

[...] el sentimiento de unidad española, aún desde posiciones progresistas y proautonomistas, empezó a tener que cargar con otro lamentable malentendido y otra interpretación interesada: “España” era algo, un abstracto, cuya unidad política se pretendía imponer por la fuerza de una Dictadura, “como siempre” (González Antón, 2007 p. 446).⁹⁸

A year after Primo’s resignation, the triumph in local elections of Liberal Republicans and Socialists marked the end of the Monarchy, signaling the turn of the centre-left to launch their national project.⁹⁹ The Republic’s Regenerationist agenda was aimed at modernizing Spain according to the European model. That included democratizing politics by ending the oligarchic regime of the Restoration, socializing wealth by promoting an agrarian reform re-distributing land among the peasants and nationalising the masses alongside Republican values through an ambitious programme of schooling and pedagogical missions in hundreds of remote villages. The secularization of society was another key aspect of the republican agenda advocating the complete separation of Church and State, effectively confining religion to the private sphere with laws guaranteeing freedom of worship, civil marriage, divorce and the secularization of education.¹⁰⁰

The initial enthusiasm of the Republican elites would soon fade as the deeply-rooted contradictions derived from the country’s problematic modernisation process resurfaced (Tuñón de Lara et al, 1985). Spanish society appeared sharply divided: only for the bourgeois centre-left parties the Republic constituted an end in itself. Their socialist allies supported the new regime as a necessary step towards Socialism. For the Anarchists, the

⁹⁸ A unitarian Spanish sentiment, even when understood from progressive and pro-autonomy viewpoints, began to be misinterpreted and associated with ideologically charged views: Spain was something, an abstract entity, whose political unity was being forcibly imposed by dictatorship, as usual.

⁹⁹ The Republican victory in urban centres was overwhelming. The monarchist had won in the countryside where popular vote was often controlled by *caciques*.

¹⁰⁰ “Catholic schools continued, but outside the State system, and in 1933 further legislation banned all monks and nuns from teaching (Vincent, 2007 p. 121).

Republic was a bourgeois institution incompatible with their revolutionary ideals. The oligarchy holding the economic power saw the loss of political power as a temporary setback while Catholic monarchists accepted the rules of the democratic game waiting for a chance to destroy the regime. The radical laicism adopted from the start, epitomised in the destruction of churches and convents in Madrid after the proclamation of the Republic, would place religion at the centre of the confrontation between the two Spains, diminishing the legitimacy of the Republic for failing to include all Spaniards (Vincent, 2007).

The national question resurfaced with the proclamation of the Catalan Republic by Macià and the drafting of a Statute of Autonomy initially declaring Catalonia's sovereignty and self-determination.¹⁰¹ The compromise of the central government presided by Azaña and peripheral nationalists to reform the administrative structure of the State would trigger a process of devolution to the regions interrupted by the Civil War. The Constitution of 1931 defined Spain as a State "*integrado por Municipios, mancomunados en Provincias y por las Regiones que se constituyan en régimen de autonomía*".¹⁰² The autonomy granted to Catalonia, the Basque Country and Galicia promoted local institutions, regional languages and cultures. Other regions also sought the recognition of their specificity with calls in favour of autonomy (González Antón, 2007).

Political instability and a culture of violence haunted the Republic from the start. Democracy was threatened by right and left-wing extremists unwilling to accept defeat in the polls. The

¹⁰¹ These claims would not appear in the final version of the Statute negotiated with the central government. The definition of Catalonia as "an autonomous State within a Federal Republic" would be changed into "an autonomous region within the Spanish State" (see González Antón, 2007 p. 464).

¹⁰² "integrated by Municipalities associated together in Provinces and those Regions constituted in regime of autonomy" (Article 8 of the Constitution).

See www1.icsi.berkeley.edu/~chema/republica/constitucion.html (retrieved on 11-2-13)

regime would survive the military coup of 1932 and the Socialist Revolution of 1934 aimed at overthrowing the elected governments. In the end, the uprising in 1936 following the Left's victory in the elections, would lead once more to the violent confrontation between the two Spains in the most destructive civil war in Spanish history.¹⁰³ Nothing hinders mass-nationalisation more than civil wars because of the trauma and division caused. The 1936-1939 conflict, which brought massive bloodshed and destruction, constituted the climax in the age-long confrontation between antithetic ways of conceiving Spain on the vertical and horizontal axes expounded above. Once again, the victors in the conflict would impose their notion of Spain on those defeated, which they labelled as the Anti-Spain. Yet again, the national project that would emerge after the Civil War would exclude the other half, buried in cemeteries, imprisoned or in exile.

Francoism represented a period of aggressive *españolización* during which the national mode of organisation would become fully established as modernisation peaked. This was the result, among other things, of rapid industrialisation, advances in education, the development of communications and urbanisation. Modernisation, aided by the regime's authoritarian nature, would bring an unprecedented penetration of the State, finally undergoing its transformation into a cultural and social container, with signs of a welfare society appearing during the 1960s. Yet, paradoxically, the regime's efforts in promoting a staunchly Catholic and unitarist nationalism would backfire once Franco's rule ended. Francoism was dismantled from the inside by its successors who would negotiate the democratisation of the country with the opposition.

¹⁰³ The number of victims during the Civil War and the repression during Francoism has been a matter of controversy among historians. Beevor (2006) estimates 38,000 victims of the "Red terror" on the Republican side and 200,000 of the "white terror" on the nationalist side. Casanova rises the number of victims in the Republican side to 50,000 (see Juliá et al, 1999). Preston (2006) estimates there were 180,000 victims on the Francoist side.

The ultimate failure of the Francoist mass-nationalisation can be attributed to the regime's violent origins as well as to its nature, something which would prevent its continuity after Franco's death. On the one hand, the regime's legitimacy had been founded upon the victory at the Civil War and the subsequent repression. While the fullness of such victory created the conditions for the long-term survival of Francoism, the imposition of a national identity increasingly obsolete in the face of Spain's rapid modernisation would end up undermining the success of the enterprise. On the other hand, the highly-personalised authoritarian nature of Francoism would condition the regime's political evolution reducing its chances of survival after Franco's death.

Indeed, it seems difficult to explain Francoism given its chameleon-like evolution, largely conditioned by the heterogeneity of its social base, the outcome of the Second World War and the changing international scene. Among the victors of the Civil War one finds the regime's different "families": the supporters of Alfonso XIII, the Carlist, the Falange, the Church, the Army and, later on, the technocrats. Also, one can distinguish a totalitarian project inspired by Fascism during the early years of Franco's rule, albeit with features markedly different from the Fascist model, such as a weak single party and the considerable strength of the Church and the Army, and a second stage Linz (1974), Payne (1987) and Soto Carmona (2001) have described as an "authoritarian regime and political system of limited pluralism." It was during the totalitarian phase when the doctrine and the symbolic apparatus of Francoism was constructed through ceremonies, festivals, monuments, flags and emblems, street names, political speeches, patriotic songs, epic narratives, stories of martyrdom and redemption, etc. The resulting discourse, rooted in the principles of National-Catholicism,

Anti-Liberal Traditionalism and the Fascist-inspired statist rhetoric of the *Falange*, included various themes: the Civil War as a Crusade coupled with the cult of the “Fallen”; Franco’s providential role in history as the *Caudillo* who saved Spain from the hordes of Marxism and Liberalism and regenerated a unified Spanish nation destined to fulfil its historical mission of Empire and champion of Catholicism.¹⁰⁴

These narratives shared an organicist, historicist and unitarist idea of Spain, advocating centralization, cultural homogenisation, firmly opposed to the peripheral nationalisms, considered a threat to Spanish unity. Yet they also differed in their conceptualisation of the nation in significant ways: the National-Catholic discourse promoted the “politization of religion” placing traditions and Catholicism as the cornerstone of Spanish identity. The discourse of the *Falange* tended to sacralise the nation effectively turning *españolismo* into a form of “political religion” (Box, 2010). National Catholicism and *Falangism* would compete for hegemony and on occasion influence each other until the latter’s decline, initiated after the Allied victory in the war and confirmed with the ascent of the technocrats associated with *Opus Dei* in the 1950s. Focusing on economic reform at the expense of ideology, these technocrats would end the autarkic policies of early Francoism and pave the way for Spain’s economic and social modernisation in the 1960s coinciding with a relaxation of political repression and greater international openness. Spain’s dramatic turnaround in the 1960s would be based on unprecedented economic growth manifested in the rise in industrial production, consumer demand and the development of tourism. All this, coupled with the expansion of education, record literacy levels, and the impact of mass-migration and urbanisation would bring Spain closer than ever to the more advanced European societies

¹⁰⁴ All these themes feature prominently in key documents during early Francoism, such as Franco’s speech on 18 April 1937 announcing the unification of all the forces participating in the “Crusade” (see Di Febo & Juliá, 2005 pp. 145-149).

(Gunther et al, 1988). The following quotes illustrate these changes in Spanish society:

[...] in the 1960s, the country's Gross Domestic Product (GDP) doubled in real terms rising to 40 per cent that of Italy, through this was still only 23 per cent that of France. Yet, the rate of growth was exponential: between 1959 and 1971, Spain's average annual growth (measured in terms of GDP) was second only to Japan's (Vincent, 2007 p. 182).

[...] between 1950 and 1967 the number of children enrolled in secondary education increased fourfold. Twenty-three thousand new schools were established after 1957 and by 1968, official statistics put the illiteracy rate under 3 per cent of those under sixty years old (*ibid* p. 180).

In 1950, the proportion of Spaniards living in towns of over 100,000 inhabitants stood at 35.7 per cent, rising to 44.1 per cent ten years later, and 51.4 per cent in 1970. Pressure on accommodation was such that shanty towns had sprung up around all major cities in the 1950s (*ibid* p. 184)

During the 1960s, the proportion of Spain's population involved in farming fell below 50 per cent for the first time. Villages stopped being agrarian communities, bound together by productive relations stemming from the land; the pueblo became rather an idealized refuge, offering an escape from urban congestion and the stress of daily life (*ibid* p. 185).

These momentous changes in Spanish society contrasted with a limited democratisation and cultural modernisation, as Francoism struggled to cope with the demands of a society undergoing rapid transformation (Di Febo & Juliá, 2005). The regime's official discourse turned to emphasising the country's prosperity and stability, invariably attributed to a competent administration, encouraging the depoliticisation of the people by promoting consumerism, sports and spectacles, while an ageing Franco appeared like an old-fashioned grandfather figure to many. The ideological principles initially employed in legitimising the regime and its nation-building discourse would become diluted, if not altogether questioned. The relegation of the *Falange* in favour of the less-politicised technocrats, the *aggiornamento* in the Church after the Vatican Council and the rapid secularisation in society would contribute decisively to such dilution (Malefakis, 1996). The effects of the Council began to be felt towards the end of the 1960s as the Church became sharply divided

between Francoist traditionalists and progressives highly critical of the regime through associations like the HOAC and the JOC and publications like *Ecclesia* and *Vida Nueva*.¹⁰⁵ This division within the ranks of the Church was accompanied by a profound crisis as the number of seminarians decreased dramatically, priests married and church attendance dropped (Payne, 2006).

During Franco's final years, all seemed to indicate that the unitary ultranationalist State model imposed in 1939 had failed (Fusi Aizpurúa, 2000). The elites appeared divided between a loyalist minority advocating continuity and a moderate majority supporting democratic reform from inside (Palomares León, 2006). Protests and strikes increased as organised clandestine opposition across the country grew and a revitalised Catalan and Basque nationalism spread. Supported by a vigorous culture, Catalanism flourished, demanding political autonomy as a first step towards nationhood (de Riquer i Permanyer, 1996b). Basque nationalism became more radical and violent as ETA gained support. Such radicalism has been attributed to a weaker Basque culture threatened with extinction in its own territory (Conversi, 1997; Aranzadi et al, 1994) as well as to the social reaction against Francoist repression (Powell, 2001). The Catalan and Basque demands for autonomy and self-determination would receive enthusiastic support from the left, further undermining Spanish nationalism, associated by many with Francoism and hipercentralism for years to come (De Blas Guerrero, 1978); (Sepúlveda, 1996); (Díaz Gijón et al, 2001); (González Antón, 2007).

The main cause behind Franco's failed mass-nationalisation was its fragility, derived from

¹⁰⁵ The *Hermanidad Obrera de Acción Católica* and the *Juventud Obrera Católica* played an important role in opposing the régime as political parties were banned.

the regime's anomalous nature and limited legitimacy. The ideological hegemony of parliamentary democracies across Europe after WWII had brought international isolation and disrepute to the regime (Malefakis, 1996). Francoism appeared tainted by violence against Spain's other half, the "Anti-Spain". Such violence was perpetuated through repression, particularly brutal at first, while later on the regime resorted to blocking political participation and employing force when necessary. Also, the regime's efforts to develop a legal framework to ensure its continuity were undermined by the centrality of Franco as a figurehead and the personality cult built around him at the expense of a solid political foundation and a well-defined ideology (Powell, 2001); (Tussell, 2005). As Franco grew older, this fragility became even more evident as Spanish civil society strengthened alongside an increasingly de-ideologised State bureaucracy in the context of frantic economic and social modernisation (Pérez- Díaz, 1987); (Linz & Stepan, 1996). Inspired by staunchly Catholic authoritarianism with a Fascist outlook, Francoism appeared anachronistic to many. When Spaniards were given the opportunity to vote in free elections, they would support those forces in favour of democratisation, including those defeated at the Civil War.

Largely peaceful and orderly, the transition to democracy constituted a gradual process of regime deconstruction orchestrated from inside, led by the monarchy and negotiated with an opposition unable to impose its model of rupture from outside (Seco Serrano, 1996); (Colomer, 1998). Haunted by the memories of a bloody civil war while still under the tutelage of a highly conservative army acting as guarantor of national unity,¹⁰⁶ Spanish

¹⁰⁶ Article 8 of the Spanish 1978 Constitution has often been interpreted in this way. (see www.congreso.es/consti/constitucion/indice/titulos/articulos.jsp?ini=1&fin=9&tipo=2) (retrieved on the 15-5-13).

society chose political stability, moderation and consensus over drastic change potentially leading to renewed social confrontation. The acceptance of civil supremacy by the armed forces after the 1981 aborted *coup d'état* significantly contributed to democratic consolidation.

The configuration of a State model capable of accommodating Spain's conflicting national identities has proved far more difficult to solve. Spain abandoned its secular policies of unitarism, political centralisation and cultural uniformity in favour of a highly decentralised, culturally diverse territorial model functioning *de facto* like a federal State (Moreno, 2001); (Magone, 2004); (Aja, 1999).¹⁰⁷ Several factors favoured this federalisation: unitarism and centralism had become widely questioned, if not delegitimised altogether, after Franco's death while the demands for self-government from peripheral nationalists were associated with the democratic discourse (Sepúlveda, 1996); (Balfour & Quiroga, 2007). However, Spain's long-established centripetal tradition, the army's staunch unitarism, ETA's threat and the pluralism of the Catalan and Basque societies advised against any bold move towards federalisation.¹⁰⁸ The result was compromise, reflected in the ambiguity of the 1978 Constitution: Article 2 proclaimed "the indissoluble unity of the Spanish nation" while recognising and guaranteeing "the right of autonomy of the nationalities and regions which integrate the Spanish nation [...]",¹⁰⁹ without specifying which territories were considered "nationalities" and which were "regions". The inclusion of the term "nationalities" provoked

¹⁰⁷ One cannot speak of a *de iure* federal State in Spain because such concept does not appear in the 1978 Constitution.

¹⁰⁸ Despite the fact that nationalist parties have often governed in recent decades and that support for Catalan and Basque independence has grown, especially among the youth, nationalism has seldom been a hegemonic force in these regions. On the contrary, a majority of Catalan and Basque citizens have traditionally acknowledged a dual identity (García Ferrando et al, 1994); Del Pino (2004).

¹⁰⁹ See www.congreso.es/consti/constitucion/indice/titulos/articulos.jsp?ini=1&fin=9&tipo=2 (retrieved on 29-5-13).

much controversy at the time:

[...] convivían entonces en las Cortes, como en el seno de la propia sociedad, visiones muy dispares de la realidad española. Así se comprobó de inmediato con motivo del debate surgido en torno al término “nacionalidades”, propuesto al alimón por Roca y Herrero de Miñón en agosto de 1977, con el apoyo de socialistas y comunistas (que lo venían utilizando habitualmente desde los primeros años setenta) y la oposición cerrada de Fraga. Para el político catalanista, la inclusión de dicho término en el título preliminar de la Constitución suponía el reconocimiento del carácter plurinacional del Estado español, lo cual representaba una ruptura no sólo con el pasado autoritario inmediato, sino con siglos de centralismo y uniformidad impuestos. Para AP y algunos sectores de UCD, en cambio, “nacionalidad” era sinónimo de nación, e incompatible, por tanto, con la existencia misma de una única nación española. La izquierda, por su parte, admitía la primera parte de la argumentación, pero extraía de ella la conclusión de que España era una “nación de naciones”. A pesar de que, en un esfuerzo hercúleo por contentar a los más aprensivos, la versión final del artículo 2 matizaría el alcance simbólico de esta innovación mediante el reconocimiento de “la indisoluble unidad de la Nación española, patria común e indivisible de todos los españoles,” la presencia del término “nacionalidades” hizo imposible la aprobación de la Constitución para buena parte de los parlamentarios de AP (Powell, 2001 pp. 228-229).

([...] highly disparate viewpoints toward Spanish reality co-existed in the Spanish Parliament and society. This was soon confirmed during the debate regarding the term “nationalities”, jointly suggested by Roca and Herrero de Miñón in August 1977 with the support of Socialists and Communists (who had been using it since the early 1970s) and the adamant opposition from Fraga. For the Catalanist politician, the inclusion of this term in the preface of the Constitution represented the recognition of the plurinational character of the Spanish State, something which not only constituted a breach with the recent authoritarian past but also with several centuries of imposed centralism and uniformity. However, for the AP and some sectors of the UCD, “nationality” was synonym of nation and hence, it was incompatible with the very existence of a single Spanish nation. The left, on the other hand, admitted the first part of the argumentation but extracted the conclusion that Spain was “a nation of nations”. Although the symbolic implications of such innovation would be toned down in the final draft of Article 2, in an herculean effort to satisfy those who were most apprehensive, by recognising “the indissoluble unity of the Spanish Nation, common and indivisible fatherland of all Spaniards”, the inclusion of the term “nationalities” made it impossible for a good number of conservative MPs to support the Constitution).

All this controversy resulted in an open model of State re-configuration negotiated in an often improvised manner, resulting in the *Estado de las Autonomías* (Aja, 1999); (Fusi Aizpurúa, 2000); (Powell, 2001). With the possibility of a centralised State ruled out from the start, two alternatives remained: one was granting autonomy to Catalonia, the Basque

Country and Galicia, as in the 1930s, recognising their cultural specificity versus the rest of Spain. The other alternative was to generalise the autonomic system¹¹⁰ across the country, opting for greater homogenisation in pursuit of a federal agenda, without openly calling it “federal”. Eventually, this second alternative prevailed amid the initial indifference from people in many regions and a fair amount of discrepancy arising from the fact that some of the autonomous regions proposed had no substantial historical or cultural basis. The end result would be an open hybrid transactional formula guaranteeing the right of autonomy to nationalities and regions, without being named, establishing two alternative paths towards autonomy: a fast-track process, applied in Catalonia, the Basque Country, Galicia and Andalusia, and a slow-track one used in other regions (Tomás y Valiente, 1992).

This process of devolution significantly altered the structure of the State, effectively turning Spain into one of Europe’s most decentralised countries: for instance, in 1985, the central government was responsible for 87% of public expenditure, the towns spent 9% and a mere 3% of public expenditure was connected with the autonomous communities. In comparison, by 1997, the percentage of public expenditure of the central government had been reduced to 61% and that of the autonomous communities had increased to 26% of the overall budget (Powell, 2001). Similarly, between 1982 and 1992, the number of public workers in regional administrations reached 600,000, thirteen times more than in 1982. Another milestone in this devolutionary process was the transfer in 1996 of 30% of the income tax yields to the regions together with the capacity to regulate other taxes previously allocated to them (*ibid*).

However, the road towards federalisation has been riddled with difficulties arising from the

¹¹⁰ “Autonomic system” refers to de-centralized quasi-federal State model consecrated in the 1978 Constitution.

contradictions inherited from the past and the tensions derived from the open and negotiated nature of the process, conceptualised by Moreno as “multiple ethnoterritorial concurrence”:

In Spain multiple ethnoterritorial concurrence relates to the interplay among Spanish regions and nationalities pursuing political and economic power, as well as the achievement of the legitimization of their institutional development. It incorporates in a dynamic manner the economic and political elements that are central to Spain’s process of federalization [...] Given the Spanish context of open interactions, *concurrence* is used to mean a simultaneous occurrence of events at both state and sub-state levels within plural Spain. However, the term *concurrence* should not be understood as being equivalent to that of *competition*. In decentralized Spain there are competitive actions between state and sub-state nationalisms and regionalisms, and between the latter amongst themselves. But the underlying feature in the process of Spanish concurrence – mainly between the central and meso levels- is the lack of compulsion to eliminate other participants. In some other instances the logic of competition implies instead the aim of achieving the monopoly by means of the elimination of the competitors [...] (Moreno 2001, pp. 90-91).

This discursive process of ethnoterritorial concurrence has resulted in a quasi-federal State with an additional important feature, the so-called “*hechos diferenciales*” distinguishing some territories from others (Aja, 1999): official languages other than Castilian in Catalonia, the Basque Country, Galicia, Valencia, the Balearic Islands and parts of Navarre;¹¹¹ the Basque, Navarrese and Canary special tax system, institutions and legal codes specific to some territories (*Diputaciones*, *Cabildos*, autonomic police forces, specific civil and foral laws, etc.). More importantly, the growing presence of nationalist movements in Catalonia, the Basque Country and Galicia dedicated to negotiating additional concessions from the central government throughout the process of regional devolution, while promoting their own alternative nation-building projects in competition with that of the Spanish State, has conditioned the construction of the Autonomic State, adding uncertainty and instability to Spanish politics (Flynn, 2001); (Sosa Wagner & Sosa Mayor, 2006). The transfer of powers in the areas of education and culture to the regions has contributed to this situation, given the

¹¹¹ The fact that over 40% of Spaniards reside in an Autonomous Region with an official language in addition to Castilian needs to be emphasised (García Ferrando et al, 1994).

all-important role these play in identity-formation (Dávila Balsera, 2005); (Fernández, 1995), together with an *españolismo* evidencing a certain inferiority complex against peripheral nationalisms.¹¹² As the devolution process was reaching its end, peripheral nationalisms have often chosen to radicalize their views and pursue pro-independence agendas (Powell, 2001).¹¹³

In the face of these concessions granted to peripheral nationalisms, other regions have often reacted by demanding equal treatment from the State in what constitutes another key feature of the current Spanish political discourse, the principles of “comparative grievance” and “inter-territorial solidarity” (Moreno, 2001). In response to these centrifugal pressures, the State and the elites have embarked on reformulating the Spanish national discourse in pursuit of a renewed identity capable of responding to the challenges posed by alternative identities formulated from the periphery, in what Balfour and Quiroga (2007) call “the reinvention of Spain.”

Finally, the discursive construction of the nation(s) in Spain needs to be situated in the broader context of the emerging “network society”, a complex structural transformation analysed by Castells (2000a; 2000b; 2000c) characterized, among other things, by the re-scaling of core social practices to the trans-national level. Such a transformation has been primarily driven by the expansion of the world capitalist system in the form of global economic processes and the technological and communications revolution which has undermined the constraints of space and time on social organization and interaction,

¹¹² This “inferiority complex” has been acknowledged by José María Aznar, among others (see Prego, 2002 pp. 104-105). The avoidance of the term “Spain” in favour of alternative expressions such as “the Spanish State” has been commonplace for some time (Muñoz Alonso, 2000), (Calleja, 2001).

¹¹³ The Declaration of Estella in 1998 and the Catalanist discourse following the reform of the Catalan Statute of Autonomy in 2005 constitute examples of this trend.

accelerating interdependence in a rapidly shrinking world. As a result of increasing globalization, the fundamental patterns of socio-economic organization, the territorial principle and power are undergoing rapid change, bringing into question the Nation-State system, while national cultures are under the pressure from mass-migration in a borderless world.¹¹⁴ The Nation-State system may be far from over but undoubtedly the State's monopoly on power faces unprecedented challenges from globalization:

These arguments suggest that the modern state is increasingly embedded in webs of regional and global interconnectedness permeated by quasi-supranational, intergovernmental and transnational forces, and unable to determine its own fate. Such developments challenge both the sovereignty and legitimacy of states. Sovereignty is challenged because the political authority of states is displaced and compromised by regional and global power systems, political, economic and cultural. State legitimacy is at issue because with greater regional and global interdependence, states cannot deliver fundamental goods and services to their citizens without international cooperation (Held & McGrew, 2000 p. 13).

Confronted with these challenges, European States have embarked in a process of regionalisation resulting in the development of the EU network State (Hettne, 2000). Immersed in this process, the Spanish State not only faces pressure from peripheral nationalisms demanding powers but feels also compelled to transfer more powers to Europe seeking to preserve stability in an increasingly chaotic “world order” where the financial markets have abducted State politics.

3.5. Conclusion

In this chapter I have analysed the historical process of nation-building in Spain in its dual dimension, including the development of the national mode of organisation and the consolidation of a Spanish identity based on shared national narratives and symbols. From

¹¹⁴ Spain has received an unprecedented flow of migrants in recent decades. In 2010 there were over 6 million foreign-born residents in Spain, amounting to 14% of the population according to Eurostat: http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/cache/ITY_OFFPUB/KS-SF-11-034/EN/KS-SF-11-034-EN.PDF (retrieved on 7-6-13). In 1981 Spain hosted less than 600,000 foreigners (Recaño & Roig, 2005).

such an analysis one can conclude that despite an early auspicious beginning, Spanish nation-building has been problematic and incomplete, resulting in a long-established well-defined State unable to accomplish a thorough mass-nationalisation across its territory.

The causes behind Spain's partial nationalisation can be found at different scalar levels in Giddens's social structuration model: an unyielding geography hindering communications; a long history of political and cultural fragmentation rooted in Spain's medieval past which continued during the 16th and 17th centuries with the composite monarchy of the Habsburgs; the "distraction" of a world Empire which perhaps arrived too early in history to become a key nationalisation factor; a late and uneven modernisation which not only delayed the consolidation of the national mode of organisation but also coincided with the Castilian decline in favour of the periphery, effectively reversing the trend initiated around the 15th century when Castile had gained a supremacy which placed it at the centre of Spanish nationalisation.

During the era of nationalism beginning towards the second half of the 18th century, this unitarist Castilian-centred nationalisation model was not sufficiently robust. Spain not only lagged behind other European nations in terms of economic and social modernisation, it also lacked the stability needed for the State and the elites to accomplish the nationalisation of the masses. The resistance of the *Ancien Régime* against liberalism inaugurated a prolonged confrontation between antithetical conceptions of Spain. Soon after the Napoleonic Wars, Spain entered an era of acute political instability and social division punctuated by a series of civil wars and abrupt regime changes during which neither a State model nor a hegemonic identity discourse could consolidate. The 1898 crisis would reveal the extent of Spain's

identity crisis, reflected in the *regeneracionismo* of the intellectual elites, while emerging peripheral nationalisms began to gain considerable popular support in Catalonia and the Basque Country. The climax of all this instability would be the civil war initiated in 1936 where the “two Spains” fought to death. Franco’s victory inaugurated a dictatorial regime during which a staunchly unitarist conception of Spain rooted in the ideology of National Catholicism was imposed. Franco’s aggressive *españolización* would backfire after the transition to democracy bringing the current de-centralisation and federalisation during which peripheral nationalisms have re-emerged with renewed strength while a de-legitimised Spanish nationalism has tried to re-construct its discourse. This has coincided with a dramatic acceleration in the expansion of the capitalist world system during which core social processes are being increasingly articulated at the transnational scale. This re-configuration of political power not only threatens the survival of the State, at least in its current form, but also conditions the Spanish identity construction insofar as identities are reproduced on a daily basis in what Renan (1884) famously called “*le plebiscite quotidien*”. The next chapters are dedicated to the ideographic analysis of contemporary national narratives from the centre’s perspective, as formulated in the Madrid press, which partly illustrate the current state of affairs in the discursive construction of Spanish identity.

CHAPTER 4: THE DISCURSIVE CONSTRUCTION OF THE NATION IN THE SPANISH PRESS: “*NACIÓN*” IN THE NEWS

Introduction

Chapters 4 and 5 are dedicated to exploring the role played by the media in shaping and reproducing national identities. More specifically, I analyse the discursive construction of the nation in the Spanish press by examining how the term “*Nación*” is conceptualized in recent narratives of *El Mundo* and *El País*. This kind of analysis builds on previous research on identity discourse in the press where competing narratives in newspapers from Madrid and Barcelona were identified in connection with two different events: The 1994 USA Football World Cup and the political negotiation between CIU, a centre-right Catalan nationalist party and the PP, the centre-right winner of the Spanish elections in 1996 (León Solís, 2003). The present research however differs from that study in several ways: (i) instead of comparing national identity narratives “from the centre” with those “from the periphery”, it narrows the focus and examines how the nation is discursively constructed from the centre’s perspective by examining the narratives of Spain’s leading newspapers in terms of readership and social projection across Spain. (ii) This research does not concentrate on two single events but looks at a broader period. (iii) While also employing discourse analysis (DA) a research tool, it combines qualitative and quantitative approaches to DA by incorporating Corpus Linguistics into its analytical apparatus.

The chapter starts with a description of the corpus employed in this research. First I explain how the corpus was compiled and annotated. Second, I introduce the different sections of the corpus. The rest of the chapter focuses on analysing the use of the term “*Nación*” in the News

sub-corpora of El Mundo and El País and discusses key issues in the discourses of the two newspapers in relation to this term.

4.1. General information about the corpus employed in this research

Tables 4.1 and 4.2 below show the details of the corpus used, comprising 49,859 articles from El País and El Mundo for a total of nearly 30 million tokens. The corpus is divided into two main sections. The larger one is the News Sub-corpus (Table 4.1) comprising a total of 36,145 news articles and over 20 million tokens. The smaller section is the Opinion Sub-corpus (Table 4.2), composed of 13,714 opinion articles and editorials from the two newspapers totalling over 9 million tokens. All the articles were written over a twelve-year period, from January 1996 to December 2007. The earliest articles in the corpus coincide with the last months of President González and the ascension of President Aznar into power in March 1996 while the latest articles in the corpus correspond to the first term of President Rodríguez Zapatero in office.

Table 4.1.

News	El Mundo	EL País
No. articles	19,200	16,945
No. tokens	10,743,390	9,696,984
No. types	85,757	84,446
Type-Token Ratio (TTR)	40.85	41.48
Total No. Tokens	20,440,374	

The News Sub-corpus

Table 4.2.


Opinion	El Mundo Opinion	El País Opinion
No. articles	8,157	5,557
No. tokens	4,901,574	4,468,687
No. types	93,022	85,270
Type-Token Ratio (TTR)	45.31	44.95
Total No. Tokens	9,370,261	

The Opinion Sub-corpus

El País and El Mundo were chosen for being the country's most popular dailies during the period covered in this research. Traditionally perceived as close competitors in the Spanish media industry, these newspapers are also seen as more or less aligned with the two dominant discourses in contemporary Spanish politics: that of the center-left, whose leading advocate is the PSOE, and the center-right represented by the PP (Woodworth, 2002). Nowadays, El País and El Mundo continue to be the most widely read dailies in Spain covering general news and current affairs, only surpassed by Marca, a sports tabloid which has traditionally been the most widely read publication in the country. Figure 4.1 shows the evolution of the readership of Spain's most popular broadsheets between the years 2000 and 2008. The source of these data is the "*Estudio General de Medios*" (EGM).¹¹⁵ Similar organizations in the UK are the "Audit Bureau of Circulations" (ABC) and the "Joint Industry Committee for National Readership Surveys" (JICNARS). Unfortunately, the evolution of the readership between 1996 and 1999 is not available in this website.

¹¹⁵ The data of the EGM are available at www.aimc.es/aimc.php (retrieved on 15-10-08).

Figure 4.1.



Readership of Spain's main broadsheets: 2001-2008 (in thousands of readers)

All the articles in the corpus were manually collected from the newspapers' national edition¹¹⁶ in their online archives using the following search query:

Figure 4.2.

ESPAÑA OR ESTADO OR CATALUÑA OR Catalunya OR VASCO OR Euskadi OR Herria OR Gibraltar!
OR comunidad! OR AUTONOMÍA OR GALICIA OR ASTURIAS OR CANTABRIA OR RIOJA OR
ARAGÓN OR CASTILLA OR ANDALUCÍA OR EXTREMADURA OR VALENCIA OR BALEAR OR
MURCIA OR NAVARRA OR MADRID OR CANARIAS

AND

OR ESTATUTO OR TERRORISMO OR VIOLENCIA OR ETA OR bandera! OR lengua! OR cultura! OR
HISTORIA OR IDENTIDAD OR INDEPENDENCIA OR autodeterminación! OR selección OR selecciones
OR SOBERANÍA OR Estella OR Lizarra OR plan Ibarretxe OR financiación!

Search query

¹¹⁶ El País and El Mundo have several versions, a national edition for the whole country and several regional editions which contain additional news related to a particular region.

The search terms were not case sensitive. Capitalized words represent lemmas (i.e. *REGIÓN*: *región*, *regiones*, *regional*, *regionalismo(s)*, *regionalista(s)*) used here for simplification purposes, while (!) represents a wildcard: i.e. *comunidad!* would return articles containing “*comunidad*” and “*comunidades*”. In both newspapers, the news articles were extracted from a section called “*España*” whereas opinion articles and editorials came from a section identified as “*Opinión*”. Each article was stored in a separate file and coded as follows in order to facilitate the retrieval of contextual information related to the article in question:

Figure 4.3.

Source: El País or El Mundo.

Main discursive Space: Catalonia, Euskadi, Other Regions, Spain as a whole.

Genre: Opinion/ Editorial, News, Interview

Year of publication

File number

Example: MSN970088 (Mundo Spain News 1997 file No. 0088).

Coding system

Detailed notes on key events and processes echoed in the articles were also compiled. These constitute “a parallel record” of the discursive construction of the nation which can be compared with textual patterns in the corpus. This arguably enhances the analysis because major shifts in textual patterns can be put into a historical perspective thus facilitating a closer alignment between text and context.

4.2. The news and opinion genres in the corpus

The organization of articles into the two sub-corpora employed in this research reflects the traditional division between news and opinion genres commonly found in the modern press where news are perceived as dealing with facts while opinion concentrates on analysis. Such distinction is generally recognized by professional journalists and media researchers alike despite the fact the boundaries between news and opinion may not always be clear-cut. In fact, as Bell (1991) points out, news is not just about the facts but also the product of organizational structures and professional practices. Hard news as we find them in newspapers is not produced by individual journalist-authors. On the contrary, at the core of news what one can find is multiply embedded texts. This is due to a number of reasons. On the one hand news is the result of the collective effort of reporters, sub-editors and editors who regularly intervene in the process of news-making and edit the source texts originally submitted by individual reporters following standard professional practices. On the other hand, much of the content included in a typical hard news item does not usually come from the reporter's individual observation. It is either obtained during an interview with one or several news sources or simply taken from previously written documents in the form of press releases, public addresses or news agency copy.

Following this long established journalistic convention, news and opinion articles in *El País* and *El Mundo* appear in separate sections of the papers both in the hardcopy and in their digital editions. Also, Opinion is usually flagged by means of a standard heading and the name of the article's author. The vast majority of the articles in the News sub-corpus belong to the category of 'hard news', although there are some cases of what Bell (*ibid*) calls 'soft news' or 'feature articles'. *El País* usually employs the term '*Reportaje*' to flag this soft news while *El Mundo*

does not usually have a term to differentiate between hard and soft news explicitly. Immediacy and factuality are two of the most distinctive features commonly associated with hard news. Hard news typically deals with very recent ‘happenings’ because newsworthiness is closely associated with timeliness. Some news contains tales of accidents, natural catastrophes, crimes etc. Another major category of hard news is dedicated to politics. This latter kind of news constitutes the bulk of the articles in the News sub-corpus in this research. Much of this news, as we will see, has to do with what people say rather than with what they do. In other words, this news is basically “talk about talk” where journalists report on what politicians have said on a particular occasion in the form of statements, announcements, opinions, reactions, appeals, etc. Consequently, much of the text in the News sub-corpus comes in the form of reported speech. This is often overtly reflected by the use of direct quotations or reporting verbs where other people’s talk is paraphrased, although there are occasions where reported speech, or pseudo-reported speech, does not feature at the surface level of text. Given this basic fact of news making one can conclude following Fishman (1980) that facts in the news are so and so because someone says it.

Typical examples of hard news items in the News sub-corpus can be found in Appendix 1. Texts 1 and 2 from El Mundo and El País respectively illustrate some of the common characteristics of the political news genre as found in the corpus. Text 1 is anonymous whereas text 2 includes the initials of its author (C.V) and the place where the news originated (Madrid). The only geographical reference we find in text 1 is “*España*”, the section of the newspaper where the article comes from. Both articles start with a headline, a one sentence summary of the story, followed by the lead. The lead is clearly the most distinctive feature in the news genre where the headline is expanded into a single paragraph summary capturing the essence of the news item

(who, what and where). This allows the copy editor or the audience to get the main point of the story. Bell convincingly argues that the lead paragraph, in addition to summarizing the news story, constitutes a nucleus of evaluation because it “focuses the story in a particular direction: it forms the lens through which the remainder of the story is viewed” (Bell, 1991 p. 152). This evaluative function is even more obvious in the news headline according to this author.

The rest of the text in the articles contains additional details where one or more participants are either directly quoted or paraphrased by the news writers. Unlike in personal narratives, the sequence of events presented in the news is hardly ever arranged in chronological order. We can see, for instance, that when additional details are provided after the lead, there are usual references to prior events such as a protest which took place in 1960 in text 1. Also, hard news stories typically end without any clear resolution or any coda, contrary to what usually occurs in personal narratives. If any outcome is mentioned at all, this usually appears in the lead. Thus, we can see how both text 1 and text 2 conclude somewhat unceremoniously as if the volume in a radio transistor gradually faded away.

Text 3 in Appendix 1 is an example of the kind of soft news also found in the News sub-corpus albeit much less frequently. The article is explicitly labeled as “*Reportaje*” (feature), to differentiate it from hard news items. The headline is comparatively more complex than the ones typically found in hard news because it is preceded by a head title: “*Los obispos repiensen España*” (the bishops re-think Spain), followed the proper headline. The author’s full-name comes next, followed by the place where the news comes from (Madrid), the name of the newspaper, the section where this item is included (*España*) and the date when the news was published. Text 3 presents some of the characteristics of the feature news genre mentioned by

Bell (1991): First, the article is comparatively longer than those usually found in hard news. Second, this kind of feature news includes a fair amount of editorializing, a typical attribute of Opinion articles as we will see. This editorializing can already be seen in the rhetorical question at the beginning of the article, typeset in italics in the original text: “*¿Está en juego la unidad de España?*” (Is the unity of Spain at stake?). More examples can be found in the remaining text which combines the kind of reported speech typical of hard news with the opinions of the journalist-author distinguishable by the way modality is encoded: (“*pero parecen contar con el apoyo de los obispos andaluces [...]*” they seem to have the support of the Andalusian bishops), (*[El resto del episcopado] podría compartir alguna de las ideas de Rouco y Cañizares [...]*” [the rest of the bishops] may share some of Rouco’s and Cañizares’s ideas [...]) etc. Third, the article does not appear to be time-bound to immediacy as we saw with hard news. We can see a reference to time in the lead but it does not point to the immediate past, as it always occurs with hard news, but to the immediate future. Therefore, the lead does not perform its usual function: that of being the abstract of the article. Here it looks more like an introduction because it does not summarize what has happened but rather deals with what may happen according to the intentions expressed somewhere else by the participants in the event (“*[la Comisión permanente de obispos] intentará llegar unida y con algún documento a la Asamblea Plenaria de mañana y el jueves*” “[the Bishops’ Committee] will try to arrive at both tomorrow’s and Thursday’s Plenary Meetings united and with some kind of negotiated document”).

The bulk of the Opinion sub-corpus, on the other hand, consists of articles contributed regularly by columnists. We can also find some unsigned editorials which supposedly reflect the stance of the newspaper on a particular issue, usually featuring prominently in the news of the day. Finally, there are also letters to the editor sent by readers expressing their opinion on multiple

issues. The analysis of numerous articles in the Opinion sub-corpus reveals the existence of significant differences within the Opinion genre which are reflected not only in the rhetorical structure of the texts but also at the grammatical and lexical levels. These differences will be analyzed in detail in the next chapter. Let me just anticipate that one type of opinion article tends to be time bound, usually addressing issues featuring prominently in the news of the day. This kind of article is usually written in a style which stresses editorializing by means of unconstrained authorial judgment. A second type of opinion article is not usually time bound as it does not relate to any specific news event. The style used here is more typical of the one found in expository essays where a proposition is presented at the beginning and this is subsequently evaluated by presenting different arguments in a concise, clear and impersonal manner.

Not surprisingly, the differences between the News and Opinion genres discussed above are clearly manifested at the lexical level. Tables 4.3 and 4.4 compare the most common lexical keywords in El Mundo Opinion versus El Mundo News and El País Opinion versus El País News respectively. These keywords, listed here according to their degree of keyness, were obtained by comparing the wordlists of the Opinion versus the News sub-corpora using WordSmith Tools 5.0 (Scott, 2008). Keyness was double-checked using an online Log-Likelihood calculator¹¹⁷ which yields the following values as strength indicators, where a value above 3.84 can be interpreted as a sign that the differences in frequency are statistically significant:

¹¹⁷ <http://ucrel.lancs.ac.uk/llwizard.html> (retrieved on 1-7-10)

Figure 4.4.

95th percentile; 5% level; $p < 0.05$; critical value = 3.84
99th percentile; 1% level; $p < 0.01$; critical value = 6.63
99.9th percentile; 0.1% level; $p < 0.001$; critical value = 10.83
99.99th percentile; 0.01% level; $p < 0.0001$; critical value = 15.13

Log-Likelihood values

Each keyword appears in the leftmost column followed by the absolute frequency scores in the Opinion and News sub-corpora and the log-likelihood score in the rightmost column. A plus sign indicates that the keyword in question is unusually more frequent in the Opinion sub-corpus if the score is higher than 3.84. A minus sign indicates an unusually higher frequency in the News sub-corpora of the two newspapers.

Table 4.3.

Keyword	Frequency El Mundo Opinion	Frequency El Mundo News	Log-likelihood
Opinión	7749	40	+17523.79
Es	46440	58298	+7767.13
Editorial	2505	492	+3508.03
Impresiones	1548	65	+3097.22
Historia	2861	1828	+1744.17
Nacionalismo	2962	2493	+1227.53
Líder	1633	7225	+754.63
Estatuto	3790	10191	+119.30
Política	8985	17525	+79.80
Ibarretxe	3818	9875	+77.26
Ayer	5731	32562	-5451.48
Aseguró	288	9505	-5214.88

Portavoz	839	10644	-3943.26
Añadió	78	5689	-3631.33
Según	2403	16381	-3524.59
José	2709	16992	-3284.32
Afirmó	309	6593	-3149.71
Fuentes	223	6038	-3131.15
PP	9014	36313	-2999.65
Ejecutivo	962	9330	-2855.27
Secretario	744	8075	-2694.42
Presidente	5866	25675	-2615.51
Dijo	1431	10707	-2585.14
Gobierno	13866	48393	-2528.69
Madrid	2777	14583	-2144.87
CIU	1971	10837	-1722.04
Vasco	9073	31237	-1549.79
Congreso	1852	9031	-1158.78
Acuerdo	2893	12235	1147.26
Socialistas	2271	9789	-961.66
Partido	6194	20173	-794.02
España	12953	37312	-748.81
Batasuna	3913	13756	-738.40
PNV	6797	21238	-685.78
Proceso	2918	10687	-662.18
PSOE	6381	19419	-545.17
Partidos	3987	12564	-423.33
Zapatero	7841	13791	-236.89
Fue	4897	13772	-233.13
Aznar	4228	11936	-207.84
Cataluña	5496	14953	-193.88
ETA	15719	3983	-188.98
País	6507	16695	-118.76

Comparing the most frequent keywords in El Mundo Opinion vs. El Mundo News

Table 4.4.

Keyword	Frequency El País Opinion	Frequency El País News	Log-likelihood
Es	41467	49814	+7659.63
Historia	3353	1488	+2890.43
Nacionalismo	4280	2898	+2388.72
Editorial	266	137	+200.93
Ayer	1809	29223	-12531.93
Presidente	3113	24971	-6549.23
PP	6680	36823	-6016.00
José	1858	18277	-5747.36
Gobierno	11055	47459	-4763.90
Portavoz	550	10293	-4720.22
Dijo	765	11309	-4635.93
Ejecutivo	456	8489	-3884.19
Secretario	401	7712	-3577.42
Aseguró	64	5371	-3523.18
PSOE	3083	17550	-3015.01
Líder	628	7913	-2960.31
Afirmó	66	4164	-2628.53
CIU	1589	11050	-2483.14
Fuentes	165	4611	2441.11
Madrid	2239	13002	-2301.78
PNV	5514	23011	-2155.61
Añadió	64	3449	-2122.55
Socialistas	2012	11426	-1955.77
Zapatero	2278	12070	-1847.63
Según	2100	11414	-1822.78
Aznar	2570	12838	-1770.60
Batasuna	2433	12329	-1745.56
Ibarretxe	2580	11442	-1238.21
ETA	11448	35336	-1136.27
Estatuto	3668	13794	-967.75
Partido	5220	1778	-871.01
Vasco	8066	24976	-816.20
Acuerdo	2934	10831	-716.83

Partidos	4299	13771	-529.89
País	11406	31233	-467.96
Cataluña	4872	14063	307.80
España	11374	28876	-205.51

Comparing the most frequent keywords in El País Opinion vs. El País News

The analysis of these keywords reveals a great deal of overlap in the terms with the largest differences in keyness in the News and Opinion sub-corpora in El Mundo and El País. Keywords like “*opinión*”, “*editorial*” or “*impresiones*”, all common headings found flagging opinion articles, are unusually more common in the Opinion sub-corpus. Abstract concepts such as “*historia*”, “*nacionalismo*”, “*política*” and the verb form “*es*”, which encodes processes of being, are also significantly more common in opinion articles. All these terms are naturally associated with the opinion genres because the emphasis there is on conceptual analysis at the expense of narrative, typical of news. As one may expect, the news genre is characterized by a much higher frequency of time expressions like “*ayer*”, used in reporting the immediate past or lexis associated with participants in the events narrated (i.e. “*presidente*”, “*portavoz*”, “*José*”, “*gobierno*”, etc.). Other terms unusually more frequent in the News sub-corpus are commonly found in reported speech such as reporting verbs (i.e. “*dijo*”, “*aseguró*”, “*añadió*”, “*afirmó*”, etc.) or reporting expressions such as “*fuentes*”, “*según*” etc.

In the remaining sections of this chapter, I examine the narratives of the nation in El País and El Mundo focusing on how the term “*Nación*” is employed in the News sub-corpus. I start by outlining the method of analysis employed, followed by the findings and some discussion. Special emphasis will be placed on the differences and similarities in the ways the two newspapers employ “*Nación*” in their discourses.

4.3. Method of analysis

This section outlines the approach used in the analysis, which will also be applied in the next chapter with other keywords employed in the discursive construction of the nation in the Spanish press. In order to achieve greater coherence, I will foreground the results and background the procedures in my discussion. Admittedly this may obscure to some extent the finer details of how the findings have been determined, something that can be partly compensated by outlining the protocol of analysis below.

The analysis comprised the following:

1. Word frequency data: The frequencies of “*Nación*” in both sections of the News sub-corpus were studied to gain an initial understanding on the centrality of this concept and to identify possible differences in the use of this term in different newspapers and across different sections of the corpus.
2. Diachronic analysis: This provided evidence on the use of “*Nación*” in the two newspapers across different periods. Significant frequency shifts in certain periods or sharp frequency differences between the two newspapers may contribute to explaining important changes in the discursive construction of the nation or differences in stance between *El Mundo* and *El País*. They may also help us identify key events in this discursive construction, something which could be subsequently corroborated with evidence at phraseological and whole-text levels.
3. Collocate and phraseological analysis: *Nación*’s most frequent collocates were analysed to gain an initial understanding on how this concept is employed discursively in the two

newspapers. Raw frequencies were complemented with Mutual Information scores to measure the relative strength of the relationships. While the analysis of frequent collocates provided the main input in identifying common phrases in the concordances, additional phraseological patterns were extracted to include common phrases containing less frequent collocates whenever necessary. The reason for doing so is that a more common collocate does not necessarily result in a common fixed phrase or phrasal pattern due to the numerous possibilities derived from language variation. Keyness plays an important role in identifying any statistically significant deviation in the use of a phrase between the two newspapers. Log-Likelihood (L-L) was used to confirm whether the differences in frequency between particular words or clusters in El Mundo and El País were deemed significant.

4. Text and discourse analysis: phraseological analysis provided the basis for broader textual analysis to help us determine how “*Nación*” is discursively constructed in the articles containing the keyword. At this stage, especial attention was paid to discourse patterns and common *topoi* in unveiling the ideological stances of both newspapers. Diachronic analysis was also employed to determine if there were significant differences in stance between the two newspapers and/or across different periods and/or in connection to any key events discussed in the press. Naturally, a broader window of analysis introduces too many variables and makes the kind of sentence-level quantitative analysis used in 3 and 4 above impracticable. However, the qualitative analysis done at this stage was built upon a solid quantitative basis because I was able to select texts for analysis on the basis of their phraseological typicality.

4.4. Frequency data of “Nación” in El Mundo and El País News

“Nación” appears as the 407th and 365th most common word in El Mundo and El País News wordlists. Its distribution in both sub-corpora does not deviate significantly as tables 4.5 and 4.6 show.

Table 4.5.

	No. of tokens	% Tokens	No. of texts	% of texts
El Mundo News	2,862	0.026	1,492	7.77
El País News	2,658	0.027	1,372	8.09

“Nación” in El Mundo & El País News

Table 4.6.

El Mundo News	Log-Likelihood	El País News
2,862	-1.12	2,658


“Nación” in El Mundo News vs. El País News

The -1.12 Log-likelihood score indicates that the term “Nación” is comparatively more frequent in El País News despite having a higher raw frequency in El Mundo News. This is due to the fact that El Mundo News sub-corpus is comparatively larger than El País News, as shown in table 4.1. Nevertheless, if the criterion for determining the statistical significance of a log-likelihood score is set at the rigorous critical value of 3.84 ($p < 0.05$), then it can be concluded that a -1.12 L-L score would not be deemed significant enough statistically speaking for the purposes of this study.

4.5. Diachronic analysis of “*Nación*”

Figure 4.5 reveals sharp differences in the use of “*Nación*” over time. After a relatively small increase in 2004 in relation to the previous year, 2005 sees a remarkable rise in occurrences in both newspapers: around 498% in El Mundo and 604% in El País News. This tendency continues in 2006 in El Mundo while the occurrences in El País News decrease by almost 19%. We see a sharp decline in both newspapers in 2007 with figures close to those of 2004.

Figure 4.5.



Diachronic use of “*Nación*” in El Mundo vs. El País News

The sharp rise and drop occurs within two years during Rodríguez Zapatero’s first term in office. In total, 2005-2006 account for 58.66% and 61.81% of the number of occurrences of “*Nación*” in El Mundo and El País News respectively. A summary look at the chronology of events compiled during the collection of the corpus points towards the new Catalan Statute as the main cause behind this sharp increase. This is not surprising considering that the proposed inclusion

of the term “*Nación*” referred to Catalonia in the *Estatut* gave place to much discussion in the media.

As stressed in chapter 3, such political initiative needs to be understood within a wider historical context following the creation of the State of Autonomies with the 1978 Constitution, which initiated a period of de-centralization and devolution that has not yet concluded partly due to the open-ended nature of the constitutional pact in relation to the structure of the Spanish State (Aja, 1999; Moreno, 2001). A nationalist party (CiU) led by Pujol governed Catalonia from 1980 to 2003. Pujol’s long term in office was characterized by a policy of nation-building inside Catalonia and conditional collaboration with the central governments of González and Aznar in exchange for important concessions, especially when those governments were minority ones (Magone, 2004). A three-party coalition government of Catalan Socialists (PSC), Independentists (ERC) and Ecosocialists (ICV) governed Catalonia between 2003 and 2010 and the nation-building process that distinguished Pujol’s long reign continued unabated with the elaboration of the new *Estatut* (MCN030027).¹¹⁸ The Catalan regional elections in 2010 saw the return of CiU to power with an absolute majority in the Catalan Parliament after having spent seven years in the opposition.

Even before their ascent to power, the Catalan Socialists led by Maragall, traditionally sympathetic with the idea of a federal Spain, seemed keen to outdo their nationalist rivals of CiU in asserting their Catalanist credentials. This could be interpreted as a political manoeuvre to attract some of the electorate traditionally supportive of CiU. A proposal for a new *Estatut* was presented by Maragall in March 2003 in Madrid where he advocated “accommodating Catalonia

¹¹⁸ The references of all the articles quoted from the corpus can be found in Appendix 2.

within a federal Spain” as well as “an international role for the Catalan government, the Generalitat” (MCN030112).¹¹⁹ This federalist sentiment traditionally present in some sectors of the PSOE received renewed impulse during the party’s meeting in Santillana del Mar in 2003 which confirmed a pluralist turn in its territorial policy after several years of complicity with the PP in the Basque Country following the assassination of Miguel Ángel Blanco by ETA. Such complicity, which had become patent in organizations such as *Foro de Ermua* and *¡Basta Ya!* and had been instrumental in the emergence of a “*Bloque constitucional*” during Redondo Terrores’s leadership of the Basque Socialists (PSE), was interrupted after Ibarretxe’s victory in the Basque elections in May 2001 (MEN020568). Zapatero further encouraged Maragall by promising him “to support the reform of the Catalan *Estatut* approved by the Catalan Parliament” at a rally held in Barcelona on 13 November 2003.¹²⁰

Eventually the first article of the *Estatut* initially proposed by the Catalan Parliament formally recognized Catalonia as a nation. This national recognition of Catalonia was strongly opposed by the People’s Party (PP), who called it “*una reforma encubierta de la Constitución*” (a covert reform of the Constitution) (MCN050174, PCN050562);¹²¹ also by many military and sectors of the judiciary (PCN060780, PCN060465, MCN050429). The People’s Party appealed to the Spanish Constitutional Court (Tribunal Constitucional) to have the Catalan *Estatut* declared unconstitutional. It also organized a campaign in defense of Spanish unity, symbolically launched in Cádiz (MCN060336, PCN060741): the city where the first Spanish constitution was

¹¹⁹ “El encaje de Cataluña en una España federal” y “la presencia internacional de la Generalitat” were the actual words used by Maragall.

¹²⁰ Zapatero’s exact words were: “Apoyaré la reforma del Estatuto de Cataluña que apruebe el Parlamento de Cataluña” as shown in YouTube: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=e5VONY0UCnI&feature=Playlist&p=E5EB4A863C35AABD&playnext=1&playnext_from=PL&index=10 (retrieved on 14 December 2009).

¹²¹ The idea of the Catalan *Estatut* being a covert reform is often repeated in the discourse of both newspapers, with 28 occurrences of “*reforma encubierta*” interpreted as such in *El País* News between 2004-2006 and 20 occurrences in *El Mundo* directly linked to the *Estatut*. Other occurrences in *El Mundo* are linked to “Plan Ibarretxe” or the policies of Zapatero or Pujol.

born during the Napoleonic War, considered by many the foundation of the Spanish modern Nation-State.

Over four million signatures were collected in this campaign, later rejected in the Spanish Parliament (PSN060215). The governing Socialist Party (PSOE) was more divided around the Catalan *Estatut*, reflecting the existing division regarding the idea of nation among the Spanish left and the tensions between the discourses of asymmetric federalism with its emphasis on regional differences and equalitarianism, which advocates the idea of all Spanish citizens having equal rights and duties (Balfour & Quiroga, 2007). The Catalan Socialists (PSC) headed by Maragall, Zapatero and most members of the Government defended more or less enthusiastically the possibility of calling Catalonia a nation and Spain “a nation of nations” while other Socialist leaders such as Bono, Barreda, Guerra, Rodríguez Ibarra and, initially, Chaves expressed unitarist views close to those in the PP as PCN050619 illustrates:

El presidente del Gobierno, José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero, aseguró ayer que no pondrá obstáculos para que Cataluña se denomine nación en el Estatuto reformado, aunque matizó que "siempre que, a la vista de los dictámenes que se realicen, dicho término sea compatible con la Constitución". Zapatero entiende que nación "no es un término estrictamente jurídico", y apeló a su significación histórico-cultural y sociológica. En la misma dirección, el ministro de Administraciones Públicas, Jordi Sevilla, estima que "Cataluña es una nación, entendida como nacionalidad en la Constitución" [...]

Algunas destacadas personalidades socialistas, como el presidente de la Comisión Constitucional del Congreso, Alfonso Guerra, y el ministro de Defensa, José Bono, se han pronunciado en contra. Otras, como el presidente de la Junta de Andalucía y presidente del PSOE, Manuel Chaves, dudan de su constitucionalidad. (PCN050619)

An important moment from a discursive point of view was when Rodríguez Zapatero argued that the nation was “a debatable concept” (*un concepto discutible*) in the course of a parliamentary debate (PSN040179), a phrase the opposition would subsequently employ to attack the President of Government. Zapatero’s initial, and yet conditional support of the term “*Nación*” for Catalonia gradually waned and his discourse became more ambiguous, partly in response to a heated campaign by the Popular Party and a sector of the media headed by El

Mundo, who accused Zapatero and the Socialists of conniving with the nationalists in destroying the Spanish nation, partly in response to opinions polls where a majority of Spanish citizens disagreed with the initiative of calling Catalonia a nation (PCN050665). This shift in the Socialist leader's discourse re-activated the terminological negotiation of the concept of nation among all stake holders, as phrases such as “*término/ concepto/ palabra/ definición (de) nación*” or “*comunidad/ entidad/ realidad/ identidad/ carácter nacional*” prove, with Zapatero at some point claiming to have “up to eight different alternative formulae to make compatible the sentiment of a majority of Catalans (who believe) that Catalonia is a nation with the sentiment of a majority of Spaniards that there is no other nation but Spain”:

El presidente aseguró ayer que tiene "ocho fórmulas distintas" para compatibilizar el sentimiento de la mayoría de los catalanes de que Cataluña es una nación con el sentimiento de la mayoría de los españoles de que no hay más nación que España. Zapatero reconoció luego que quizá la cifra de ocho sea exagerada, y algunos de sus colaboradores admiten que aún es pronto para tener una solución que, en todo caso, debe ser consensuada.

No obstante, entre las fórmulas estudiadas está definir a Cataluña como "país", que es el término usado habitualmente por los catalanes para referirse a su comunidad y que, según el diccionario de la Real Academia, significa "nación", pero también "región, provincia o territorio". O denominarla "comunidad nacional", fórmula que propuso el presidente del Consejo de Estado, Francisco Rubio Llorente, con un sentido más cultural que político. (PCN050232)

At the same time, Rodríguez Zapatero toned down the identity debate arguing that “*el proyecto de reforma no debe ser ‘ni las tablas de la ley ni un arma arrojadiza’*”,¹²² while claiming that he “*no es ni un nacionalista ni un españolista*” and “*el mejor patriota es el que no presume de ello*”¹²³ (PCN050711). Another manoeuvre in the same direction consisted in eliminating the term “*Nación*” from the first article of the *Estatut*, much to the consternation of Catalan nationalists, and maintaining it in its Preamble, arguing that the preamble of a legal document lacked “legal force” (PCN050619, MCN060272). After arduous negotiation between the Socialist government and the more moderate nationalists of CIU in which Maragall was

¹²² The Projected Reform [of the *Estatut*] should not become the [Mosaic] Tables of the Law, nor should it be an excuse for attacking each other.

¹²³ He is neither a nationalist nor a Spanish nationalist and the best patriot is that who does not boast about it.

sidelined by Madrid (PCN060605), a trimmed text of the Estatut was eventually approved by the Spanish Parliament in March 2006 with the votes against it of PP and the Catalan independence supporters of ERC, who nevertheless admitted to agree with 85% of its contents (PCN060504). Although the PSOE voted in favour of the Estatut, the “*guerrista*” faction¹²⁴ of the party admitted in private that they still did not like the text according to El Mundo (MCN060390). The *Estatut* was subsequently voted on a referendum in Catalonia on 18th June 2006 and approved by 73.90% of the electorate with 20.76% against (including the pro-independence votes of ERC supporters and those of the PP). The abstention rate however was very high (49.42%).¹²⁵ Four years later, the Spanish Constitutional Court agreed with 90% of the Estatut, although 14 articles out of a total of 129 appealed by PP were declared unconstitutional. Another 27 articles were re-interpreted by the Court. The resolution of the Constitutional Court has not been well-received in Catalonia, where the vast majority of political parties, including PSC, have vowed to continue their struggle for national recognition.

4.6. Common collocates of “*Nación*” in El Mundo and El País News

This section shows the most frequent collocates of “*Nación*” in the News section of El Mundo and El País. Mutual information scores are used to determine collocational strength. An MI score higher than 3 will be deemed indicative of strong collocation, following the specifications of Wordsmith Tools (Scott, 2008). Tables 4.7 to 4.13 show the most frequent lexical collocates of “*Nación*” clustered according to meaning. Given the size of this corpus, I only include those appearing a minimum of 20 times within a L5-R5 range in at least one newspaper and I only list

¹²⁴ Guerrista is a common term used to refer to a faction of PSOE led by Alfonso Guerra, a key figure in the Socialist Party in the last 30 years who was Deputy Prime Minister under Felipe Gonzalez between December 1982 and January 1991.

¹²⁵ Source El Mundo: <http://www.elmundo.es/elmundo/2006/06/18/espana/1150653842.html> (retrieved on 8-10-09)

the most frequent positions within this range. Tables 1 and 2 in Appendix 3 show an extended list.

Table 4.7.

L5-R5	El Mundo News	MI	El País News	MI
R1	Nación española (210)	7.601	Nación española (220)	7.977
L3 & L2	España ** nación (69) España * nación (58)	4.658	España ** nación (84) España * nación (41)	5.069
R1	Nación catalana (92)	6.871	Nación catalana (52)	6.337
L3 & L2	Cataluña ** nación (180) Cataluña * nación (115)	6.781	Cataluña ** nación (159) Cataluña * nación (239)	7.019
R1	Nación vasca (70)	5.412	Nación vasca (69)	5.317
L2	Herria * nación (33)	6.276	Herria * nación (14)	5.942
L3	Vasco ** nación (12)	1.982	Vasco ** nación (8)	1.514
L3 & L2	Euskadi ** nación (12) Euskadi * nación (5)	4.592	Euskadi ** nación (11) Euskadi * nación (8)	3.756
L3 & L2	Galicia ** nación (9) Galicia * nación (9)	6.140	Galicia ** nación (12) Galicia * nación (20)	6.806
L4 & L3	Andalucía *** nación (2) Andalucía ** nación (3)	4.723	Andalucía *** nación (7) Andalucía ** nación (5)	5.144

Collocates of “*Nación*”: Candidate nations

Table 4.8.

L5-R5	El Mundo News	MI	El País News	MI
L3 & L4/L2, R3	Comunidad ** nación (11) Comunidad * nación (9) Nación ** comunidad (13)	5.235	Comunidad ** nación (6) Comunidad *** nación (9) Nación ** comunidad (13)	5.356
R4/R3	Nación *** Europa (9)	4.524	Nación ** Europa (5)	5.013

Collocates of “*Nación*”: Geography

Table 4.9.

L5-R5	El Mundo News	MI	El País News	MI
L1	Término nación (216)	9.517	Término nación (185)	9.517
L2 & L1	Concepto de nación (47) concepto nación (20)	8.681	Concepto de nación (37), concepto nación (5)	8.463
L4 & L2	Definición *** nación (30) Definición * nación (20)	9.190	Definición *** (101) Definición * nación (18)	9.590
L1	Palabra nación (41)	6.892	Palabra nación (31)	6.545
L4, L3, L2	Idea *** nación (8) Idea ** nación (7) Idea * nación (7)	5.904	Idea *** nación (5) Idea ** nación (10) Idea * nación (8)	5.672
R2	Nación de naciones (52)	9.130	Nación de naciones (52)	9.119
R2	Nación * patria (22)	8.325	Nación * patria (25)	8.475
L2/L4	Denominación * nación (15)	6.184	Denominación *** nación (19) Denominación * nación (15)	8.618
R1	Nación sin (22)	3.385	Nación sin (12)	3.136
R1	Nación dentro (19)	5.586	Nación dentro (18)	5.885
R1	Nación propia (13)	5.392	Nación propia (3)	4.394
R1 & R3	Nación nacional (4) Nación ** nacional (4)	3.243	Nación ** nacional (6)	4.042
R2 & R3	Nación * nacionalidad (7) Nación ** nacionalidad (4)	7.991	Nación * nacionalidad (15) Nación ** nacionalidad (3)	7.829
R2	Nación * ciudadanos (16)	4.269	Nación * ciudadanos (11)	3.889
R4 & R5	Nación *** todos (9) Nación **** todos (5)	2.770	Nación *** todos (15) Nación **** todos (6)	3.067
R1 & R3	Nación nacional (4) Nación ** nacional (4)	3.243	Nación ** nacional (6)	4.042

Collocates of “*Nación*”: Concept

Table 4.10.

L5-R5	El Mundo News	MI	El País News	MI
L1	Única nación (26)	5.986	Única nación (40)	6.555
L1	Nuestra nación (27)	6.224	Nuestra nación (16)	5.728
L1	Gran nación (21)	4.653	Gran nación (17)	4.606
R3	Nación ** común (21)	5.589	Nación ** común (23)	6.063

R1	Nación plural (20)	7.305	Nación plural (14)	7.031
R1	Nación libre (14)	6.206	Nación libre (9)	5.770
R5	Nación **** indivisible (18)	10.814	Nación **** indivisible (16)	10.855

Collocates of “*Nación*”: Quality

Table 4.11.

L5-R5	El Mundo News	MI	El País News	MI
L3	Estado ** nación (380)	6.640	Estado ** nación (388)	6.813
L5	Debate **** nación (91)	6.088	Debate **** nación (137)	6.092
L2	Estatuto * nación (11)	4.781	Estatuto * nación (18)	4.707
R2	Nación ** estatuto (19)	4.781	Nación ** estatuto (22)	4.707
R3	Nación ** Estatut (5)	4.985	Nación ** Estatut (0)	
L4 & L3	Unidad ** nación (51) Unidad *** nación (15)	6.295	Unidad ** nación (61) Unidad *** nación (12)	6.238
L4 & L3	Reconocimiento **** nación (11) Reconocimiento ** nación (17)	7.084	Reconocimiento *** nación (33) Reconocimiento ** nación (11)	7.037
L3	Defensa ** nación (36)	5.470	Defensa ** nación (19)	4.891
L4 & L3	Constitución **** nación (6) Constitución ** nación (5)	4.122	Constitución **** nación (15) Constitución *** nación (11)	5.005
R3	Nación ** Constitución (8)	4.122	Nación ** Constitución (8)	5.005
L4/L3	Pueblo *** nación (10)	4.737	Pueblo ** nación (7)	5.037
L3	Inclusión ** nación (20)	7.930	Inclusión ** nación (19)	8.251
L3	Construcción ** nación (12)	6.738	Construcción ** nación (10)	5.733
L2/L4	Denominación * nación (15)	6.184	Denominación *** nación (19) Denominación * nación (15)	8.618
R3	Nación **preámbulo (21)	8.849	Nación **preámbulo (20)	8.569
R4 & R3 /R2	Nación ** derecho (12) Nación * derecho (7)	4.673	Nación *** derecho (15) Nación ** derecho (12)	4.786
R5/R4	Nación **** derechos (9)	4.268	Nación **** derechos (5)	3.596
R5/R3 & R2	Nación **** soberanía (5)	6.034	Nación ** soberanía (4) Nación * soberanía (4)	5.974
R4/R3	Nación *** texto (4)	3.571	Nación ** texto (6)	4.199
R3	Nación ** articulado (8)	8.077	Nación ** articulado (11)	7.836
R2/R5	Nación * artículo (4)	4.460	Nación **** artículo (9)	5.079
R4/R3	Nación *** proyecto (2)	3.445	Nación ** proyecto (5)	3.781

Collocates of “*Nación*”: Issues

Table 4.12.

L5-R5	El Mundo News	MI	El País News	MI
L3	Gobierno ** nación (136)	3.715	Gobierno ** nación (132)	3.624
R2 & R3	Nación * presidente (14) Nación ** presidente ()	2.679	Nación * presidente (8) Nación ** presidente (6)	2.280
R4/R1	Nación *** Zapatero (8)	3.543	Nación Zapatero (10)	3.196
R1	Nación Rajoy (7)	3.049	Nación Rajoy (6)	3.410

Collocates of “*Nación*”: Participants (people & institutions)

Table 4.13.

L5-R5	El Mundo News	MI	El País News	MI
L2	Es * nación (262)	5.059	Es * nación (227)	4.997
L2	Somos * nación (45)	7.694	Somos * nación (44)	7.476
L2 & L3/L1	Ser * nación (13) Ser ** nación (9)	3.839	Ser * nación (13) Ser nación (6)	3.911
L2 & L3	Sea * nación (21) Sea ** nación (13)	5.009	Sea * nación (29) Sea ** nación (9)	5.292
R1/R3	Nación son (7)	3.764	Nación ** son (8)	3.550
R1	Nación está (4)	2.441	Nación está (5)	2.941
L2	Hay * nación (14)	4.183	Hay * nación (20)	4.417
R2	Nación * tiene (11)	3.437	Nación * tiene (16)	3.817
R1	Nación debe (6)	3.837	Nación debe (5)	3.585
R2	Nación * puede (6)	3.212	Nación * puede (7)	3.240
L5	Dice ***** nación (6)	4.195	Dice ***** nación (10)	4.662
R1	Nación dijo (11)	3.067	Nación dijo (4)	2.584
R1	Nación dice (5)	4.195	Nación dice (1)	4.662
R1	Nación añadió (6)	3.786	Nación añadió (0)	2.856
L5 & L2	Defina ***** nación (11) Defina * nación (5)	10.051	Defina ***** nación (8) Defina * nación (4)	9.515
L5 & L4	Define *** nación (4) Define ***** nación (4)	8.237	Define *** nación (16) Define ***** nación (11)	8.828
R2	Nación * definir (15)	8.413	Nación * definir (13)	8.510
L5 & L4	Reconoce ***** nación (7) Reconoce *** nación (5)	6.627	Reconoce ***** nación (5) Reconoce ***** nación (3)	6.295
L2	Construir * nación (16)	6.935	Construir * nación (11)	6.168

L2	Defender * nación (5)	4.881	Defender * nación (9)	5.528
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Collocates of “*Nación*”: Processes

4.7. The discourses of “*Nación*” in El Mundo and El País News

This section compares how the concept of nation is discursively constructed in the news section of both newspapers. The analysis, based on phraseological and whole-text evidence, is organized around a series of findings substantiated with evidence from the News corpus. The picture that emerges from the analysis corroborates the social constructivism advocated in this study and the key role played by discourse in nation-building. This is the story of several territories, identified in the category “Candidate Nations”, competing for nationhood (Table 4.7). A related category is “Geography”, associated to phrasal patterns such as “*DEFINIR/LLAMAR/DENOMINAR/SER ... Comunidad (autónoma) ... Nación*”, and “*La nación más antigua/vieja de Europa*” (referring to Spain in El Mundo News) or “*Nación ... en Europa*” (referring to the Basque nation in El País News). Quantitatively speaking, Spain and Catalonia are the two main candidates followed by the Basque Country and Galicia. There are also occasional references to Andalusia as a nation.

Finding 1: There is ample evidence of negotiation around the concept of nation in both newspapers.

The collocates listed under “Concept” and “Quality” (tables 4.9 and 4.10) reflect a discursive negotiation involving competing national claims. Expressions such as “*Término*”, “*Concepto*”, “*Definición*”, “*Palabra*”, “*Idea*” and “*Denominación*” tend to be used in very similar contexts and seem almost interchangeable in the following examples:

En el citado documento interno se establece, además, que el Preámbulo del Estatuto incurre en «fraude de interpretación» del artículo 2 de la Carta Magna «al equiparar el término nacionalidad al concepto de nación, configurando a Cataluña como un ente preexistente a la Constitución y cuyo autogobierno tiene una legitimidad anterior a ella». (MCN060317)

Rodríguez Zapatero quiso restar importancia al debate en torno al término nación: «A estas alturas, en un país más de futuro que de pasado, lo peor sería dar una batalla por las palabras, por un concepto que a lo largo de la Historia ha tenido y tendrá contenidos distintos». (MSN060023)

La identidad de Galicia se ha convertido en un problema insalvable: el PP aceptaba hablar del "sentimiento nacional" de los gallegos, pero no la mención de la palabra "nación" que proponían PSdeG y BNG. (PORN070095)

Cuando nosotros defendemos la idea de nación catalana sin hacer redondeos, sin intentar buscar circunvalaciones extrañas para decir que Cataluña es una nación, seriamente lo decimos porque defendemos nuestra identidad. (PCN060123)

Other collocates in these two categories are related to phrases such as “*nación de naciones*” or “*nación de ciudadanos*”, “*única nación*” or “*nación en la que todos sus ciudadanos sean iguales...*”. They also reflect this negotiation around what constitutes “a nation” and what community should be called “nation”. The category “issues” (table 4.11) is more heterogeneous. Many collocates listed here also result from this discursive negotiation between competing nations. One particular group of collocates refers to the places where those territories aspiring to be recognized as nations state their claims: “*Estatuto*”, “*Preámbulo*”, “*Articulado*”, “*Texto*”, “*Artículo*”, referring nearly always to the Catalan *Estatut*. These terms tend to appear together with nominalized processes such as “*inclusion*”, “*denominación*” or with “processes of doing” realized as verbs such as “*DENOMINARSE*” or “*DEFINIR*”.¹²⁶

La inclusión del término nación en el preámbulo del Estatuto fue acordada el pasado 21 de enero por el presidente del Gobierno, José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero, y el líder de CiU, Artur Mas. (PCN060540)

La ministra de Cultura, Carmen Calvo, consideró ayer que hay que desdramatizar la polémica sobre si Cataluña puede denominarse nación en su Estatuto argumentando que el término nación «es un comodín» y tiene muchos juegos en la historia política y más connotaciones políticas y culturales que jurídicas. (MCN050100)

¹²⁶ The use of capital letters here indicates the existence of a lemma with several lexical realizations.

Collocates like “*Unidad*”, “*Reconocimiento*”, “*Defensa*”, “*Construcción*” etc. refer to issues related to one of the nations under dispute, while “*Estado*” and “*Debate*” are related to the phrase “*Debate del Estado de la Nación*”, Spain’s foremost parliamentary debate. The category of “Participants” (table 4.12) refers to people and institutions mentioned in connection with Spain. The collocates under this category and that of “Issues” tend to refer to more external elements of the nation and they do not contribute to explaining the intrinsic meaning of nation in the same way as those collocates listed under “Concept”. The last category of collocates refers to processes associated to “*Nación*” lexicalized as verbs (table 4.13). One should bear in mind that many of these are closely related to some of the collocates listed under “concepts” and “issues” such as “*Definición*”, “*Reconocimiento*”, “*Defensa*” or “*Construcción*”, which could also be considered processes lexicalized as nouns as a result of grammatical metaphor (Halliday, 1985; Halliday & Martin, 1993). This category of processes is sub-divided according to the process types of “being”, “doing”, “saying” and “sensing”, used in the systemic functional grammar tradition (Martin & Rose, 2003).

Finding 2: Some of these collocates reveal different ideologies in the discourses of “*Nación*”.

We can distinguish three major stances (unitarism, pluralism and nationalism) and two minor ones (post-nationalism and regionalism). Unitarism, or Spanish nationalism, is based on the premise that there is one indissoluble nation in Spain, as article 2 of the Spanish Constitution acknowledges: The Spanish nation. These are some other unitarist *topoi* identified in the News sub-corpus:

- National sovereignty resides in the Spanish people. Therefore, the principle of self-determination cannot be applied in the Basque Country or in Catalonia:

Y al lehendakari le espetó (Rajoy): "España es lo que los españoles quieren que sea. Cuando se habla de derecho de autodeterminación, derecho a decidir, lo que se está diciendo es que ustedes que están sentados aquí no pueden decidir. Y la esencia de la Constitución, y de la nación española, es la soberanía nacional. Y que el voto de todos vale igual". (PSN070273)

También Aguirre habló con Zapatero de las reformas estatutarias y dejó claro que "Madrid está muy cómoda en su encaje en España, en tanto que otros planteamientos atentan contra la soberanía nacional, porque la nación española es la suma de las voluntades de todos los españoles". Y añadió: "Cuando se dice que los vascos son titulares de soberanía, todos tenemos que oponernos". (PSN040048)

- Spain may well be “*una nación plural*” but everybody should enjoy equal rights and duties:

Y dijo (Bono): "La España a la que han de defender es diversa y plural, pero es también vertebrada, en la que todo el mundo entiende no se puede atribuir más beneficio a quien más riquezas tenga, en el sentido de que pagar más impuestos no da más derechos". Y juzgó esta intención como "despreciable" e "insolidaria". "La igualdad de oportunidad de los españoles, que garantiza la propia nación española, es un valor constitucional", indicó. (PSN040028)

«¿Considera conveniente que España siga siendo una única Nación en la que todos sus ciudadanos sean iguales en derechos y obligaciones, así como en el acceso a las prestaciones públicas?». Esta es la pregunta que el PP insta a Rodríguez Zapatero a someter a consulta popular. (MCN060769)

- Spain is not “a nation of nations”. It is a nation of citizens with equal freedoms and rights.

(Bono): «No pienso pedir ni permiso ni perdón. No puedo evitar mis sentimientos y yo me siento español y, además, me gusta», afirmó. «España no es una casa en ruinas, ni un edificio a construir con elementos prefabricados que vayan aportando unos y otros a su antojo en una especie de romería solidaria. No veo que se precisen reformas generalizadas». «Y eso», recordó con la cita textual en la mano, «ya lo dijimos los socialistas en la declaración de Santillana del Mar». «Pretender refundar España constantemente», dijo tajante, «denota una cierta insolencia porque España, más que nación de naciones, es una nación de ciudadanos iguales en derechos y obligaciones». (MSN050070)

- The New Catalan Estatut represents “a covert reform of the Spanish Constitution” whose Article 2 recognizes the unity of the Spanish nation. Therefore, the Catalan Statute threatens the existence of Spain as a nation.

"España ha desaparecido del mapa", para pasar al núcleo de su estrategia de oposición: la nación española. Rajoy mantiene que Zapatero "está desguazando la Constitución disimuladamente", a través de las reformas de los Estatutos. (PSN060207)

El PP defiende un referéndum sobre el Estatut ante la "quiebra de la unidad nacional". (PCN060198)

Pluralism is based on a central *topos*: While the Spanish Constitution acknowledges that the Spanish nation is one and indissoluble, there can be more than one nation within the Spanish Nation-State. It all depends on how “nation” is defined. Pluralists support the idea of a fully-fledged federal Spain, which can be considered “a nation of nations”, a concept coined by Anselmo Carretero, according to El País:

Maragall dice que España debe confiar en una Cataluña que "no hace trampas"
Mensaje del presidente catalán con motivo del Día de la Constitución
En la estela también de Anselmo Carretero -nombre de cabecera autonómica para el presidente José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero y hombre que acuñó el término de España nación de naciones-, Maragall afirmó: "Ahora es el momento del reconocimiento constitucional de las autonomías y de dar cabida a las diversas realidades que quieren convivir en la nación de naciones que es España". (PSN040129)

Other pluralist *topoi* found in the data are:

- The idea of Spain being a nation of nations is already implicit in Article 2 of the Spanish Constitution because “*nacionalidad*” is a synonym of “nation”.

Lo hizo casi a la misma hora en que Iceta explicaba en el Parlamento catalán que el PSC "no comparte las dudas" expresadas la víspera por el presidente del PSOE, Manuel Chaves, acerca de la constitucionalidad o no de la definición de Cataluña como nación. "Es totalmente constitucional", argumentó, "porque nación y nacionalidad son sinónimos". (PSN050065)

La polémica sobre este asunto surgió a raíz de una entrevista con el presidente del Gobierno publicada en EL PAÍS el pasado 17 de octubre, en la que Zapatero restaba importancia a la reclamación catalana, considerando que los términos nación y nacionalidad no son tan precisos y quizás puedan ser empleados indistintamente. El PP respondió de inmediato que el presidente estaba jugando con la definición de España de un modo irresponsable. (PSN040173)

Más insistió en que, por primera vez, se reconoce en una ley orgánica que el término nacionalidad de la Constitución es sinónimo de nación. (MCN060724)

(Llamazares): Eso es un debate semántico. La Constitución marca la pluralidad territorialidad: nacionalidades y regiones. La nación de naciones no es incompatible con la idea de nación española. En 1978 se buscó el eufemismo de nacionalidades en vez de naciones en el artículo 2 porque había presiones militares. Hoy no existen. (PSN050159)

- The unity of the Spanish nation is not in danger because of the autonomic reforms.

La presidenta del Tribunal Constitucional, María Emilia Casas, aseguró ayer que la unidad de España no está en peligro y que el alto tribunal está precisamente para garantizarla. (PSN060169)

El Parlamento de Andalucía aprueba el Estatuto sólo con los votos de la izquierda
"No se rompe España, sino una forma determinada de concebirla", afirma Chaves. (PORN060028)

Rubalcaba trató de tranquilizar a los que dudan de que el concepto de nación española esté en peligro: "Nadie va a tocar el artículo de la nación española en la Constitución. Jurídicamente no hay nada preexistente a la Constitución, salvo la soberanía nacional", insistió. (PCN050582)

- Catalonia is a nation but not a nation without a State.

La defensa de la nación catalana no significa, aseguró, la negación de la nación española "pues España es una nación de naciones". Y eso se inscribe en la voluntad de "superar la lógica de un Estado, una nación". Contra lo que muchos nacionalistas suelen decir, De Madre sostuvo que Cataluña no es una nación sin Estado. "Somos una nación que ya tiene un Estado, el español, que es el nuestro", precisó. (PCN050671)

MADRID.- El portavoz de Convergència i Unió (CiU) en el Congreso de los Diputados, Josep Antoni Duran Lleida, quiso aclarar ayer «tantas falsedades» como, en su opinión, se han dicho últimamente. «Este no es un proyecto de Estatuto que pretenda la segregación de Cataluña del resto de España», indicó. «No es el primer paso hacia la independencia ni para crear un Estado propio para Cataluña», añadió. (MCN050371)

- Catalan independence makes no sense in the context of the European Union.

Europa, no independencia

"¿Independencia, de qué, si todos somos europeos?", se preguntó el presidente en una conversación con periodistas ante el monumento a Rafael Casanova, máximo responsable político de Barcelona durante el asedio de las tropas borbónicas. Para Maragall, que ha venido reiterando que su futuro político pasa por el proyecto euromediterráneo, Europa es la garantía "de que nadie se come a nadie y todos continuamos siendo lo que somos: los catalanes, catalanes; y los castellanos, castellanos". Por ello, consideró "ridículo" querer avanzar por la senda independentista. (PCN060276)

Nationalism (Basque, Catalan, Galician, etc.) is based on the idea that Spain is not a nation.

Rather it is a State that houses true nations like Catalonia, Euskal Herria/Euskadi and Galicia

who may aspire to constitute their own State:

España, a juicio del presidente de la Generalitat, «no es sólo una realidad administrativa, sino una realidad afectiva, histórica, de intereses y de memorias comunes, pero no es una nación». Frente a esa realidad, Pujol sitúa a Cataluña, como una nación con personalidad propia en la que «la lengua es uno de los hechos más significativos». (MSN980099)

Other common nationalist *topoi* are:

- The true nations inside the Spanish State are not free.

Sin embargo, Benach, en su discurso titulado La nación del siglo XXI y pronunciado en la sala Francesc Tarafa de Granollers, argumentó que la autodeterminación no es sólo «una necesidad para la nación catalana: también lo es para el Estado español, que nunca será un Estado normalizado mientras los pueblos que lo componen no sean libres». (MCN040139)

Joan Puigcercós habló claro y alto. El suyo es un partido que aspira a conseguir "la nación catalana libre", pero dicho esto adelantó el voto favorable de su grupo a la investidura de Zapatero y se mostró dispuesto a la negociación y al diálogo permanente. (PCN040205)

- Basques and Catalans have the right to decide if they wish to be independent from Spain:

La proximidad del referéndum del Estatut en Cataluña, previsto para el 18 de junio, convirtió la reunión de ayer en Sabin Etxea en un apoyo explícito al sí en la consulta en Cataluña y en una reivindicación del derecho de los ciudadanos a decidir de la "nación catalana, gallega y vasca" en España. (PCN060661)

También quedan suprimidos del preámbulo "la vocación y el derecho de Cataluña a determinar libremente su futuro como pueblo". (PCN050564)

A minority standpoint, hardly represented in the data, could be described as “post-nationalism”. Among its proponents we find intellectuals associated with movements such as *¡Basta Ya!* and political parties such as *Ciudatans de Catalunya* or UPyD, although many members in these organization are probably closer to Unitarism. These social movements first appeared in the Basque Country and Catalonia in defense of individual freedoms being threatened by the nation-building policies of Basque and Catalan nationalist governments. Although they coincide with unitarism in advocating a strong State guarantor of citizen rights, they tend to see all forms of nationalism as a thing of the past and favour a society more tolerant with different national identities where individual rights and freedoms should come first. Fernando Savater’s thought-provoking statement, “*la idea de España me la sopla*”,¹²⁷ constitutes a good example of this minority discourse, as in the following examples referring to Catalonia:

El periodista Ivan Tubau, también fundador de Ciutadans, hizo el "ejercicio" de repetir las polémicas palabras del actor Pepe Rubianes, por las que se disculpó en su día, pero cambiando España por Cataluña en el sujeto. "La nación catalana me suda la polla", dijo entre aplausos. (PCN060262)

Exigen recuperar la consideración de ciudadanía y de libertades civiles frente a «la nación catalana, soñada como un ente homogéneo, que ocupa el lugar de una sociedad forzosamente heterogénea». Y ponen de manifiesto que el victimismo nacionalista sólo sirve para ocultar la nefasta gestión del gobierno catalán. En Cataluña, dicen, «actúa una corrupción institucional, el requisito principal para ocupar una plaza o recibir una ayuda, es la contribución al mito identitario». (PCN050033)

¹²⁷“I don’t give a damn about the idea of Spain”: www.youtube.com/watch?v=bjfxOVZ_uDE (retrieved on 24 December 2009).

Leaving aside the considerable frustration one detects here as a result of the identity straightjacket the authors have been subjected to for many years, I would argue that this post-nationalist discourse runs the risk of being engulfed by unitarism unless it begins to deviate significantly by including Spanish nationalism more often in their critique. It is important to note that these standpoints are not necessarily monoglotic. In fact, there can be significant variation in their discourses leading sometimes to intermediate positions like “moderate pluralism” or “regionalism” which represents a compromise between unitarism and pluralism. This is by no means a new phenomenon in Spanish politics. The discourse of regionalism was already present as a form of proto-nationalism in places like Catalonia and the Basque Country by the end of the 19th century (Ucelay-Da Cal, 2003); (de Riquer i Permanyer, 2001) and it is still quite representative in Galicia and other regions as a consequence of the process of federalization undergone in Spain in the last decades (Balfour & Quiroga, 2007). Nuñez Feijóo, the current president of the Galician Autonomous Community, Josep Piqué, a former leader of the right-wing People’s Party (PP) in Catalonia, or Socialist politician Manuel Chaves constitute good examples of this as the following quotations from the News Corpus illustrate. In MORN070158 it is reported that Nuñez Feijóo considers the reference to the unity of the Spanish nation in the new Andalusian Statute “an unnecessary excess” and “*españolista*”. He also defines Galicia as “*una nacionalidad con identidad propia*”. PCN040116 and PCN040063 echo Josep Piqué ambiguous opinions in connection to the idea of Spain being a nation of nations: On the one hand, he declares not to accept the definition of Catalonia as a nation, although he admits that this territory has certain features which could fall into this category:

Feijóo ve «españolista» el Estatuto de Andalucía

SANTIAGO DE COMPOSTELA.- El presidente del Partido Popular de Galicia, Alberto Núñez Feijóo, afirmó ayer que el Estatuto de Autonomía andaluz (que va a ser votado en referéndum el domingo próximo) y de Castilla-La Mancha (que tramitan las Cortes) son «españolistas» por las definiciones que hacen de ambas comunidades.

Consideró «excesiva» la referencia que se incluye en ellos a «indisoluble unidad de la nación española», según dijo a la Radio Galega. Por eso, pidió al presidente de la Xunta, el socialista Emilio Pérez Touriño, buscar un acuerdo sobre el Estatuto gallego, porque «aún se está a tiempo».

Indicó que en Galicia «no tiene sentido» aprobar un «Estatuto españolista», como el andaluz o el castellanomanchego, ni plantear un texto con «nación», como propone el BNG.

«No es posible decir en Andalucía que la única nación es España y aquí que Galicia es una nación», afirmó. Ambas cosas le parecen «un exceso innecesario». «Proponemos que Galicia es una nacionalidad con identidad propia», dijo, aunque aclaró que la propuesta del PPdeG también hacía un guiño a los nacionalistas al incluir la frase «sentimiento nacional», añadió. «Nosotros no planteamos un Estatuto de nación, ni un Estatuto españolista, sino un texto galleguista porque es ahí donde coinciden la mayoría de los gallegos», declaró el dirigente del PP de G. (MORN070158)

Durão Barroso hizo suyo, en una entrevista publicada ayer en este periódico, el criterio del líder del PP de Cataluña, Josep Piqué, de que la idea de España como nación de naciones puede estar bien "pero crearía más problemas de los que resolvería". (PCN040116)

Tampoco quiso hablar sobre este asunto el portavoz parlamentario del PP, Eduardo Zaplana, a pesar de que su partido en Cataluña ha dado su plácet al término, por lo menos en el trámite inicial, tal como ayer reiteró Josep Piqué, presidente del PP catalán. Piqué subrayó, no obstante, que su partido no aceptará que se defina Cataluña como nación. A renglón seguido admitió que "Cataluña, por su historia y sus características, tiene rasgos que pueden ser susceptibles de ser calificados como de nación". (PCN040063)

The right-wing People's Party (PP) is overwhelmingly unitarist notwithstanding the regionalist undertones of some leaders. A majority of the Socialist Party (PSOE) tends to be pluralist, although the party appears more divided on this issue with several prominent figures frequently expressing unitarist views close to those of the PP. This difference in stance is clearly reflected in the terminology employed by both parties. PP's most important committee is called "*Dirección Nacional*" (National Directorate) and then it has "*Direcciones Regionales*" (Regional Directorates) and "*Presidentes Regionales*".¹²⁸ PSOE's top committees are called "*Comisión Ejecutiva Federal*" (Federal Executive Committee) and "*Comité Federal*" (Federal Committee) and thus PSOE appears constituted as "a federation of parties". The terminology of the different Socialist parties in the federation seems to vary a lot. For instance, the "*Partit dels Socialistes de Catalunya*" (PSC) has a "*Comissió Executiva*" (Executive committee) and a "*Consell Nacional*" (National

¹²⁸ Source: http://www.pp.es/esp/comite-ejecutivo-nacional_12.html (retrieved on 15 October 2009).

Council), the word “national” referring to Catalonia.¹²⁹ The Basque and Galician branches of the Socialist Party also used the term “national” to refer to their respective areas in the parties’ terminology. Other Socialist parties, like the “*Partido Socialista de Castilla La Mancha*” (PSCM) prefer the term “Regional” and so they have an “*Ejecutiva Regional*” (Regional Executive Committee) while in Asturias they prefer the term “federation” instead of “party” in their official name. The case of Madrid is particularly interesting. The party was originally called “*Agrupación Socialista Madrileña*” when it was funded by Pablo Iglesias towards the end of the 19th century. In February 1977 it adopted the name of “*Federación Socialista Madrileña*” and in 2004 it became “*Partido Socialista de Madrid-PSOE*”. In conclusion, the different stances with respect to the Spanish nation are reflected in the terminologies used by the PP and PSOE with the latter having significant terminological differences in different areas as well as some terminological variation over time.

Collocates such as “*única*”, “*gran*”, or “*defensa*” are nearly always associated with a unitarist stance in El Mundo and El País News, whereas “*libre*” and “*propia*” are associated with nationalist views. “*Nuestra nación*” is equally used by unitarists and nationalists, and occasionally by pluralists. “*Sin*” tends to appear in the phrase “*Nación sin Estado*”, especially in El Mundo News, a term equally used by nationalists and pluralists, or attributed to them by unitarists. “*Nación dentro*”, on the other hand, tends to be used by pluralists:

¹²⁹ Sources: www.psoe.es/ambito/saladeprensa/news/index.do?id=205388&action=View, www.socialistes.cat/El-Partido/Organizacion, www.socialistasvascos.com/presentacion/presentacion.php?sbc=160, www.psdeg-psoe.org/lista.php?idapartado=1&apartado=PSdeG, www.pscm-psoe.com/pb/directorio/resultados.php?idc=2 (retrieved on 15 October 2009).

Por eso, la pregunta que el PP pide que se someta a referéndum insiste en que España es la "única nación" española. (PCN060741)

A mediados de junio, durante una visita oficial a Palma, Bono salía al paso de la inclusión del término «nación» en el proyecto de Estatuto de Cataluña. «La única nación que reconoce la Constitución es la nación española». Cualquier otra creación nacional no cabe en la Constitución», aseguró. (MCN060553)

Don Juan Carlos inició su tradicional mensaje navideño con una afirmación rotunda, "España es una gran nación", para ensalzar lo conseguido hasta ahora, con referencias constantes a los valores de la Constitución. (PSN050068)

Mariano Rajoy (PP): El primer punto del programa electoral del PP en las próximas elecciones será la defensa de la nación española y de la Constitución. (PSN060215)

La campaña electoral de EH tendrá una estrategia volcada en su presencia en la calle y bajo un lema: «Una nación libre está a punto de nacer. Y se llamará Euskal Herria». (MEN010356)

Finalmente, los electos intentarán «proyectar en el ámbito internacional la existencia de Euskal Herria como nación propia y diferenciada, y actuar como tal en la futura configuración europea». (MEN990048).

(Rajoy): No hablamos el lenguaje antiguo de los derechos históricos, las soberanías medievales o los pueblos irredentos. Nosotros defendemos los derechos individuales. Porque los integrantes de nuestra Nación no son las tierras ni la Historia: son las personas. (MSN050020)

Pujol ha explicado que su nacionalismo no consiste en «agredir a nadie, es seguir siendo lo que somos, de forma positiva y constructiva» y se ha preguntado «¿en nombre de qué y con qué derecho nos vienen a decir que no podemos seguir defendiendo nuestra nación y nuestro idioma». (MCN990102)

Sevilla consideró ayer que no existen contradicciones entre la propuesta del PSC y la Constitución porque «el concepto nacionalidad que figura en nuestra Carta Magna siempre se ha entendido como nación sin Estado». Contrariamente, López Garrido recordó que la Constitución reserva el concepto de nación para España, aunque se mostró partidario de que se produzca un debate «amplio y libre» al respecto. (MCN050607)

Si hace unas semanas una encuesta revelaba que el 51% de los catalanes cree que Cataluña es una nación, hoy, otra encuesta encargada por la Generalitat al Instituto Opina asegura que el 60,4% de los catalanes cree que Cataluña es una nación dentro del Estado español, mientras que un 31,5% no está de acuerdo con esta afirmación. (PCN050016)

“Nación plural” constitutes an interesting case, used by unitarists and pluralists alike in negotiating their concepts of nation. A significantly higher number of occurrences attributed to the leaders of PP together with some textual evidence found in the corpus may indicate that this term could have been appropriated by Unitarism to engage pluralists while setting limits to their advances around the principle of an “Autonomic Spain” consecrated by the 1978 Constitution:

Pasqual Maragall, candidato socialista a la Presidencia de la Generalitat catalana, defendió anoche en Bilbao un proyecto para construir una "España plural" para el futuro, frente a los tres nacionalismos que, a su entender, están llevando a España a un "callejón sin salida": el español, el catalán y el vasco. Esa nación plural debe nacer, además, de la periferia geográfica, "sin que nunca más sea considerada periferia política", dijo. (PSN030060)

Este estira y afloja se produjo en el contexto de la reafirmación por el presidente del Gobierno del carácter de España como nación plural. A la pregunta "¿hay algo que le impida decir que España es un Estado plurinacional", Aznar respondió: "No. Simplemente yo creo que no tengo una concepción de España como estado. España es en sí misma una gran nación. Una gran nación plural que se organiza en un Estado, en un Estado autonómico. Pero España es más que un estado. Es una nación". (PSN960320)

CiU y CC, a través de sus respectivos portavoces, Xavier Trias y José Carlos Mauricio, confirmaron que en la votación de hoy apoyarán la investidura. Trias habló de «coherencia y sentido de la responsabilidad», emplazó al PP a especificar hasta dónde quieren llegar en su colaboración con los nacionalistas catalanes y se extendió sobre el sistema de financiación autonómica como condición para futuros acuerdos. Previamente, Aznar había hablado de «vertebración constitucional de España como nación plural», como guiño a los nacionalistas, mezclado con menciones al «proyecto común» o la «solidaridad» entre las comunidades. (MSN000044)

El ex presidente del PP catalán parte de la base de que la privilegiada posición de bisagra que ocupan en el Parlamento "los nacionalismos segregadores y rampantes" ha colocado a España ante el dilema de elegir entre dos concepciones de su propia esencia. Una de ellas, defendida por el PP y el PSOE, es la de "España como nación plural, proyecto común, sustancia espiritual común, lengua común, matriz cultural común e historia común", estructurada en el Estado de las Autonomías. (PSN970225)

Only one use of "*Nación plural*" referring to a nation other than Spain has been found, where a non-nationalist narrator quotes a Basque nationalist's use of the term "*Nación plural*" trying to play down a "biological justification" previously employed by the same person to justify Basque uniqueness:

Para explicar esta decisión, Ortuondo sostuvo que el hecho diferencial vasco se basa en "muchos factores, entre ellos el histórico y el biológico". Este análisis causó cierta sorpresa en la Cámara. Ortuondo dijo también que el País Vasco ha sufrido en su historia "muchas derrotas y una inmigración masiva que lo ha desdibujado, provocando el conflicto político". Preguntado luego sobre esta argumentación para defender su abstención a la comisión de Prodi, Ortuondo explicó que había citado el factor biológico "porque así lo establecen los antropólogos" y añadió para suavizar el argumento de la inmigración que ésta "ha hecho una aportación que convierte a Euskadi en una nación plural". (PEN990386)

4.8. Comparing the discourses of "*Nación*" in El Mundo and El País News

This section compares the discourses of El Mundo and El País News by examining the phraseology of the different candidate nations identified as collocates of "*Nación*". Table 4.14 shows common collocates related to the different candidate nations. The figures in the first and last column indicate the total number of occurrences in both sub-corpora within a

L5-R5 range and the number of occurrences found in the most common positions are shown in the columns called El Mundo and El País News. The remaining columns show the Mutual Information scores for each collocate relation. A score higher than 3 is considered indicative of strong collocation.

Table 4.14.

Tot. M L5-R5	El Mundo News	MI	El País News	MI	Tot. P L5-R5
440	Cataluña ** nación (180) Cataluña * nación (115)	6.781	Cataluña ** nación (159) Cataluña * nación (239)	7.019	512
252	España ** nación (69) España * nación (58)	4.658	España ** nación (84) España * nación (41)	5.069	272
49	Herria * nación (33)	6.276	Herria * nación (14)	5.942	30
33	Vasco ** nación (12)	1.982	Vasco ** nación (8)	1.514	20
31	Euskadi ** nación (12) Euskadi * nación (5)	4.592	Euskadi ** nación (11) Euskadi * nación (8)	3.756	35
26	Galicia ** nación (9) Galicia * nación (9)	6.140	Galicia ** nación (12) Galicia * nación (20)	6.806	49
229	Nación española (210)	7.601	Nación española (220)	7.977	244
103	Nación catalana (92)	6.871	Nación catalana (52)	6.337	58
80	Nación vasca (70)	5.412	Nación vasca (69)	5.317	77
15	Nación gallega (15)	8.061	Nación gallega (6)	7.472	10
5	Nación andaluza (5)	6.598			

Candidate nations in Mundo & El País News

The most cited territories are Spain, Catalonia and the Basque Country. Galicia comes at a distant fourth place and there are also occasional references to Andalusia. Interestingly, “*Cataluña*” is the most common left collocate of “*Nación*”, especially in El País News, whereas “*española*” is much more common than “*catalana*” to the right in both sub-corpora. Also, three different ways to refer to the Basque Country, *Euskal Herria*, *País*

Vasco and Euskadi, appear on the list of the most common collocates of “*Nación*” in both newspapers, a probable sign of different ideologies present in the Basque nationalist discourse. All this initial evidence seems to point towards differences in the discourses associated with each candidate nation, something I will explore with detailed analysis of the collocates of “*Nación*”.

The left collocate noun forms of the different candidate nations are associated with three main phraseological patterns shown in figure 4.6:

Figure 4.6.

A. Candidate nation	+ PROCESS	+ nación	+ (MORE INFO)
NP	VP	NP	PP/ADJ/Clause

i.e. España es una nación plural.

B. PROCESS/THING + Candidate nation + como (una) nación + (MORE INFO)

NP/ VP	PP/NP	PP/ADJ/Clause
--------	-------	---------------

i.e. La definición de Cataluña como una nación en la reforma de su Estatuto.

i.e. [El artículo del Estatuto] que define a Cataluña como una nación.

C. PROCESS/THING + [...] nación + Candidate nation + (MORE INFO)

VP/NP	NP	PP/Clause	PP/Clause
-------	----	-----------	-----------

i.e. [...] al uso del término nación para definir a Cataluña en el futuro Estatuto.

Main Phraseological patterns associated with “candidate nations”

As table 4.15 illustrates, the most common phrases are “*Cataluña [...] como [...] nación [...]*” and “*Cataluña [...] es una nación [...]*”.¹³⁰ A complete list of phrases can be found on tables 1-3 in appendix 5.

Table 4.15.

El Mundo News	Log-Likelihood	El País News
Cataluña [...] es una nación [...] (128)	+0.01	Cataluña [...] es una nación [...] (114)
España es [...] nación [...] (57)	-2.42	España es [...] nación (68)
España [...] nación de naciones [...] (30)	-1.94	España [...] nación de naciones [...] (38)
Cataluña [...] como [...] nación [...] (165)	-49.98	Cataluña [...] como [...] nación [...] (292)
España [...] como [...] nación [...] (54)	+0.25	España [...] como [...] nación [...] (44)
Euskal Herria como (una) nación [...] (38)	+6.22	Euskal Herria como (una) nación [...] (17)
Galicia como (una) nación [...] (12)	-4.74	Galicia como (una) nación [...] (23)
La inclusión del término nación [...] (19)	+0.00	La inclusión del término nación [...] (17)
Uso del término nación [...] (10)	+0.06	Uso del término nación [...] (8)
El término nación para definir [...] Cataluña (10)	-0.05	El término nación para definir [...] Cataluña (10)
Término nación en el preámbulo [...] (9)	-0.79	Término nación en el preámbulo [...] (12)

Main phraseological patterns associated with candidate nations

The higher frequency differences between El Mundo and El País News seem to occur with pattern B. A log-likelihood score of -49.98 indicates that “*Cataluña [...] como [...] nación [...]*” is unusually more frequent in El País News. If we just take the phrase “*Cataluña como nación*”, the score is even higher (-61.79). Although this could be attributed to stylistic nuances, such disparity is probably linked to differences in stance between the two newspapers. My hypothesis is that El País News favours a more pluralistic stance which

¹³⁰ Square brackets indicate the existence of extended phrasal patterns based on the core phrase “*Cataluña como nación*”: i.e. “*Cataluña como (una) nación (con personalidad propia)*”.

recognizes the possibility of various nations within the Spanish Nation-State and this would translate in a considerably higher number of voices in favour of “Catalonia as a nation”. The higher log-likelihood score of “*Galicia como (una) nación [...]*” may corroborate this hypothesis. A much higher frequency of “*Euskal Herria como (una) nación [...]*” in El Mundo News, on the other hand, would not disprove this hypothesis, as Euskal Herria is not a pluralist term but rather the preferred term of radical Basque nationalists and ETA supporters. Its higher frequency in El Mundo News could be part of a unitarist strategy of polarization by amplifying separatist views which also discredit pluralism. I will explore this hypothesis by examining the phraseology of patterns B and C in more detail next.

Tables 4.16 and 4.17 compare the phrases “*Cataluña/ España como (una) nación*” by listing processes and things commonly associated with them in El Mundo and El País News. A complete list can be found on tables 1 and 2 in Appendix 5.

Table 4.16.

El Mundo News (165 occurrences)	El País News (292 Occurrences)
DEFINIR (88): Definición (33); (se) define (14); (PODER) definir(se) (13); (se) define (9); (se) ha definido (8); sea definida (3); haya definido (2); definía (2), (se) definiera (2), definiendo, debe ser definida	DEFINIR (169): Definición (101); (se) define (25); definir (13); (se) define (15); ha definido (8); definía (2); definen; han definido; sea definida (2); se definiera.
RECONOCER (18): Reconocimiento (10), reconoce (5), reconozca (2), reconocer, reconozcan	RECONOCER (51): Reconocimiento (22); (será) (quedaré) (se vea) (debe verse) reconocida (10); (se) reconozca (6); reconocer (6); reconoce (5); reconocía; había reconocido.
	DENOMINAR (24): Denominación (18), denominar (5), denominará.
SENTIR (10): Sienten (4), sentimos (4), sienta, no siente	SENTIR (3): Sienten (2), sentimos.

PROCESS/THING + [...] *Cataluña como (una) nación*

Table 4.17.

El Mundo News (44 occurrences)	El País News (37 occurrences)
Idea (7)	IDEA (5): Idea (4); ideas.
CONCEPTO (6): Concepto (4), conceptos (2).	Concepto (4)
DEFINIR (4): Definición (de Aznar); definió; está definida; hubiera definido.	DEFINIR (9): Definición (2); define (2); Definiendo, definen, definió, definir; está definida
HABLAR DE (4): Hablar de, ha hablado, habla de, habló de.	Hablar de.
Futuro (3)	Futuro.
CONCEBIR (2): Conciben, concebida	CONCEBIR (3): Concepción, concepciones, concibe.
Acabar con (2)	Acabar con.
Ruptura (2)	

PROCESS/THING + [...] *España como (una) nación*

Finding 3: One important difference in the discourse of the various candidate nations is that Spain tends to be constructed as an “established nation” while the rest are usually presented as “aspiring nations” in both newspapers.

The use of “*DEFINIR*”, “*RECONOCER*”, “*DENOMINAR*” and “*SENTIR*”¹³¹ in connection with “*CATALUÑA como (una) nación*” indicates that Catalonia is mostly constructed as an “aspiring nation”, not always recognized as such by participants, as shown in the extracts below. “*España como (una) nación*”, is mainly associated with “*DEFINIR*” as well as with “*IDEA*”, “*CONCEPTO*” or “*futuro*”. Other less common collocates imply

¹³¹ The use of capital letters on the table indicate a lemma with various lexical realizations (i.e. define, ha definido, definición, etc.)

the possibility of Spain as a nation being under threat, especially in *El Mundo News*.¹³²

Many of these collocates, with the possible exceptions of “*DEFINIR*” and “*CONCEBIR*”, give the impression of Spain being usually constructed as an “established nation”. A closer look at the texts associated with these two patterns corroborates this initial impression:

Incluso hay quien cree, como Benegas, que este sistema «pone en riesgo la idea de España como nación», porque el PP y sus socios se empeñan en «deslegitimar un proyecto coherente de Estado», mientras «legitiman cualquier reivindicación autonómica, aunque sea inconstitucional o una barbaridad». (MSN960007)

Para el diputado socialista, la reforma muestra que “la idea de España como nación” que tiene el PP quiere “convertir en enemigos o en antiespaña a todos los que les lleven la contraria”. (PSN030091)

[El senador de CiU Pere Macias] También se dirigió al PP, con una petición: «No utilicen más a Cataluña como elemento de su estrategia electoral de desgaste del Ejecutivo. No sé si han caído en la cuenta de los riesgos que entraña esa política para la convivencia de toda la ciudadanía española y para el concepto mismo de España como nación. ¿Qué nación es esa que maltrata a parte de sus hijos?». (MSN050382)

Después de haber participado, durante más de un año y medio, en los trabajos de la ponencia estatutaria, Vendrell tiene muy claro que el proyecto que se debate en el Parlament «incluye aspectos claramente inconstitucionales», como el modelo de financiación, la definición de Cataluña como nación o la apelación a los derechos históricos. (MCN050643)

“La única nación que la Constitución reconoce es la nación española”, sentenció ayer el ministro de Defensa, José Bono, quien con mucho énfasis planteó sus discrepancias políticas ante la eventual definición de Cataluña como nación en la reforma de su Estatuto. (PSN050065)

El ministro de Industria y secretario general del PSC, José Montilla, considera que España es una “nación de naciones”, que en la reforma de la Constitución se debe recoger la “singularidad” o la vía por la que cada comunidad accedió a la autonomía y cree que el reconocimiento de Cataluña como nación es algo que formará parte de la reforma de la Ley Fundamental y del debate estatutario. (PSN040137)

Ángel Acebes, secretario general del PP, esgrimió ayer unas declaraciones del presidente del ERC, Josep Lluís Carod Rovira, para argumentar que la definición de Cataluña como nación “es el primer paso para declararla un Estado, porque toda nación quiere un Estado”. (PSN050077)

En Irún (Guipúzcoa), tras una ofrenda floral en el Monumento a las Víctimas, en la plaza del Árbol de Gernika, justo al lado de una fortificada comisaría de la Ertzaintza alrededor de la cual no se veía a ningún agente, Rajoy solemnizó el compromiso del PP de no modificar “ni una coma” de la Constitución en la definición de España como nación. (PEN040249).

MSN960007 constitutes an interesting example of how a Spanish nationalist discourse is often used as a tool against political rivals: here a Socialist politician, Benegas, makes use of unitarist arguments to criticize an agreement between the PP government and CIU on the

¹³² This is evidenced by collocates such as “acabar con”, “ruptura”, “ha terminado con”, “destrucción” or “no sobrevivirá”.

autonomic financing system arguing that this places the very idea of Spain, the established nation, under risk. Significantly this text was produced shortly after Aznar's tight electoral victory followed by arduous negotiation with Catalan and Basque nationalists of CIU and PNV to secure enough votes to form a minority government in Spain. Although the PP had vigorously campaigned against further decentralization, the election results forced Aznar to negotiate with moderate nationalists to achieve a stable parliamentary majority (Magone, 2004). The PSOE opted then for a brief shift towards unitarism in a remarkable reversal of roles.

PSN030091 brings us back to more familiar territory with the Socialists adopting a pluralist position more tolerant with nationalist views against the PP's proposal to penalize any Basque initiative of referendum proposed by Ibarretxe. Spain as a nation is nevertheless taken for granted in the text. In MSN050382 we hear the voice of a Catalan nationalist, Pere Macias, in defence of the Catalan *Estatut*. He argues that the PP's unitarist position against the *Estatut* is an electoral manoeuvre that paradoxically places the idea of Spain as a nation under risk, because it "maltreats some of its own children", the Catalans. It should be noticed that in addressing a non-nationalist audience Macias tries to undermine their position using an old Catalanist *topos*, namely that of "separatists versus separators" where unitarism, identified with *castellanismo*, denies the reality of a plural Spain (Ucelay-Da Cal, 2003). Interestingly, Macias's argumentation makes him closer to pluralism than to present-day nationalism because in alerting his unitarist rivals of the dangers derived from using the Catalan question to weaken Zapatero's pluralist government, he implicitly acknowledges the existence of Spain as a nation.

MCN050643 and PSN050065 illustrate the unitarist views of the PP and some Socialist leaders. The former argues that the definition of Catalonia as a nation in the *Estatut* is unconstitutional whereas the latter shows Bono's opinion, a prominent Socialist politician with unitarist views. PSN040137 illustrates the pluralist view of many Catalan Socialists who advocate the idea of Catalonia being a nation inside a Spanish nation of nations. In any case, we can clearly see in this text the contrast between Spain being an "established concept" now being modified in order to accommodate Catalonia as a newly emerging nation, as stressed by the use of the word "*reconocimiento*". Finally, if we compare the use of "*definición*" in PSN050077, PEN040249, MCN050643 and PSN050065 one can clearly see this distinction of established versus aspiring nation being reproduced: the definition of Catalonia as a nation is qualified as "*unconstitutional*" (MCN050643) and "*eventual*" (PSN050065) thus constructing Catalonia as an aspiring nation. If we look at "*definición de España como nación*", on the other hand, we can sense an official nation on the defensive after Catalonia has been defined as a nation. The argument here is that one should not change "a comma in the Constitution as far as Spain's definition as a nation is concerned".

The phraseology associated with other candidate nations also tends to reflect this "aspiring versus established" distinction, as can be seen in Appendix 4: the phrase "*Galicia como nación*" collocates with "*DEFINIR*", "*RECONOCER*", "*despertar*", "*triunfo*", etc. The various terms referring to the Basque Country, on the other hand, tend to be associated with different themes which reflect the ideological load they carry. The nationalist term "*Euskal Herria*", commonly found among independence and ETA supporters and increasingly among PNV members, often reflects the idea of Euskal Herria as an "established nation" with concepts like "*existencia*", "*destino*" and, like "*España*", also can be constructed as

under threat (i.e. *liquidación, destruir, puede sobrevivir* etc.). *Euskal Herria* however is also associated with lexis that indicates that for some people this is an aspiring nation: “*RECONOCER*”, “*construcción nacional*”, etc. *Euskadi*, a term invented by Sabino Arana that has been common currency among PNV supporters and later adopted by pluralists, presents a similar prosody to that of “*Galicia*” and “*Cataluña*”.

This dichotomy of Spain-official nation versus Catalonia-aspiring nation is further confirmed after examining the phrases “*Término nación*”, “*Nación catalana*” and “*Nación española*”. “*Término nación*” is the most common phrase used in the category of “Concept”, a group of collocates also including “*concepto*”, “*definición*”, “*palabra*”, “*idea*”, etc. employed in negotiating competing national claims. These are collocates clearly associated with aspiring nations because established ones do not need to be advocated explicitly. Table 4.18 compares the use of “*Término nación*” in the news section of both newspapers while figure 4.7 tracks its use over time.


Table 4.18.

	El Mundo News	El País News
No. occurrences “ <i>Término nación</i> ” [...] (L5-R5)	225	198
No. occurrences “ <i>Término nación</i> ”	216	185
No. articles “ <i>Término nación</i> ”	141	143
No. articles “ <i>Término nación</i> ” (Cataluña)	*116	*110
No. articles “ <i>Término nación</i> ” (España)	4	2
No articles “ <i>Término nación</i> ” (Euskadi)	*7	1
No articles “ <i>Término nación</i> ” (Galicia)	4	*14
No articles “ <i>Término nación</i> ” (Andalucía)	4	*10
No articles “ <i>Término nación</i> ” (Other)	7	4

*Starred items indicate a dual reference of “*Término nación*” (i.e. Cataluña and Galicia).

“*Término nación*” in El Mundo vs. El País News

Figure 4.7.



Use of “*Término nación*” in El Mundo vs. El País News over time

The phrase “*Término nación*” constitutes over 90% of the occurrences of “*Término [...] nación*” within a L5-R5 range. This pattern can be found in 141 and 142 articles in each of El Mundo and El País News. As predicted, the phrase refers to Catalonia in over 82% and 78% of the cases in El Mundo and El País News respectively whereas the references to Spain are reduced to a total of four articles in El Mundo and two in El País News, representing a mere 2.85% and 1.42% in each case. A closer look at the texts explains why Spain is seldom associated with this phrase. All of them could be considered counter-examples. In three cases (MSN040322, MCN050175 and PSN040179) it is argued that “the term nation is only applicable to Spain in the Spanish Constitution”. In two other cases (MSN07621 and PSN040129), “*término*” does refer to an emerging concept: that of “Spain as a nation of nations” and the last use of “*Término nación*” referring to Spain (MSN050024) is clearly tinged with irony:

La primera respuesta no gustó a García-Escudero, que acusó a Rodríguez Zapatero de especular con conceptos muy importantes: «Cualquier estudiante de primero de Derecho sabe que en nuestra Constitución el término nación se reserva única y exclusivamente a la nación española». (MSN040322)

Luego, entró en materia: «Yo mantengo que el término nación no es unívoco; que tiene muchos significados. Pero si se introduce en un texto legal, la evocación es jurídica y, en ese caso, la Constitución sólo menciona el término nación para referirse a España y sólo habla de nacional al referirse a la soberanía española». (MCN050175)

“Cualquier estudiante de Derecho sabe que en nuestra Constitución, el término nación se reserva exclusivamente a la española”, le espetó Escudero, quien le pidió que hablara como ex profesor de Derecho Constitucional. Zapatero prefirió hacerlo "como persona que se aproxima sin ningún tipo de prejuicio a este concepto". Y desde allí recogió el guante: "Quizá no haya un concepto tan discutido en la teoría política y en la ciencia constitucional como el de nación, y es algo que sabe en efecto cualquier estudiante de Derecho". (PSN040179)

Sosa, ex alto cargo en la anterior etapa del PSOE en el Gobierno, rechaza el término «nación de naciones» con el que coqueteó Zapatero y advierte sobre contenidos concretos del Estatuto de Cataluña, como los que tienen que ver con la lengua. (MSN070621)

En la estela también de Anselmo Carretero -nombre de cabecera autonómica para el presidente José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero y hombre que acuñó el término de España nación de naciones-, Maragall afirmó: "Ahora es el momento del reconocimiento constitucional de las autonomías y de dar cabida a las diversas realidades que quieren convivir en la nación de naciones que es España". (PSN040129)

Rajoy: Me sorprende que este debate se siga llamando del estado de la Nación, porque le debe de sonar rarísimo el término nación. No tiene una idea realista de España. (MSN050024)

Tables 4.19 and 4.20 show the most common processes, things and qualities associated with “*Nación catalana*” and “*Nación española*”. The former is associated with processes such as *RECONOCER* and *AUTODETERMINAR* and with qualities such as “*nueva*” and “*libre*”, all reinforcing the idea of Catalonia as an emerging nation. “*Nación española*”, on the other hand, is mainly associated with “*unidad*” and “*DEFENDER*”.

Table 4.19.

El Mundo News (92 occurrences)	El País News (52 Occurrences)
RECONOCER (10) Reconocimiento (8), impide reconocer, se reconozca	RECONOCER (2) Reconocimiento, No se reconozca,
Concepto (6)	Concepto (2)
AUTODETERMINAR (2) Autodeterminación (2), se autodetermine (2)	
Término (1)	Término (6)
Hablar (2)	

Hable, hablaron	
	El derecho [...] a decidir (3)
Anhelos (2)	
PROYECTO (2) Proyecto, proyectos (para crear)	
Nueva (2)	Nueva
Libre (2)	Libre

PROCESS/THING/QUALITY + [...] Nación *catalana*

Table 4.20.

El Mundo News (210 occurrences)	El País News (220 occurrences)
Unidad de la nación española (41) Indisoluble unidad de la nación española (26) Unidad indisoluble de la nación española (15)	Unidad de la nación española (55) Indisoluble unidad de la nación española (30) Unidad indisoluble de la nación española (7) Unidad indivisible de la nación española (2) la unidad de España y de la nación española (3)
DEFENDER (37) Defensa de la nación española (30) Fundación para/por la Defensa de la Nación Española (23) Plataforma para la Defensa de la Nación Española (2) Asociación para la Defensa de la Nación Española (1) Defender la nación española (3) Defenderá la nación española (1) Defiende la nación española (1) Defendemos la nación española (1) Defendió a capa y espada la nación española (1)	DEFENDER (19) Defensa de la nación española (12) Fundación para/por la Defensa de la Nación Española (5) Asociación para la Defensa de la Nación Española (1) Defender la nación española (6) Defiende la nación española (1)
HABLAR (4) Habló de nación española (1) Habla de la nación española (1) Habla es la nación española (1) Hablar del Estado español y no hacerlo de la nación española (1)	HABLAR (3) Se habla de nación española (1) habla de una única nación española (1) sólo habla de la "nación española" (1)

<p>INTEGRAR (2)</p> <p>“comunidad autónoma integrada en la nación española” (1)</p> <p>«integrada por derecho propio en la nación española» (1)</p>	<p>INTEGRAR (8)</p> <p>INTEGRADA (4)</p> <p>integrada por derecho propio en la nación española (1)</p> <p>comunidad foral propia y diferenciada, indivisible e integrada en la nación española (1)</p> <p>la Navarra del Amejoramiento integrada en la nación española (1)</p> <p>Castilla-La Mancha se define como una comunidad autónoma integrada en la nación española (1)</p> <p>(nacionalidades y regiones) que integran la nación española (4)</p>
<p>Concepto nación española (1)</p> <p>Concepto de nación española (3)</p>	<p>Concepto de nación española (7)</p>
<p>DIGNIDAD (4)</p> <p>Dignidad de la nación española (3)</p> <p>Dignidad menoscabada a la nación española (1)</p>	<p>Dignidad de la nación española (1)</p>
	<p>UNA (5)</p> <p>Una nación española (4)</p> <p>una sola nación, única e indivisible, la nación española (1)</p>
	<p>NEGAR (4)</p> <p>no supone negar la nación española</p> <p>tampoco niega la nación española”</p> <p>no niega la nación española</p> <p>quienes niegan la nación española</p>
<p>DISCUTIR (3)</p> <p>Discusión sobre la nación española</p> <p>Se discute a la nación española</p> <p>Discutir la nación española</p>	<p>Discusión sobre la nación española</p>
<p>HABER (2)</p> <p>No hay otra/más nación que la nación española (2)</p>	<p>HABER (3)</p> <p>"Hay una nación española y luego dentro hay nacionalidades y regiones"</p> <p>no hay más nación que la nación española (2)</p>

PROCESS/THING/QUALITY + [...] *Nación española*

A closer look at a seemingly neutral term such as “*Concepto de nación catalana*” also reveals this “aspiring nation” theme if we compare it with “*Concepto de nación española*”:

Acebes mantuvo que, "cuando se duda de si la nación es España o Cataluña, se producen estas consecuencias". Se refería, otra vez, a una respuesta del presidente del Gobierno en la entrevista que publicó este diario hace dos semanas, cuando dijo que no le "sonaba mal" el concepto de "nación catalana". (PSN040059)

Maragall también dijo que el presidente del Gobierno, José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero, está «demostrando determinación y coraje político para llevar a cabo las reformas institucionales necesarias». «Ha propuesto dos cosas: una revisión del concepto de nación española y más respeto para el concepto de nación catalana» subrayó. (MCN040223)

Ningún Parlamento, Asamblea o Cortes de ninguna comunidad puede decidir por su cuenta cómo se organiza el Estado español, ni modificar el concepto de nación española", rezaba la declaración conjunta, en la que en ningún momento se mencionaba expresamente a Cataluña. Castilla-La Mancha se convierte de esta forma en la primera autonomía, que por escrito, manifiesta su oposición al Estatuto catalán. (PSN050164)


The implication here is that the concept of a Catalan nation is considered as a disputed one (“it does not sound bad to Zapatero” and Maragall “demands more respect” towards this concept). The concept of the Spanish nation, on the other hand, is constructed as being revised or modified. Pluralists and unitarists seem to agree on that account in spite of their opposing views.

Finding 4: All the phraseological evidence confirms the impact of the new Catalan Statute of Autonomy in the discourses of “Nación” in both newspapers.

Over 97% and 91% of the articles containing the pattern “*Término [...] nación*” in El Mundo and El País News were written in the years 2005 and 2006, when the discussion of the Catalan Statute and the definition of Catalonia as a nation in its text occupied Spanish politics during months. The fact that 58.66% and 61.81% of all the articles containing the word “Nación” in El Mundo and El País were also written in 2005-2006 provides substantial evidence in support of this thesis, especially if we consider this is a much larger sample:

1,492 articles from El Mundo and 1,377 from El País News. This centrality of the Catalan Statute is enhanced by the fact that we can also find numerous references to the *Estatut* in articles linked to other issues such as “Constitutional reform” and especially to “other regional Statutes” with direct allusion to the Catalan law as a leading influence (i.e. PORN060120, PORN060027, PCN050473, MORN060119, MORN060028). The evolution of news articles dedicated to “Other Regions” between 1996-2007 also shows a substantial increase in the number of articles after 2004 in both newspapers, especially in El Mundo News, as figure 4.8 shows.

Figure 4.8.



Evolution in the number of News articles dedicated to Other Regions

All the evidence points towards another “Autonomic race” taking place as a result of the new status quo brought by the Catalan Statute. The numerous references to the *Estatut* in articles dealing with other regional Statutes can be explained by the anxiety the Catalan law provokes in other regions which seek not to be treated as second-class entities if the existing order of things is altered. This reveals a common trait in identity discourses in the Spanish

State of the Autonomies, the tension between an asymmetrical configuration of the State championed by the “*nacionalidades históricas*”¹³³ and a horizontal distribution of power with all the autonomies enjoying similar competency levels (Balfour & Quiroga, 2007).

"Es una reforma con lealtad total a la Constitución y a la nación española", recalcó Agramunt, que calificó de "exageración que se hable de una reforma express" por parte de IU, CiU y el resto de minorías. "Alcanzamos un Estatuto de primera categoría y no deseamos que sea más que nadie, pero tampoco menos que nadie", indicó el popular, que destacó que con la reforma se aprueban dos cuestiones importantes pendientes: la recuperación del derecho foral valenciano y la capacidad plena de disolución de las Cortes valencianas para convocar elecciones. (PORN060046)

En la misma línea, Soraya Sáenz de Santamaría -una de las artífices del acuerdo junto a Federico Trillo y Jaime Ignacio del Burgo- declaró a este diario que el nuevo Estatuto es «un antídoto contra el preámbulo catalán y otros futuros devaneos nacionalistas». Una afirmación que contrasta con la de Manuel Chaves. «El Estatuto es homologable al catalán y será referencia para el resto». (MORN060115)

La andalucista Pilar González puso el acento en que se ha aceptado la inclusión de la palabra nación en el Preámbulo del Estatuto de Cataluña y no en el de Andalucía. "La nueva categoría, la de nación, la crea el PSOE y ustedes han de encontrar la solución. No podemos aceptar la discriminación, que se permitan privilegios a los que Andalucía no tiene acceso. Cuando nación es lo máximo a lo que podemos aspirar, no podemos ser realidad nacional". (PORN060096)

A particularly interesting article is PORN060120 ("*La reforma del Estatuto Valenciano, Un nuevo Estatuto valenciano a mitad de camino del catalán*"), where a detailed comparison between the Catalan and Valencian Statutes is made arguing that in spite of the PP's support of the Valencian Statute and the nationalist flavour of the Catalan one, the two reforms have become more similar after key elements of the Catalan Statute that breached the Constitution had been trimmed.

As mentioned in chapter 3, this egalitarian argument amply manifested in the corpus has been described as “comparative grievance”, one of the key components of the “multiple ethnoterritorial concurrence” model of relations in post-Franco's decentralized Spain (Moreno, 2001). Comparative grievance was at the root of the disputes between territories seeking equal treatment during the arduous political negotiations that led to the

¹³³ The term “*Nacionalidades históricas*” refers to those territories that had Statutes of Autonomy in the 1930s (The Basque Country, Catalonia and Galicia). Article 2 of the Spanish Constitution however speaks of “*nacionalidades y regiones*” without naming them.

establishment of the State of the Autonomies with the 1978 Constitution (Powell, 2001; Tusell, 2005). The phrase “*café para todos*”, attributed to centre politician Clavero Arevalo¹³⁴ against the so-called asymmetrical federalism in democratic Spain epitomises this egalitarian discourse. If Andalusia, a territory known for its vibrant regional identity planted on broadly recognized Spanish roots, championed the discourse of “*café para todos*” once with a popular referendum demanding equal treatment to the one awarded to the so-called “*nacionalidades históricas*”, the Catalan move towards national recognition triggered an Andalusian response in a similar direction: Some Andalusian parties led by the Socialists (PSA) suggested to call the region “*realidad nacional*” in their newly-proposed Statute, much to the disgust of PP who argued against this and proposed a direct reference to the “indissoluble unity of the Spanish nation”.

«De entrada, deduzco que Zapatero no ve obstáculos para que Andalucía esté en el mismo nivel que Cataluña, igual que lo estaba hace 25 años», señaló Álvarez. Según explicó, la inclusión del término nación en el Estatuto es «imprescindible» para garantizar la «igualdad absoluta» de los andaluces con respecto a cualquier otro pueblo del Estado. (MORN060118)

Catalans and Basques often consider that this egalitarian discourse undermines their right to a special relationship with the State, as the following quote by Maragall illustrates:

BARCELONA.- El presidente de la Generalitat catalana, Pasqual Maragall, afirmó ayer que el espíritu de la Constitución establece diferencias entre «nacionalidades», como Cataluña, y «regiones», por lo que pidió que ese «espíritu inicial» de la Carta Magna sea respetado. En una declaración institucional con motivo del Día de la Constitución, que se celebra hoy, Maragall pidió «que las nacionalidades sean nacionalidades y las regiones, regiones». Con la futura reforma de la Constitución, añadió, es necesario que «cada nacionalidad histórica sea considerada como tal, como comunidad nacional». (MCN040223)

Finding 5: Comparative phraseological analysis shows that Spain and the various aspiring nations are discursively constructed very differently.

¹³⁴ The phrase was pronounced on 4 December 1977 according to El Mundo: <http://www.elmundo.es/suplementos/cronica/2006/535/1138489203.html> (retrieved on 24-11-09).

“*Nación española*” is commonly associated with three ideas: “Unity”, “defence” and “nation of nations”, a pluralist *topos* already discussed. The phrase “*unidad de la nación española*”, often modified by the adjective “*indisoluble*” and by the phrase “*patria común e indivisible de todos los españoles*” represents 27% and 29% of the occurrences of “*Nación española*” in El Mundo and El País News respectively.

Table 4.21.

PHRASE	El Mundo (hits)	% of total hits	El País (Hits)	% of total hits
Unidad de la nación española	57	27.14	65	29.54
Indisoluble unidad/ unidad indisoluble...	44	20.95	38	17.27
“(como) patria común (e) indivisible de todos los españoles”	19	9.04	22	10.00
“patria común e insoluble de todos los españoles”	1	0.47	1	0.45
“patria común e indestructible de todos los españoles”	1	0.47	0	0
“patria común de todos los españoles”	0	0	2	0.90
“Única e indivisible patria de todos los españoles”	0	0	1	0.45

The phrase “*unidad de la nación española*” in El Mundo vs. El País News

Its origin is in Article 2 of the Spanish Constitution:

La Constitución se fundamenta en la indisoluble unidad de la Nación española, patria común e indivisible de todos los españoles, y reconoce y garantiza el derecho a la autonomía de las nacionalidades y regiones que la integran y la solidaridad entre todas ellas.¹³⁵

¹³⁵ Source: narros.congreso.es/constitucion/constitucion/indice/index.htm (retrieved on 29-12-09)

(The Constitution is based on the indissoluble unity of the Spanish nation, common and indivisible fatherland of all Spaniards and it recognizes and guarantees the right to autonomy of the nationalities and regions that integrate (the Spanish Nation) as well as the solidarity among all).

Article 2 is often used as a unitarist topos against the Catalan Statute or other Autonomic reforms as the extracts below illustrate. In MCN050590 it is used by the Popular Party as a red line any autonomic reform should not cross. Manuel Chaves, then Socialist president of Andalusia, similarly uses Article 2 in MCN050126 to disagree with the idea of calling Catalonia a nation in its newly proposed Statute. Interestingly, we can see the Andalusian Socialists adopting a pluralist stance later on when they propose calling Andalusia “*Realidad nacional*” in their Statute (PORN060010). The Popular Party sticks to their guns by referring to Article 2 of the Constitution and accuse the Socialists of being led astray by the Catalans.¹³⁶ Article 2 is occasionally introduced in pluralist narratives like in PCN050619, where Rodríguez Zapatero and other Socialist leaders justify that Catalonia be called a nation in its Statute by arguing that the concept of nation is not necessarily a legal one, that “*nacionalidad*” is equivalent to “Stateless nation” and that the recognition of Catalonia as a nation would not have any political consequence because Spain is a nation of nations.

El PP pide rechazar la reforma de un estatuto si cambia la financiación [...]

Según los populares, estas reformas ponen en discusión el modelo de Estado y generan «incertidumbre y preocupación» en la ciudadanía. Para hacer frente a esta situación, el PP plantea que el Congreso de los Diputados pida al Gobierno que establezca unos «criterios y límites claros para la reforma de los estatutos de autonomía», salvaguardando «la unidad, la soberanía nacional, la viabilidad del Estado, la igualdad y solidaridad interterritorial y garantizando que ninguna definición que se propugne vulnere el artículo 2 de la Constitución», que proclama la «indisoluble unidad de la Nación española» y reconoce el derecho a la autonomía «de las nacionalidades y regiones que la integran y la solidaridad entre todas ellas». (MCN050590)

EL MODELO DE ESTADO / DEBATE EN EL PSOE

Chaves rechaza la inclusión del término 'nación' en un Estatuto

El presidente de la Junta de Andalucía lo considera «incompatible» con el artículo 2 de la Constitución, que trata de la indisolubilidad de España

SEVILLA.- El presidente de la Junta de Andalucía, el socialista Manuel Chaves, afirmó ayer que denominar nación a una comunidad autónoma en su correspondiente Estatuto -tal y como reclama el tripartito para Cataluña- resulta totalmente «incompatible» con la propia Constitución Española, en

¹³⁶ The phrase used by Arenas is that “*los andaluces hagan de palmeros de Maragall*”.

concreto con su artículo 2, en el que se apela, precisamente, a la «indisoluble unidad de la Nación española» y que, según el dirigente socialista, «no se debe modificar». (MCN050126)

Chaves da por imposible el acuerdo con el PP sobre el Estatuto andaluz [...]

La polémica en las últimas semanas se ha centrado en la decisión del PSOE de incluir en el preámbulo del Estatuto la expresión "realidad nacional" para definir a Andalucía, una fórmula que propuso el ex ministro de UCD Manuel Clavero Arévalo. Con esta iniciativa, los socialistas esperaban atraerse a la reforma a los andalucistas, que defienden el término nación.

Excusa para el 'no'

Pese a venir de Clavero Arévalo, un referente histórico de la derecha en Andalucía, el PP puso el grito en el cielo por la decisión del PSOE de incluir esta denominación, aunque los socialistas estaban y están convencidos de que este asunto no era más que una excusa para justificar el no a la reforma.

Igualmente, en el texto articulado ha habido polémica con la definición. PSOE y PP coinciden en la denominación de Andalucía como nacionalidad histórica, pero las diferencias vinieron cuando los socialistas decidieron simplificar el farragoso artículo 1.1 del Estatuto. Así, el PSOE sustituyó la referencia "a la insoluble unidad de la nación española, patria común e indivisible de todos los españoles" por una mención al artículo 2 de la Constitución española, que contiene esta cita.

En su último intento para intentar el acuerdo con el PP, los socialistas plantearon este jueves volver a hacer una referencia expresa a la "unidad de España" y de la "nación española" tanto en el preámbulo como en el artículo 1.1. [...]

El enquistamiento de la negociación no afectó a Javier Arenas, quien ayer aseguró hará un esfuerzo "hasta la extenuación" por alcanzar un acuerdo con el PSOE sobre la reforma e, incluso, dijo estar dispuesto a "ceder" en algunas de sus "pretensiones", informa Diego Narváez. Pero entre estas cesiones no se encuentra, en ningún caso, su exigencia de que se elimine la expresión "realidad nacional", que da repelús en el PP y que ven "incompatible" con alusiones a la unidad de España y de la nación española.

Arenas, en un acto de partido en Málaga, reclamó que el PSOE "también flexibilice sus posiciones" y reiteró el argumento de que el 90% de los andaluces está conforme con la denominación de nacionalidad histórica o comunidad autónoma. Añadió que incluir el término realidad nacional significa que los andaluces hagan de "palmeros" de Maragall, presidente de la Generalitat catalana. (PORN060010)

LA REFORMA DEL ESTATUTO CATALÁN

Zapatero admitirá el término nación para Cataluña si lo avalan los dictámenes

El presidente del Gobierno afirma que la cuestión no es estrictamente jurídica [...]

A juicio del presidente del Gobierno, el concepto de nación "no es estrictamente jurídico sino que tiene diversos sentidos y diversas interpretaciones, como el histórico-cultural y el sociológico". No obstante, recordó que los límites de la reforma del Estatuto catalán, como la de los demás estatutos, son que "el contenido concreto de cada uno de los artículos a reformar respete la Constitución y sea fruto de un amplio consenso".

En la misma dirección, el ministro de Administraciones Públicas, Jordi Sevilla, tampoco pone obstáculos a que se defina a Cataluña como nación en el Estatuto reformado "siempre que se entienda al equivalente a nacionalidad en la Constitución de 1978", lo que "tendrán que avalar los correspondientes dictámenes jurídicos". Sevilla recuerda que el término "nacionalidades", recogido en el artículo dos de la Constitución, es equivalente a "nación sin Estado" y que "los constituyentes así lo entendieron".

El artículo dos de la Constitución distingue entre nacionalidades y regiones en estos términos: "La Constitución se fundamenta en la insoluble unidad de la nación española, patria común e indivisible de todos los españoles, y reconoce y garantiza el derecho de autonomía de las nacionalidades y regiones que la integran y la solidaridad entre ellas".

En el debate de la ponencia constitucional de 1978, fue el ponente de UCD (Unión de Centro Democrático), Miguel Herrero de Miñón, quien propuso el término "nacionalidad", que resultó definitivo. Previamente, el ponente de CiU, Miquel Roca, había propuesto el de "nación". El portavoz del PSC, Miquel Iceta, dijo hace dos días que "los términos nación y nacionalidad fueron considerados sinónimos para los constituyentes".

El portavoz socialista en la actual Comisión Constitucional del Congreso, Ramón Jáuregui, estima también que el término nación, que se plantea introducir en el Estatuto reformado, "tiene una acepción histórico-cultural" que "puede hacerlo compatible con la Constitución". No obstante, Jáuregui cree que "si apareciese en el preámbulo del nuevo Estatuto y no en el articulado, se evitarían problemas jurídicos".

Jáuregui admite que es "real" el riesgo denunciado por Alfonso Guerra de que los nacionalistas interpreten que el reconocimiento de nación en el Estatuto les anime a dar el paso de reclamar, más

adelante, un Estado propio. Cree, no obstante, que la propuesta de reforma de estatutos es para "una generación" y que serán las futuras generaciones las que deben decidir el futuro. El portavoz del PSC, Miquel Iceta, precisa que introducir la definición de Cataluña como nación sería un problema "si pusiera en duda que España es una nación de naciones" o "si preparan el camino para otra cosa". "Pero éste no es el caso, porque si España es una nación de naciones, Cataluña es una de ellas". (PCN050619)

The association of "*Nación española*" with the idea of "defence" is particularly common in El Mundo News due to a significantly higher number of occurrences of the phrase "*Fundación para/por la Defensa de la Nación Española (DENAES)*",¹³⁷ an association of unitarist ideology created in January 2006 in response to what they perceive as a lack of Spanish patriotism and continued separatist attacks against the Spanish nation. Appendix 6 reproduces an introductory text from the Association's website.¹³⁸ This insistence on defending the Spanish nation obviously implies the existence of threat, something occasionally reflected in the discourse of the Spanish nation, especially in El Mundo News, with expressions such as "*deshacer*", "*acabar con*" or "*atacar a*". The *Estatut* is identified as a direct cause of threat in the examples below. MSN060025 is particularly interesting considering that the source of news is El Mundo's own director who identifies himself with the unitarist discourse of PP.

MODELO DE ESTADO / REACCIONES DESDE LAS AUTONOMIAS

Fraga vetará la reforma en Galicia si no se retira el concepto de nación [...]

En todo caso, consideró que la reforma del Estatuto catalán «de ninguna manera puede ser aprobada en el Parlamento nacional porque es claramente inconstitucional». Al respecto, el presidente fundador del PP apreció que el nuevo texto catalán contribuye a «deshacer la nación española, patria común e indestructible, compatible con la autonomía» y pidió «no destruir la obra de los Reyes Católicos». (MORN050056)

«Zapatero va a dejar un Estado inviable si la deriva nacionalista actual no se detiene»

Pedro J. Ramírez afirma que EL MUNDO seguirá investigando el 11-M, al margen de lo que digan los partidos políticos y la sentencia judicial

Pedro J. realizó un pormenorizado análisis sobre la delicada situación que atraviesa la nación española tras la aprobación del Estatuto de Cataluña y la presión de los nacionalismos catalán y vasco: «Veremos si la España constitucional es capaz de sobrevivir a las concesiones que está haciendo Zapatero en materia de soberanía». (MSN060025)

¹³⁷ A L-L score of +10.77 where a critical value of 10.83 indicates a probability of <0.001 of this not being due to chance constitutes solid evidence in support of this.

¹³⁸ www.nacionespanola.org

Spain is also associated with “*gran nación*”, “*nación de ciudadanos [...] libres e iguales*”, “*nación más antigua de Europa*” or “*vieja nación*”. However these ideas are seldom elaborated in the News Corpus. This is not surprising in the light of recent findings from corpus-based studies in genres like parliamentary debates, where one may have expected a higher degree of elaboration in the argumentation (Teubert, 2008). The examples below throw a bit more light into the way the Spanish nation is constructed. In MSN070135 the Spanish nation is considered to be 500 years old. This same idea of antiquity is stressed in PCN960108 together with those of diversity and plurality whereas in MORN050056 the Spanish nation is identified “as the work of the Catholic Kings”. In MSN060113 there is a reference to the 1812 Constitution as the foundation of a nation of citizens while MSN970048 refers to some new legislation to regulate the symbols of the Spanish nation.

Ángel Acebes (PP). «Hoy es un gran día, una excelente ocasión para recordar que Ceuta y Melilla son dos ciudades plenamente españolas y que *España es una gran nación con más de 500 años de historia* y la voluntad cierta para seguir conviviendo en democracia y libertad». (MSN070135)

El programa electoral del PP señala: “*España es uno de los ejemplos más antiguos de gran nación europea*. Como fruto del proceso histórico de su formación, España es plural, diversa, multilingüe y pluricultural. El proyecto nacional que el Partido Popular impulsa parte de la convicción de que España es una realidad viva, una sustancia común y no la mera agregación de las diversidades que se reconocen en su seno” (PCN960108)

Al respecto, el presidente fundador del PP apreció que el nuevo texto catalán contribuye a «deshacer la nación española, patria común e indestructible, compatible con la autonomía» y pidió «no destruir la obra de los Reyes Católicos». (MORN050056)

«La nación española no es una idea metafísica», dijo, «sino la reunión de las voluntades libres e iguales de todos los españoles, tal como la concibieron las Cortes de Cádiz». (MSN060113)

Con la normativa que el Gobierno aprobará mañana queda totalmente regulado y homologado el Himno Nacional con lo que se completa, junto a la Bandera y el Escudo de España, la trilogía de símbolos representativos de la nación española. (MSN970048)

On the one hand, Catalonia and Euskadi are mostly associated with “*Nación libre*” and with “*derecho*”, both related to the nationalist *topoi* of oppressed nation and the right to self-determination. On the other hand, they are linked to a unitarist *topos* of rejection that denies the existence of these nations with phrases such as “*no quieren*”, “*no hay*”,

“estamos en contra”, “polémica” or “entelequia” “invención de la izquierda”. Some references to the Galician nation tend to be more restrained with nationalist voices speaking of a Galician nation inside Spain (PORN050024).

The question of the antiquity of the Catalan and Basque nations seems rather contradictory. On the one hand, they are identified with the idea of new (*nueva*) and birth (*nacimiento*) although other texts like MCN970001 link the origins of the Catalan nation to the medieval figure of *Gifré el Pelós* while in MEN000418 Ibarretxe’s claim of *Euskadi* being older than the Spanish State is quoted.

MODELO DE ESTADO / La estrategia 'popular'

El PP implica ahora a sus barones en contra del Estatuto catalán en el debate del Senado

Promueve a la vez la intervención de los presidentes autonómicos socialistas y anuncia su veto a la ley [...]

“El objetivo consiste en enfrentar a políticos como Ibarra, Chaves o Barreda con sus respectivos electorados a cuenta del reconocimiento de la nueva nación catalana.” (MCN060318)

Ibarretxe acusa al PP y al PSE de intentar medrar a costa de dividir [...]

Otegi presentó también el cartel diseñado para las próximas elecciones vascas, en el que aparece el cuerpo desnudo de una mujer embarazada que, según dijo, pretende transmitir que 'Euskal Herria se encuentra ante la oportunidad histórica real de alcanzar un estatus de soberanía en Europa'. Su lema será: 'Una nación libre está a punto de nacer'. (PEN010665)

MODELO DE ESTADO / EL TEXTO DEL PROYECTO

Los artículos más conflictivos del nuevo Estatut

La definición de Cataluña como nación, la atribución a la Generalitat de competencias hasta ahora exclusivas del Estado, las nuevas atribuciones en inmigración y Justicia y, sobre todo, la financiación, centrarán la oposición al texto [...]

La nación catalana ha venido realizándose en el curso del tiempo con las aportaciones de energías de muchas generaciones, de muchas tradiciones y culturas, que han encontrado en ella una tierra de acogida. (MCN050273)

El Gobierno le recuerda que es 'lehendakari' gracias a la Constitución

El portavoz del Gobierno contestó así al lehendakari, que sostiene que «Euskadi es una nación anterior al Estado español» y que «el problema Euskadi-España» es anterior a ETA y dura ya «160 años». (MEN000418)

Pujol llama a luchar contra la ridiculización del catalanista [...]

En su intervención, Jordi Pujol aludió a las críticas que recibió su proclama nacionalista durante la conmemoración del 1.100 aniversario de la muerte de Guifré el Pelós (Wifredo el Velloso), considerado el fundador de la nación catalana. (MCN970001)

Other texts detail the territories that comprise the Catalan and Basque nations in the nationalist imaginary:

El congreso del PI aclama a Colom y Rahola como líderes del partido

El objetivo del PI, según las ponencias aprobadas en este congreso, es conseguir "la independencia y la unificación de la nación catalana, integrada por el Principado de Cataluña, el País Valenciano, las islas Baleares y Pitiusas, la Cataluña Norte [las comarcas del Rosellón, Capcir, Conflent y Vallespir, en Francia] y la Franja de Poniente [comarcas de habla catalana en la comunidad autónoma de Aragón] (PCN970061)

Fin de la tregua. Texto del acuerdo entre ETA, PNV y ETA de agosto de 1999

I.- Contexto político e histórico del nuevo pacto

- Euskal Herria es actualmente una Nación dividida entre dos estados, sin ninguna representación unitaria ni soberana. Es más, los territorios incluidos en cada Estado tienen dificultades para formar una única entidad:

- En el territorio bajo dominio de España, Araba, Bizkaia y Guipuzkoa, conforman la Comunidad Autónoma denominada CAV, mientras Nafarroa forma una comunidad autónoma diferenciada.

- En el territorio bajo dominio de Francia, Lapurdi, Baxenafarroa y Zuberoa están incluidos en un departamento más amplio que acoge también al Bearne. Dentro de ese departamento, se produce otra división, ya que Zuberoa está unida a la subprefectura de Oloron. (MEN990320)

There are also differences in the identity markers related to these candidate nations.

Catalonia tends to be identified with language and with a quasi-Renanian desire of “sharing a common project”. Language is also associated with Galicia whereas in the case of *Euskadi*

we can find some criticism of a racial undercurrent in Basque identity:

Carod se confiesa en el 'Magazine': «Soy la bestia negra de la derecha» [...]

«la nación catalana es una comunidad de personas que en el territorio de lengua catalana quiere compartir un proyecto colectivo común» (MCN060133)

LA HERENCIA DE ARZALLUZ

El pensamiento del ex presidente

El presidente del PNV deja en las hemerotecas un legado de declaraciones impactantes, polémicas y contradictorias

"Los vascos descendemos de los primeros neandertales de Europa y han conservado un patrimonio genético diferente (...) con una enorme cantidad de Rh negativo. En Europa, étnicamente hablando, si hay una nación, ésa es Euskal Herria. Primero anduvieron los antropólogos con sus craneotomías, luego vinieron los hematólogos con el Rh de la sangre. Siempre encontraron una especificidad entre los vascos. Ahora han venido los biólogos con el monogenismo y el neomonogenismo, concluyendo que esta humanidad, la humanidad de la que formamos parte, procede de una única pareja. Y cuentan, se trata de algo sorprendente, cómo vinieron a Europa y cómo su sangre (se trata de algo ocurrido hace 25.000 años, me refiero al hombre de Cromagnon) perdura solamente en los vascos" (1993). (PEN040078)

4.9. Objective news? Analysing ideology in news-making

Objectivity has often been identified as one of the core values in journalism.

Notwithstanding the differences in its conceptualization among professionals from different cultural backgrounds (Donsbach & Klett, 1993), journalists have usually strived to portray themselves as neutral reporters of facts committed to segregating values in news-making

(Schudson, 1978). Objectivity however has been questioned from inside and outside the journalistic profession on a number of fronts: by advocacy and civic journalists, by critics accusing the media of bias (Herman & Chomsky, 1988; Chomsky, 2002) and by critical discourse analysts employing linguistic analysis to prove that news objectivity is a problematic concept, if not a myth (Fowler, 1991). Although news report “facts” according to journalists, one may argue that objectivity is affected by a number of things such as editorial decisions on what is newsworthy, the angle adopted in reporting news and even occasional breaches in factual reporting by poor or biased professionals.

Finding 6: There is evidence of different ideologies in El Mundo and El País News in relation to what constitutes a nation, thus confirming the problematic nature of objectivity in news reporting.

A sample of 507 news articles with 724 instances of phrases containing the word “*Nación*” from El Mundo and 576 articles featuring 795 phrases from El País was analyzed in terms of stance (table 4.22). These phrases were chosen due to their high raw frequency and high Mutual Information scores (table 4.23).

Table 4.22.

Phrase	No. Occ. El Mundo News	No. Articles El Mundo News	No. Occ. El País News	No. Articles El País News
Término [...] nación	232	141	202	142
Cataluña como (una) nación	138	105	269	185
Nación catalana	92	62	52	43
Nación española	210	158	220	170
Nación de naciones	52	41	52	36

Sample articles containing phraseology associated with “*Nación*”


Table 4.23.

El Mundo News	MI	L-L	El País News	MI
Término [...] nación (216)	9.517	+0.27	Término nación (185)	9.517
Cataluña como (una) nación (138)	6.781	-57.42	Cataluña como (una) nación (269)	7.019
Nación catalana (92)	6.871	+7.54	Nación catalana (52)	6.337
Nación española (210)	7.601	-2.39	Nación española (220)	7.977
Nación de naciones (52)	9.130	-0.27	Nación de naciones (52)	9.119

Comparative analysis of common phrases in El Mundo and El País News

Each article was annotated and categorized as “Unitarist”, “Pluralist”, “Nationalist”, “Post-nationalist” or “Various” according to the stance of what it reported. A fairly restrictive policy was adopted in labeling articles as unitarist, pluralist or nationalist, thus making the “various” category comparatively looser. For instance articles were categorized as unitarist only if that was the only voice perceived throughout the text or if there was clear evidence that a unitarist voice was being introduced by the narrator as a value judgment against nationalist or pluralist voices. Articles echoing more than one voice without blatant intervention by the narrator were categorized as “various”, even if there was clear evidence of a unitarist or pluralist stance dominating the discourse. The results indicate the existence of sharp ideological differences between the two newspapers, with El Mundo constructing the nation mainly from a unitarist perspective and El País heavily leaning towards pluralism (figure 4.9).

Figure 4.9.




Stance in El Mundo vs. El País News

The phrases “*Término [...] nación*”¹³⁹ with 97% and 90% of occurrences and “*Cataluña como (una) nación*” with 82% and 86% of occurrences in 2005-2006 in El Mundo and El País News respectively are the most closely linked to the discussion following the introduction of the word “*Nación*” in the new Catalan Statute of Autonomy. The discourse associated with these two phrases echoes the idea of Catalonia as an emerging nation independently of the stance adopted. “*Cataluña como (una) nación*” is overwhelmingly more common in El País News with over 94% more occurrences. The articles containing these two phrases present notable differences in stance however: over 50% of the articles containing “*Término [...] nación*” are pluralist in El País compared to less than 20% in El Mundo (figure 4.10). In the case of “*Cataluña como (una) nación*” the number of pluralist articles in El Mundo represents less than 15% while in El País the percentage is almost 53%.

¹³⁹ Square brackets are used to indicate that other words may appear between “*término*” and “*nación*”, i.e. “*CiU propone el término «histórica nación»*” (MCN060170)


Less than 5% of the articles containing “*Cataluña como (una) nación*” belong to the nationalist stance in El País News compared to almost 24% in El Mundo (figure 4.11).

Figure 4.10.



Stance in El Mundo vs. El País News, articles “*Término [...] nación*”

Figure 4.11.




Stance in El Mundo vs. El País News, articles “*Cataluña como (una) nación*”

“*Nación española*” is comparatively less closely associated with the debate provoked by the Catalan Statute with 56% and 61% of occurrences in 2005-2006 in El Mundo and El País


News, with “*Nación catalana*” and “*Nación de naciones*” somewhere in between. Compared with “*Cataluña como (una) nación*”, “*Nación catalana*” is more commonly associated with a nationalist stance in El País News (figure 4.12). “*Nación de naciones*” on the other hand is a predominantly pluralist term as proved by the higher percentage of pluralist articles in El Mundo (figure 4.13).

Figure 4.12.



Stance in El Mundo vs. El País News, articles “*Nación catalana*”

Figure 4.13.



Stance in El Mundo vs. El País News, articles "*Nación de naciones*"

The analysis shows that the two ideologies in El Mundo versus El País News are constructed according to different strategies. The main one is to create hegemonic discourses by emphasizing unitarist/pluralist voices in El Mundo and El País. I will illustrate how these newspapers create hegemonic discourses by comparing the frequencies of pluralist and unitarist participants in a small sub-corpus containing the articles with the phrase "*Cataluña como (una) nación*", a term significantly more common in El País News.¹⁴⁰

Table 4.24.

"Cataluña como (una) nación"	El Mundo News	EL País News
No. articles	105	185
No. tokens	81,088	142,986
No. types	8,220	10,290
TTR	38.67	38.65

¹⁴⁰ The Log-likelihood score is -57.42.

Total No. Tokens	224,074
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Sub-corpus “*Cataluña como (una) nación*”, El Mundo vs. El País News

Table 4.25 compares the frequencies of the main participants in this sub-corpus. Although El País tends to problematize the news about the *Estatut* acknowledging, like Rodríguez Zapatero, that some aspects may not be 100% constitutional, the voices of those radically rejecting the reform and considering it an initiative against Spanish unity are clearly a minority in this newspaper. The news are usually constructed as a negotiation among various stakeholders, mostly in favour of the new Catalan Statute in one way or another, such as “*Consejo Consultivo*” (-42.34), an advisory body of the Catalan government on legal matters, “*Esquerra*” (-42.05), “*Zapatero*” (-23.06), “*Unió*” (-18.21) and “*Presidente*” (-16.32). Seemingly neutral terms such as “*Parlamento*” (-22.13), “*ejecutiva*” (-15.37), “*ponentes*” (-12.76), “*sociedad*” (-11.33), “*negociadores*” (-11.54), “*entorno*” (-10.37), “*catedráticos*” (-9.58) or “*juristas*” (-7.23) are mostly associated with pluralist voices:

El consejero sostuvo que el Consultivo ha "avalado la columna central del proyecto, el esqueleto que lo sustenta". Enumeró rápidamente algunos de los puntos que han suscitado no poca polémica en los últimos meses y que el Consejo Consultivo ha dictaminado como constitucionales, como la definición de Cataluña como nación, la inclusión en el Estatuto de un título sobre derechos ciudadanos, el sistema de blindaje de las competencias de la Generalitat y la reforma de la Justicia. (PCN050390)

El preámbulo pactado por PSOE y CiU dice: "El Parlamento de Cataluña, recogiendo el sentimiento y la voluntad de ciudadanos y ciudadanas catalanes, ha definido, de forma ampliamente mayoritaria, a Cataluña como nación [...]. (PORN060081)

La Ejecutiva Federal del PSOE asumió ayer el dictamen de los cuatro catedráticos de Derecho Constitucional que han analizado la propuesta de reforma de Estatuto de Autonomía aprobada por el Parlamento catalán [...]

Los catedráticos afirman que el término nación "referido a Cataluña tiene una dimensión teórica, que está condicionada de manera decisiva por el debate político, ideológico y cultural". Por ello, han optado por "no analizar la cuestión en este momento, circunscribiendo su análisis a una perspectiva estrictamente jurídico constitucional". (PCN050183)

Table 4.25.

Term	El Mundo News	% El Mundo News	L-L	El País News	% El País News
Consultivo	3		-42.34	68	0.05
Esquerra	25	0.03	-42.05	150	0.10
Zapatero	149	0.18	-23.06	410	0.29
Parlamento	95	0.12	-22.13	286	0.20
Republicana	15	0.02	-21.75	84	0.06
Unió	20	0.02	-18.21	92	0.06
Cortes	44	0.05	-16.87	151	0.11
Presidente	209	0.26	-16.32	510	0.36
Ejecutiva	5		-15.37	41	0.03
PSOE	142	0.18	-14.56	362	0.25
Arzalluz	0		-14.38	16	0.01
Ponentes	1		-12.76	21	0.01
Partit	0		-12.58	14	
Socialistes	0		-12.58	14	
Tripartito	34	0.04	-12.39	115	0.08
Republicanos	9	0.01	-11.70	48	0.03
Negociadores	3		-11.54	28	0.02
Sociedad	12	0.01	-11.33	56	0.04
Aznar	4		-10.45	30	0.02
Entorno	1		-10.37	18	0.01
Central	23	0.03	-10.03	82	0.06
Catedráticos	1		-9.58	17	0.01
Puigcercós	17	0.02	-9.26	65	0.05
CIU	162	0.20	-8.84	376	0.26
Bargalló	2		-8.63	20	0.01
Líderes	9	0.01	-8.50	42	0.03
Universidad	1		-8.03	15	0.01
Juristas	2		-7.23	18	0.01
Votantes	18	0.02	+36.59	0	
President	21	0.03	+35.45	1	
Parlament	61	0.08	+30.64	34	0.02
Govern	15	0.02	+30.49	0	

Selección	18	0.02	+29.66	1	
Consell	10	0.01	+20.33	0	
Bono	29	0.04	+14.76	16	0.01
Tributaria	28	0.03	+12.53	17	0.01
Nadal	14	0.02	+11.05	5	
Populares	46	0.06	+10.03	41	0.03
Magistrados	18	0.02	+9.08	10	
Ibarretxe	24	0.03	+8.43	17	0.01
Guerra	39	0.05	+6.69	38	0.03

Comparative frequencies of participants: “*Cataluña como (una) nación*”, El Mundo vs. El País News

An exception to the pluralist orientation in El País is “*Cortes*” which often appears in articles containing “various voices”, including unitarist ones. Terms like “*Arzalluz*” (-14.38) and “*Aznar*” (-10.45) do not constitute any exception. All the occurrences of “*Arzalluz*” come from the same article (PEN000035), where his statement in favour of treating Spanish citizens as migrants in the Basque Country is heavily criticized by many people. In Aznar’s case, not a single article in El País News containing the phrase “*Cataluña como (una) nación*” subscribes to unitarism. On the contrary, Aznar is mentioned by participants constructing a pluralist argument:

Fue cuando Duran reprochó a Mariano Rajoy que ahora defiende encendidamente la Constitución y el Estatuto de Cataluña de 1979 cuando dos de sus predecesores en el cargo de presidente del PP, José María Aznar y Manuel Fraga, se opusieron a ambos textos. (PCN050038)

De la actitud del PP y de José María Aznar, que han manifestado que España corre riesgo de desintegración con el Estatuto de Cataluña, [Zapatero] dijo que "confían muy poco en España. "Es la misma actitud que cuando el señor [José María] Aznar salía en televisión porque nos iba a embarcar en una guerra que ha costado miles de vidas en Irak y decía que no querían esa guerra. Es la misma actitud que cuando sufrimos la tragedia del 11 de marzo, que nos estuvieron engañando porque nos decían que no era terrorismo islamista. (PCN050214)

Many terms significantly more frequent in El Mundo News tend to be associated with voices opposing the idea of Catalonia being a nation, the most obvious case being “*Populares*” (+10.03). “*Votantes*” (+36.59) is restricted to three articles, two of which about polls where

a majority of people are said to oppose the Estatut. To a lesser extent, “*Magistrados*” (+9.08) is also used in articles with a unitarist orientation. “*Bono*” (+14.76) and “*Guerra*” (+6.69), two Socialist leaders opposing the idea of a Catalan nation are also significantly more frequent in El Mundo News:

Bono vuelve a desmarcarse de la línea impuesta por Zapatero
Desoye la orden de silencio y niega como Guerra que Cataluña sea nación - El presidente no valora la investigación al PCTV, pero el ministro la apoya. (MSN050075).

A second strategy involves the polarization of arguments in El Mundo News by using a comparatively higher number of nationalist voices within an overall context dominated by unitarism: By confronting “only one Spanish nation” against “Spain is not a nation”, the more moderate stance represented by pluralism is undermined. The opposite occurs in El País News, where nationalist voices linked to the *Estatut* are usually toned down or diluted in articles featuring competing stances. As figure 4.10 showed, “nationalist articles” in El Mundo represent 14.39% of the total, subsumed in a unitarist core of 50.69% of the articles. “Nationalist articles” in El País represent a mere 5.90% within a pluralist core of 43.05%, while the percentage of articles containing “various voices” is higher in El País: 26.90% versus 18.73%.

The combination of a hegemonic discourse with a polarizing/de-polarizing strategy reveals the newsmaker operating as a hidden narrator who selects “who says what” in the news. This also seems to have an impact in the use of certain lexis. For instance, El Mundo shows a marked preference for Catalan terms like “*President*” (+35.45), “*Parlament*” (+30.64) and “*Govern*” (+30.49) which add a nationalist flavour to its discourse in articles highly critical with pluralist or nationalist views by presenting nationalism with radical overtones. The most noticeable case is “*President*”, often referring to Pujol:

REFERÉNDUM EN CATALUÑA / La Junta Electoral Central desestima los recursos del PP y ERC por entender que «no cabe ejercer ninguna forma de censura previa» / Piqué acusa al 'president' de «desprecio a las leyes»

Maragall incita a votar 'sí' porque 'sentimos Cataluña como nación'. (MCN060614)

La editorial suspende el acto ante la «posibilidad real» de que se produjeran incidentes - El 'president' se desmarca de las opiniones del histórico dirigente de ERC y de las de su mujer. Pujol evita presentar el libro racista de Barrera para frenar el escándalo. (MCN010071)

If we compare the frequencies of these terms in the much broader context of the news sub-corpus, the differences between both newspapers are even more striking, especially if we consider possible hyponyms (table 4.26). The figures clearly speak for themselves: this huge difference in log-likelihood scores in one direction or another, with the exception of “Montilla”, cannot be random.

Table 4.26.

Term	El Mundo News	% El Mundo News	L-L	El País News	% El País News
President	801	-	+806.81	32	-
Presidente	25,624	0.24	-60.29	24,785	0.26
Pujol	6,046	0.06	-121.41	6,637	0.07
Maragall	5,132	0.05	-63.34	5,409	0.06
Montilla	1,629	0.02	-0.50	1,508	0.02
Parlament	1,350	0.01	+301.40	520	-
Parlamento	7,442	0.07	-50.03	7,964	0.08
Govern	1,222	0.01	+1,487.44	8	-
Gobierno	48,315	0.45	-148.46	47,188	0.49

Comparative frequencies of participants, El Mundo vs. El País News

The unusually higher frequency of “*Ibarretxe*” and “*Selección*” in El Mundo News seems part of this polarizing strategy. Text analysis reveals that the “Ibarretxe connection” to the Catalan nation is used by PP to portray the *Estatut* in radical terms. Accordingly, the

discourses of El Mundo and El País are remarkably different: while El Mundo echoes the views of the Popular Party, El País criticizes the “Ibarretxe connection” by reproducing the Socialist discourse against this:

Tres de cada cuatro españoles contra las exigencias de Maragall e Ibarretxe
Un 75% se opone a que la Constitución o el Estatuto reconozcan a Cataluña como 'nación' - Un 62% frente a un 18% cree que el 'plan Ibarretxe' debe ser rechazado aunque lo apruebe el Parlamento vasco. (MSN040294)

Debate sobre nación

La tensión la introdujo Zaplana ya de entrada al manifestar que el proyecto catalán "rompe el consenso constitucional" y al equiparlo con el plan Ibarretxe. Todos los grupos de la izquierda y CiU le respondieron con duras respuestas. (PCN060149)

“El PP "está haciendo tremendismo [...] comparándolo con el plan Ibarretxe", ha dicho Rubalcaba, que califica de "sorprendente" que este partido "esté tan preocupado por la unidad de España" y que al mismo tiempo trate de "enfrentar a Cataluña con el resto de España". (PCN050703).

“Selección” (+29.66) reflects the emotionally-charged connection between sports and national identity. In the following example the newsmaker denounces the spread of Catalan nationalism in education and sports:

SEMBRANDO LA DIFERENCIA / Radiografía del escándalo silencioso que va minando España (y VII)
Un sueño llamado Cataluña-Brasil
Los libros de texto recuerdan los JJOO de Barcelona como el inicio de la 'reconstrucción nacional' de Cataluña y alientan el deseo de que una selección propia alcance la final del Campeonato Mundial de Fútbol. (MSN070591)

In a third strategy occasionally employed by both newspapers, the newsmaker blatantly inserts value judgments qualifying the views quoted in the text. Not surprisingly, the bias always leans toward a unitarist stance in El Mundo and a pluralist one in El País.

MODELO DE ESTADO / Varias federaciones **denuncian** el «cansancio» de la ciudadanía y que no haya más asunto en la agenda política / Los 'guerristas' podrían asumir que el término 'nación' vaya en el preámbulo **aunque no les guste**
Los barones pedirán a Zapatero que cierre ya el Estatuto y **no ceda más**
Dirigentes de Madrid, Andalucía, Castilla-La Mancha, Extremadura y Galicia plantearán hoy al presidente en el Comité Federal que «**la opinión pública está cansada** y este debate no puede llenar la agenda». [...] **MANUEL SANCHEZ**
MADRID.- Con resignación, sin ningún entusiasmo, con la exigencia de que «se acabe cuanto antes» y, sobre todo, de que «no haya más concesiones a los nacionalistas», el PSOE afronta el Comité Federal de hoy bajo la sombra de la negociación del Estatuto de Cataluña. (MCN060560)

El PP catalán se opuso en la redacción de la ponencia parlamentaria del Estatuto a que Cataluña sea denominada nación, si bien Francesc Vendrell, portavoz parlamentario del PP en el Parlament, declaró en julio de 2004 que "si la mayoría de partidos cree que hay que hablar de nación catalana en vez de Cataluña, el PP no está en contra". (PCN050268)

El Gobierno y la Ejecutiva del PSOE admiten que el texto aprobado por el Parlamento catalán cogió desprevenidos a los cuadros del partido a los que alarmó su contenido, el apoyo del PSC y la actuación del presidente de la Generalitat, Pasqual Maragall. Éste, en el Comité Federal del PSOE, celebrado el 3 de septiembre, se comprometió a que el Parlamento catalán aprobaría un texto "políticamente realista y jurídicamente constitucional".

A esta desorientación ha contribuido la "brutal campaña" del PP contra el Estatuto, centrada en el lema "se rompe España". (PCN050623).

In MCN060560 and PCN050623 a newsmaker aiming to discredit the voices used in the narrative introduces comments against pluralism/unitarism. In MCN060560 the newsmaker even “impersonates” Socialist politicians using a language highly critical against the Estatut, where Zapatero is said to be “granting too many concessions to the nationalists”. In PCN050623 the newsmaker refers to PP’s campaign against the Estatut as “brutal”. In PCN050268 the narrator quotes a past statement in direct contradiction with the PP’s present stance. The newsmaker in MCN060560 goes even further when he uses quotation marks to report a future event (sic).¹⁴¹

4.10. Conclusions

The analysis of the discursive construction of the term “*Nación*” in the News corpus proves the existence of an ongoing negotiation in El Mundo and El País around what constitutes a nation, with several territories being associated with this concept. Phraseological analysis reveals that the two newspapers tend to construct Spain as an “existing nation” while “Catalonia” above all, “Euskadi” and “Galicia” are usually constructed as “aspiring nations”.

¹⁴¹ The use of the future tense “*plantearán*” is a clear indication of this.

All the evidence emerging from the diachronic analysis of the articles containing the term “*Nación*” and its associated phraseology indicates that the debate originated around the new Catalan Statute represented a milestone in the discursive construction of the nation in Spain between 1996 and 2007. Such debate reached a high point after the inclusion of the term “*Nación*” in the draft of the *Estatut*, which triggered much discussion in the media on the issue of nationhood. In this respect, textual analysis reveals the existence of three main ideologies: Unitarism (Spanish nationalism), Pluralism and Nationalism on the periphery, with *El Mundo* clearly advocating a unitarist stance and *El País* a pluralist one. A variety of strategies are used to construct these stances in both newspapers, the main one being the construction of a unitarist/pluralist hegemonic discourse by under-reporting opposing voices. *El Mundo* also employs a strategy of polarization within a predominantly unitarist discourse by introducing a comparatively higher number of nationalist voices whereas *El País* tends to moderate nationalist views in conjunction with its hegemonic pluralist discourse. Both newspapers occasionally make use of newsmaker bias in their discourses. These sharp differences between the two newspapers not only reveal the problematic nature of objectivity in news reporting but also highlight how deeply divided the Spanish society is on the issue of national identity.

CHAPTER 5: THE DISCURSIVE CONSTRUCTION OF “*NACIÓN*” IN OPINION ARTICLES

Introduction

This chapter analyses how the concept of “*Nación*” is constructed in a corpus of opinion and editorial articles totalling 9.37 million tokens (table 5.1). As with the News Corpus, the frequencies of “*Nación*” and “*España*” will be presented together with the diachronic analysis on the use of these expressions. I will then discuss how “*Nación*” and “*España*” are conceptualized in the discourses of El Mundo and País Opinion employing different kinds of analysis. I will consider common collocates and phrases as well as entire texts to identify main stances, definitions, paraphrases and themes.

Table 5.1.

	El Mundo Opinion	El País Opinion
No. articles	8,157	5,557
No. tokens	4,901,574	4,468,687
No. types	93,022	85,270
TTR	45.31	44.95
Total No. Tokens	9,370,261	

Opinion corpus


Finding 1: There are significant differences between the two newspapers in the number and distribution of opinion articles over time.

One important difference with respect to the News corpus is a greater discrepancy in the number and distribution of opinion articles over time between the two newspapers,

notwithstanding some similarities such as a decreasing trend in articles between 2000-2003 and an increasing one between 2004-2006 (figure 5.1). There are opposite trends in the years 1997 and 2007 and, more significantly, greater discrepancy after 2004. A score of .022 in Statistical Variance (ANOVA), where $\leq .05$ indicates that the deviation is statistically significant, confirms that those differences are not due to chance. The sharp increase in the number of articles in both newspapers occurs after the return of the Socialists to power in March 2004, in the aftermath of a terrorist attack in Madrid with more than 200 victims and several hundreds injured, attributed to Al-Qaeda. Days before the election opinion polls indicated that the Popular Party could emerge victorious. Many in the PP still believe that the attack changed the fate of the elections because the party was punished for its alliance with Bush in the Iraq conflict. El Mundo still questions Al Qaeda's involvement in the attack and demands that further investigation be conducted.

As seen in the previous chapter, this power shift in Spanish politics laid the ground for a new wave of federalization spearheaded by the reform of the Catalan Statute, followed by other regional Statutes. These were at the centre of the political debate between 2005-2007, with the right fiercely opposing the Catalan reform, arguing that it was unconstitutional and that it endangered Spanish national unity. My hypothesis is that the significantly higher number of opinion articles in El Mundo during this period is related with its unitarist stance against the *Estatut*, resulting in the proliferation of opinion articles on Spanish identity. Although the political debate created around the *Estatut* was also echoed in El País, the paper's pluralism may explain a more restrained attitude resulting in significantly fewer articles. This is something that detailed phraseological analysis largely confirms as we will see.

Figure 5.1.




Distribution of opinion articles in El Mundo and El País

Finding 2: There are important stylistic differences in how opinion articles and editorials are written in the two newspapers.

The analysis of a large sample of articles in the Opinion corpus revealed two main writing styles distinguishable from each other in how appraisal resources are employed by the authors as well as by other discourse features. Focusing primarily on English, the language of evaluation has been theorized by different linguistic schools (Hunston & Thompson, 2000). The Systemic Functional approach has been chosen here for two reasons. Firstly, comparatively more descriptive work has been carried out using this approach. Secondly, the kind of semantic analysis used in this school can easily be transferred to other languages like Spanish.

Martin and White (2005, p.1) define appraisal as “concerned with the interpersonal in language, with the subjective presence of writers/speakers in texts as they adopt stances towards both the material they present and those with whom they communicate”. Operating at the level of discourse semantics, appraisal is mainly realized prosodically throughout a continuous stretch of discourse. These authors place appraisal resources across three interacting domains: “Attitude”, “engagement” and “graduation” (figure 5.2):

Figure 5.2.



An overview of appraisal resources (Martin & White 2005)

According to them:

Attitude is concerned with our feelings, including emotional reactions, judgments of behavior and evaluation of things. Engagement deals with sourcing of attitudes and the play of voices around opinions in discourse. Graduation attends to grading phenomena whereby feelings are amplified and categories blurred (ibid, p.35).

Attitude is subsequently sub-divided into “affect”, “judgment” and “appreciation” where affect is said to deal with the resources for construing emotions, judgment with resources for evaluating behavior (social esteem or social sanction) and appreciation with resources for construing the value of things. Engagement could be “monogloss” if the author’s voice is unmediated or “heterogloss” if alternative voices can be detected in the text. Finally graduation deals with gradability, the level of force and focus in the messages.

The first writing style identified in the corpus features an extended use of what Martin and White call “commentator voice”, characterized by unconstrained authorial judgment and a tendency towards monoglossia. Other common features include mentioning an event, usually at the beginning of the text, and the extended use of human agents associated with processes. Authorial judgment often takes place in a highly-charged tone. MCOP980047 constitutes a good example of this. The event triggering the editorial is a manifesto by 113 town councils in Catalonia announcing their decision not to display the Spanish flag on the “Catalan national day”. Most clauses feature the same institutional agent explicitly or implicitly (*los ayuntamientos nacionalistas*). Alternative voices are only allowed as quotes from the manifesto intended to expose a radical nationalist discourse to a unitarist readership. The entire text is colored by negative authorial judgment where the initiative is scoffed. The only occasion where positive judgment appears is when the nationalist campaign is contrasted with the attitude of “many other Catalan town councils” which exhibit the Spanish national flag the rest of the year.

OPINION

Viernes, 28 de agosto de 1998

IMPRESIONES

Una «guerra de las banderas» de Gila [-ve social sanction: impropriety]

Un total de 113 ayuntamientos, gobernados casi en su totalidad por partidos nacionalistas, han lanzado un manifiesto dirigido a todos los municipios de Cataluña para que el próximo 11 de septiembre, Diada Nacional de Catalunya, sólo ondee la senyera en las balconadas consistoriales. No es la primera vez que [los ayuntamientos nacionalistas] lo hacen. El texto de su manifiesto de este año afirma: «El hecho de poner sólo la bandera de Cataluña en el balcón del Ayuntamiento es una afirmación de nuestra catalanidad y, en caso contrario, es abonar un proyecto expansivo de la nación castellana, también llamada España». Pero [los ayuntamientos nacionalistas] lo reclaman sólo para el Onze de Setembre [-ve social sanction: impropriety]. ¿No condenan esos consistorios «el proyecto expansivo de la nación castellana, también llamada España», que «abonan» muchos Ayuntamientos catalanes -todos los más importantes- [+ve social esteem: appreciation] exhibiendo la bandera española... el resto del año?

[los ayuntamientos nacionalistas] Convertir el nacionalismo político en un ejercicio de charanga y pandereta como éste resulta, en realidad, de lo más celtibérico [-ve social sanction: impropriety]. Se ve que los responsables de estos 113 ayuntamientos de Cataluña tienen mucho tiempo libre. [-ve social sanction: impropriety]

The predominant voice in the second writing style is that of an “essayist”, characterized by no/minimal authorial inscribed social sanction, similar to the journalistic “reporter voice” or the “interpreter voice” found in history textbooks according to Martin and White (2005). Heteroglossia also prevails in this style together with the usual absence of events related with the article and the presence of abstract things as agents of processes instead of human agents, giving an impression of detachment and objectivity. The following extracts from PSOP050156 constitute a rather extreme example of this style. They bear remarkable resemblance to academic texts, including references to published authors: Álvarez Junco, Berger and Luckmann, Searle. Reasoning constitutes the basis of this text. The author puts forward a thesis, that of reality being a social construct mainly through language, and elaborates on this like in an essay. The only apparent shift in authorial voice comes when Zapatero is criticized for ignoring the differences in language contexts, academic versus legal, when the PM did not oppose the idea of Catalonia being called a nation in its *Estatut*. Even so, this proposition is conveniently hedged with expressions such as “*parece ser ignorada*” or “*viene a afirmar*”, thus reinforcing the heteroglossia in the text.

Palabras, contextos y realidad

JOSÉ MARÍA RUIZ SOROA

EL PAÍS - Opinión - 08-09-2005


Nación, nacionalidad, comunidad nacional, región, catalán, valenciano, español, castellano, matrimonio, unión civil, y tantas otras palabras, no son sino los nombres que damos a las cosas, a la realidad. [Ø] Discutir sobre su respectiva mejor o peor adecuación a esta última es tanto como recaer en la vieja querella nominalista tardoescolástica, una pérdida del tiempo, pues lo que importa (lo que existe) es la realidad, no el nombre que le damos. Esto nos decía hace poco el admirable historiador José Álvarez Junco como prólogo a sus reflexiones sobre el concepto de nación. Pero, ¿de verdad es esto así de sencillo?, ¿de verdad existe una realidad objetiva extralingüística más allá de las palabras, una realidad a la que éstas simplemente denotarían? Lo cierto es que no, por lo menos en el ámbito social, en el que la realidad se construye socialmente y no tiene una existencia objetiva independiente de los hombres (Berger y Luckmann). Las instituciones (el dinero, el Estado, la familia o el fútbol), aunque en ocasiones tienen un remoto soporte físico, son artefactos socialmente elaborados mediante convenciones soportadas por una intencionalidad colectiva. Y el meollo de esa elaboración social de la realidad es lingüístico; el lenguaje es el elemento que constituye esencialmente la realidad social, gracias al hecho de que las palabras son mecanismos simbólicos que por convención representan o significan algo que va más allá de ellas mismas. Ciertamente, el lenguaje es él mismo también una institución social, pero posee una naturaleza muy especial: es la institución social básica presupuesta por todas las demás. Una sociedad puede poseer el lenguaje y no el matrimonio, la propiedad o el Estado. Pero [una sociedad] no puede poseer éstos si no posee el lenguaje (John R. Searle) [...]

Esta relevante diferencia entre contextos lingüísticos es la que parece ser ignorada por aquellos de nuestros políticos, y pienso ante todo en el presidente del Gobierno, que se refugian en el relativismo de los conceptos científicos (relativismo epistemológico) para declararse indiferentes ante su utilización legal (relativismo jurídico). Dado que el concepto de nación tiene contornos borrosos y discutidos en la teoría política (lo que es cierto), me declaro indiferente en cuanto a su uso normativo constitucional, viene a afirmar Rodríguez Zapatero. El nombre no tiene mayor importancia. Olvida nuestro hombre que la Constitución no es un tratado universitario, sino una norma, nada menos que la norma de normas. (PSOP050156) ("Palabras, contextos y realidad" by José María Ruiz Soroa).

#Finding 3: The writing style featuring the commentator's voice is the most common one in both newspapers, but significantly so in El Mundo Opinión.

727 articles containing the expression "*nación española*" and the pattern "*España [...]* *nación*" (5L-5R) from El Mundo and País Opinión were analyzed in terms of style. Articles predominantly written in the commentator voice appear to be more common in both newspapers but much more so in El Mundo Opinión, where they represent over 87% of the articles sampled. Comparatively, the essayist voice seems to be more extensively employed in El País Opinión: Over 34% of the articles examined tend to conform to this style compared to over 61% of articles mainly featuring the commentator voice (figure 5.3.).

Figure 5.3.



Writing styles in El Mundo vs. País Opinion

I will re-examine these different styles when discussing some differences in the discourse of the two newspapers towards the end of this chapter.

5.1. “*Nación*” and “*España*” in the Opinion corpus

As we can see in tables 5.2 and 5.3 “*Nación*” and “*España*” have a similar distribution in both newspapers. “*España*” is the 30th and 32nd most common term in El País and Mundo Opinion while “*Nación*” occupies the 156th and 157th place. A low Log-likelihood score in both cases shows no significant differences in relation to keyness (“*España*” -0.35); “*Nación*” (-0.26) where $p < 0.05$; critical value = 3.84).

Table 5.2.

	No. of tokens	% Tokens	No. of texts	% of texts
El Mundo Opinion	2,845	0.058	1,445	17.71
País Opinion	2,630	0.053	1,018	18.23

“*Nación*” in El Mundo & País Opinion


Table 5.3.

	No. of tokens	% Tokens	No. of texts	% of texts
El Mundo Opinion	12,984	0.26	4,745	58.16
País Opinion	11,927	0.26	3,971	71.36

“España” in El Mundo & País Opinion

Figures 5.4 and 5.5 illustrate the diachronic evolution of *“Nación”* and *“España”* between 1996-2007. We can observe a sharp rise in the use of these terms in 2005. This is particularly the case with *“Nación”* which increases around 178% in El Mundo Opinion and 417% in El País Opinion, coinciding with the debate generated around the use of the term *“Nación”* in the Catalan Statute. This is followed by a decrease in the number of occurrences from 2006, much sharper in El País.


Figure 5.4.



Distribution of *“Nación”* in El Mundo and País Opinion over time

The trends in the use of “*España*” are similar to those of “*Nación*” although the changes are more gradual, particularly in El Mundo Opinion. This may be explained by the fact that “*España*” is a more general term than “*Nación*”, employed in a broader range of contexts. Therefore it is probably less affected by the time-bound initiative to use the term “*Nación*” to define Catalonia in its new regional statute.

Figure 5.5



Distribution of “*España*” in El Mundo and País Opinion over time

Tables 5.4 and 5.5 show the most common collocates of “*Nación*” and “*España*” in El Mundo vs. País Opinion grouped according to semantic category and ordered according to raw frequency within each category, independently of whether these terms are widely used in just one newspaper or in both. Appendices 7 and 8 offer a more detailed comparison of these collocates. Generally speaking there is an unsurprising degree of overlap as well as complementarity in the collocational profiles for both terms. There is an additional category of collocates associated with the concepts of time and space in “*España*”. There are also occasional differences in some collocates associated with the different categories.

Table 5.4.

GEOGRAPHY	nación española; España [...] nación; Cataluña [...] nación; nación catalana; Catalunya [...] nación; nación vasca; País Vasco [...] nación; Euskadi [...] nación; Euskal Herria [...] nación; Andalucía [...] nación; nación andaluza; Galicia [...] nación; nación [...] Europa; nación europea; comunidad [...] nación; nación [...] comunidad; territorio [...] nación; nación alemana
CONCEPT	término(s) [...] nación; nación de naciones; Estado(s) [...] nación; concepto(s) [...] nación; nación [...] nacionalidad(es); definición [...] nación; nación sin Estado; palabra(s) nación; idea [...] nación; concepción [...] nación; nación [...] patria; dentro [...] nación; nación de ciudadanos; nación política; nación [...] nacional; nación [...] sujeto (político/ de soberanía); propia [...] nación; carácter [...] nación; nación cultural; denominación [...] nación; nombre [...] nación; nación [...] región(es); pueblo(s) [...] nación; nación [...] étnica; sentimiento [...] nación; nación [...] proyecto; expresión nación; distinción [...] nación; alma [...] nación; nación cívica; nación sin cabeza; condición de nación; sentido [...] nación; nación asociada
QUALITIES	Indisoluble [...] nación; gran(de) nación; única nación; nación plural; nación [...] posible; una sola nación; nación democrática; nación [...] indivisible; nación [...] común; nueva nación; vieja nación; nación soberana; nación independiente; nación moderna; nación [...] libre; nación [...] antigua; pequeña nación; nación real; nación [...] plurinacional; nación unida; nación plena
ISSUES	(Debate) Estado de la nación; unidad [...] nación; nación [...] Constitución; ; reconocimiento [...] nación; nación [...] soberanía; nación [...] estatuto; construcción [...] nación; existencia [...] nación; nación [...] preámbulo; símbolos [...] nación; defensa [...] nación; nación [...] constitucional; lengua [...] nación; futuro [...] nación; nación [...] derecho(s); identidad [...] nación; fin [...] nación; liquidación [...] nación; ensayos [...] nación; supervivencia [...] nación; historia [...] nación; discurso [...] nación; nación [...] libertad(es); nación [...] régimen; vida [...] nación; texto [...] nación; camino [...] nación; fuerza [...] nación; nación [...] competencias; nación [...] financiación; nación [...] artículo; voluntad [...] nación; tiempo [...] nación; independencia [...] nación; pertenencia [...] nación; inclusión [...] nación; afirmación [...] nación; uso [...] nación; nacimiento [...] nación; intereses [...] nación; Estatut [...] nación; integridad [...] nación; tradición [...] nación; nación [...] igualdad; continuidad [...] nación; tema [...] nación; autogobierno [...] nación; problema [...] nación; representación [...] nación; patriotismo [...] nación; articulación [...] nación
PEOPLE & INSTITUTIONS	Gobierno [...] nación; presidente de la nación; parlamento de la nación; nación [...] Zapatero; derecha [...] nación; PP [...] nación; nacionalistas [...] nación; congreso [...] nación; izquierda [...] nación; ETA [...] nación; instituciones [...] nación; enemigos [...] nación; nación [...] rey; Maragall [...] nación; comunidades autónomas [...] nación
PROCESSES (BEING)	SER [...] nación; hay [...] nación; nación [...] está; nación [...] TENER; existe [...] nación; FORMAR [...] nación; nación [...] parece; constituye [...] nación; nación [...] resulta; nación [...] implica; pertenecer [...] nación
PROCESSES (DOING)	construir [...] nación; defender [...] nación; nación [...] PODER; hacer [...] nación; nación [...] debe; convertir [...] nación; destruir [...] nación; liquidar [...] nación; pretenden [...] nación;
PROCESSES (SAYING)	DEFINIR [...] nación; Nación [...] DECIR; RECONOCER [...] nación; nación [...] llamada; HABLAR [...] nación
PROCESSES (SENSING)	QUERER [...] nación; nación [...] ENTENDER; cree [...] nación
DEICTICS	Nuestra nación; esa nación; esta nación; otra nación; toda nación; misma [...] nación; aquella nación, tal nación; ninguna nación; cada nación; cualquier nación
PARTITIVES	Toda la nación; Conjunto [...] nación; media nación; nación entera; resto de la

	nación; mayoría de la nación
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“Nación” in El Mundo/ País Opinion: Main Categories of collocates

Table 5.5.

GEOGRAPHY	Cataluña [...] España; España [...] Europa; España [...] Francia; Vasco [...] España; Euskadi [...] España; lugares [...] España; capital de España; Partes de España; España [...] Marruecos
CONCEPT	Idea de España; España [...] nación; España plural; España constitucional; España democrática; España de las autonomías; España autonómica; Anti-España; Reino de España; Palabra España; nombre de España; concepto [...] España; visión de España; España invertebrada; concepción de España; España federal; España oficial; España plurinacional; España eterna; España contemporánea; España real; España roja; España negra; España republicana; España imperial; España [...] tierra
QUALITIES	nueva España; libre [...] España; España [...] gran; España moderna; vieja España; España fuerte; España [...] diferente; España [...] unida; España [...] diversa; España [...] abierta;
ISSUES	historia de España; unidad de España; futuro de España; pueblos de España; política/o [...] España; territorial [...] España; nacional [...] España; problema(s) [...] España; democracia [...] España; ruptura [...] España; proyecto [...] España; realidad [...] España; odio a España; Constitución [...] España; intereses [...] España; símbolo(s) [...] España; histórica [...] España; identidad [...] España; España: Modelo de Estado; gobernabilidad de España; banderas de España; caso de España; España [...] antiterrorista; España [...] libertad; relaciones [...] España; social [...] España; España; relaciones [...] España; liquidación de España; España: Referéndum; Balcanización de España; libertad [...] España; peligro [...] España; cohesión [...] España; destrucción de España; defensa [...] España; imagen [...] España; modelo [...] España; integridad [...] España; paz [...] España; estabilidad [...] España; menos España; mapa de España; interés [...] España; terrorismo [...] España; vida [...] internacional [...] España; separación [...] España; modernización [...] España; independencia [...] España;
PEOPLE & INSTITUTIONS	Gobierno(s) de España; Banco de España; rey(es) de España; presidente [...] España; España [...] ETA; Partido [...] España; PP [...] España; España [...] españoles; España [...] Zapatero; España [...] Aznar; derecha [...] España; enemigos [...] España; corona [...] España; socialistas [...] España; comunista [...] España; monarquía [...] España; ciudadanos [...] España; España [...] PSOE; izquierda [...] España;
SPACE/TIME	España [...] hoy; España actual; Fuera de España; dentro de España; España [...] años; España [...] siglo; España siempre; España tras; España después; España antes;
PROCESSES (BEING)	España [...] SER; España como; España HABER; España [...] ESTAR; España TENER; España va; España parece; España sigue
PROCESSES (DOING)	HACER [...] España; gobernar [...] España; defender [...] España; romper España; destruir España; separarse de España; cierra España
PROCESSES (SAYING)	LLAMAR España; DECIR [...] España; hablar [...] España
PROCESSES (SENSING)	ODIAR a España; QUERER [...] España; ver [...] España; CREER [...] España; España [...] sabe; ENTENDER España; duele España
DEICTICS	esta España; esa España; otra España; aquella España; nuestra [...] España; propia España
PARTITIVES	Resto de España; toda España; una España, media España; conjunto de España;

“España” in El Mundo/ País Opinion: Main Categories of collocates

As in the News corpus, the collocational profiles “Nación” and “España” in El Mundo and País Opinion reflect the same negotiation on the issue of nationhood resulting from the claims about the various emerging nations, mainly Catalonia and the Basque Country, versus the established nation of Spain. The high frequency of some phrasal patterns under the categories of “Concept” and “Quality” like “*Nación de naciones*”, “*España plurinacional*”, “*España federal*”, “*Estado-nación*”, “*nación y/o nacionalidad(es)*”, “*Nación sin Estado*”, “*Nación española, patria común [...]*”, “*Nación política*”, “*Nación cultural*”, “*Nación de ciudadanos [libres e iguales]*”, “*nación [española como] sujeto político/de soberanía*”, “*Pueblo [...] nación*”, “[*Nación*] *concepto discutido y discutible*”, “*Nación étnica*”, “*Propia nación*”, “*Única nación*”, “*Nación plural*” or “*España plural*” are a direct consequence of this discursive negotiation. This is also the case with other common collocates belonging to the same category of “Concept” such as “*Término(s)*”, “*Concepto(s)*”, “*Definición*”, “*Palabra*”, “*Idea*” or “*Concepción*”, “*Visión*”, etc. as the examples below illustrate:

Las omisiones de Benach cuadran con el «camino sin retorno hacia una nación plena» que quiere iniciar. La idea de «nación plena» es incompatible con la Constitución, que reconoce una nación, la española, y varias nacionalidades y regiones, entre ellas Cataluña. (MCOP030007) (“Ahora Cataluña”, by Justino Sinova)

En tal sentido, pues, la palabra nación utilizada en el artículo 2 de la Constitución Española significa sin ambages dos cosas y nada más que dos: por una parte, que sólo hay una nación, la española, que es indivisible, y que es la patria común de todos los españoles. Y, por otra, que no obstante se trata de una nación plural o compuesta, formada por nacionalidades y regiones, pero no es una nación de naciones ni nos hallamos ante un Estado plurinacional. (MSOP040138) (“La deconstrucción constitucional” by Jorge de Esteban)

Si se acepta liberalmente esta redacción, el término nación aplicado a Cataluña, Euskadi y Galicia no debería asustar a nadie con la sospecha que tras ese término subyace la voluntad de crear otro Estado. Porque las mismas razones existen para abrigar esa sospecha con el término nacionalidad, ya que nacionalidad se diferencia de nación en que esta acepción suele aplicarse a las naciones que son a la vez Estado. (PCOP050164) (“Naciones y Nacionalidades” by Santiago Carrillo)

The remaining categories of collocates also replicate many of the patterns already discussed in the News corpus. The category of “Participants” includes collocates referring to institutions, organizations or individuals mentioned in connection with “*Nación*” such as “*Gobierno*”, “*Presidente*”, “*Banco*”, “*Rey(es)*”, “*Parlamento*”, “*Zapatero*”, “*La derecha*”, “*Congreso*”, “*ETA*”, etc., the most common phrases being “*gobierno de España*”, “*gobierno de la nación*”, and “*presidente del gobierno de la nación*”. The category of “Processes” includes verb collocates where processes of “being”, especially “*SER*” and “*HABER*”, dominate, followed by Processes of “doing” and “saying” with collocates like “*Construir*”, “*HACER*”, “*gobernar*”, “*RECONOCER*” or “*DEFINIR*”. The most common collocates of “*Nación*” in the category of “Issues” are “*Estado*” and “*Debate*”, both appearing in the phrase “Debate del/sobre el estado de la Nación”. “*Historia*” is the most common collocate of “*España*” in this category. Other frequent collocates like “*Unidad*”, “*Reconocimiento*”, “*Soberanía*”, “*Derecho*”, “*Lengua*”, “*Identidad*”, “*Pertenencia*”, “*Inclusión*”, “*Afirmación*”, “*Modelo*”, “*Separación*” or “*Independencia*” are usually connected with competing national claims, while “*Constitución*”, “*Estatuto*”, “*Preámbulo*” or “*Constitucional*” usually refer to the sources where these claims are stated:

El líder del PP sigue clamando que hablar de Cataluña como nación es reconocerle carácter de Estado soberano, pero ocurre que en el Estatuto anterior y en el nuevo no se habla para nada del Estado nación ni de soberanía, sino de nacionalidad, término empleado tanto en el artículo 2 de la Constitución como en el primero del Estatuto de 1979 y que todos los constituyentes y la doctrina constitucional al completo consideraron sinónimo del de nación. (PCOP060040) (“Del Estatuto catalán al vasco” by J.A. González Casanova)

En términos políticos, la banda obsequia a ZP una holgada mayoría en las urnas, a cambio de lo cual obtiene por vía indirecta el reconocimiento implícito de que Euskadi, al igual que Cataluña, es una nación con derecho a constituirse en Estado cuando lo considere oportuno. (MEOP050126) (“El precio de la tregua” by Isabel San Sebastián)

More significantly, a group of collocates under the categories of “Issues” and “Processes of Doing” are employed to colour the discourse of the Spanish nation with an aura of weakness

(i.e. “*problema(s)*”, “*cohesión*”) or to convey the idea of the Spanish nation being under threat by the emergence of the Catalan and Basque nations and the deeds of those people actively promoting these rising constructs or even tolerating them: “*Defensa*”, “*Defender*”, “*Futuro*”, “*Fin*”, “*Liquidación*”, “*Liquidar*”, “*Supervivencia*”, “*Integridad*”, “*Continuidad*” and “*Destruir*”, “*Ruptura*”, “*Odio*”, “*Balkanización*”, “*Peligro*”, “*Destrucción*”. This threat theme is practically non-existent in the phraseology of El País Opinion, where the possibility of threat is occasionally minimized or even flatly denied. Incidentally, the idea of the Spanish nation being under threat is seldom conveyed in Mundo News, to the point of not being an issue worth mentioning there. This will be discussed in detail later on in this chapter.

The category of “Deictics” includes determiners and pronominal forms used to refer to “Nación”. The most common phrases found are “*nuestra nación*”, “*esta nación*”, “*esa nación*” and “*otra nación*”. The last category of collocates is that of “Partitives” with phrases such as “*toda la nación*”, “*conjunto de la nación*”, “*media nación*” or “*la nación entera*”.


5.2. Stance in the discourses of “*Nación española*” in El Mundo and País Opinion

#Finding 4: The Unitarist/Pluralist stances observed in the discourses of El Mundo and País News are clearly confirmed in the Opinion corpus.

This is evidenced at various levels of analysis, no matter whether we compare whole texts, phraseology or even grammar. This arguably reinforces the importance of multi-level analysis because discrepancies in the frequency of some key phrases alone may not always


be linked to differences in stance, although it often is. The stances of El Mundo and País Opinion in relation with the Spanish nation were analysed by examining a sample of 727 articles containing a total of 560 occurrences of “*nación española*” and 449 cases of the pattern “*España [...] nación*”, including phrases such as “*España como (una) nación*”, “*España (no) es una nación [...]*” among others. The results clearly confirm the trends seen in the News corpus with roughly 90% of the articles in El Mundo Opinion adhering to Unitarism and around 70% of articles in El País Opinion showing a pluralist stance (figures 5.6 and 5.7).

Figure 5.6.



Stance El Mundo vs. País Opinion, articles “*nación española*”

Figure 5.7.



Stance El Mundo vs. País Opinion, articles “*España [...] nación*”

Likewise, the phraseologies of El Mundo and País Opinion also reflect this Unitarist/Pluralist distinction, in spite of some discrepancies in the frequencies of some key phrases. Table 5.6 shows common phrases ordered according to log-likelihood scores. Critical values higher than 3.84 ($p < 0.05$) are considered statistically significant for the purposes of this study.

Table 5.6.

El Mundo Opinion	MI	L-L	El País Opinion	MI
Estado-nación (37)	5.651	-35.36	Estado-nación (99)	6.154
Nación política (9)	2.256	-24.16	Nación política (40)	3.628
Nación cultural (5)	5.149	-21.03	Nación cultural (29)	6.637
Nación real (0)	NA	-19.25	Nación real (13)	4.749
Nación de naciones (67)	8.155	-15.98	Nación de naciones (112)	8.306
Nación española (334)	7.694	+12.17	Nación española (226)	7.051
Única nación (21)	6.028	+4.90	Única nación (8)	5.569
Nación única (6)	6.028	-1.41	Nación única (10)	5.569
España como (una) nación (50)	5.015	-0.92	España como (una) nación (55)	4.927
España [...] es una nación [...] (44)	5.015	-0.19	España [...] es una nación [...] (44)	4.927

Comparative frequencies of common phrases in El Mundo vs. País Opinion

“*Nación de naciones*” (-15.98), a pluralist notion, is unsurprisingly far more common in El País Opinion. Also “*nación política*” (-24.16) and “*nación cultural*” (-21.03) which tend to be employed in this newspaper to categorize the various nations it recognizes according to Meinecke’s old distinction, as we will see later on (Meinecke, 1970). Phrases such as “*nación española*” (+12.17) and “*única nación*” (+4.90) are typical of the unitarist discourse whereas “*nación única*” (-1.41) is slightly more common in El País Opinion. This difference reflects a key distinction in Spanish grammar between descriptive adjectives (epithets) and classifying ones: As the following examples illustrate, *única* before the head noun functions as an epithet because it does not qualify *nación* in order to differentiate it from others. Rather, it attaches an unsurprising epithet to *nación* confirming its expected uniqueness. The opposite occurs when *única* is placed after *nación* thus acknowledging the existence of several nations in Spain:

El nacionalismo vasco plantea, con el plan Ibarretxe, la creación de un Estado-nación asociado a lo que quede de España y el nacionalismo catalán trabaja para que se acepte la existencia de la nación catalana, significativo paso para la independencia con que sueña Carod-Rovira. Esto lo ve un ciego pero Zapatero no concibe preocupación alguna. Debe leer el artículo 2 de la Constitución, en el que se hallan estos dos enunciados: «indisoluble unidad de la Nación española» y «nacionalidades y regiones que la integran». [O sea, que la nación en España es una \(y la ley la cita con mayúscula\) y las nacionalidades son componentes de la única nación.](#) (MSOP040132) (“Jugando con fuego”, by Justino Sinova)

Si lo que se quiere es que el Estado español se autodefina constitucionalmente como Estado plurinacional, la reforma es imprescindible porque [la Constitución actual no se fundamenta en la existencia de una pluralidad de naciones, sino de una nación única dentro de la que existen nacionalidades y regiones. Como la diferencia entre nacionalidad y nación se basa en argumentos siempre discutibles, hace tiempo que muchos hemos aceptado una idea de España como nación de naciones, pero en esa idea España no deja de ser una nación que engloba a las demás,](#) ni, de otra parte, la confluencia de las distintas sociedades nacionales en un solo Estado tendría explicación racional si entre ellas no hubiese algún tipo de unidad previa. (PSOP980132) (“La reforma de la Constitución”, by Francisco Rubio Llorente)

The unusually higher frequency of “*Estado-Nación*” in El País Opinion (-35.36) deserves special attention. Both newspapers normally use this concept in general terms or with specific reference to Spain. Those rare references to Catalonia and Euskadi as “*Estados Nación*” are always constructed as nationalist aspirations rather than facts and usually have negative connotations independently of the authors’ pluralist or unitarist ideology. A closer

look at the significantly more frequent use of “*Estado-Nación*” in El País Opinion reveals that both the general concept of Nation-State and the Spanish Nation-State are often perceived as problematic. This is accomplished by means of three related *topoi*: One consists in presenting the Spanish Nation-State as inherently weak due to deficient nation-building throughout history. In a second *topos*, the Nation-State is considered an obstacle to a peaceful solution of the Spanish national problem. Thirdly, there is a tendency to consider the general concept of Nation-State as something outdated and increasingly irrelevant in a post-national world.

By problematizing the concept of Nation-State, El País Opinion not only tends to adhere to a post-national view of Spain and the world as a whole but it also advances its pluralist agenda because a diluted post-modern Spanish Nation-State leaves room for the recognition of the various national identities present in the Spanish society and thus may lead to a peaceful resolution of the Spanish national problem, provided that the aspirations of the newly emerging nations to statehood are kept at bay. The following extracts illustrate the discourse of El País Opinion in connection with this idea of the Nation-State. PSOP980042 stresses the weak economic, cultural and political foundations of the Spanish Nation-State. PSOP070204 attacks the Spanish nationalism of the PP and the *Foro de Ermua* and wonders whether Spain can eventually accept “a post-national government” where citizens may eventually “emancipate from an old and frustrating Nation-State like Spain”. PSOP060044 criticizes the concept of Nation-State calling it “harmful lie” and “Jacobin invention” which “caused millions of deaths in the 20th century” and then attacks the Popular Party’s nationalist discourse in connection with the Catalan Statute. PSOP960066 explains how the pluralist notion of “*nación de naciones*” adequately reflects Spain’s weaknesses with respect to

nation-building resulting in the various unfinished national projects. The conclusion is that we should assume this pluralism as a good starting point for a peaceful solution to the Spanish national problem in spite of the tensions and uncompromising attitudes it provokes.

Eso no significa ignorar el esfuerzo modernizador del ochocientos, **pero tampoco cabe infravalorar los estrangulamientos económicos, culturales y a la postre políticos, que gravitan sobre la construcción del Estado-nación en la España del siglo pasado.** Son éstos precisamente los que afloran en la crisis del 98, aunque nada esencial cambie después de la misma en la superficie. Ningún Estado de la Europa centro-occidental pasa por una crisis de identidad como la que afecta desde entonces -y hasta hoy, subrayado- España. En ninguno fracasan e modo tan evidente, lo que se hace visible bajo Cánovas, los mecanismos de integración económica, política y cultural que en España se ponen en marcha siguiendo el patrón francés. Y en ninguno, como consecuencia de la forma que asume el desastre colonial, los fenómenos de militarismo y antimilitarismo con más activos, también hasta la fecha. (PSOP980042) ("Crisis de imperio", by Antonio Elorza)

Un Gobierno posnacional

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El pasado lunes, EL PAÍS publicaba los dos rostros de las dos manifestaciones de respuesta al atentado de la T-4. La primera, la de los ecuatorianos y de los sindicatos, secundada por la mayoría de fuerzas políticas, era una ordenada exhibición, en la que sólo lucían pancartas estrictamente ajustadas a los eslóganes pactados. La segunda, la del Foro Ermua y de la derecha, era un mar de banderas rojigualdas. En mi condición de periférico y agnóstico en materia de fe nacionalista -venga de donde venga- mi empatía estaba, por supuesto, con la primera manifestación. Pero, por un momento, me imaginé a Zapatero contemplando estas imágenes. Intenté ponerme en su lugar y pensé que me resultaría inevitable un punto de preocupación: **¿a estas alturas de la historia, es posible que el grado de emancipación de los ciudadanos de un viejo y frustrante Estado-nación como España sea ya tan alto que un presidente pueda ganar las elecciones con los emblemas nacionales en manos de la oposición? ¿Es el Gobierno de Zapatero el primer Gobierno posnacional de la historia?** Me gustaría poder confundir mis deseos con la realidad y poder contestar que sí. Pero tengo mis dudas. Sería realmente muy sano que la ciudadanía española demostrara con sus votos que está más allá de himnos y banderas. **Lo cual haría todavía más absurdo tener a la séptima potencia mundial encallada en un debate de patrias y territorios, propio del siglo XIX.** Y, sin embargo, me temo que o Zapatero recupera las banderas o tendrá problemas. En cualquier caso, el Partido Popular está convencido de ello. (PSOP070204) ("Un gobierno posnacional", by Josep Ramoneda)

Nada puede ser más nefasto que confundir la idea del "Estado", una comunidad de ciudadanos libres, iguales en derechos y en deberes, ligados al gobierno por un pacto social que se renueva en cada votación general, con la de la "nación", un concepto de identidad cultural que ninguna ley -ni constitución, ni estatuto- puede imponer o prohibir, porque pertenece al dominio de la conciencia.

Esa dañina mentira que es el "Estado-nación", una invención jacobina que sirvió en el siglo XIX para completar el proceso de homogeneización de algunos Estados que llevaban ya siglos por este camino, ha originado en la Europa del siglo XX millones de muertos y procesos monstruosos de limpieza étnica, que han implicado el desplazamiento de grandes masas de población.

Hay en el mundo actual unos 200 Estados y más de 2.000 etnias y nacionalidades. Empeñarse en esta malsana identificación entre el Estado y la nación podría conducir o a 2.000 guerras de independencia, con muchos millones de muertos, o a 2.000 actos de asimilación forzada y de genocidio cultural, no menos condenables. La única salida racional de una situación semejante es la del Estado plurinacional que garantice la convivencia en paz y tolerancia de etnias y naciones. [...]

Nada puede ser más peligroso que remover imprudentemente, como está haciendo en la actualidad el PP, un complejo mal definido de sentimientos, más que de ideas, nacionalistas, que la propia voluntad de confusión ha llevado a que nunca se clarifiquen adecuadamente. (PSOP060044) ("El Partido Popular y la Constitución de Cádiz", by Josep Fontana)

Cuando hablamos de "nación de naciones" en España nos estamos refiriendo precisamente a ese encabalgamiento de varios procesos de construcción nacional en torno al dato central de los bloqueos que a lo largo del siglo XIX afectan a la consolidación del Estado-nación español. Los antecedentes políticos de éste coincidían, en calidad de first comer, con otras monarquías de agregación de Europa occidental, tales como Francia o Inglaterra. Pero sobre esa orientación de signo unitario se acumulan a lo largo del siglo XIX los elementos negativos, con el telón de fondo del atraso y de la desagregación que marcan el tránsito del Antiguo Régimen a la España liberal. La tardía constitución de un débil mercado nacional y una industrialización focalizada, una centralización política que recoge los efectos negativos del atraso, un sistema educativo insuficiente que mantiene altas tasas de analfabetismo y evita la imposición del idioma nacional sobre los periféricos, son factores que dejan maltrecho el intento de reproducir el modelo francés. Además, por un azar histórico, y a excepción de Galicia, las regiones que experimentan un proceso de modernización económica coinciden con las que poseen rasgos culturales y antecedentes políticos propios.

El resultado no es un Estado estrictamente plurinacional, porque España es mucho más que un aparato estatal bajo el que se encuentran las auténticas naciones, y cabe, en consecuencia, hablar de un nacionalismo español con la misma legitimidad que de un nacionalismo vasco, incluso aplicado el término a muchos ciudadanos de Euskadi. Pero tampoco es un Estado-nación unitario donde catalanes, gallegos y vascos hayan sido reducidos a la condición de lo que Engels denominaba Völkerruinen, ruinas de pueblos, destinadas a desaparecer a corto plazo de la escena europea. Los dos procesos, el de la frustrada construcción nacional española y el de la construcción nacional de los pueblos periféricos, se encuentran imbricados. "Nación de naciones" no es mala expresión para designar esa peculiar situación de formaciones nacionales coincidentes en torno a una principal que ha registrado estrangulamientos fundamentales para su desarrollo. Esto genera, indudablemente, tensiones e intransigencias, pero precisamente para resolver unas y otras está el sistema democrático. Francia, Italia o Inglaterra no tienen este problema, nosotros sí. Hay que asumirlo y buscar soluciones. (PSOP960066) ("El discreto encanto de la burguesía", by Antonio Elorza)

Although El Mundo Opinion reflects some pluralist views similar to those in El País in around 20% of the articles containing the term "Estado-Nación", over 62% of its articles still adhere to strict unitarist principles where the Spanish Nation-State is staunchly defended against alternative national constructs, always negatively presented in this unitarist discourse. Some articles acknowledge the ideas of a historically weak Spanish nation-building (i.e. MSOP070371) or the crisis of the current Nation-State model in an increasingly globalized world (i.e. MSOP980051, MSOP990069, MCOP070074), but the conclusions usually put forward here do not subscribe to El País's pluralist agenda. Instead, they tend to portray the Spanish Nation-State as something which should be defended from the threats of Catalan and Basque nationalism as well as from its own internal weaknesses. For instance, MSOP050045 supports the "utopia of a United States of Europe" and yet uses the metaphor of "a home where people are about to bring down its master walls" to refer to Spain, labelled "the most

ancient Nation-State in the old Europe”. MSOP050057 warns us about “Spain’s possible balkanization” in the face of a constitutional reform where the so-called “nations without State” in Spain take for granted the “*long term* decline of the Nation-State model” for their own spurious motives and provoke an introspective mood within Spain at a time when we should all be looking outwards. MCOP050202 warns us against “a Catalan Statute which destroys Spain and founds a new Nation-State purporting to be the metropolis of what is left from Spain”:

España, por el contrario, es el Estado-nación más antiguo de la vieja Europa y el que se ha descentralizado más honda y aceleradamente. Acabamos de refrendar un proyecto de Constitución Europea (los primeros) porque queremos caminar hacia la utopía de unos EEUU de Europa, al tiempo que en casa parece que estamos por tirar los tabiques de carga, dañando la estructura del edificio. (MSOP050045) (“Contra el Estado federal”, by Martín Prieto)

Siempre que se habla de reforma de la Constitución, o que se dibuja la idea de una confederación de naciones, no puedo evitar el recuerdo de esa anécdota. Sobre todo teniendo en cuenta el desenlace de ese estupendo proyecto -yugoslavo- cuyas virtudes ponderaba, con gran regocijo, ese prócer nacionalista catalán tan perspicaz.

Algún medio norteamericano de la prensa señala estos días, con no disimulada complacencia, la posible balcanización de España. Y el carácter de bomba de relojería que puede poseer una España en proceso de balcanización respecto al proyecto europeo.

Muchos nos preguntamos: ¿por qué ahora, justamente ahora, se plantea con tal virulencia algo a todas luces innecesario: la reforma de la Constitución? Está claro que es la cita europea lo que determina esa nerviosa urgencia. Se teme que la Europa que se constituya lo sea de estados-nación, y que allí no tengan lugar alguno las llamadas naciones sin Estado. Se da por sentado el declive del Estado-nación, en grave e irresponsable confusión de una tendencia a largo plazo, y de lenta erosión, que puede dar lugar a importantes reflexiones de filosofía política, y una realidad que se halle al alcance de la mano, y que puede generar opciones en el ámbito de la política real.

Con todo lo cual se desvía lo que en estos momentos se debiera estar discutiendo aquí en España, como sucede en Francia, en Alemania, en Suecia, en Dinamarca o en Italia: la Constitución Europea. Una vez más, España se encierra, en momentos decisivos, en esas téticas introspecciones que evocan precedentes funestos. (MSOP050057) (“Defensa de las nacionalidades históricas”, by Eugenio Trías)

Dicen los sicarios de Montilla que estamos contra ese Estatuto que supone la liquidación del régimen constitucional español. Bueno, ¿y qué? ¿No tenemos derecho a estarlo? Casi toda España lo está, empezando por Córdoba, de la que renegó Montilla. Ese Estatuto destruye España, hunde la solidaridad, destruye el mercado único y funda de hecho un nuevo Estado-nación que se pretende metrópoli del resto de España. (MCOP050202) (“Montilla, dimite”, by Federico Jiménez Losantos)

The last piece of evidence concerning the differences in stance between both newspapers comes from the analysis of “*nación española*”, a term unusually more common in El Mundo Opinion as the +12.17 L-L score shows. This expression typically appears in three main positions in both sub-corpora: (i) embedded in a NP functioning as a modifier, (ii) in subject

position or (iii) as part of a VP, normally functioning as an object. There are also a few cases of “*Nación española*” in appositional structures or in NPs where the phrase is post-modified by another NP preceded by the conjunction “como”. The use of qualifying adjectives is fairly rare. The analysis of “*Nación española*” post-modifying an NP reveals a number of themes associated with this concept while the analysis of this phrase associated with verbs illustrates a number of processes in which the Spanish nation is a participant, either its agent or its recipient. Finally, appositional structures and phrases of the type “*Nación española como...*” contain paraphrases that explain the concept of “Spanish nation” much like definitions that employ copulative verbs such as “*es*” or “*se define*”. Table 5.7 shows the different lexical realizations of NP + Spanish Nation in both newspapers. As we can see, this is the most common position of “*nación española*” in both sub-corpora, with 56.15% of cases in El Mundo and 53.81 cases in El País.

Table 5.7.

PHRASE	El Mundo Opinion (hits)	% total hits	El País Opinion (Hits)	% total hits
NP+ de la nación española	155	46.54	83	37.21
NP+ a la nación española	16	4.80	8	3.58
NP+ de nación española	6	1.80	13	5.57
NP+ una nación española	0	0.00	12	5.38
NP+ prep + la nación española	10	3.00	4	1.79
TOTAL	187	56.15	120	53.81

“*Nación española*” in complex NPs

Interestingly, the pattern featuring the indefinite article “NP+ *una nación española*” does not exist in El Mundo Opinion but it represents 5.38% of the occurrences of “Spanish nation”

embedded in an NP in El País Opinion. This constitutes further evidence of the latter's pluralism because one of the referential functions of the indefinite article is to encode nouns as "non-unique". A closer examination of the concordances partly confirms this idea and reveals another interesting use of the indefinite article in encoding the Spanish nation, namely the possibility of presenting it as something hypothetical that cannot be taken for granted:

Con independencia de la actitud política de cada cual, parece claro que no se puede describir a Cataluña, Galicia o el País Vasco como meras subunidades de una nación española que, tomada en este sentido primario, no existe como referente nacional común de todos los ciudadanos. El uso secundario de nación española es el que considera a. España como una "nación de naciones", concepto que pretende: incorporar a todos los ciudadanos del Estado independientemente de cuál sea su afinidad nacional dominante a nivel primario. (PSOP960008) ("¿Nación de naciones?", by Ferrán Requejo)

Los no nacionalistas carecemos de argumentos cuando nos empeñamos en razonar con los nacionalistas en su terreno que es fundamentalmente sentimental y solemos resultar contradictorios y hasta algo ridículos. Así, por ejemplo, el intento de imponer como más deseable una nación española (con inclusión de Euskadi) al independentismo vasco suele correr paralelo a la afirmación de que los nacionalismos son "algo trasnochado". (PSOP990008) ("¿Por qué lleva la iniciativa el nacionalismo?", by Ramón Cotarelo).

The single most frequent phrase associated to "*nación española*" is "*unidad de la nación española*", often modified by the adjective "*indisoluble*" and post-modified by the phrase "*patria común e indivisible de todos los españoles*" (in 7 out of 8 cases). "*Unidad de la nación española*" roughly represents 13% of the occurrences of "Spanish nation" in both El Mundo and País Opinion. The origin of this phrase can be traced to Article 2 of the Spanish Constitution:

La Constitución se fundamenta en la indisoluble unidad de la Nación española, patria común e indivisible de todos los españoles, y reconoce y garantiza el derecho a la autonomía de las nacionalidades y regiones que la integran y la solidaridad entre todas ellas.¹⁴²

(The Constitution is based on the indissoluble unity of the Spanish nation, common and indivisible fatherland of all Spaniards and it recognizes and guarantees the right to autonomy of the nationalities and regions that integrate (the Spanish Nation) as well as the solidarity among all).

As stressed in chapter 3, the Spanish Constitution distinguishes between "nationalities" and "regions" but it does not name or define them. This ambiguity in the Constitution leaves

¹⁴² <http://narros.congreso.es/constitucion/constitucion/indice/index.htm> (retrieved on 1-7-12).

room for negotiation along the unitarist and pluralist lines, as these two quotations illustrate: Fancelli argues in PCOP050158 that the term “*nacionalidad*”, used in the Spanish Constitution to describe some of the territories integrated in Spain in addition to “regions” cannot be explained according to the way dictionaries define “*nacionalidad*” (an “attribute” or an abstract condition rather than a concrete noun). However, the inclusion of the phrase “*nacionalidades y regiones*” in the Constitution can be explained from the point of view of an encyclopaedia: The historical division between Spanish, Basque and Catalan nationalism had resurfaced once again when the Constitution was being drafted. The military could not accept the Basque and Catalan nationalist proposal of Spain being composed of “nations and regions” and so, the term “*nacionalidades*” was created to secure a way forward in this dispute. However, the political situation in Spain has changed and the army no longer represents a threat. And yet, people still seem scared of calling Catalonia “a nation” and Spain “a nation of nations”, Fancelli wonders. He concludes by saying that “a nation of nations” may constitute a tautology according to the dictionary, but not according to the encyclopaedia.

Volvamos un momento a los fundamentos de derecho que la Constitución se otorga. Afirma basarse en “la **indisoluble unidad de la Nación española**”, pero a la vez reconoce “la autonomía de las nacionalidades y regiones”. De nuevo el diccionario nos deja en la estacada: por “nacionalidad” no registra más que “condición y carácter peculiar de los pueblos y habitantes de una nación”. Es decir, estamos ante un atributo que nuestro texto normativo convierte en substantivo, contra toda norma sintáctica y semántica. ¿Cómo es eso posible? El diccionario no puede explicarlo y no lo registra: está fuera de sus normas, al menos hasta tanto no decida incorporarlo como neologismo. En cambio, la enciclopedia política registra que en 1977 en este país se estaba elaborando con penas y fatigas una carta a satisfacción de sectores duramente enfrentados. Y que buena parte de los militares, que en 1981 llegarían a dar un golpe de Estado, no tragaban con la pretensión nacionalista de que España fuera definida como un conjunto de naciones y regiones autónomas. De modo que Adolfo Suárez, a la sazón presidente del Gobierno, llamó a Miquel Roca, ponente nacionalista de la Constitución, y acordaron salvar el temible escollo -detrás había espadones en alto, poca broma- dejando la cosa en “nacionalidades”. También así se construye la lengua, aunque el diccionario no lo admita. Han pasado casi 30 años y el contexto ha cambiado radicalmente. Los militares se dedican mayormente a tareas solidarias en el marco europeo y no existe más presión que la política en una democracia normalmente construida. Pero parece que todavía asusta que Cataluña se nombre a sí misma como nación y que también lo haga España, que en este caso pasaría a denominarse una “nación de naciones” (y regiones). Desde luego, el diccionario se limitará a subrayar la tautología y ahí te las compongas. Estos días ha surgido ya, como ejemplo para ridiculizar la fórmula, la expresión “bicicleta de bicicletas”. ¿Alguien en su sano juicio se atrevería a utilizarla? Bueno, el diccionario no, ya se ha dicho, pero la enciclopedia lo hace con absoluta tranquilidad. (PCOP050158) (“La nación, entre el diccionario y la enciclopedia”, by Agustí Fancelli)

Robles-Piquer, a former politician from the centre-right Popular Party, argues that the authors of the Constitution used the term “nationality” in a novel way¹⁴³ (i.e. “correcting the dictionary”) to satisfy those (nationalists) who were not happy with something as honourable as being part of a Spanish region. He further argues that this proved a serious (linguistic) licence, made in order to guarantee a consensus, which can only be understood if we acknowledge the fact of the “indissoluble unity of the Spanish nation”. He then introduces the threat theme and identifies several threat agents, observing how this unity is neglected by “third-world nationalist demands supported by “terror” in the Basque Country, also shown in Ibarretxe’s separatist Plan. The paragraph concludes with an attack to the president of the Catalan Government for applauding the Catalan pro-independence flag.

[...] Los constituyentes del 78 creyeron conveniente corregir el diccionario y la sustantivó, sin duda para complacer a quienes no se contentaban con algo tan honroso como ser parte de una región española y aducían títulos históricos que, aunque resulte increíble, negaban así a tierras tan cargadas de siglos como Aragón, Castilla o Andalucía, por ejemplo. Fue, ésta, una licencia grave cometida en aras del consenso y que sólo se entiende sobre la base del reconocimiento expreso y pleno, en la propia Constitución, de "la indisoluble unidad de la Nación española, patria común e indivisible de todos los españoles". Todo ello lo olvida la lacrimosa reivindicación tercermundista que el terror apoya en el País Vasco y que se expresa en el plan separatista del presidente del Gobierno autónomo vasco y en los aplausos a las banderas independentistas del presidente del Gobierno autónomo catalán. (PSOP040127) (“Palabras presidenciales”, by Carlos Robles Piquer)

Once again, El Mundo’s stance is overwhelmingly unitarist whereas the differences between unitarism and pluralism in El País are not so sharp this time. This is not surprising, given that we are now dealing with articles featuring the phrase “(indissoluble) unity of the Spanish nation”, where one can reasonably expect a favourable stance.

¹⁴³ He mistakenly calls it “nominalization” when in reality it means using the term “nationality” in a concrete way, to refer to some territories, instead of using it to refer to the condition associated with the membership to a particular national group.

Table 5.8.

	EL MUNDO OPINION	EL PAÍS OPINION
No. of articles (“unidad de la nación española”)	37	24*
Unitarist Stance	34 (91.89%)	11 (44%)
Pluralist Stance	2 (5.40%)	12 (48%)
Non-specified Stance	1	2

*one article in El País presents multiple stances because it summarizes the opinions of experts from a wide ideological spectrum on the possible unconstitutionality of the new “Catalan *Estatut*”.

Unitarism vs. Pluralism in “*unidad de la nación española*”

91.89% of the articles in El Mundo Opinion present a unitarist stance whereas the position in El País Opinion is quite evenly spread between Unitarism and Pluralism with 44% of articles subscribing the former and 48% the latter. The year of publication of the articles and the themes explicitly mentioned there as *leitmotiv* also offer interesting clues on the conditions of production and reception, helping us contextualize the use of the phrase “indissoluble unity of the Spanish nation [...]” in relation with the main events marking the political agenda in Spain during these years. Thirty out of thirty-seven articles containing this phrase were published between 2004-2006 in El Mundo, which represents 81.08% of the total number of articles. In the case of El País, the number of articles published in the same period is 12 (50% of all the articles). The Catalan Statute is a key topic related with the phrase “(indissoluble) unity of the Spanish nation” in both El Mundo and El País while the Andalusian Statute also features quite prominently in El Mundo, but not in El País. This contributes to the unitarist argument developed in El Mundo by arguing that if more concessions are granted to the Catalans, demands from other regions will follow suit and this will in turn trigger further demands from the nationalists on the periphery. Those articles that

adopt a pluralist stance in El País justify the possibility of Catalonia being a nation and Spain “a nation of nations” and/or play down the consequences of recognizing new nations inside Spain. In doing so, they make use of different *topoi*:

Relativisation/perspectivisation: The idea of national unity may appear problematic when considered from different perspectives. Similarly, national plurality can be possible if we adopt different points of view. For instance:

- (i.) The question whether Catalonia can be defined as a nation constitutes a symbolic and linguistic debate rather than a legal one (PCOP050022).
- (ii.) The phrase “unity of the Spanish nation” mentioned in the Constitution does not describe a reality. Rather, it creates one. If we adopt of sociological, political or historical perspective, one may say Spain never achieved national unity or that it has lost it if it ever had it (PSOP980132).
- (iii.) A nation of nations is not a tautology if we look at an encyclopedia instead of a dictionary (PCOP050158).
- (iv.) A political nation (Spain) is different from a cultural nation (Catalonia) (PSOP050159).

Legalese:

- (i) The definition of a territory as a nation does not necessarily imply that a nation can automatically become a sovereign State (PCOP050022).
- (ii) Art. 2 of the Spanish Constitution is contradictory and ambiguous and leaves the question of the structure of the State open to discussion. Acknowledging the indissoluble unity of the Spanish nation and recognizing at the same time the right to autonomy of nationalities and regions is contradictory because the Constitution does not clarify what “a nationality” is (PCOP060056).

(iii) Art. 2 of the Spanish Constitution establishes that Spain is “a nation of nations” (PSOP040064).

Double-sided argumentation as a pretext to invoke tolerance.

(i) The rhetoric in Art. 2 of the Spanish Constitution seems as strong as that of the Catalan Statute in its national identity claims. Let us be tolerant with the rhetoric from both camps because Catalonia is plural and so is Spain (PSOP070131).

(ii) Art. 2 represents a political compromise between those who see Spain as one nation and those who see it as “plurinational” (PSOP040064; PSOP050159; PSOP010074).

Also, many articles in El Mundo containing “*unidad de la nación española*” portray the idea of Spain being under threat, with threat agents identified in 22 cases (59.47% of all the articles containing the phrase “unity of the Spanish nation”). The idea of threat seldom appears in those articles of El País that adopt a unitarist stance: only three articles imply threat, out of which two include threat agents. Interestingly, these two articles are signed by members of the right- wing Popular Party, not usually favoured by the editorial line of El País.

5.3. The Discourses of the Spanish Nation in El Mundo vs. País Opinion

This section examines how the Spanish nation is conceptualized in the narratives of El Mundo and País Opinion. The discussion is primarily based on detailed analysis of the concordances of “*nación española*” and “*España [...] nación*” (5L-5R) followed by more qualitative analysis of whole articles containing these phrases. This is complemented by the study of other common phrases used in the narratives of the Spanish nation in both newspapers.

Linguistic analysis reveals that definitions and paraphrases are mainly encoded as VPs containing defining expressions (i.e. “*es*”, “*se define*”, “*entendida como*”, etc.) or as complex NPs encoded in various ways: (i) post-modified by the phrase “*de la nación española*” (i.e. “*idea de la nación española*”); (ii) headed by the conjunction “*como*” (i.e. “*España como nación de naciones*”); (iii) in appositional structures (i.e. “*la nación española, «patria común e indivisible»*”). Appositional structures are also occasionally realised as VPs (i.e. “*lo que se está fraguando a todo lo largo del siglo XIX: la nación española moderna*”). Such definitions and paraphrases were extracted from all the concordances in *País* and *El Mundo* Opinion and the texts in which they appeared were analysed in search of the themes, concepts and strategies employed. The concept of Spanish nation was also examined in relation to historical time so as to determine how both newspapers explain the origins and evolution of the Spanish nation.

The NPs associated with “*nación española*” reflect the social constructivist underpinnings of its discursive construction in both newspapers: “*concepto*”, “*concepción*”, “*idea*”, “*término*”, “*sentidos*”, “*discurso*”, “*argumento*”, “*construcción*”, “*proyecto*”, “*configuración*”, “*modelo final*”, “*creación*”, “*mitos*”, “*relatos fundadores*”, “*hecho*”, etc. The language employed unequivocally portrays the Spanish nation as a socio-discursive historically evolving artefact. An extensive analysis of the texts containing definitions and paraphrases of “*nación española*” reveals interesting differences and similarities in how these newspapers discursively construct the Spanish nation around various themes, mainly related with history, law, politics and, less commonly, language, culture and religion. Such themes are not necessarily presented independently in separate texts. Instead, they often

combine in single texts creating complex clusters of interrelated themes where the Spanish nation is simultaneously portrayed as a socio-political construct enshrined in a legal framework which is also a product of history. In view of this, the discursive construction of the Spanish nation could be explained in terms of a series of interconnected and overlapping themes that include history, politics, law, as well as socio-cultural manifestations such as language, religion or traditions. Such themes tend to be quite broad and polyphonic in nature. For instance, history would not only include a collective perception of continuity but also elements like foundational myths and fables, whereas political themes would range from the institutional and legal to the ideological and sentimental, closer to Renan's notion of daily plebiscite.

Finding 5: The discourses of the nation in *El Mundo* and *País Opinion* are characterized by significant phraseological differences in line with the unitarist vs. pluralist distinction explained before.

Table 5.9 shows the most common keyphrases in the discourses of the nation in both newspapers, where we can observe significant differences in frequencies in line with the unitarist vs. pluralist distinction already explained.

Table 5.9.

El Mundo Opinion	MI	L-L	El País Opinion	MI
España plural (102)	7.270	-41.44	España plural (199)	7.402
Anti-España (5)	5.019	-36.82	Anti-España (42)	7.470
Nación política (9)	2.256	-24.16	Nación política (40)	3.628
Nación cultural (5)	5.149	-21.03	Nación cultural (29)	6.637
Nación de naciones (67)	8.155	-15.98	Nación de naciones (112)	8.306
España constitucional (72)	4.228	+13.21	España constitucional (31)	3.327
Nación española (334)	7.694	+12.17	Nación española (226)	7.051

Única nación (21)	6.028	+4.90	Única nación (8)	5.569
España democrática (57)	5.250	-4.41	España democrática (75)	4.611
Historia de España (236)	5.508	-2.30	Historia de España (247)	5.403
Nación única (6)	6.028	-1.41	Nación única (10)	5.569
Nación plural (23)	7.262	+1.04	Nación plural (15)	5.765
Idea [...] de España (174)	6.077	+0.20	Idea [...] de España (160)	5.576
España como (una) nación (50)	5.045	-0.92	España como (una) nación (55)	4.927
España [...] es una nación [...] (44)	5.045	-0.19	España [...] es una nación [...] (44)	4.927
España autonómica (22)	4.621	-1.08	España autonómica (27)	4.659
España de las autonomías (31)	4.776	+0.03	España de las autonomías (27)	3.842

Common keyphrases in the narratives of the Spanish nation

5.3.1. “Nación de naciones” vs. “única nación”

The most important difference between the discourses of El País and Mundo Opinion is the recognition by the former of Spain being “a nation of nations”, something rejected by the latter which advocates the existence of only one nation, “única nación” (table 5.10):

Table 5.10.

	EL MUNDO OPINION	EL PAÍS OPINION
No. of articles (“nación de naciones”)	56	112
Yes	6 (10.71%)	52 (62.65%)
No	48 (85.71%)	13 (15.66%)
NEUTRAL/NON-SPECIFIED	2 (3.57%)	18 (21.68%)

Stance towards Spain as “una nación de naciones” El Mundo vs. País Opinion

El Mundo Opinion criticises the concept of “nación de naciones” as “feo terminacho” (MSOP000083), “bobada” (MSOP000089), “totum revolutum” (MSOP050057), “noción falaz” (MSOP050092), “fraude histórico” (MSOP050134), “ocurrencia de un idiota,

historiador aficionado, Luis Carretero y su hijo Anselmo” (MSOP050040), in allusion to a well-known pluralist ideologue admired by Maragall. Notwithstanding this criticism, it is also interesting to note that four out of the six articles acknowledging the possibility of Spain being “a nation of nations” were written in 1996, a time when the PP was negotiating with Catalan and Basque nationalists to form a minority government and compromise was needed. In this context, El Mundo’s director, Pedro J. Ramírez, suggests in MSOP960243 that Aznar should abandon “his reticence towards accepting the idea of Spain being a nation of nations”. The same author will categorically reject this possibility in subsequent articles. For instance, in MSOP070349, he alludes to the idea of “nation of nations” echoing a well-known anti-pluralist argument put forward by Sosa Wagner et al (Sosa Wagner et al 2006): That of Spain increasingly looking like the Habsburg Empire “with its monumental and paralyzing mess”:

Eso significa que Aznar debe ponerse a la cabeza de un proceso de transformación, aceptando ejercer un poder compartido y dotando al concepto de «segunda transición» de un contenido mucho más rico y audaz que el que bajo dicho título se reflejaba en su libro. Sus expresas reticencias a aceptar la idea de que España ha sido en el fondo una «nación de naciones» y su rechazo al federalismo deben dar paso a una nueva mentalidad, equivalente a la que llevó a Suárez a devolver a la sociedad parte del poder acumulado por el franquismo en las instituciones de la Administración central. (MSOP960243) (“Seis bases para un compromiso histórico”, by Pedro J. Ramírez)

¿Hacia dónde nos dirigimos? Sólo voy a recoger aquí un diagnóstico al que sin duda el presidente Zapatero concederá autoridad y crédito por proceder de su viejo y creo que apreciado profesor el catedrático Francisco Sosa Wagner: «A fuerza de insistir en lo que nos separa y olvidar lo que nos une, a fuerza de complacernos y ensimismarnos con las naciones y con la 'nación de naciones', con las diferencias de la España 'plural' y manosearlas todas las mañanas y en todas las ocasiones, a fuerza de idear o magnificar litigios lingüísticos y rememorar agravios y distinguir en nuestro patrimonio créditos inextinguibles contra la cuenta de unos derechos históricos, en rigor prehistóricos y fantasmales... podemos llegar en efecto pasito a pasito, con frívola parsimonia, a montar algo parecido al Imperio Austrohúngaro, con sus monumentales y paralizantes líos». (MSOP070349) (“Sobre la paz, el diálogo y el Imperio... Austrohúngaro”, by Pedro J. Ramírez)

Other common expressions employed in the unitarist narrative of El Mundo Opinion are “*España constitucional*” (+13.21) and “*nación plural*” (+1.04), whereas “*España plural*” (-41.44) features prominently in the pluralist narrative of El País. This kind of expressions may result from a recurrent need in political discourse for new labels which on the surface

look non-controversial. They tend to function as “slogans” to advance certain political agendas among mass audiences (Teubert, 2008).

Further analysis reveals that “*España plural*” is frequently associated with the discourse of the PSOE and its leaders, particularly Maragall and Zapatero (PSOP050083, PSOP030058, PCOP050048, PCOP050056), to promote a federal agenda and that this term is usually employed by the pluralist left to criticize the unitarist right. PSOP020014 is an open letter to Zapatero from Maragall announcing a new impulse towards federalism described as “*España plural*”. PSOP030008 opposes the idea of “*una España plural y dinámica*” of Maragall and the PSOE to that of “*la España una y estática*” of the PP. After recognizing Catalonia as a nation, PCOP050053 announces “a second transition” which may result in “a plural Spain with a federal structure”. PSOP000086 accuses the PP of marginalizing the Autonomous Communities in an attempt to return to the old Francoist idea of “*una España una y grande*” when the future lies in “a plural Spain within a plural Europe”.

El nuevo socialismo está ya en marcha. El nuevo federalismo, o como le llamamos tú y yo, la España plural, está a punto.” (PSOP020014) (Carta abierta a José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero, by Pasqual Maragall)

Maragall tiene argumentos para aceptar el debate de tú a tú con el presidente del Gobierno: ha sido él, por lo menos aparentemente, el que ha conseguido que el discurso sobre España del PSOE se distanciara del PP, y que frente a la España una y estática empezará a tomar consistencia como alternativa posible una idea de España plural y dinámica.” (PSOP030008) (Aznar y Maragall, by Josep Ramoneda)

Cataluña es una nación. Es decir, Cataluña es una comunidad con conciencia clara de poseer una personalidad histórica diferenciada y voluntad firme de proyectar esta personalidad hacia el futuro mediante su autogobierno. [...]

La segunda transición que ahora se inicia culminará, si prospera, con la consolidación de la única España posible: una España plural de estructura federal.” (PCOP050053) (Desde Cataluña, by Juan José López Burniol)

¿Por qué el PP no ha aprovechado la ocasión para dar más legitimidad y más presencia a las comunidades autónomas? ¿Por qué las ha marginado de la idea presente y futura de España? ¿Por qué nos quiere hacer regresar a la vieja idea de una España una y grande cuando nuestro futuro será el de una España plural en el seno de una Europa plural? (PSOP000086) (La chapita española, by Jordi Solé Tura)

The significantly fewer cases of “*España plural*” in El Mundo Opinion are also usually associated with the PSOE and its leaders. The articles contain a somewhat unusual proportion of favourable voices, over 28% of the articles versus 54% against, together with a

majority of articles attacking this concept and some cases illustrating attempts to re-formulate “*España plural*” in terms more amenable to Unitarism. MSOP050105 blames Zapatero for promoting “the mess” with “his plural Spain”. MSOP040179 conflates Zapatero’s plural Spain with nationalism on the periphery and suggests that this has only lead to a new “*caciquismo*” (see chapter 3 p. 202). In MSOP980102 Aznar states his belief in a plural Spain re-formulating the discourse usually associated with “plural Spain” by advocating the validity and continuity of the Spanish nation while dismissing the nationalisms on the periphery as something of the past. Finally, MSOP990005 reformulates “plural Spain” using the label of “*nación plural*” according to a unitarist interpretation of the Constitution which recognizes the existence of Autonomous Communities in the context of national unity.

Tal vez pueda culparse a Zapatero de haber alentado el lío con su España plural, tal vez sea, como el casto José, un soñador en la España faraónica de la corrupción, que toca la flauta y el camarillo mientras crece la riada del Nilo. (MSOP050105) (El lío, by Raúl del Pozo)

Zapatero ha querido abrir las puertas a la España plural y nacionalista donde todo es posible, pero lo que ha entrado de momento es una nueva generación de caciques que invocan su nacionalidad festiva y tienen confianza directa con Madrid. (MSOP040179) (Los neocaciques, by Francisco Umbral)

No soy un nacionalista español, pero sí un español en sentido constructivo que cree en la vigencia, en la continuidad y en el futuro de la nación española. Yo creo que una España plural ganará más en las urnas del futuro. A mi modo de ver, la historia de los nacionalismos es la Historia de un siglo XIX que se adentró demasiado en el XX.” (MSOP980102) (Una paz para nuestra Historia, by José María Aznar)

Son palabras de Javier Arenas recogidas en su ponencia: «España plural, un proyecto de futuro en común», en la que se ve a nuestro país como una nación plural que tiene en la Constitución de 1978 el motor y garantía del Estado de las Autonomías, con sus elementos homogéneos y heterogéneos en el seno de la unidad nacional. (MSOP990005) (“La metamorfosis de AP o la resurrección de UCD. El Partido Popular pretende convertirse en el referente del centro político”, by Raúl Heras)

“*Nación plural*”, on the other hand, is used in El Mundo Opinion to re-affirm unity of the Spanish nation while confining pluralism to the current State of the Autonomies regulated by the Constitution. In MSOP040115 Rajoy reminds Zapatero that Spain is ONE, just ONE “*Nación plural*” while Arenas emphasizes the idea of “national unity” in his description of

Spain as a plural nation. In MSOP040138 the idea of “*Nación plural*” is equated to that of “only one nation which is indivisible and the common fatherland of all Spaniards”. MSOP000083 arguably shows the true face of staunch Unitarism by caricaturing “the plural” as a “*terminacho*” only welcome if safely wrapped in “the unitary”.

Si para Rodríguez Zapatero esto es discutido y discutible, para la Constitución de 1978 que, precisamente, hemos festejado hace una semana, no lo es. Le recuerdo a nuestro presidente que España es constitucionalmente una nación plural, articulada en nacionalidades y regiones, pero «una», insisto, una nación. (MSOP040115) (“España es una nación”, by Mariano Rajoy)

España ha sido y es una nación plural que, gracias a la Constitución, motor y garantía del Estado de las Autonomías, se afirma como tal, acepta sus elementos homogéneos y heterogéneos en el seno de la unidad nacional y proyecta la cohesión de esta pluralidad constitutiva en sus objetivos compartidos. (MSOP990003) (“Un esfuerzo de convivencia”, by Javier Arenas)

En tal sentido, pues, la palabra nación utilizada en el artículo 2 de la Constitución Española significa sin ambages dos cosas y nada más que dos: por una parte, que sólo hay una nación, la española, que es indivisible, y que es la patria común de todos los españoles. Y, por otra, que no obstante se trata de una nación plural o compuesta, formada por nacionalidades y regiones, pero no es una nación de naciones ni nos hallamos ante un Estado plurinacional. (MSOP040138) (“La deconstrucción constitucional”, by Jorge de Esteban)

Si España es, como bien dice Aznar, una nación plural, pluralísima, pluralérrima hiperpluralisticoespialidosa, es porque algo unitario la mantiene. De otro modo no sería plural sino que habría desaparecido. Para que algo sea plural debe existir como algo. Hasta el feo terminacho de «nación de naciones» afirma la pluralidad partiendo de la unidad. Lo heterogéneo necesita algunos elementos de homogeneidad para no volatilizarse. La pluralidad lingüística de España es tan cierta como la unidad forjada desde la baja Edad Media, con el castellano como koiné de la comunidad, mecanismo para que el hablante vascuence y el gallego se entiendan en una lengua común, cuyo nombre correcto es español. ¿Que se quedan contentos diciendo cada diez minutos o cada diez líneas que España, la «cosa enorme» de Pujol, es plural? Bienvenido el terminacho. Pero conste que cuanto más se insiste en la pluralidad de España más resalta la continuidad y, en definitiva, la unidad. Si durante mil o dos mil años España ha sido y es tan plural, qué poco centralismo represor ha habido. Y cuantísima España. (MSOP000083) (Lo plural, by Federico Jiménez Losantos)

The existence Spain as “a nation of nations” is attributed by Elorza in El País Opinion to the co-occurrence of various nation-building processes blocking each other along the 19th century which hindered the consolidation of a Spanish Nation-State (PSOP960066). In view of this, El País Opinion constructs its “nation of nations” narrative in a number of ways. First it affirms that Spain is a nation and not just a State (PCOP960052), in opposition to what nationalists on the periphery claim. It then identifies the term “*nacionalidades*” mentioned in the Spanish Constitution with the concept of nation (PCOP050002, PCOP050164,

PCOP050022) and opts for an asymmetrical model by referring to Spain as “*nación de naciones y de regiones*” (PSOP050159, PEO030069, PSOP010022):

En realidad, el término nación en lugar del término nacionalidades es el que estaba en la cabeza de los constituyentes cuando se redactó el artículo 2 de la CE y si no se pudo incluir en el texto constitucional y posteriormente en los estatutos de autonomía fue porque en 1978-79 el horno no estaba para bollos. Así se deduce claramente del debate sobre el artículo 2 en la Comisión de Asuntos Constitucionales y Libertades Públicas del Congreso de los Diputados. Todos los parlamentarios que intervinieron, tanto fuera para apoyar como para oponerse a la inclusión del término “nacionalidades”, afirmaron expresamente que nación y nacionalidad eran sinónimos. Entre los que se oponían estaban Manuel Fraga, quien partía del “**hecho indiscutible de que nacionalidad y nación es lo mismo**” o Licinio de la Fuente, para quien “nacionalidad es equivalente a nación” u Ortí Bordás, que afirmó de manera tajante que “nacionalidad es exactamente igual que nación”. En esto es en lo único en que coincidían con quienes apoyaban la inclusión del término nacionalidades en la Constitución, como Roca, para quien “nacionalidades o nación quieren decir exactamente lo mismo” o Peces Barba, que decía que “para nosotros nacionalidad y nación es lo mismo”, por lo que podría hablarse de que “**España es una nación de naciones**” (Constitución Española. Trabajos Parlamentarios. T. I. Cortes Generales 1980, páginas 658, 812, 838, 816, 846 y 847). (PCOP050002) (“¿Por qué no?”, by Javier Pérez Royo)

Estoy muy a gusto con la definición de España como nación de naciones y regiones (y ya sé que la Constitución dice nacionalidades); me satisface sobremedida que el catalán, el euskera o el gallego sean otras lenguas españolas oficiales; he defendido y defiende un federalismo asimétrico que otorgue mayores competencias a las nacionalidades que a las regiones y lamento que esas lenguas no tengan mayor presencia oficial, por ejemplo, en el Senado. (PSOP010022) (“Carta abierta al señor Varela i Serra” by Emilio Lamo de Espinosa)

Third, it tends to place the Spanish nation at a higher level than the rest. For instance, it speaks of “*nación mayoritaria*” vs. “*naciones minoritarias*” within the Spanish State (PCOP050164), “*Nación (con mayúscula)*” vs. “*nación (con minúscula)*”, Catalonia, (PCOP050002), “*nación/Estado nacional*” vs. “*naciones subordinadas*” –“which are not Nation-States” (PEOP010226). Or it talks of *superposición de naciones*” (PCOP970020) and employs the metaphor of “Russian dolls” to describe “a more comprehensive Spanish nation which houses other nationalities” (PSOP980074). The distinction between “*nación política*” (-24.16) and “*nación cultural*” (-21.03), significantly more common in El País Opinion, is key in explaining this differentiation between the Spanish nation and the rest: Spain is commonly associated with the former, in connection with the notion of sovereignty whereas other nations tend to be relegated to the category of “*naciones culturales*”. In PSOP020080, Peces-Barba, a former Socialist politician who participated in the committee which drafted

the Constitution, associates the Spanish nation with the notion of sovereignty (which is only one, he argues). He then considers the terms “*nacionalidad*” and “*nación*” as synonyms and speaks of “*hechos diferenciales de character cultural*”. A similar argument is presented in PSOP040120 where “*nacionalidad*” is equated with a “cultural nation” distinguishable from a “political nation”:

En la Constitución de 1978, las bases de la unidad se basaban en los siguientes principios:
Primero. España se constituía en un Estado social y democrático de derecho cuya soberanía nacional correspondía al pueblo español en su conjunto. Esta idea de la unidad de la soberanía se correspondía con la realidad histórica, porque nunca habían existido en la España moderna otras naciones soberanas.
Segundo. Se reconocía la autonomía de las nacionalidades y de las regiones, dentro de esa sociedad plural. Nacionalidad y nación son conceptos sinónimos en la Constitución. Se distinguía la única nación soberana, España, y además se reconocía que en su interior existían hechos diferenciales nacionales de carácter cultural. Por eso algunos hablamos de España como nación de naciones y de regiones. (PSOP020080) (“Los vascos y la Constitución: el pájaro pequeño y el grande”, by Gregorio Peces-Barba Martínez)

Todavía cabría señalar otro significado para la idea de nacionalidad: el vínculo afectivo que une al ciudadano con su nación. De estos significados, ha permanecido, sin embargo, la distinción entre una idea de nación política, ligada a la realización de un orden político liberal-democrático, y una idea de nacionalidad o “nación cultural”, susceptible de reconciliarse con la existencia de una nación política equiparada en la práctica al papel de los Estados soberanos. (PSOP040120) (“Nación y nacionalidad”, by Andrés De Blas Guerrero)

Fourth, in spite of the above, the concept of sovereignty tends to be underemphasized in El País Opinion. Instead there is much greater emphasis on identity in conceptualizing the nation, proved by the numerous articles stressing this aspect: PSOP050017, PSOP040047, PCOP970020, PCOP960065, PCOP050169, PCOP050110, etc. This arguably fits well with El País’s pluralist agenda given the unquestionable existence of multiple national identities in Spain and the limitations traditional definitions of the Spanish nation in terms of sovereignty pose for a pluralist solution to the Spanish national conundrum. For instance, PSOP970106 proposes “to obviate hard/univocal interpretations of terms like nation, sovereignty and State” in re-defining Spain and “explore those of “supra-nationality, cultural/linguistic/patriotic pluralism, federalism and subsidiarity”. PSOP050106 concludes that Spain is a nation of nations based on the various national sentiments that can be found in

Spain. This reasoning often leads to the defence of various forms of federalism, as illustrated in PEO070040 below (but also PSOP020069, PCOP060056).

Pues bien, desde la perspectiva europea, la redefinición de España debería obviar el sentido duro y unívoco de términos como nación, soberanía y Estado y explorar los de supranacionalidad, pluralismo cultural, lingüístico y patriótico, federalismo, subsidiariedad y otros por el estilo.

No sé si de ahí resultaría una España pensada como nación de naciones, como un Estado plurinacional o si seguiría concibiéndose, en expresión de la Constitución, como una patria común entre otras patrias más altas y más chicas. (PSOP970106) ("La 'reinención' de España", by Juan Antonio Ortega Díaz-Ambrona)

Con arreglo, sin embargo, al mismo argumento, siguiendo una lógica estrictamente paralela, hay que concluir que también España es una nación. Quienes reclaman el derecho a ser incluidos en esta categoría no pueden, a continuación, negar ese título a España aduciendo que sólo es un "Estado". Porque hay muchos millones de personas que se sienten españoles, que quieren ser españoles (muchos más, entre paréntesis, que quienes se sienten catalanes; no en términos absolutos, es decir, no más millones de personas, dato que no sería decisivo, sino muchos más en términos relativos también: si hay, supongamos, un 60% de catalanes que creen que Cataluña es una nación, el porcentaje de ciudadanos españoles que sienten a España como nación no baja del 90%; y habrá que despreciar mucho la realidad para no tener en cuenta ese dato); si toda esta gente cree en España como nación, por la misma razón antes explicada, España es una nación.

Si tanto Cataluña como España son naciones, por tanto, la fórmula "nación de naciones" está servida. (PSOP050106) ("La disputa nominalista", by José Álvarez Junco)

Así las cosas, ¿qué opciones tiene hoy la España que se siente española a la hora de afrontar el problema vasco? Sólo dos, basadas ambas en el mismo presupuesto, a saber: que el Estado autonómico fruto de la Constitución, desarrollado con coraje y vigor hasta convertirlo en un auténtico Estado federal, es el único marco -no inmutable, sino modificable según sus propias reglas- que la nación española acepta como base de su proyecto común. (PEOP070040) ("Conllevancia o autodeterminación", by Juan-José López Burniol)

The opposite occurs in El Mundo Opinion where identity is comparatively less prominent than sovereignty, always understood as exclusive to the Spanish nation. In MCOP050227 Rajoy is quoted as saying that "sovereignty resides in the Spanish nation" whereas Jiménez Losantos accuses the State in MSOP060220 of "having abandoned all its obligations... first of which is to protect the origin of sovereignty: The Spanish nation". The same author proclaims in MSOP050188 that all constitutions in Spanish history "have been based on the Spanish nation, understood as unique and indivisible:"

Rajoy resumió la filosofía de las enmiendas en cuatro principios: la soberanía reside en la nación española, existe igualdad de derechos entre todos los españoles, el Estatuto debe respetar la Constitución y también debe ofrecer garantías de los derechos de los ciudadanos frente al intervencionismo del proyecto aprobado en Cataluña. (MCOP050227) ("PP y PSOE acercan posiciones pero Zapatero no quiere pactar con Rajoy", Editorial)

El problema de España es el de la dimisión del Estado de todas sus obligaciones, la primera de las cuales es proteger el origen de la soberanía, que es la nación española. (MSOP060220) (“Moratorias”, by Federico Jiménez Losantos)

Sin embargo, sucede que la Constitución española de 1978, como todas desde la gaditana de 1812, se basa en la Nación española como sujeto político. Y que la actual define a España como patria común, única e indivisible. Dificilmente puede ser única la Nación española si alberga en su interior a la nación catalana con los mismos títulos de soberanía. Si la soberanía reside en el pueblo español, no cabe otra Nación. Y si cabe, adiós soberanía nacional y adiós igualdad de los españoles ante la ley. (MSOP050188) (“La gran estafa”, by Federico Jiménez Losantos)

Sovereignty is associated with the concepts of citizenship, freedom, equality and statehood in phrases such as *“nación de ciudadanos libres e iguales”* (MSOP050164, MSOP070162, MSOP060078), *“sujeto político”* (MSOP050274, MSOP050241), *“fuente de soberanía”* (MSOP040033, MSOP980054), *“origen de soberanía”* (MSOP060220), *“fundamento de toda legalidad”* (MSOP050180), *“piedra angular de la constitución”* (MSOP040026), *“la nación que garantiza la igualdad”* (MSOP040067), etc.

Similarly to what we saw in the News Corpus, another feature in the narrative of the Spanish nation in El Mundo Opinion consists in introducing a polarizing discourse by echoing the views of Basque and Catalan nationalists, usually in critical terms. A common theme is the belief that Spain is not a nation:

Y todo ello después de afirmar con la mayor desfachatez que España «no es una nación» sino un conglomerado estatal donde conviven naciones como la catalana y autonomías, o resto de España. Semejante locura es lo que vende el jefe de Unió, el amigo de Aznar, a quien en la sede del PP y Moncloa veían como el probable sustituto de Vidal-Quadras -quien, a la vista de todo esto debería replantearse su dimisión- en una relación «confederal», por supuesto, entre Unió y el PP. (MSOP960171) (“La unidad nacional”, by Pablo Sebastián)

Leyendo así a Maquiavelo parece San Juan de la Cruz, o San Francisco de Asís, el amante del hermano lobo y de toda la flora y fauna de esa España que fue imperio donde nunca se puso el sol, que llevó y arraigó su cultura y culturas (¡mejor me lo ponéis!) por medio mundo y que unos catetos e indocumentados de CiU dicen que no es una nación. (MSOP960088) (“El príncipe enseña la España salvaje”, by Aurora Pavón)

This polarizing discourse is rare in El País Opinion. On the contrary, presenting Spanish nationalism and nationalism on the periphery as equally problematic is common

(PEOP000103, PEOP980242, PEOP980095). This is clearly reflected in the unusually high frequency of expressions like “*nacionalismo español*” (Table 5.11):

Table 5.11.

El Mundo Opinion	MI	L-L	El País Opinion	MI
Nacionalismo español (83)	5.902	-72.56	Nacionalismo español (214)	6.404
Nacionalista español (16)	4.253	-3.42	Nacionalista español (26)	4.137

“*nacionalismo español*” in El Mundo vs. País Opinion

This pluralist equidistance between nationalisms in the discourse of El País Opinion can sometimes be interpreted in post-national terms. For instance, by equating the conception of the Spanish and Basque nations, Aranzadi seems to question the validity of this concept in PEOP000046. Cotarelo distances himself from all nationalists and accuses Spanish nationalism of trying to impose the Spanish nation while accusing nationalism on the periphery of being outdated in PSOP990008:

Y desde el punto de vista de una ideología democrática que haga hincapié en la fundamentación exclusiva del Estado en la voluntad de los ciudadanos, **la concepción de la nación (de la nación española) que la Constitución consagra es tan naturalista, tan organicista, tan esencialista y supravoluntarista, tan antidemocrática en suma, como la concepción de la nación (de la nación vasca) del Pacto de Lizarra y de los documentos soberanistas del PNV.** (PEOP000046) (“Apostillas de un inocente”, by Juan Aranzadi)

Los no nacionalistas carecemos de argumentos cuando nos empeñamos en razonar con los nacionalistas en su terreno que es fundamentalmente sentimental y solemos resultar contradictorios y hasta algo ridículos. Así, por ejemplo, **el intento de imponer como más deseable una nación española (con inclusión de Euskadi) al independentismo vasco suele correr paralelo a la afirmación de que los nacionalismos son "algo trasnochado".** (PSOP990008) (“¿Por qué lleva la iniciativa el nacionalismo?”, by Ramón Cotarelo)

5.3.2. Two uncanny associations? Religion and language in the national narratives of El Mundo and País Opinion

This section discusses two identity markers conspicuously unusual in the discursive construction of the Spanish nation in El Mundo and País Opinion, in the context of expressions such as “*España [...] nación*” and “*nación española*”: Religion and language.

#Finding 6: Religion and language do not feature prominently in the discourses of the Spanish nation of El Mundo and País Opinion.

Long considered the cornerstone of Spanish identity, Catholicism no longer plays this defining role in Spanish society nowadays (Payne, 2006). On the one hand, religious practice has dramatically declined coinciding with Spain’s modernization and secularization processes, initiated in the 60s and 70s. On the other hand, any attempt to link Catholicism with Spanish identity in 21st century Spain will arguably be hindered by the National-Catholic association so prevalent during Francoism. Neutral references to religion in connection with the Spanish nation are very rare in El Mundo Opinion (MSOP980103, MSOP060045) and non-existent in El País Opinion. The expressions “*nacionalcatolicismo/ nacional-católico*” mark this general trend to dissociate Catholicism and the Spanish nation and to criticize any attempt to bring religion in general and the Catholic faith in particular to center stage.

Table 5.12.

El Mundo Opinion	MI	L-L	El País Opinion	MI
Nacionalcatolicismo (19)	8.606	-30.10	Nacionalcatolicismo (64)	8.729
Nacional-católico (8)	6.553	-0.79	Nacional-católico/a (11)	6.973

Religion and the Spanish nation, El Mundo vs. País Opinion

MSOP070191 criticizes the interference of the Church in education and declares the end of “*nacionalcatolicismo*” while MSOP000150 objects to the celebration of the Spanish national day on the 12th of October due to its religious connection, arguing that linking politics and religion is not proper in modern Spain. PSOP070072 discusses the current discredit suffered by religion identifying it with Spanish nationalism. PSOP060130 emphasizes the difficulties in establishing a non-denominational State, even under a Socialist government, while PSOP010103 criticizes the PP’s proposal in defense of Catholic instruction in Catalan schools labeling it a return to “*nacionalcatolicismo*”.

Se ha acabado el nacionalcatolicismo. Vamos en busca de la laicidad. Y es, en efecto, el Estado quien ahora debe educar «a la sociedad, a la nación y al hombre». Profese la religión que profese, o no profese ninguna... (MSOP070191) (“La Ciudadanía”, by Antonio Gala)

No sin dudas (a mi entender más que razonables) en España se ha instaurado como Fiesta Nacional el día de la Virgen del Pilar, tradicional conmemoración de la Hispanidad: la proyección de España en América. ¿Aglutinan ambos rasgos a los españoles de hoy? La hispanidad, ahora, es cultura, no política. Y no debiera pertenecer a la España moderna, unir política y religión. Pues precisamente tal unión caracterizó a la España vieja, y no hablo sólo del nacionalcatolicismo franquista, sino de la España del Siglo de Oro, la España imperial, que llevaba la cruz indisolublemente unida a la espada. No, el día del Pilar o de la Hispanidad -que se imbrican- no es el día adecuado para la Fiesta Nacional de un país que se quiso nuevo con la Constitución de 1978. (MSOP000150) (“Una ilustre fiesta vieja”, by Luis Antonio de Villena)

Quizá ese desprestigio de la religión en general se deba entre nosotros a algo más que al esquematismo de epígonos tardíos de la Ilustración, es la repulsa hacia la Iglesia católica que ha condicionado tanto nuestras vidas y la sociedad. Pues el catolicismo para nosotros tiene rasgos propios, es la ideología nacional, y nacionalista, española. El nervio del argumento de la nación española fue escrito por clérigos y el supuesto continuo histórico católico-castellano se basa en la continuidad de la Iglesia católica española. Las crónicas medievales de Ximénez de Rada pretenden continuarse ahora en el discurso de Rouco Varela. Es lógico que frente a ese argumento de la esencia de España exista un contradiscurso comunitario nacional en las diócesis vascas y catalanas. (PSOP070072) (“El fracaso del catolicismo español”, by Suso de Toro)

La construcción del Estado laico se está convirtiendo en misión casi imposible. No vivimos, es verdad, en un Estado confesional como lo fuera el de la época del nacionalcatolicismo, pero tampoco en un Estado laico o sencillamente no confesional. Quedan todavía no pocos restos de confesionalidad. Algunas de las actuaciones recientes del Gobierno socialista nos alejan todavía más de la laicidad. (PSOP060130) (“Estado laico, ¿misión imposible?”), by Juan José Tamayo)

El nacionalcatolicismo español amenaza con volver por sus fueros en versión actualizada por el Partido Popular catalán. Una proposición no de ley presentada por el PP en el Parlamento de Cataluña insta al Gobierno de la Generalitat a tomar medidas para que otras confesiones no desplacen en los centros escolares la asignatura de religión católica.

El Estado, a juicio del PP, debe intervenir para evitar que los minaretes suplanten al románico. La vieja identificación entre la fe y la patria asoma de nuevo ante la amenaza de la competencia de otras creencias. (PSOP010103) (“Viejas añoranzas”, Editorial)

The association of Spanish identity and language seem problematic *a priori* given that several languages are spoken in Spain and that Catalan and, to a lesser extent Basque, have been key identity markers in alternative nation-building projects. The official recognition of the various regional languages and the acknowledgment of the concept of “*lengua propia*” in the Constitution, a notion further consolidated in several regional statutes, do not facilitate the identification of the Castilian language with the Spanish nation despite its official status and its widespread use across Spain. The evidence from the Opinion Corpus seems to confirm this impression. References to language in the definitions of the Spanish nation are rare in both newspapers (PCOP970020, PCOP050137, MSOP980103, MCOP020015) while phrases like “*lengua catalana*” are more common than “*lengua castellana*” or “*española*” (table 5.13).

Table 5.13.

El Mundo Opinion	MI	L-L	El País Opinion	MI
Lengua catalana (82)	8.311	-0.35	Lengua catalana (82)	7.824
Lengua propia (61)	7.505	-6.90	Lengua propia (86)	7.684
Lengua castellana (45)	10.546	-3.76	Lengua castellana (60)	10.402
Lengua española (40)	5.976	-0.09	Lengua española (39)	5.424
Lengua común (33)	7.125	-1.48	Lengua común (40)	6.721
Lengua materna (32)	11.811	-3.99	Lengua materna (46)	11.497
Lengua vehicular (29)	11.721	+19.13	Lengua vehicular (4)	10.912
Lengua oficial (38)	8.371	-0.74	Lengua oficial (42)	8.513
Lengua vasca (12)	4.738	-30.79	Lengua vasca (52)	5.926
Lengua valenciana (9)	8.373	+4.19	Lengua valenciana (2)	7.453

Language and the nation, El Mundo vs. País Opinion

Notwithstanding the occasional pluralist voices (MSOP030057, MSOP010108, MCOP980057, MCOP960032), El Mundo Opinion’s unitarist narrative generally advocates

the right to be taught in Castilian in Catalonia and denounces the discrimination against this language in Catalonia and the Basque Country. The pluralist narrative of El País Opinion is more miscellaneous. It supports full bilingualism in those territories with more than one official language while echoing different viewpoints in connection with the situation of Castilian in Catalonia. There are occasional voices denouncing the discrimination against Castilian, usually in less vehement tone than in El Mundo Opinion (PCOP980015, PCOP070007, PCOP980042, PCOP980002) much in contrast with voices denying or relativizing this discrimination in defence of Catalonia's language policy (PSOP060210, PSOP000148, PCOP980029, PCOP960024, PCOP060217, PCOP060126, PCOP060028). There are also examples reminding us of how the Castilian language was imposed on the Catalans in different periods (PSOP010056, PSOP010052, PSOP010045, PSOP000040). The following examples illustrate these differences in the narratives of both newspapers. PSOP070130 questions the idea of a Spanish nation associated exclusively with the Castilian language, precisely the argument proposed in MCOP020015 where this language is said to be persecuted. The discrimination against Castilian in Catalonia is denied in PCOP960024 while El Mundo and other media, accused of spreading this myth, are labelled *“separadores”*.

Los diferentes nacionalismos que existen en España son criaturas de una misma época, y han sobrevivido en gran medida gracias a la escalada que se estableció entre ellos desde el siglo XIX en adelante. Frente a la arbitraria idea de que España era Castilla y de que, por tanto, la lengua castellana y, de paso, la religión católica definían la condición de español, surgieron otras ideas no menos arbitrarias y que reproducían el mismo razonamiento en una escala territorial más reducida. (PSOP070130) (*“La importancia de España”*, by José María Ridaó)

El consenso de fondo entre los escasos partidos antifranquistas y los abundantes franquistas dispuestos a democratizarse en 1977 fue y es el de la deslegitimación radical de España. Como nación, es decir, como comunidad histórica multisecular, y como cultura basada en una lengua común, que es la española. No importa que la Constitución hable de «patria común e indivisible de todos los españoles», no importa que de la lengua común diga que «todos los españoles tienen el deber de conocerla y el derecho a usarla». España y todos sus símbolos, empezando por la bandera, han sido borrados de la vida cotidiana en todas las regiones donde los nacionalistas mandan. La lengua española ha sido prohibida y perseguida en todos los ámbitos de la vida pública donde los nacionalistas imponen su ley. Véase la Administración Pública y la Educación en Cataluña tras un cuarto de siglo de pujolismo. Véase cómo los jueces prohíben al alcalde de La Coruña llamar La Coruña a La Coruña. Tanto comisario político en Prado del Rey con tanta

derecha y tanta izquierda centralistas para que al final llueva «en todo el Estado Español» y se esperen «precipitaciones en Girona, Lleida, Ourense y A Coruña». Toda precipitación es poca para no hablar en español donde los nacionalistas no quieren ni oírlo. (MCOP020015) (“Pujol no mintió”, by Federico Jiménez Losantos)

Los separadores de la COPE y de Abc y El Mundo han hecho creer que el predominio del catalán en la escuela pública (no en la privada) está erradicando a la lengua castellana no solamente en la enseñanza, sino de toda Cataluña. Sólo hace falta pasearse por el Ensanche barcelonés, ya no, digo por Nou Barris, y coger diariamente el metro para percatarse de que en la calle la lengua mayoritaria es el castellano. Si se acerca a un quiosco, el 95% de las revistas son en castellano, y sólo uno de los cuatro periódicos de Barcelona, está escrito en catalán. Si usted va al cine, predominan en un 90% las películas en castellano. ¿Dónde está, pues, la amenaza de extinción del castellano? Durante cuarenta años el régimen franquista combatió genocidamente la lengua y la cultura catalanas, aunque en los últimos 15 o 20 años aflojó su presión y permitió la publicación de libros y alguna revista, pero jamás de ningún periódico, y con sólo algunas concesiones en la radio y la televisión. El libro reciente de Josep Benet Intent franquista de genocidi cultural contra Catalunya es un alegato incontestable. (PCOP960024) (“Don Pedro Laín, tranquilícese”, by Albert Manent)

5.3.3. History in the narratives of El Mundo and País Opinion

This section discusses how history is portrayed in the narratives of the Spanish nation in El Mundo and País Opinion. I will first examine how the origins of Spanish nation are narrated. This will be followed by a comparative analysis of common themes in the historical narratives of the nation, both in general terms and with specific reference to various characters and periods. The data are extracted from a sample of 727 articles containing a total of 560 occurrences of “*nación española*”, 449 cases of the pattern “*España [...] nación*” and 671 articles containing 983 occurrences of “*historia [...] España*”, “*nuestra historia*” and “*historia española*”.

Finding 7: History appears to be the most frequent identity marker in the discourses of the Spanish nation in El Mundo and País Opinion. There are however differences as well as similarities in the historical narratives of the Spanish nation in both newspapers.

Detailed analysis of the articles containing the expressions “*nación española*” and “*España [...] nación*” reveals history as a key feature in the discursive construction of the Spanish

nation in both newspapers. This is also confirmed at the phraseological level (table 5.14) where Spanish history features more frequently in the narrative of El País Opinion. The three most common patterns are “*historia de España*”, “*nuestra historia*” and “*historia española*”. In all cases the log-likelihood scores indicate that these phrases are more common in El País, especially “*nuestra historia*” where a -14.48 log-likelihood score indicates that the differences in frequency are statistically significant.

Table 5.14

El Mundo Opinion	MI	L-L	El País Opinion	MI
Historia de España (236)	5.495	-2.30	Historia de España (247)	5.422
Nuestra historia (186)	7.781	-14.48	Nuestra historia (245)	7.413
Historia española (28)	5.287	-3.81	Historia española (41)	5.101

Phraseology related with “history of Spain”, El Mundo vs. País Opinion

Finding 8: Unitarism tends to conceptualize the Spanish nation in perennialist terms whereas Pluralism generally conceives it as a modern construct.

El Mundo Opinion emphasizes the idea of the Spanish nation being a historical construct resulting from a long historical evolution. This is clearly reflected in its phraseology: “*unidad histórica y política*” (MSOP040178), “*hecho histórico*” (MEOP970165), “*vieja*” (MSOP980141, MSOP060257, MSOP040120), “*la nación más vieja de Europa*” (MSOP040115), “*la nación más antigua de Europa*” (MSOP070162, MSOP060235, MSOP060001), “*nación antiquísima*” (MSOP070217), “*el Estado-nación más antiguo de la vieja Europa*” (MSOP050045), “*la Nación-Estado más antigua de Europa*” (MSOP060093), “*comunidad histórica multisecular*” (MCOP020015), “*la bimilenaria*

historia de España” (MSOP040148), “*milenaria andadura histórica*” (MSOP070248), “*hecho histórico bimilenario*” (MSOP050061), “*el Estado más viejo y cohesionado de Europa*” (MSOP050137), “*uno de los primeros estados de Europa*” (MSOP000165), “*nación cargada de siglos y de experiencia*” (MSOP000173), “*la más vieja de las naciones y el más antiguo de los Estados nacionales de Occidente*” (MSOP060113). In line with this perennialist stance, El Mundo Opinion is critical with social constructivist approaches which conceive the Spanish nation as “a modern invention”. MSOP030120 suggests that a book titled “Spain: Three millennia of history” should be compulsory reading for “our feral nationalists” and even “for the more cultivated ones” this proves that the Spanish nation did not begin around 1492 but that it existed “fuzzily” long before. MSOP040189 argues that the Catholic Monarchs did not have to invent the Spanish nation because this had always existed, or at least for a very long time.

España: tres milenios de Historia del sabio Antonio Domínguez Ortiz, que acaba de morir, debería ser lectura obligada y acotada para nuestros nacionalistas asilvestrados y hasta para los cultos, porque hasta los fastos sevillanos del 92 por la llegada de Colón a América parecía que coincidían con la creación de España por Isabel de Castilla y Fernando de Aragón. El cocinamiento de sangres, culturas, artes e idiomas en la Península Ibérica alcanzó su hervor con la toma de Granada y el horizonte traspasado de los mares tenebrosos en cuyo confín las tripulaciones eran devoradas náufragas por incommensurables monstruos oceánicos, pero España, aunque fuera de manera brumosa, existía ya desde antes que el oso de Don Favila y no terminaba en el castillo de Doña Urraca. (MSOP030120) (“Tres mil años”, by Martín Prieto)

Igual que no tuvieron que hacerlo los Reyes Católicos, tampoco en 1808, en 1812 o en 1820 hubo que inventar la nación española porque, parafraseando a Lincoln, «siempre» -o por lo menos desde muchísimo tiempo antes que Kentucky- había estado ahí. (MSOP040189) (“Mirando hacia atrás sin hiel”, by Pedro J. Ramírez)

In theorizing this perennialism, some unitarist voices in El Mundo Opinion use Ortega y Gasset’s concept of “*razón histórica*” also employed by Julián Marías in “*España inteligible*” (Marías, 1985), where the Spanish nation is conceived as a historical project gradually built layer by layer as a result of a “vast process of incorporation”. This is what differentiates Spain, “the only true nation”, from Catalonia and Euskadi, only “poetic nations based on the lesser notion of collective spirit” in MSOP060104:

En naciones como España, que recibió su primer impulso unificador hace más de 2.000 años, el criterio racional y realista para definir la nación es «la razón histórica» (Ortega, Julián Marías), desde la cual deben juzgarse los sentimientos y la voluntad de todos los grupos. La razón histórica trata de descubrir en un concepto -el de nación, el de España o romanticismo- el núcleo permanente que nos permite usarlo con sentido en distintas épocas, y a la vez acomoda ese núcleo a las formas concretas que ha tomado a través del tiempo.

La nación se forma desde la Historia compartida del pasado, las referencias compartidas en el presente, y el proyecto de vida en común para el porvenir. El proyecto de futuro comporta un ingrediente de imaginación, pero fundado en una herencia. La España de hoy es una realidad formada por la convivencia de comunidades que, habiendo sido reinos y jurisdicciones diferentes, fueron fraguando su mutua relación en distintas formas de Estado hasta culminar en la Constitución de 1978.” [...]

Los nacionalismos regionales no se pueden comparar con la realidad nacional de España, porque no tienen más fundamento que la noción de «espíritu» colectivo, indigna de una sociología contemporánea. Los separatistas vascos y catalanes conciben sus «nacionalidades» como «familias que han engordado», a pesar de que esos territorios fueron y siguen siendo marmitas de fusión de inmigrantes. España, en cambio, es el resultado «de un vasto proceso de incorporación». Cuando algunos distinguen, de manera vaga, desde luego, entre España como la única nación verdadera y Cataluña y Euskadi como «naciones poéticas», se refieren al discurso del «alma catalana» y «el alma vasca», reflejado en los juegos florales en torno a 1900, y en libros como *El alma castellana* (1900) de Azorín o *Campos de Castilla* (1912), de Antonio Machado, entre otros muchos.

La idea de nación de los separatistas es a la vez medieval y de un futurismo utópico. Desde esa postura escriben una historia falsificada del pasado y diseñan planos de «comunidades imaginadas» para el futuro. (MSOP060104) (“España: ¿nación de naciones?”, by Ciriaco Morón Arroyo)

El Mundo Opinion highlights various periods within this vast process of historical incorporation whose roots are found in Christianity and the Greco-Roman civilization (MSOP070418, MSOP050140, MSOP060045, MSOP040061). The Christian Reconquest is described as “the founding epic of the modern Spanish nation” (MEOP010304) “which brought back the Christian and Roman unity which has defined our nation for 2,000 years” (MSOP060239). Other articles are less assertive about the Middle Ages arguing that Spain as a political body did not exist then but that a certain idea of Spain was already present (MSOP040146, MSOP040051). The reign of the Catholic Monarchs is seen by many as the birth of the Spanish Nation-State (MSOP020086, MSOP070094, MSOP040051, MSOP000173, MSOP020086, MSOP980141, MSOP070162, MSOP060151, MSOP050122) while others distinguish between the formation of the Spanish Nation-State after the unification of the different kingdoms under a single crown and the modern notions of “*nación constitucional*”, “*nación como sujeto politico*”, “*nación de ciudadanos*”, “*patriotismo*” and “*soberanía*” dated around 1808 when the first Spanish constitution was

approved (MCOP050282, MSOP050164, MSOP050061, MSOP050221, MSOP040051, MSOP060222, MEOP050301) when the Spanish nation “awakes to modernity” according to Aznar (MSOP070181). The essence of this perennialist conceptualization of the Spanish nation is captured in MSOP070418 where the author lectures Zapatero about the antiquity of the Spanish nation. This is in clear contrast to the pluralist and post-national narrative of MSOP040221 where Aznar’s perennialism is mocked by arguing that his nationalism is not different from that of Carod, Otegi, Arzalluz and Maragall in the way it is used to manipulate history with proposals such as Spanish history having started with the Big bang:

España tiene 3.000 años de civilización (léase el libro póstumo de Domínguez Ortiz), más de 2.000 de civilización grecorromana (léase a Sánchez Albornoz), más de 1.500 de independencia nacional dentro de esa civilización cristianorromana (léase a Menéndez Pidal), más de 500 de Estado nacional (léase algo), 200 de civilización constitucional (léase la Constitución de Cádiz) y, aparte del latín, el griego, el hebreo e incluso el árabe, muchos siglos de una lengua común de cultura, la española, que es de las más importantes del mundo (aprenda a leer). (MSOP070418) (“Zetapé pedagogo”, by Federico Jiménez Losantos)

Parece que los nacionalistas, sean del signo que sean, tienen patente de corso para tratar la Historia como si fuera plastilina. Quito un principado acá, remuevo un poco las fechas y me invento un Reino de Cataluña que nunca existió. Mezclo una teoría genetista nazi con un poco de filología del siglo XIX y me sale una raza no indoeuropea. Con sus últimas declaraciones en la Universidad de Georgetown, Aznar se ha sumado al síndrome napoleónico que padecen Carod Rovira, Otegi, Arzalluz y Maragall. En el manicomio del nacionalismo patrio, el español no se queda atrás en el arte de la mentira y la manipulación histórica. «Los problemas de Al Qaeda con España empiezan en el siglo VIII». Toma ya. No sólo Bin Laden es inmortal, sino que, al igual que los catalanes se inventan un reino, Aznar adelanta 6 o 7 siglos el nacimiento de España. Para él, los visigodos, los romanos y los iberos tenían claro que eran españoles. En sus sueños, hasta los mamuts llevaban la banderita impresa.

De hecho, para Aznar, España existe desde siempre en el continuo espacio-temporal: TVE se encargó de demostrarlo con una serie sobre la Historia de España que empezaba con el big bang. España no sólo es una unidad de destino en lo universal sino que no pueden con ella ni los agujeros negros de Hawking. Siguiendo las enseñanzas del maestro, hay historiadores que han vuelto a presentar la Reconquista no como un largo proceso de convivencia más o menos violenta entre distintas civilizaciones sino como una cruzada al estilo del Guerrero del Antifaz. De ser así, hay que señalar que tomarse ocho siglos para reconquistar la Península supone el récord bélico más lento de la Historia. Alfonso X, Alfonso XII, Jaime I y los demás monarcas asturianos, castellanos, leoneses, aragoneses, navarros y mallorquines (curiosamente no hubo reyes vascos ni españoles ni catalanes, qué lástima) eran unos perfectos inútiles. (MSOP040221) (“Rebuznos políglotas”, by David Torres)

Pluralist voices in El País Opinion tend to see the Spanish nation as a modern construct emerging towards the second half of the 18th century and the beginning of the 19th century, although some may admit a prior substratum of cultural identity (PSOP010008). Despite some exceptions (PSOP990060, PSOP980109), these authors emphasize that the modern

concept of nation is a product of the liberal-nationalist ideology which only emerged in the modern era. PSOP960013 describes “the modern idea of nation as a liberal invention” while PSOP020080 explains that the idea of nation “related with that of a *communis patria* substituted the prior construct of *propriae patriae* represented by the Crown”. PSOP050078 traces the origins of the Spanish nation to the war against Napoleon in the early 19th century.

Frente al encendido debate que a veces se presencia en los medios de comunicación, **en realidad los historiadores están de acuerdo en algunas ideas esenciales acerca de la Nación española. Pocos la remontan a tiempos medievales, aunque en ellos y en los modernos sea posible detectar un sustrato de identidad cultural a partir del cual pudo surgir. El tiempo de su nacimiento, de su eclosión sentimental y de la conversión de éste en un factor de cohesión esencial para la colectividad, fue al final del XVIII o comienzos del XIX.** (PSOP010008) (“El nuevo nacionalismo español”, by Javier Tusell)

La idea moderna de nación es un invento del liberalismo. Fueron los ilustrados y los constituyentes gaditanos los que crearon la nación política, compuesta por ciudadanos libres, como algo equivalente a igualdad civil, a Constitución, a Estado limitado. (PSOP960013) (“¿Quién teme al nacionalismo español?”, by Javier Varela)

La idea de la *communis patria* ha estado más presente que la de la *propriae patriae*. Hasta el siglo XIX esa figura la representaba la Corona, y a partir de 1812 lo hizo la idea de nación. **Incluso en muchas ocasiones la religión católica fue usada también como elemento unificador desde la idea, a mi juicio equivocada, del Estado Iglesia.** (PSOP020080) (“Los vascos y la Constitución: el pájaro pequeño y el grande”, by Gregorio Peces-Barba Martínez)

Ocurre sin embargo que desde principios del XIX, como paradójico efecto de la lucha contra la invasión napoleónica, la diosa nación comenzó a sentar sus reales entre los españoles. (PSOP050078) (“España tripartita”, by Juan Antonio Ortega Díaz-Ambrona)

Any perennialist attempt to historicize the nation is seen as a nationalist strategy of ideological manipulation where present concepts and assumptions are projected towards the past in an attempt to present the nation as something ancient. This argument, repeated *ad nauseam* in pluralist articles in El País Opinion (PSOP010079, PSOP000010, PSOP970031, PSOP980093, PSOP970074, PSOP980122, PSOP980109, PSOP010008), is illustrated in the following examples: PSOP000046 links the origins of modern national history to the emergence of the Nation-State and argues that this led to a manipulation of the past in the service of a project for the future, namely the affirmation of national differences. This argument is echoed in PSOP970031 when Álvarez Junco speaks of collective memory “as ideological re-constructions of the past in the service of present political goals”. He then

questions the perennialist concepts of a Roman or a Medieval Spain arguing that these were mere geographical terms. A similar argument is presented in PSOP970082, where history as an academic discipline is linked to the nationalist ideology and is seen as a tool to educate the citizens of the new Nation-States which emerged in liberal Europe.

A nadie se le escapa que la aparición del Estado-nación coincide en el tiempo con el desarrollo de la historia nacional moderna. Mediante un cuidadoso juego de olvidos y manipulaciones el pasado se pone al servicio de algo que es, en realidad, un proyecto de futuro; en este caso, la afirmación de las diferencias nacionales. Y se contamina también de una conciencia "presentista" que tiende a proyectar hacia atrás la visión de la nación tal y como existe en el presente. Las tres dimensiones temporales coexisten así en una misma actividad. No estamos hablando, claro está, de la actual historiografía académica, sino de la historia como disciplina escolar. (PSOP000046) ("El futuro del pasado", by Fernando Vallespín)

La llamada "memoria colectiva" consiste, por tanto, en reconstrucciones ideológicas del pasado -esto es, al servicio de fines políticos del presente-. El caso más claro es el de las historias nacionales, que por mucho que se pretendan disciplinas académicas tienen como fin primero y principal el reforzamiento de un ente político actual. De lo que se trata en ellas es de explicar a los ciudadanos que los estados en los que viven son el producto de la existencia inmemorial de un mismo pueblo sobre un mismo territorio; de ahí el aura de respetabilidad con que rodean a la autoridad política, la legitimidad básica de que la dotan, al margen incluso de la opinión de sus ciudadanos. Por eso se ha hablado a los niños desde hace siglos de una "España romana", pese a que nada hubo en la era romana que se pareciera a la actual España; hubo, sí, una "Hispania", de nominación meramente geográfica que incluía toda la Península Ibérica, dividida a su vez en varias provincias, nunca coincidentes con las actuales España y Portugal. "Hispania" la llamaba, con buen criterio, el fenecido programa del Ministerio de Educación. Texto que, incoherentemente, se refería de seguido a una "Edad Media española" y a una "España, eslabón entre la Cristiandad, el Islam y el Judaísmo", pese que al significado de este término en la Edad Media no fue menos geográfico que el de la era romana y siguió incluyendo, por supuesto, a Portugal. (PSOP970031) ("De historia y amnesia", by José Álvarez Junco)

No en vano, la Historia surgió en el siglo XIX como una disciplina académica en la que el nacionalismo era su piedra angular. Una disciplina, de marcado contenido ideológico-político, necesaria para la formación de los ciudadanos de los nuevos Estados-nación que emergen en la Europa liberal. En España, la Constitución de Cádiz de 1812 alumbra una nación que define nuestra identidad colectiva. Los historiadores comienzan la titánica tarea de buscar la "identidad" y la "diferencia" sobre la base de un proceso que, como ha señalado Anderson, trata de definir la esencia nacional, desde su genealogía. Se trata de ajustar, a veces "recreando", a veces "inventando", el hilo unitario de tradiciones, héroes, lenguas, acontecimientos y monumentos que vinculan, a lo largo del tiempo, un pueblo al territorio en el que se conforma la nueva nación. (PSOP970082) ("ideologías y nacionalismos en la enseñanza de la historia", by Clementina Díez de Baldeón)

Similarly to what we saw in the scarce pluralist voices in El Mundo Opinion, El País Opinion also questions the perennialist stance of the PP and its ideologues. PSOP000077 criticizes the government's policy of exhibitions and their historical bias while PSOP040053 criticises the mediocre TV series "*Memoria de España*" and the work of Jon Juaristi for their perennialist interpretations of Spanish history.

En esto, el PP ha sido más activo en todos los planos, pero su decidida orientación conservadora difícilmente favorece la integración en una cultura política democrática. La línea de grandes exposiciones trazada por María del Carmen Iglesias y por los "historiadores de confianza" del ministerio borra cuidadosamente todas las aristas -insistiendo en la modernidad de la Restauración o minimizando el alcance de los desastres de la Invencible o del 98-, para desembocar en la identificación entre Nación y Monarquía. Incluso puede llegarse a decir que la nación española existía ya en tiempo de los visigodos -catálogo de Carlos V y su mundo- o sugerir que la monarquía encarnó siempre la grandeza de España. Pero esto, más allá de la obtención de honores para los servidores antaño izquierdistas de un Gobierno que se premian a sí mismos, sólo puede tener en política un efecto bumerán. Como el famoso informe de la Academia de la Historia. (PSOP000077) ("Imágenes y creencias", by Antonio Elorza)

Al margen de la calidad de sus asesores, la mediocre serie televisiva Memoria de España fue presentada como la demostración de la existencia de un pueblo común desde tiempos remotos, en directa correspondencia con el planteamiento electoral de quienes estaban en el poder hasta marzo pasado. Y un brillante escritor como Jon Juaristi ha dedicado su último libro, farragosa enumeración de leyendas medievales, a "la reconstrucción del imaginario español", "condición necesaria para la existencia de la nación española". Como si no supiéramos que los Estados-nación no tienen su origen, sino mucho después en el siglo XVIII. (PSOP040053) ("El revisionismo histórico español", by Javier Tusell)

Finding 9: El Mundo and País Opinion coincide in presenting a general picture of the Spanish nation and its history as something problematic. However they differ in how they construct the different periods and historical characters.

A negative impression characterises the narratives of both newspapers where Spain is seen as a weak Nation/State and Spanish nation-building as a failure or at least as an incomplete process. For instance, Spain is described as "an old nation and a weak State" (MSOP000173, MSOP050051), national articulation considered "a failure" (PSOP980097), "an unsolved problem" (PSOP980147) and Spanish identity as "feeble" (PSOP020017) and "unclear" (MSOP040136, PSOP050130). In more extreme cases, authors speak of "a history which was never fully accomplished" (MSOP050166), "a cultural and moral vacuum" in Spanish society (PSOP050121) and even conclude that this lack of unity may be interpreted by some as a proof of Spain's non-existence (MSOP070006):

España es una nación vieja y un Estado débil. (MSOP000173) ("El Estado débil", by Raúl Heras)

Esta congénita e indiscutida debilidad del Estado. (MSOP050051) ("De la ilusión a la razón", by Nicolás Redondo Terreros)

Resulta bien conocido el fracaso histórico del Estado español en el momento de acomodar sus distintas realidades nacionales a lo largo de los últimos siglos. (PSOP980097) (“Federalismo: sí, pero ¿para qué?”, by Ferrán Requejo)

Es relativamente cierto afirmar que el problema histórico de la articulación de España, en tanto que Estado, es muy antiguo y que no está resuelto. (PSOP980147) (“Los confederales”, by José Antonio Ayestarán)

España, desde 1898, no ha creído de forma estable y tranquila en sí misma. (PSOP020017) (“Creer en nosotros mismos”, by Pasqual Maragall)

Llevamos toda la historia preguntándonos qué cosa sea España. (MSOP040136) (“La churriquera”, by Francisco Umbral)

El problema, desde el punto de vista histórico, tiene raíces más hondas, y es que en nuestro país no hemos tenido nunca una idea clara del concepto de nación. (PSOP050130) (“La unidad de España”, by José Luis Abellán)

Quizá la historia de España no se ha terminado de hacer. (MSOP050166) (“Historia de España”, by Antonio Gala)

El principal rasgo de la sociedad española actual seguramente sean la delgadez y fragilidad del suelo sobre el que se levanta. Y debajo de ese suelo, un vacío cultural y aun moral. Un vacío que nace de la falta de continuidad, de la ruptura. (PSOP050121) (“La nación española”, by Suso de Toro)

En resumen, hay poco sentimiento de ser una nación unida, y en consecuencia es imposible estar de acuerdo sobre un himno. En muchos aspectos, los españoles como nación no existen porque no tienen sentimientos compartidos. Quizá eso explique por qué en muchas universidades y colegios no es posible insistir en enseñar la Historia de España, ya que (opinan) España no existe. (MSOP070006) (“¿Debería tener letra el himno nacional?”, by Henry Kamen)

Compared to other nations, Spain and its history are usually presented as exceptional and this is said to result in a weak nation-building. Those rare attempts to play down Spain’s historical exceptionality (see Joseph Pérez in PSOP990104) are swiftly contested by reinforcing the mainstream discourse of negativity (PSOP990005). The examples below illustrate how Spain’s exceptionality is constructed in El Mundo and País Opinion. PSOP000046 compares the expanding historical narratives from the national to the European in the majority of European States with the shrinking into the national-regional in Spain, attributed to a fragile Spanish identity. PSOP060071 argues that Spain has been different in its history due to a difficult past and MSOP960180 compares Spain’s “grandiloquent patriotism, tainted with tragic nuances and assumed fatalism” with France’s “patrimony of grandeur” and English unquestioned patriotism, “printed in people’s genes”.

Mientras en la mayoría de Estados europeos la gran cuestión gira en torno a la necesidad de suplir o compaginar las historias nacionales con una común historia europea, aquí nos vemos obligados a reducir la escala hacia lo nacional-regional. Esto atestigua la fragilidad de nuestra misma autocomprensión nacional [...] (PSOP000046) (“El futuro del pasado”, by Fernando Vallespín)

No nos engañemos. España ha sido diferente en su historia y aunque con el tiempo nos hayamos ido normalizando, todavía presentamos rasgos singulares heredados de un pasado difícil. (PSOP060071) (“Discutida guerra civil”, by Francisco Bustelo)

La idea de patria se hereda sin duda alguna, como la tendencia al reuma, como las fincas rústicas. A nosotros, la Historia de España nos ha legado un sentimiento patriótico grandilocuente, con ribetes trágicos y fatalismo asumido. Heredamos España con lúgubre responsabilidad, como hidalgos arruinados prestos sin embargo a mantener alto el nombre del abuelo, lleno de deudas seculares. Algo muy diferente a la idea de un francés, que se siente siempre agraciado con su patrimonio de «grandeur», o a la de un inglés, para quien la patria está impresa en sus genes y ni se le ocurrirá ponerse a considerarla en abstracto. (MSOP960180) (“Líderes y patrias”, by Alicia Jiménez Bartlett)

Ningún Estado de la Europa centro-oriental pasa por una crisis de identidad como la que afecta desde entonces –y hasta hoy, subrayado- España. En Ninguno fracasan de modo tan evidente, lo que se hace visible bajo Cánovas, los mecanismos de integración económica, política y cultural que en España se ponen en marcha siguiendo el patrón francés. (PSOP980042) (“Crisis de imperio”, by Antonio Elorza)

A series of inter-related themes are employed in the problematisation of Spanish national history in both newspapers. One is Spain’s socio-economic and cultural backwardness, reflected in expressions like “*atraso*” and “*decadencia*”. Another is the fragility of the State and Spanish society, captured in the expression “*España invertebrada*” famously coined by Ortega y Gasset in 1921. A closely related theme is Spain’s perennial political rivalry characterized by a culture of intolerance epitomized by the violent confrontation of “*las dos Españas*”, also reflected in expressions such as “*cainita*”, “*cainismo*” and “*anti-España*”. Table 5.15 compares these phrases in the Opinion corpus.

Table 5.15.

El Mundo Opinion	MI	L-L	El País Opinion	MI
Atraso (25)	NA	-1.03	Atraso (30)	NA
Decadencia (12)	NA	-7.39	Decadencia (27)	NA
Problema de España (25)	4.321	-1.63	Problema de España (32)	4.507
España como problema (5)	4.321	-8.07	España como problema (17)	4.507
España invertebrada (15)	8.564	+0.60	España invertebrada (10)	7.940
Las dos Españas (91)	9.007	+2.56	Las dos Españas (64)	9.122
Cainita (38)	NA	+5.57	Cainita (18)	NA

Cainismo (13)	NA	+0.16	Cainismo (10)	NA
Anti-España (17)	5.019	-13.37	Anti-España (42)	7.470

Phraseology related with the problematisation of the Spanish nation

Examples of these themes abound in the narratives of *El Mundo* and *País Opinion* without significant differences in stance in their generalizations. The following examples capture the essence of this problematisation. MSOP040189 echoes the views of Spanish intellectuals in connection to Spain's backwardness while PSOP960063 emphasizes how the idea of decadence has been part of the Spanish psyche since the second half of the 17th century. In PSOP970086 Menéndez Pelayo is quoted in connection with Spain's problematic national unity, which MSOP980047 attributes to the traditional lack of consensus on the form of the State among Spaniards. This lack of articulation is linked to *cainismo* in MSOP070348, a malaise which has infected Spain during much of its history and has given rise to the idea of "*las dos Españas*" destined to eliminate each other (PSOP990056). After some respite provided by the arrival of democracy after Franco *cainismo* is said to have made its comeback with Zapatero (MSOP060182, MCOP050036). Zapatero's government is also blamed in MSOP060067 for having resurrected the invertebrate Spain while *El País Opinion* puts the blame on the right for Spain's *cainismo* (PSOP000162, PSOP040015):

Sobre estos escenarios, Ortega legitima la grotesca descalificación de España por los enciclopedistas, admitiendo, por lo tenues de las luces del siglo XVIII, que <<nos faltó el siglo educador>> y presenta a Europa como una solución lejana y pendiente; Unamuno clama que le <<duele España>> por formar parte de <<esa minoría de europeos>> que no logra imponerse a la <<mayoría de berberiscos>> que le rodea; Américo Castro explica que la esencia de lo español está en el <<vivir desviviéndose>>; Claudio Sánchez Albornoz residencia en los delirios expansionistas de los primeros Austrias el <<cortocircuito de la modernidad>> que nos condena a la oscuridad; Vicens Vives define el <<problema de España>> como nuestra incapacidad de asimilar el capitalismo, el racionalismo y el liberalismo y el propio Salvador Espriu arrastra melodiosamente su <<desesperat dolor>> por <<aquestar meva pobra, bruta, triste, dissortada pàtria>>, refiriéndose no a Cataluña sino a España. (MSOP040189) ("Mirando hacia atrás sin hiel", by Pedro J. Ramírez)

Proclividad relacionada con ese síndrome de "decadencia" tan vivo en la conciencia histórica de los españoles desde la segunda mitad del siglo XVII, que he intentado analizar con algún detenimiento en otras ocasiones. (PSOP960063) ("El centenario que viene", by José María Jover)

Como decía Menéndez Pelayo de la unidad nacional, qué le vamos a hacer, no tenemos otra. (PSOP970086) ("La culpa es del Estado", by Santos Juliá)

Desde la efímera experiencia de la Primera República en el siglo pasado, nunca había existido consenso entre los ciudadanos sobre la forma de Estado. (MSOP980047) ("Una Constitución de todos y para todos", Editorial)

Si quiero apuntar un viejo problema que ha agudizado ese cainismo que caracteriza nuestra historia: la falta de vertebración del Estado. (MSOP070348) ("Sobre la crispación", by Pedro G. Cuartango)

Un ejemplo de esa incorrecta interpretación de la historia puede ser la bien acreditada, entre muchos de nosotros, teoría de las "dos Españas", a cuya consolidación ha contribuido decisivamente la reiteración de guerras civiles durante el siglo XIX. El hecho de que éstas tuvieran lugar avalaba la existencia de "dos Españas" irreconocibles entre sí, cada una de las cuales se arrogaba el privilegio de ser la auténtica y, por lo tanto, con el derecho de eliminar a la contraria. (PSOP990056) ("La concepción excluyente de la historia española", by José Luis Abellán)

Aunque durante un breve periodo en la Transición pareció difuminarse el tópico de las dos Españas, el cainismo que caracteriza a nuestro espíritu nacional ha vuelto a aflorar con vigor inusitado. [...] <<Españolito que vienes al mundo te guarde Dios, una de las dos Españas ha de helarte el corazón>>, escribió Antonio Machado. (MSOP060182) ("Las dos Españas", by Pedro G. Cuartango)

Los acontecimientos que se están precipitando desde la llegada al poder del actual gobierno socialista han provocado que uno de los libros de Ortega y Gasset, España invertebrada, haya cobrado nueva actualidad. [...]

La invertebración de la que habla podría resumirse como <<una debilidad congénita de la unidad de España>>, que diagnostica en el momento en que la escribe y que define como una enfermedad crónica en el proceso de su continua tendencia a la desmembración, tras la aparente unidad conseguida en el siglo XVI. (MSOP060067) ("El bienio desvertebrador", by Jorge de Esteban)

[...] la inmensa mayoría de los graves problemas políticos que hemos sufrido como pueblo, han tenido su origen en la imposición de una determinada visión de España de unos sobre otros [...] Quizá pueda usted hacerlo –y es evidente que puede-, pero incurrirá una vez más en el gran error de nuestra historia: una parte de España impone a la otra su parcial visión del Estado. (MCOP050036) ("Carta abierta a José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero", by Adolfo Suárez Illana)

La derecha española no ha tolerado que hubiera otra visión política de España que no fuera la suya. Ésta ha sido la esencia del nacionalismo español, que, justamente por eso, por ser un nacionalismo exclusivamente de derechas, ha sido un nacionalismo brutal y débil. Solamente podía imponerse por la fuerza, porque su capacidad de convencer y de integrar era escasísima. [...]

Teníamos que acabar con la repetición de ese ciclo infernal de nuestra historia, que había conducido a que ninguna Constitución fuera aceptada por el conjunto de la sociedad española, sino únicamente por una parte de la misma. (PSOP000162) ("Vuelta a las andadas", by Javier Pérez Royo)

Aquí también se diría que andamos en el empeño de reconstruir a toda velocidad las dos Españas, que pensábamos reconciliadas en el yunque de la Constitución después de tanto cainismo guerracivilista. Es como si se quisieran borrar los años de la concordia para reeditar los pasados rencores, como si de la convivencia inaugurada se quisiera pasar a la invalidación del discrepante, como si la disidencia se entendiera en términos de penosa decadencia a extirpar. Algunos líderes del PP han dado en pensar que vale la pena tener toda la razón aun al precio de aniquilar a quienes se resisten a acompañarles para compartirla. (PSOP040015) ("¿Vuelven las dos Españas?", by Miguel Ángel Aguilar)

The weakness of the Spanish nation throughout history explains the emergence of alternative national sentiments and nation-building projects in Spain in both narratives. The two newspapers however differ in how they deal with this plurality of national sentiments, as we have seen before: While pluralism is acknowledged in the discourse of *El País Opinion* as a natural consequence of this problematic nation-building (PSOP960066), alternative nationalisms are perceived as a threat in the unitarist discourse of *El Mundo Opinion* (MSOP070162):

Cuando hablamos de "nación de naciones" en España nos estamos refiriendo precisamente a ese encabalgamiento de varios procesos de construcción nacional en torno al dato central de los bloqueos que a lo largo del siglo XIX afectan a la consolidación del Estado-nación español. (PSOP960066) ("El discreto encanto de la burguesía", by Antonio Elorza)

Los españoles volvemos a estar inquietos por el futuro de nuestra nación. Parece como si España padeciera un siniestro maleficio y estuviéramos condenados a replantearnos una y otra vez lo que fuimos, lo que somos y lo que queremos ser. Presumimos, y con razón, de ser uno de los países más prósperos del mundo. Hemos alcanzado cotas de bienestar inimaginables hace unas décadas. Somos la octava potencia industrial, al menos según las estadísticas. Disfrutamos de un régimen de libertades fruto de la voluntad de concordia y entendimiento de nuestro pueblo. Llevamos 30 años de democracia ejemplar. Y, sin embargo, los gérmenes de la disgregación y el desencuentro han anidado entre nosotros. ¿Qué nos ocurre?" [...]

No contábamos tampoco con que ciertos gobiernos nacionalistas acabaran haciendo uso y abuso de sus profundas competencias autonómicas para imponer su peculiar visión de la Historia y, so pretexto de promover las lenguas vernáculas, hayan implantado auténticas barreras lingüísticas que amenazan con convertirse en fronteras políticas capaces de hacer saltar por los aires el fundamento mismo de la Constitución. (MSOP070162) ("España, nación de ciudadanos libres e iguales", by Jaime Ignacio del Burgo)

Sharp differences between the historical narratives of *El Mundo* and *País Opinion* also emerge in connection with specific historical periods and characters. This is not the case with Francoism, unanimously seen as a sinister dictatorship characterized by cruel political repression, but it clearly applies to the Second Republic and the Civil War. *El Mundo Opinion* tends to see the Republic as an undemocratic fiasco, a period of disillusionment, turmoil, division and confrontation culminating in a tragic civil war. That is the stance observed in over 69% of the articles with just over 7% offering a positive view of this period. *El País Opinion* on the other hand is usually supportive of the Republic in different degrees.

Over 48% of the articles examined construct this as a period of democracy and modernization and over 16% as a laudable modernization attempt which tragically failed. Less than 10% of the articles share the predominantly negative view of El Mundo. While the Civil War is unanimously perceived as a tragedy, El País Opinion tends to put all or most of the blame on Franco and the right (over 65% of the articles examine), with only 24% of the articles attributing equal guilt to both sides. The stance in El Mundo Opinion is markedly different, with over 51% of the articles equally blaming both sides and only over 28% of the articles either putting all the blame or more blame on Franco's side. The unusually high occurrence of "*Anti-España*" in El País Opinion (-13.37) clearly reflects these differences of stance. Not so much connected with a pluralist stance per se but rather with a liberal-leftist view of Spanish history, this is a term associated with the Francoist stigmatization of its opponents in the Spanish Civil War. The following examples illustrate these differences. MSOP060074 contrasts the success of the monarchy with a republic "which brought the civil war and the burning of convents and private buildings" and "could not become the system of freedom intended", while MSOP070086 warns us against "mythologizing the Second Republic's virtues" concluding that "this period was a disgrace in which all political tendencies should be blamed". A similarly negative view is presented in MEOP060417 contrasted with Zapatero's sympathy for this period. PSOP060152 on the other hand constructs the Republic as "a democratic project of broad social reform" while PSOP020062 blames the right for not admitting the progressive nature of the republican regime and for having brought it down with a military coup. Finally, PSOP050113 questions the rightist narrative of a failed republic eventually leading to the Civil War.

Las dos repúblicas, una muy corta, y la otra, que trajo la Guerra Civil, y la quema de conventos y edificios privados, quisieron, pero no fueron ni pudieron ser el sistema de libertades pretendido. (MSOP060074) ("El gran papel desempeñado por nuestra Monarquía", by Cayetana Alba)

Ese intento de mitificación de las virtudes de la II República no se corresponde con lo que pasó. En mi opinión, ese periodo, seguido de la demencial Guerra Civil, fue una desgracia en la que están involucradas todas las tendencias políticas. (MSOP070086) (“El apagón”, by Jorge de Esteban)

Se cumplen hoy 75 años de la proclamación de la II República; ese periodo de nuestra historia cuya evocación resulta especialmente grata para el presidente del gobierno. Quienes los vivieron desde las calles de un pueblo, fuera de los despachos oficiales y apartados de los cenáculos de la intelectualidad, no suelen recordarlo con la misma añoranza que José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero, tal vez porque los valores que sufrieron en carne propia no fueran tan dignos de encomio como algunos se empeñan en hacernos creer ahora. [...]

Fueron aquellos tiempos de miseria, desigualdad, opresión, incultura, odios viscerales, marginación de los más débiles –empezando por las mujeres–, sectarismo de uno y otro bando y, finalmente, guerra. (MEOP060417) (“Valores' republicanos” by Isabel San Sebastián)

La República de 1931 pretendió ser el primer proyecto democrático y de amplia reforma social que acabara por fin con el monopolio secular del poder político y de la riqueza nacional en manos de una minoría privilegiada, conservadora, reaccionaria y autoritaria. Al bienio de su intento reformador, su moderación desesperó a los proletarios superexplotados, pero fue suficiente para encender las iras del bloque conservador, incluida la jerarquía eclesiástica, su máximo agente ideológico y movilizante en una sociedad inculta y retrógrada. (PSOP060152) (“La guerra que no cesa”, by José Antonio González Casanova)

Nadie discute, salvo la derecha interesada y recalcitrante, que la breve experiencia vivida por nuestro país con motivo de la proclamación de la II República Española el 14 de abril de 1931 fue una opción renovadora. El proyecto de España que se puso en marcha entonces marcó una línea de progreso capaz de homologarse con los países más avanzados. Tampoco nadie pone en cuestión que el 18 de julio de 1936 un golpe de Estado militar derrocó al poder legítimamente constituido, salvo la derecha que se aprovechó del botín de guerra durante más de 40 años. Así las cosas, y por una ausencia de debate nacional, sin complejos, sobre el periodo republicano, la guerra civil y la dictadura, seguimos ocultando y oscureciendo el periodo histórico más progresista de la España del siglo XX. (PSOP020062) (“La II República Española”, by Pedro Taracena Gil)

La memoria de los vencedores de la Guerra Civil española, amos absolutos durante la dictadura de Franco, ocupa todavía un espacio preeminente en comparación con la de los vencidos. [...]

Las televisiones más poderosas e influyentes, las que llegan hasta el último rincón de España, rara vez se adentran en la historia de esas décadas del siglo XX, entre otras cosas porque esa historia de sueños de libertad, conflictos y violencia política no casa bien con la sucia realidad que inunda sus programaciones. Pero cuando lo hacen, exhiben lo que podría denominarse el síndrome neofranquista: recordar la República como un gran fracaso que condujo a una guerra civil, drama y tragedia en la que todos los combatientes cometieron barbaridades, y ocultar, o relatar de pasada, los asesinatos, las torturas y violaciones sistemáticas de los derechos humanos que cometieron Franco y su dictadura hasta el último momento de su existencia. (PSOP050113) (“La historia que nos cuenta TVE”, by Julián Casanova)

In spite of the difficulties faced then, the transition to democracy after Franco's death is almost unanimously perceived as an exception to Spain's problematic history in the narratives of the two newspapers, an unprecedented period of democracy, freedom, peace and modernization which has finally brought the normalcy Spain lacked throughout much of its tragic history. Much of the credit is given to King Juan Carlos and Adolfo Suárez and also to the consensual attitudes of most political leaders at the time.


Differences between the narratives in both newspapers however appear when Spain's present political situation under Zapatero is contrasted with this immediate past, as we will see next.

5.3.4. Is the Spanish nation under threat?

Finding 10: One of the most significant differences between the discourses of the Spanish nation in both newspapers is the narrative of threat found in El Mundo Opinion, especially between 2005-2006.


This threat narrative is present in approximately 35% of the NPs and in 41% of the sentences containing "*nación española*", while 70% of the articles containing this phrase reflect some kind of threat. Figures 5.8 and 5.9 illustrate the repercussion of this threat narrative in El Mundo Opinion by tracking its evolution over time in articles containing "*nación española*" and by comparing the presence of threat versus non-threat at different levels of analysis, namely the lexico-grammatical, in the immediate context of the phrase "*nación española*", and the broader context where entire texts are examined in search of this narrative. This arguably provides a more accurate measurement of the impact of threat because by relying solely on phraseological analysis there is a risk of misrepresenting linguistic phenomena operating at different levels of analysis. We can see once again a dramatic increase in the number of articles containing threat narratives in 2005 and a sharp decline after 2006, pretty much coinciding with the distribution of the word "*nación*" in the Opinion corpus shown in figure 5.4 at the beginning of this chapter (p. 326).

Figure 5.8.



Threat across time in the discourse of El Mundo Opinion

Figure 5.9.



Types of threat versus non-threat over time in El Mundo Opinion

This broader textual analysis proves to be essential in El País Opinion, where a closer look at the rare threat lexis detected reveals that the possibility of threat to the Spanish nation is actually being rejected or contested; or when acknowledged, it is considerably toned down.

PSOP060227 criticizes the suggestion that the Spanish nation is in danger because of the *Estatut*, as claimed by the Association for the Defence of the Spanish nation, an institution close to the Popular Party. In PSOP030004, Catalan Socialist politician and José Montilla, criticizes Aznar's unitarist ideology, the politization of Spanish national unity and the threat discourse promoted by the PP to attack the pluralism of the PSOE.

El jueves de la semana pasada tuvo lugar en Madrid la presentación de la Fundación para la Defensa de la Nación Española, según los portavoces de la cual España "peligra" y está "en serio riesgo de desaparición"; "la máxima expresión del ataque a la Constitución, la soberanía nacional y España misma es el proyecto de Estatuto catalán", aseveró el presidente de la nueva entidad, Santiago Abascal, antes de añadir que "el reconocimiento de la nación catalana es demoledor para la unidad nacional". El acto, celebrado en un céntrico hotel, no reunió a un puñado de freakies o de extremistas lunáticos, sino a un selecto elenco de próceres que ocupan o han ocupado altísimos cargos públicos y tienen vendidos millones de libros. (PSOP060227) ("Tragedia o engaño" by Joan B. Culla i Clarà).

El presidente del Gobierno, José María Aznar, desde su llegada al poder en 1996, ha fijado un rumbo a su política interior que es cada día más excluyente de la realidad constitucional y más intolerante con la realidad nacional. El presidente Aznar, en estos casi ocho años de mandato, ha convertido en tema recurrente la unidad de España como arma arrojadiza contra la oposición de izquierdas y contra los nacionalismos periféricos. Para Aznar y el Partido Popular, el PSOE es un partido que, si gobernara, propiciaría la fractura interna de la nación española con temas tan diversos y conceptos tan alejados de la realidad de la mayoría natural como España plural, plurinacional y federal. El agente disolvente de la unidad patria, para José María Aznar, son Pasqual Maragall y sus malas influencias en un partido socialista que debe mantenerse en la oposición para preservar la unidad milenaria de la vieja Iberia. (PSOP030004) ("¿Quién protege a España de Aznar?" by José Montilla).

While acknowledging the existence of alternative nation-building processes in Spain centred in denying the Spanish nation, PSOP050127 starts by emphasizing "the nation's good health" as well as "its overwhelming recognition".


Pese a la ofensiva de los nacionalismos periféricos reforzada desde los años finales de la dictadura, pese a las ambigüedades de una parte de las fuerzas políticas democráticas, mi impresión es que la nación española sigue gozando de buena salud. Es demasiado honda la génesis del surgimiento histórico de España, demasiado significativa nuestra vida en común en la modernidad, demasiado profunda la construcción de un orden liberal de 1808 a 1936, demasiado larga la dictadura, suficientemente eficaz la vida de nuestra restablecida democracia, para que la vida de la nación española no alcance un reconocimiento abrumador en el mundo actual. La nación de España, entendida como una comunidad de ciudadanos sujeta a un régimen común de derechos y libertades, espacio de una solidaridad histórica renovada día a día por los avatares de una vida en común, pienso que se sostiene firme, hoy por hoy, por debajo de los datos políticos cotidianos... [...] Nos encontramos hoy en España con unos procesos muy intensos de construcción de unos hechos nacionales distintos al español. A su servicio se han puesto unos gobiernos subestatales que han entendido el Estado de las Autonomías no como un marco de convivencia de distintas sensibilidades nacionales, sino como rampa de lanzamiento para la construcción de unos hechos nacionales que no se satisfacen con su afirmación, sino que prolongan su acción en la negación de la común nación española. Porque negación es, al fin y al cabo, la afirmación de una nación catalana o vasca junto al reconocimiento de una "nación de naciones", España, en la que no cabe ver sino la vieja

categoría de un Estado que engloba en su seno auténticas y genuinas naciones. (PSOP050127) (“La salud de la nación española” by Andrés de Blas Guerrero).

Figure 5.10 shows the most frequent lexical realizations of *El Mundo*’s threat discourse together with common threat agents and causes. Threat processes are encoded as verbs in sentences where the “Spanish nation” features as agent or as recipient, but more significantly, they are even more frequent in headwords of complex NPs of the type “destruction of the Spanish nation”. Grammatical metaphors (nominalization) are employed to thematize processes otherwise lexicalized as verbs (defend, destroy, liquidate, etc.). Arguably, this thematization enhances the effect of the threat discourse because it turns threat into a topic which could even be taken for granted. The threat agents and causes associated with this discourse can be divided into several groups: (i) President Zapatero, his government, the Socialist Party and several of its leaders; (ii) The Catalan, Basque and other nationalist people; (iii) ETA and its associates; PRISA, *El País*’s publisher, and its people; The Catalan and other new Statutes as part of the Autonomic System; The “Basque nationalist offensive” after the Estella Agreement, especially the Ibarretxe Plan and its “Referendum” where the Basque people are supposed to decide on the issue of “self-determination”.¹⁴⁴

¹⁴⁴ Ibarretxe does not use the term “Referendum”. He prefers the term “consulta” –consultation- because according to Spanish law, only the State can call a referendum. Using the word “referendum” could have adverse legal implications for his policy.

Figure 5.10.



Threat discourse in El Mundo Opinion

Finding 11: A single author, Federico Jiménez Losantos,¹⁴⁵ contributes significantly to this threat discourse in El Mundo Opinión.

His are more than 36% of the articles containing the phrase “Spanish nation”, 98% of which contain some kind of threat implication. Jiménez Losantos launches scathing attacks against what he considers the enemies of a moribund Spanish nation (“a corpse”, “in ruins”, “reduced to ashes”. Prime Minister Zapatero (ZP or *Zetapé*), his government and the Socialist Party feature highly on this list. Considered “a traitor” for his “dealings with Basque and Catalan nationalists” and for “having surrendered to ETA”, Zapatero is labeled one of the main culprits in the destruction of Spain, together with Socialist leaders such as Maragall (“a nationalist”). Theirs is the “anti-constitutional” and “separatist” *Estatut* which marks “the end of the Spanish nation”, “destroys freedom” (“like in North Korea”) and “solidarity among all Spaniards”. Basque and Catalan nationalist parties and leaders also feature highly on Jiménez Losantos’s list (“PNV/Arana’s children”, “Ibarretxe and his plan”, “Arzalluz”, “Otegi”, “Carod-Rovira/Roviretxe”, “Pujol”, ERC, CIU, etc.). They are “separatists” dedicated to destroying the Spanish nation together with ETA, another major culprit. They are assisted by “Zapatero and his gang” in this enterprise (“Zapatero has thrown himself into ETA’s arms”) and helped by PRISA’s¹⁴⁶ media empire (“the PRISOE”, “the Polanquist Empire/Komintern”). Lesser culprits in frequency terms are other regional Statutes, Spain’s Autonomic system (“a failure”, “hugely expensive”), an ambiguous Spanish Constitution and those leftist parties who have “deserted the idea of Spain”.

¹⁴⁵ Jiménez Losantos conducts a popular talk show in the Spanish radio and writes opinión articles in El Mundo on a regular basis. Author of several books, he has been listed among the most influential Spaniards in recent years. <http://www.elmundo.es/especiales/2006/01/sociedad/500del2006/poder1.html#17> (retrieved on 7-7-12)

¹⁴⁶ The PRISA Group is one of Spain’s largest media empires. Its leading newspaper is none other than El País, the most widely read broadsheet in Spain.

MSOP050055 shows the extent to which this threat discourse can operate in El Mundo Opinion, especially in Jiménez Losantos's writing, characterized by the use of the commentator voice discussed earlier on (p. 321). The writer's is the only voice being heard making frequent use of inscribed social sanction. The target of the diatribe is Zapatero, caricatured as "*Don Zetapé*". He is the agent, overt or implied, in most clauses being accused of "deceit", "treason", "blatant complicity with ETA", "presumption", "attempting to marginalize the opposition" and "demolition and liquidation of the Spanish nation". Grammatical metaphor (*traición, demolición del pacto constitucional, liquidación de la nación española*) plays a key role in constructing this threat discourse. It not only provides the writer with additional rhetorical resources by enabling the thematization or objectivation of verbal processes but also conveys the impression that these accusations are factual and need no further proof. Much of this criticism is also amplified by graduation, in terms of quantity and intensity (underlined) as well as by hyperbolic metaphor (*Don Zetapé; comunista de zulo y checa*).

Como ya se cree sus novelas *Don Zetapé* dice que las elecciones muestran la voluntad de cambio de la sociedad vasca [-ve social sanction: impropriety]. **¿Que forma de engañarse y de engañarnos [Don Zetapé]!** [-ve social sanction: impropriety] La triste verdad es que **su traición al Pacto Antiterrorista y a la Ley de Partidos, su abierta complicidad con la ETA** [-ve social sanction: impropriety] para que vuelva a sentarse en el Parlamento del que legalmente había sido expulsada **se han traducido en una clara radicalización del separatismo**, cuya fuerza emergente es **el partido de la ETA, comunista de zulo y checa hasta en el nombre y totalitario hasta las cejas** [-ve social sanction: social esteem]. ¿De qué **se engríe**, pues, *Don Zetapé*? [-ve social sanction: impropriety] [*Don Zetapé*] ¿De haber obtenido un escaño menos que el PP cuando gobernaba, con Mayor de candidato? [*Don Zetapé*] **¿De contar con la ETA para doblegar al PNV, y con el PNV y la ETA para marginar al PP?** [-ve social sanction: impropriety] **Lo que tan turbiamente trama [*Don Zetapé*]** es una tregua de ETA que le permita ir a las elecciones con **un turbio plan de demolición constitucional y liquidación de la nación española presentado como el triunfo de la paz y de la siesta** [-ve social sanction: impropriety]. **Pero no hay paz sin libertad. Ni en los cementerios.** (MSOP050055) ("**De turbio en turbio**" [-ve affect], by Federico Jiménez Losantos).

5.4. The discourses of emerging nations in El Mundo and País Opinion

This section discusses how alternative national constructs are represented in the discourses of El Mundo and País Opinion. Table 5.16 shows common phrases associated with the various emerging nations specifying the total number of occurrences within a L5-R5 span, the most common positions and Mutual Information scores. As in the News Corpus, Catalonia and the Basque Country are the only candidates with real impact. Andalusia and Galicia present a similar number of occurrences, although in the first case no real aspiration towards acquiring a national status is conveyed. There is only one occurrence attributing nationhood to the Canary Islands coming from a nationalist voice. These three minor candidates are usually mentioned as a sequel to Catalan national claims.


Table 5.16.

Total L5/R5	El Mundo Opinion	MI	El País Opinion	MI	Total L5/R5
266	Cataluña ** nación (97) Cataluña * nación (83)	6.377	Cataluña ** nación (66) Cataluña * nación (49)	5.887	170
81	Nación catalana (71)	6.931	Nación catalana (71)	6.692	77
1	Catalunya ** nación (1)		Catalunya ** nación (2) Catalunya * nación (2)	4.155	4
58	Nación vasca (53)	5.446	Nación vasca (71)	5.686	88
19	Vasco ** nación (5) Vasco **** nación (5) Vasco *** nación (3)	1.846	Nación *** vasco (5) Vasco ** nación (4) Vasco * nación (4)	1.920	18
11	Euskal Herria como nación (5) Euskal Herria ** nación (2)	5.883	Euskal Herria como nación (6)	4.629	9
11	Euskadi ** nación (12) Euskadi * nación (5)	4.592	Euskadi ** nación (4) Euskadi *** nación (3) Euskadi **** nación (3)	3.232	17
13	Andalucía ** nación (4) Andalucía * nación (2)	5.196			
6	Nación andaluza (5)	7.121			
11	Galicia **** nación (4) Galicia * nación (3)	3.039	Nación **** Galicia (2)		2
2	Nación gallega (2)	NA	Nación gallega (1)	NA	1
			Canarias ** nación (1)	NA	1

Emerging nations in El Mundo vs. País Opinion


Figures 5.11 and 5.12 illustrate the diachronic evolution of all the terms associated with the Catalan and Basque nations in El Mundo versus País Opinion. The pattern in the former case generally coincides with that of the more general term “*Nación*” shown in figure 5.4, whereas that of the Basque nation differs considerably. This is arguably another proof of the centrality played by the Catalan Statute in starting a period of discursive negotiation on the national issue in recent years.

Figure 5.11.



The CATALAN NATION, El Mundo vs. País Opinion

Figure 5.12.



The BASQUE NATION, El Mundo vs. País Opinion


Finding 12: The discourse of the Catalan and Basque nations in El Mundo Opinion is based on the categorical rejection of these emerging national constructs whereas that of El País Opinion tends towards their conditioned critical acceptance.

The discourses of the Catalan and Basque nations in both newspapers portray these as emerging constructs alternative or complementary to the existing Spanish nation, usually associated with qualities like *“posible”*, *“presunta”*, or processes like *“DEFINIR, RECONOCER, DENOMINAR, CONVERTIR, CONSIDERAR*, etc”. *“SER”* is still the most common process, but it often appears embedded in periphrasis like *“DECIR QUE SER”* conveying the idea of novelty.

The unitarist vs. pluralist ideologies in El Mundo and El País are corroborated (figure 5.13). El Mundo’s discourse is characterized by its categorical rejection of the Catalan nation while

El País tends towards its conditional acceptance while reflecting considerable distrust in the face of the aspirations towards self-determination allegedly implicit in the *Estatut*. There is also frequent criticism of Catalan nationalism for trying to reproduce the nationalist-unitarist discourse in Catalonia.

Figure 5.13.



Stance towards the Catalan nation, El Mundo vs. País Opinion

El Mundo Opinion's critique is occasionally angry and disrespectful. The Catalan nation is described as "*cuento de payeses*" and "*una nación de la que huían sus reyes*" (MCOP050232). It is also argued that "*la presunta nación catalana se afirma en la negación de la actual nación española*" (MCOP050240). Statements by Pujol and other nationalist leaders affirming the existence of the Catalan nation and denying the Spanish one are widely criticised (MCOP960033, MSOP990039, MSOP980083, MCOP980043) together with the efforts by the Catalan government to promote an image of Catalonia as an oppressed stateless nation abroad (MCOP070079). Counter arguments such as "*Cataluña no es ni más ni menos que una comunidad autónoma a punto de rozar su altísimo techo competencial*"

(MSOP980133) or “*Cataluña no es una nación sino el Condado de Barcelona que ostenta el Rey*” (MSOP050137) abound.

The Catalan nation criticised in El Mundo Opinion is seen as a social construct (MCOP050006, MCOP050030, MCOP050277) based on several arguments: Socio-historical, linguistic, sentimental-symbolic and politico-legal. The socio-historical argument is often contrasted with the politico-legal one. Zapatero is criticised for conflating these two in MCOP040021, unable to differentiate between “*nacionalidad/nación (Catalonia) cultural*” and “*nación política*” (Spain). Catalonia is said to possess “*una personalidad histórica peculiar y diferenciada*” (MCOP960071, MCOP040021), ironically attributed “a Catalan history of no less than 3,000 years” (MCOP960029), a long history Catalan nationalists deny to the Spanish nation (MSOP000095). This Catalan national history is considered “a falsification” (MCOP050030, MCOP050277). Historical milestones in Catalan nation-building, from the *Corpus de Sang de 1640* to Francoism, The War of Succession and the Republic, are relativized arguing that these were periods of inner tension among Catalans to emphasize how weak Catalan national sentiment was.

Language is identified as the most defining feature of anything Catalan: “*único hecho diferencial*” (MCOP960044), “*seña de identidad prácticamente única*” (MCOP970017). The concept of “*lengua propia*” is considered “a myth” (MCOP050030) and Catalan nationalists are accused of trying to impose monolingualism with their nation-building policies (MCOP060067, MCOP050143), “*la obligación de hacer coincidir nación y lengua*” (MCOP060239), “*un mercado lingüístico unificado*” (MSOP050195), “*construir una nación catalana poblada únicamente por patriotas que hablan sólo catalán*”

(MCOP050006), ignoring, according to pluralist Cristina Peri Rossi, that “*Cataluña es y será una nación bilingüe*” (MCOP070089).

The symbolic-sentimental argument is based on a strong sense of belonging to the Catalan nation promoted by Catalan nationalism (MCOP960071, MCOP050112, MCOP060054, MCOP060025), an identifiable and differentiated Catalan identity (MCOP060253), reflected in a national anthem and a flag according to pluralist Henry Kamen (MSOP010119). This discourse, whose popularity is questioned (MSOP050310), is identified with the romantic essentialism of the *jocs florals* where Catalonia appears as “*una nación poética contrapuesta a la verdadera nación española*” (MSOP06104). The Catalan education system is accused of presenting Catalonia as “*nación símbolo enfrentada históricamente a otra nación símbolo y tabú: España*”, thus converting the Catalan nation into “*una especie de religión laica*” (MCOP050143).

The politico-legal argument is the one most commonly found in El Mundo Opinion. The emphasis here is on the concepts of sovereignty and self-determination (MCOP050277, MSOP060164, MEOP060406, MCOP060302, MSOP050024, MSOP040250, MEOP060436, MSOP050092, MCOP060215, MCOP060195, MCOP070081, MCOP050119, MCOP030050, MCOP050245, MCOP050158, MCOP050167, MCOP050282) arguing that Catalonia’s definition as a nation has legal consequences (MCOP050086) because “every nation requires an State” (MCOP050112) and that behind Catalonia’s definition as a nation “*se oculta la deseada capacidad para decidir su propio destino, al margen de la nación española, basándose en un poder constituyente y soberano genuinamente catalán*” (MCOP050266), that is, the creation of “*un Estado en potencia*” (MCOP050093, MSOP040186).

The various definitions of Catalonia presented reflect the negotiations around the *Estatut* (MCOP060016, MCOP050001). Zapatero is accused of indifference when it comes to defining “*España y a Cataluña como nación, nacionalidad, entidad nacional o cualquier otra variedad semántica*” (MCOP050013, MSOP040194). As a result of that, “*media España ni siquiera sabe ya si debe llamarse España o Cataluña, nación o país, estado o palangana o cuarteto de cuerdas*” (MSOP060108).

CiU’s definition of Catalonia as “*nación con soberanía propia aunque asociada al Estado español*” (MCOP030015) is criticised as well as the idea of Catalonia “*única nación dentro de un Estado plurinacional español*” which “*condescendientemente acepta relacionarse en un marco de libre solidaridad con las demás con rango inferior de nacionalidades y regiones*” (MCOP050277). Pluralist views associated with Maragall are also questioned. For instance, Catalonia’s definition as “*una nación que forma parte de la España plural reconocida por la Constitución*” (MCOP030016) or the aspiration to become “*una nación con pleno derecho, pero dentro del Reino de España*” (MCOP060010), “*una nación dentro del Estado español*” (MCOP050007) or “*una nación en términos de igualdad con España*” (MCOP040021); or the “*nuevo basilisco estatutario*”: “*La nación catalana constituida en comunidad autónoma española*” (MCOP070090), “*una entidad nacional constituida en comunidad autónoma... Un poco más que el Valle de Arán*” (MCOP050102). Given the Valley of Aran’s recognition as “*entidad nacional*” in the *Estatut*, El Mundo Opinion takes the opportunity to mock Catalanism calling Catalonia a “*nation of nations*” (MCOP050131, MSOP050160). It is concluded that “*Catalonia can be either a nation or an*

autonomous community” (MCOP050283) and Maragall is accused of proposing to “*convertir a Cataluña en una nación al margen de España*” (MCOP050004).

Pluralist and nationalist arguments eventually come together in El Mundo Opinion in the face of a Catalonia finally becoming “*nación independiente con derecho a expansionarse*” (MCOP050172) and annexing all the territories which historically, linguistically and culturally have been considered Catalan: Valencia, the Balearic Islands, Aragon and Alghero (MSOP060167). The “pre-political” concept of “*pueblo*” (MCOP050092) with the right to self-determination is contrasted with that of “*individuos con derechos, libertades y obligaciones*” (MCOP050257, MCOP060034) arguing that “*nación catalana significa la reducción artificial y negativa del demos ciudadano*” (MCOP060294).

El País Opinion’s stance regarding the Catalan nation is eminently pluralist in many respects. It is considerably more heteroglossic than that of El Mundo Opinion, showing a wider variety of views, including unitarist ones, albeit within a strong pluralist core. Generally speaking, Catalonia is recognised as “*nación con minúscula*” (PCOP050002, PCOP050158) inside Spain, understood as “*nación de naciones*” (PSOP060178, PSOP040165, PCOP970020): “*Un conjunto nacional inserto en el seno de otro conjunto nacional*” (PCOP970020), “*estable e irreversible*” (PCOP030038). Accordingly, it is argued that the terms “*nación*” and “*nacionalidad*” are synonyms (PSOP980052, PCOP060167, PCOP060040), something rejected by some unitarist voices (PCOP050170, PCOP050132).

Various pluralist voices emphasize the symbolic, not legal, character of the concept of nation applied to Catalonia (PCOP050022, PCOP050002, PCOP060167), its sociological and

cultural sense (PCOP050022, PCOP050013), the idea of “*territorio compartido memoria colectiva y tradición común*” (PSOP960162), “*historia*” (PCOP050154, PCOP050017, PCOP030022), “*sujeto/realidad histórico/a*” (PCOP050111, PSOP060043) or “*personalidad histórica diferenciada*” (PCOP030016), as well as the Renanian notion of “collective national conscience” (PCOP050169, PCOP050034, PCOP050158, PCOP050156, PCOP050106, PCOP000014, PCOP030016, PCOP050040, PCOP060167, PCOP050053, PCOP970020, PCOP060075, PCOP060043, PCOP960065, PCOP040047, PCOP060028); or even the racial component found in Almirall or Gener (PSOP030022). On occasion it is argued that such national conscience is “*plural, dual y aparece debilitada*” (PCOP050071, PCOP060075), “*coja*” (PCOP030007), “*desgarrada por particularismos sectarios*” (PCOP050152). The idea of a Catalan nation as political construct is also emphasized (PCOP050166, PCOP050127, PCOP050038, PCOP060075) together with the importance of culture (PCOP050154, PCOP050156, PCOP050017, PCOP050106, PCOP960050) and “*lengua propia*” (PCOP010004, PSOP960162, PCOP050166, PCOP060043, PCOP050154, PSOP050078, PCOP050156) without the inclusion of Valencia and the Balearic Islands (PSOP050209), although some isolated voices question the importance of language in a multi-lingual Catalonia (PCOP050071).

Discrepancy within pluralism is manifested when it comes to defining the terms of a Catalan nation within the Spanish nation. Some authors opt for the distinction between cultural nation (Catalonia) and political Nation-State (Spain) (PCOP050004, PCOP050010, PCOP050169), despite Catalonia eventually becoming a political nation “*por aburrimiento*” (PCOP060147). Alongside this dichotomy, the Catalan nation would not be considered “*sujeto de soberanía, portadora de estatalizad*” (PCOP050002, PCOP050013, PCOP050022,

PCOP010004, PCOP050010, PCOP050110), “*Un sujeto singular desligado de la nación española*” (PCOP050166, PSOP050203). It would be “*una nación sin estado propio*” (PCOP050034), “*no independiente*” (PCOP960050). This pluralist discourse therefore rejects the dichotomy of Catalan nation vs. Spanish State typical of Catalan nationalism (PCOP050164, PCOP040067) advocating instead a Catalonia “*nación plural*” (PSOP040165, PCOP960015, PCOP970020, PSOP040047 and “*plurinacional*” (PCOP960061, PCOP050169). Other authors do not agree with the distinction between cultural and political nation and speak of Catalonia as “a political nation within another political nation called Spain” (PSOP050182, PSOP060154).

This insistence in comparing the Spanish and the Catalan nation provokes suspicion in a significant number of pluralist articles critical with the *Estatut* (PSOP050017, PCOP050155), accused of converting the Catalan nation into “*sujeto soberano*” (PCOP050018, PCOP060019, PCOP050132), “*nación completa*” (PEOP040009), “*única*” (PSOP030061), “*homogenea*” (PSOP060181, PCOP050169), “*unitaria a pesar del Valle de Arán*” (PCOP050137), “*nación con dimensión de Estado*” (PCOP050060), “*con la voluntad de ser Estado*” (PSOP960162), when “neither Catalonia nor Spain are homogeneous” (PCOP970020, PSOP040165) but “*naciones plurales*” (PCOP960015), “*plurinacionales*” (PCOP960061) . This conditioned national recognition of Catalonia by some pluralist authors is accompanied by strong criticism towards Catalan nationalism, accused of “curtailing the cultural and linguistic pluralism of the Catalan nation” (PCOP960001, PCOP050166) and “aiming to construct an essentialist Catalan nation” (PCOP050011), “an homogeneous Catalan nation by imposition” (PSOP060181), “eliminating the nation of nations” (PCOP050111, PSOP030061, PCOP050137). Perceiving nationalism in

quasi-religious terms (PSOP050078, PCOP990031), these pluralist authors propose a concept of Catalan nation removed from the nationalist uniformity advocated by the defenders of an ethnic essentialism which identifies nation and people (PCOP030018), a metaphysical and transcendental concept which has nothing to do with the nation of citizens (PCOP020025).

The unitarist/pluralist distinction in the discourses of El Mundo vs. País Opinion is partly diluted in the case of the Basque nation. Having acknowledged Spain's national plurality, many voices in El País Opinion tend to put this debate aside and concentrate on criticizing peripheral nationalism. The pluralist presence also seems to increase in El Mundo Opinion with the contribution by Joseba Arregi, a former PNV politician turned pluralist ideologue.¹⁴⁷ He authors twenty-five articles in El Mundo Opinion related with Basque issues starting from 2004. Despite his pluralist inclination, Arregi's contribution is reduced to criticizing the exclusionist unitarism of Basque nationalism and other nationalist movements on the periphery, which deny the national plurality of their respective territories while preaching that very same plurality for the Spanish State (MEOP070478). In his critique of Ibarretxe's policies, Arregi opposes the PNV's ethnic nationalism to a civic nationalism where citizens come before abstract concepts like "*pueblo*" (MEOP070005). Arregi also criticizes any strategy by the PNV accommodating towards ETA (MEOP070301). He even advocates the ascension of Spanish parties to the Basque government as a basis for the construction of a plural Euskadi within a plural Spain:

Lo que Euskadi necesita es reafirmar la transversalidad entre los demócratas que le hace ser sociedad en sentido político, no necesariamente un gobierno transversal. Y la transversalidad debe incluir al Partido Popular. Y es preciso no olvidar quién ha puesto en duda, entre paréntesis, en riesgo y bajo sospecha la

¹⁴⁷ Arregi's pluralist proposal of a Basque civic nation has been expounded in books like "*La nación vasca possible*" (see references).

transversalidad existente, pretendiendo sustituirla por la unilateralidad nacionalista. (MEOP050069) (“Contra el catastrofismo”, by Joseba Arregi).

All this does not exclude the frequent anti-pluralist views in El Mundo Opinion where the possibility of a Basque nation is compared with the existence of an Andalusian or Cantabrian nation (MSOP040178) or nations called Galicia, Castilla, Toledo or Cartagena (MSOP060004).

While recognizing the Basque and the Catalan nations, El País Opinion is mostly critical with peripheral nationalism. The main accusation is also the lack of pluralism in Basque nation-building (PSOP980074, PSOP990102, PSOP050182, PEO000144, PEO000073, PEO000007, PCOP960005, PEO990176, PEO990030, PEO980214, PEO980165, PEO070012, PEO050103, PEO000354, PEO000211, PEO050047, PCOP050169, PSOP980052) and this same argument is occasionally extended to Spanish unitarist nationalism (PEO000046, PSOP050071), something rare in El Mundo Opinion (MEOP000503).

Much of the discourse in both newspapers questions the nationalist idea of the Basque nation based on five main interrelated postulates: identity, history, self-determination, ethnic nation and nation as a social construct. A common pluralist *topos* postulates a Basque nation based on identity while agreeing at the same time with the existence of a Spanish identity also present in Catalonia and Euskadi (PCOP960005, PCOP050169, MEOP010140). The historical and ethnic postulates are criticized in El Mundo Opinion labelling the Basque nation as “*virtual*” (MEOP980211), “*hipotética*” (MEOP030010, MEOP060056), “*nonata*” (MEOP060056), “*nunca existió*” (MEOP060233), “*imaginaria*” (MEOP050245), “*a la vez medieval y de un futurismo utópico*” (MSOP060104), “*ensoñación*” (MSOP07162),

“sueño loco” (MEOP030006), “*invención nacida de la cabeza de un visionario, Sabino Arana, que creyó ver en los Fueros el origen de la identidad nacional, cuando históricamente representaban el vasallaje a la corona española (sic)*” (MEOP030185), “*falsificación de la historia*” (MEOP030185), “*nación poética*” as opposed to the Spanish nation, “*la única verdadera*” (MSOP060104). El País Opinion describes it as “*nación imaginaria*”, the product of Romantic nationalism (PEOP000211); “*una tribu*” (PEOP000144), “*nación de patriotas impositivos y excluyentes*” (PEOP020221), “*constitucionalmente inmanejable*” (PEOP050047). Nationalists are accused of “mistaking ethnic and cultural communities for political ones” (PEOP070169). This ethnic conception of things Basque is contrasted with a more integrative Catalan identity (PEOP050094) while advocating a civic and pluralistic notion of the Basque nation (PEOP000257) which does not place the nation above civic liberties (MEOP000395). Both newspapers emphasize the idea of a Basque nation as a social construct rather than a historical reality (MEOP980211, PEOP980214) while criticizing the exclusion of many citizens (PEOP000211) and the violence (MEOP990179, PEOP020198).

5.5. Conclusions

Chapters 4 and 5 have illustrated how corpus-based discourse analysis can be used in empirical social research enhancing the representativity of the data, offering a standardized replicable method of text analysis and allowing us to make reliable generalisations about the construction of national narratives in the Spanish press. The analysis of opinion articles confirms the differences in stance on nationhood observed in the News Corpus at various levels of linguistic analysis: Phraseological, whole-text and grammatical. El Mundo largely reproduces the mainstream unitarist discourse of the right whereas the left’s pluralist

discourse of asymmetrical federalism dominates the narratives of El País. Other discourses identified by Balfour and Quiroga (2007) are less common: the views of “right-wing modernizing regionalism”¹⁴⁸ are rare in El Mundo. Faithful to its pluralism, the discourse of El País is more polyphonic. An asymmetrical federalist narrative epitomized in the expression “*Nación de naciones*” and civic nationalism with post-national features, tolerant with alternative identities, dominate its discourse.

In both El Mundo and País Opinion Spain is constructed as an “established nation” while Catalonia and Euskadi are considered “emerging nations”. Other territories like Galicia are practically ignored. As we saw in the News Corpus, the political climate created by the inclusion of the term “*Nación*” in the Catalan Statute plays a central role in the construction of national narratives here. This is evidenced by the sharp increase in articles containing the terms “*Nación*” and, to a lesser extent, “*España*” between 2005 and 2006, when the *Estatut* occupied the centre of the political debate, as well as by detailed phraseological and whole-text analysis of a large sample of articles containing these terms. Probably, the *Estatut* is behind the statistically significant differences in the number of articles found in El Mundo and País Opinion between 1996 and 2007, given that the spike in the number of articles takes place after 2004. The higher number of articles in El Mundo Opinion may be attributed to the greater impact the campaign against the *Estatut* launched by the Popular Party had in this newspaper. Additional evidence in support of this hypothesis comes from the markedly unitarist stance in El Mundo as well as by the widespread use of threat themes during that period. However, there may be additional causes behind the higher number of opinion

¹⁴⁸ Regionalist modernisers of the PP like Núñez Feijoo, Piqué or Zaplana emphasise the growing importance of the regions without questioning Spanish unity. They also tend to support a civic form of nationalism with some post-national influences, a discourse which is closer to the views of moderate pluralists in the PSOE than the traditionalist centralist discourse of the right according to the above-mentioned authors.

articles in El Mundo Opinion given that the increasing trend continues in 2007 when the number of articles containing the terms “*Nación*” and “*España*” had significantly dropped.

The threat discourse associated with the Spanish nation in El Mundo Opinion constitutes the most significant difference between the two newspapers and between the Opinion and the News Corpus. Threat is facilitated by an editorial style characterized by monogloss unconstrained authorial judgment leading to highly charged remarks about the fate of the Spanish nation, not only at the hands of Catalan and Basque separatists but also as a result of the policies of the Socialist government presided by Zapatero. One regular contributor, Jiménez Losantos, is largely responsible for this discourse. His remarks are usually the most inflammatory prose found in El Mundo Opinion, although the use of the commentator voice and the threat discourse also feature in the writing of other authors.

The Opinion Corpus provides additional evidence on how the unitarist and pluralist narratives of El Mundo and País are constructed. References to history are central in both cases at the expense of alternative identity markers like symbols, religion, language, the monarchy, etc. The analysis of historical narratives reveals some similarities as well as differences. While both newspapers conceive the nation as a social construct, El Mundo generally opts for Perennialism and El País adheres to Modernism. The two newspapers coincide in problematizing nation-building, although the periods and historical figures generally praised and criticized are different. The conclusions derived from this problematisation are also different. El Mundo emphasises the staunch defense of a Spanish nation under threat by alternative emerging national constructs while El País generally opts for recognizing Spain as a nation of nations in the context of an increasingly plural and

post-national society, although this post-nationalism is not elaborated in sufficient detail. This recognition of a plurality of nations within the Spanish Nation-State is however accompanied by criticism of Catalan and Basque nationalism for sharing with *españolismo* a unitarist conception of their nation.

The analysis of national narratives in the Spanish press evidences the polyphonic nature and inherent instability of the discourse, subject to frequent re-formulation and shift (Angermüller, 2012), (Teubert, 2010), revealing at the same time far-reaching paradoxes in the discursive construction of nationhood. Identity appears central to Spanish politics but it is often fragmented and controversial. On the one hand, there is little banality in how the nation(s) is narrated, as the proliferation of articles including the term “*Nación*” and the threat discourse in connection with the *Estatut* indicate. Nationhood may even be used, for spurious political agendas, to discredit rivals and undermine policies. On the other hand, we are presented with divergent narratives of a Spanish nation largely understood in historical terms whose history unanimously perceived as plagued with weakness and internal conflict.

As Balfour and Quiroga (2007) stress, the construction of a Spanish identity ‘above politics’ is still pending or remains a work in progress given the divide between the right and the left on how the past should be interpreted and how Spanish nationalism should project into the future. In a way, there is considerable symbiosis between unitarist *españolismo* and peripheral nationalisms. Both discourses share historicist, teleological and non-inclusive conceptions of nationhood where *españolismo* often appears as defensive and reactive against the challenge from the periphery: a *mater dolorosa* being abandoned by its

children.¹⁴⁹ As Spain's de-centralisation peaked towards 2001, the dynamics of multiple ethnoterritorial concurrence identified by Moreno (2001)¹⁵⁰ seem to have been substituted by more confrontational strategies openly questioning the State of Autonomies. Examples of this can be found in the "*Plan Ibarretxe*", the new *Estatut*, the current plans for a referendum on self-determination and the creation of a Catalan State¹⁵¹ or the growing calls for re-centralisation coming from the centre (see p. 1). In response to this polarisation, the pluralist discourse of *El País* seems more rational and innovative. This rationality is reflected in the editorial style of the newspaper, far less reliant on authorial judgement. By advocating a relativist and tolerant form of civic nationalism one could argue that *El País* provides an innovative alternative to the dichotomy of mutually exclusive identities from the centre and the periphery. However, the risk that the way-out advocated by *El País* may end up being silenced as the confrontation between nationalisms grows is real. After all, discursive rationality and innovation may not always constitute advantages in what Teubert (2008) calls "the age of spin", dominated by arthritic politics and media discourses void of new ideas, full of blatant repetition.

One last paradox is worth noticing: the growing calls in support of Catalan and Basque nationhood come at a historical time when a "post-national mode of organization" seems more than plausible, with Nation-States appearing increasingly dysfunctional as social processes are being re-scaled at world-level and societies become ethnically and culturally hybrid. The current economic crisis and the numerous corruption cases dominating Spanish

¹⁴⁹ *Mater dolorosa* is the metaphor employed by (Álvarez Junco, 2001) in his study of the idea of Spain in the 19th century.

¹⁵⁰ See pp. 232-233.

¹⁵¹ See Noguer, M. (2013) Mas encarga el diseño de un Estado catalán. *El País* [online], Friday 12 April. Available from: http://ccaa.elpais.com/ccaa/2013/04/11/catalunya/1365706298_014468.html [accessed on 20 -7-13]

politics nowadays are adding fuel to the fire as Spanish society faces peripheralisation in world-system terms and politics appear increasingly delegitimized amid growing pessimism and distrust (Juliana Ricart, 2012). And yet, in accordance with Sewel's axiom of multiplicity of structures (see p. 73) national identities seem impervious, at least for now, to these changes:

[...] economic globalization has progressed with tremendous speed, but politics and the media have remained primarily national. Or, using Appadurai's concepts, we might say that the financescape has moved much faster than the ideoscape. As a result, we see a disjuncture between the two scapes and a sharp rise of nationalism in many countries (Rantanen, 2012 p. 149).

OVERALL CONCLUSION

I have proposed a theoretical model and a methodology for the study of nationhood based on a social-constructionist perspective, assuming that nations are historically evolving constructs and that nationhood is largely a modern phenomenon, inscribed in the context of world capitalist expansion, *albeit* with pre-modern antecedents. Such a model and methodology capture the extreme complexity of the nation-building phenomenon satisfactorily, taking into account both its macro and micro dimensions and allowing us to combine nomothetic analysis with idiographic accounts based on empirical data.

Nations are said to have been constructed discursively, by means of semiotically-mediated social action situated across time-space. This discursive construction has operated on two main fronts: it shaped the national mode of organization, associated with State-building, and it led to the creation and diffusion of narratives constituting national identities. Structured at different scales, nation-building is characterized by its complex dynamics and changing nature. Ideographic analysis works best with myriad micro-events at the bottom level of structuration, as micro-events are easily quantifiable and have identifiable agents. In the case of meso-processes, roughly allocated in time-space and operating along complex chains of causes and effects, agency is diluted, quantification is often problematic and so is explanation. Nomothetic analysis is needed with structures, highly abstract agent-less phenomena situated at the *longue durée* consisting of a duality of virtual cultural schema and actual resources which both enable and constrain social action at lower levels of structuration.

By applying this theoretical model to the study of Spanish nation-building, I have analysed the historical process of State-formation and the development of the national mode of organisation in Spain, illustrating my analysis with concrete examples from different periods. It has been concluded that Spanish nation-building was weak and problematic due to a number of factors: an unyielding geography hindering communications; a long history of political and cultural fragmentation rooted in Spain's medieval past; Spain's complex transition from world Empire into Nation-State; a late and uneven modernisation which delayed the consolidation of the national mode of organisation and contributed to the Castilian economic and demographic decline; and a long history of confrontation between antithetical ways of conceiving the nation, starting with the divide between liberals and traditionalists in the early 19th century and continuing with the emergence of peripheral nationalisms and "*las dos españas*" which fought the Civil War.

In the second part of the thesis, I have analysed how the nation is being narrated in the Madrid press employing a corpus-based discourse analytical approach. By combining the more quantitative, lexically oriented methodology of corpus linguistics with by the qualitative analysis of entire texts, such an approach has helped minimize the micro-macro gap, favouring objectivity and representativity and providing a more balanced and comprehensive method of linguistic analysis at different levels. It can be concluded from this analysis that no hegemonic national discourse from the centre's perspective seems to have emerged, as the narratives of *El Mundo* and *El País* are markedly different. This methodology could be applied to further mapping the discursive construction of the nation in Spain in multiple directions. For instance, from a bottom-up perspective, corpus-based analysis of historical texts, regional and local newspapers, textbooks, TV programs, etc.

could provide information on how the nation has been/is being narrated in different discursive domains. Similarly, more studies on the symbolic representation of the nation could throw light on how this all-important area is being constructed. Last but not least, given the dynamic and polyphonic nature of discourse, it would also be useful to study how readers interpret the narratives of *El Mundo* and *El País* analysed in this thesis, how they attempt to “reduce the complex indexical organization of texts to interpretive schemes which represent the relevant subject positions of discourse” (Angermüller, 2011 p. 2998). From a top-down point of view, one could analyse how the re-scaling of social processes caused by dissolution of time-space is affecting national identities at both individual and societal levels. Elaborating on Eugene Weber’s metaphor (Weber, 1976): will the former *paisans* turned *citoyens* ever become *globalites*? Identity may remain anchored at the national scale for now, but will it continue doing so?

APPENDIX 1

Sample news articles from El Mundo News and El País News

Text 1: A typical hard news item from El Mundo News (MCN000072)

ESPAÑA

Domingo, 21 de mayo de 2000

Pujol anima a defender Cataluña «de los ataques que sufre todavía hoy»

[HEADLINE]

BARCELONA.- Jordi Pujol, presidente de la Generalitat, pidió ayer a los catalanes que recuperen «la fortaleza» y el sentimiento de «autoestima» que les llevó a «no rendirse» hace 40 años, cuando el catalanismo era reprimido por el régimen de Franco, para que así afronten «los ataques» que, en su opinión, Cataluña sufre todavía hoy. **[ARTICLE LEAD: WHO, WHAT, WHERE]**

«Pese a que hemos arrastrado grandes decepciones en los últimos años, todavía estamos aquí, molestando a mucha gente» añadió. «Y si se producen reacciones duras es porque somos más importantes y, por eso, también hay ataques más duros. Nadie ataca al que va cayendo sino al que se levanta», señaló el jefe del Ejecutivo catalán. Llamó a la sociedad catalana a actuar con «patriotismo» y a «plantar cara» a las dificultades que se presenten desde fuera de Cataluña, durante la conmemoración de los Hechos del Palacio de la Música, de 1960, cuando una protesta de jóvenes catalanistas provocó la detención y el encarcelamiento del propio Pujol. «Este no es un acto dedicado a la nostalgia», dijo, «sino a recordar que hoy necesitamos la misma fortaleza y autoestima porque, ahora, también existen dificultades muy insidiosas».

Text 2: A typical hard news item from El País News (PSN060040)

El Congreso admite una propuesta para publicar leyes en las lenguas cooficiales [HEADLINE]

C. V. - Madrid

EL PAÍS - España - 15-02-2006

El Pleno del Congreso tomó ayer en consideración una proposición de ley de Izquierda Verde (IV) en la que se pretende regular la publicación de todas las normas jurídicas de aplicación general en todas las lenguas que son cooficiales en las distintas comunidades autónomas. La proposición fue admitida por 182 votos a favor y 124 en contra, del PP. **[ARTICLE LEAD: WHO, WHAT, WHERE...]**

Joan Herrera defendió el texto de su grupo y logró el apoyo de los nacionalistas, pero el portavoz socialista Pedro Muñoz rebajó el entusiasmo de los proponentes al advertir de que, aunque votarían favorablemente la toma en consideración de la proposición, ésta será severamente corregida durante el trámite parlamentario. Muñoz aseguró: "No podemos referirnos a España, en un sentido estricto, como un Estado plurilingüe", y subrayó que no puede admitirse que la publicación en las distintas lenguas pueda ser "condición necesaria" para que entren en vigor en los distintos territorios. El portavoz socialista se refirió al decreto de 1997, que dictó el PP con un presidente que "hablaba catalán en la intimidad", ironizó,

para regular esta cuestión. Es necesario, dijo, "avanzar" sobre aquel decreto, pero dejando claro que la propuesta de IV será muy corregida.

Text 3: A typical soft news item from El País News (PSN060190)

REPORTAJE

Los obispos repiensen España

La Conferencia Episcopal debate desde hoy, muy dividida, si emite un documento pastoral sobre la unidad nacional [HEADLINE]

JUAN G. BEDOYA - Madrid

EL PAÍS - España - 20-06-2006

¿Está en juego la unidad de España? La primera reunión extraordinaria en la historia de la Conferencia Episcopal se enfrenta desde hoy a esta pregunta. Esta mañana empieza el debate su Comisión Permanente -24 prelados, entre ellos tres cardenales y siete arzobispos-, que intentará llegar unida y con algún documento a la Asamblea Plenaria de mañana y el jueves. [ARTICLE LEAD: WHO, WHAT, WHERE...]

Los cardenales de Madrid y Toledo, Antonio María Rouco y Antonio Cañizares, y varios arzobispos del centro peninsular, reclaman que de la reunión debe salir una instrucción pastoral, convencidos de que, en efecto, "está en juego la unidad de España". Lo ha declarado, con un titular en grandes dimensiones, Rouco en una llamada "entrevista institucional" concedida a la revista del arzobispado Alfa y Omega, con motivo de la presentación de su libro España y la Iglesia católica. Cañizares, primado de Toledo, va más lejos que Rouco. "La unidad de España es una cuestión moral", sostiene. Es el más empeñado en la necesidad de emitir una instrucción sobre la cuestión, y lleva meses trabajando para ello. En el camino ha recibido el respaldo de Roma, que lo ha hecho cardenal. Pero no ha convencido al presidente del organismo, el obispo de Bilbao, Ricardo Blázquez -Cañizares es su vicepresidente-, y menos al resto de los prelados que ejercen en territorios nacionalistas, especialmente catalanes y vascos. No son mayoría ni sus iglesias son las más dinámicas -la crisis del catolicismo es muy aguda en estas dos comunidades-, pero parecen contar con el apoyo de los obispos andaluces, entre muchos otros.

El resto del episcopado, entre otros el arzobispo de Pamplona, Fernando Sebastián, podría compartir alguna de las ideas de Rouco y Cañizares, pero no ven la necesidad de que la Iglesia católica vuelva sobre un tema sobre el que ya se ha pronunciado con severidad. El arzobispo Sebastián, uno de los teólogos más relevantes del episcopado, que ha ocupado los más altos cargos de la Conferencia Episcopal, excepto la presidencia, desde los tiempos del cardenal Tarancón, fue el autor de uno de esos documentos, titulado Valoración moral del terrorismo en España, de sus causas y de sus consecuencias.

Esta Instrucción Pastoral aprobada en una de las dos asambleas plenarias de 2002, se ocupaba extensamente del problema nacionalista español cuando se expresa de "forma inmoderada, pierde el sentido cristiano de la vida y alimenta una concepción nihilista de la sociedad y de su articulación política".

Otro sector del episcopado recela del documento propuesto por Cañizares por razones más prácticas. Oponen primero un argumento de oportunidad. Son muchos los conflictos entre la Iglesia romana y el Gobierno español -cuestiones de moral y familia, además del problema de la enseñanza de la religión y la renovación del sistema de financiación eclesiástica-, para introducir uno nuevo, advierten. Ponen otra objeción: el viaje de Benedicto XVI a Valencia el próximo mes de julio. El Papa será visitado por el jefe del Estado, Juan Carlos I, y el

presidente del Gobierno, José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero, y un documento episcopal poniendo sobre papel que los actuales gobernantes ponen en riesgo la unidad de España no sería la mejor credencial para ese encuentro. Desde la creación de las conferencias episcopales nacionales por el Concilio Vaticano II, en 1965, es la primera vez que la española celebra una sesión extraordinaria, aunque no es la primera ocasión en que los prelados exponen sus preocupaciones sobre la organización del Estado y los nacionalismos. Ocurrió en 1978, con motivo del referéndum para aprobar la Constitución. Entonces, el primado de Toledo, cardenal Marcelo González, encabezó la revuelta de una decena de obispos. Finalmente, predicaron con ahínco votar contra el texto constitucional.

APPENDIX 2

References of articles from the corpus quoted in the thesis (alphabetically and numerically ordered)

Note: There is a pay per view service to access the articles of El Mundo. The links provided for El País lead directly to the articles.

MCN970061

Rodríguez, O. (1997) Pujol llama a luchar contra la ridiculización del catalanista. **El Mundo** [online], Monday 25 August. Available from: <http://www.elmundo.es/1997/08/25/indice.html> [Accessed 6 July 2013]

MCN990102

El Mundo (1999) Pujol: «PP y PSOE podrían llegar a una confrontación civil sin CiU». **El Mundo** [online], Sunday 30 May. Available from: <http://www.elmundo.es/papel/hemeroteca/1999/05/30/espana/> [Accessed 5 July 2013]

MCN010071

Manchón, M. (2001) Pujol evita presentar el libro racista de Barrera ara frenar el escándalo. **El Mundo** [online], Friday 2 March. Available from: <http://www.elmundo.es/elmundo/2001/03/01/espana/983465422.html> [Accessed 6 July 2013]

MCN030027

Manchón, M. (2003) Carod será 'un primer ministro' de Cataluña 'con todas las de la ley'. **El Mundo** [online], Wednesday 10th December. Available from: <http://www.elmundo.es/2003/12/10/espana/> [Accessed 1 July 2013]

MCN030112

Oliveres, J. (2003) El líder del PSC pide que el Gobierno escuche la opinión de la Generalitat en la negociación de tratados y acuerdos internacionales / Reclama la presencia de Cataluña en la UNESCO. **El Mundo** [online], Wednesday 26th March. Available from: <http://www.elmundo.es/2003/03/26/espana/> [Accessed 1 July 2013]

MCN040139

Par, S. (2004) El presidente del Parlament pide que Cataluña pueda 'divorciarse' de España. **El Mundo** [online], Saturday 11 September. Available from: <http://www.elmundo.es/papel/2004/09/11/espana/> [Accessed 4 July 2013]

MCN040223

El Mundo (2004) Maragall destaca la diferencia entre regiones y nacionalidades. **El Mundo** [online], Monday 6 December. Available from: <http://www.elmundo.es/papel/2004/12/06/espana/> [Accessed 5 July 2013]

MCN050100

El Mundo (2005) Calvo: el «comodín» del término 'nación'. **El Mundo** [online], Monday 1 August. Available from: <http://www.elmundo.es/papel/2005/08/01/espana/> [Accessed 4 July 2013]

MCN050126

Caro Romero, J. (2005) Chaves rechaza la inclusión del término 'nación' en un Estatuto. **El Mundo** [online], Friday 6 May. Available from: <http://www.elmundo.es/papel/2005/05/06/espana/> [Accessed 6 July 2013]

MCN050174

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PSOP050203

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PSOP050209

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PSOP060044

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PSOP060071

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PSOP060130

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PSOP060152

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PSOP060210

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PSOP060227

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PSOP070204

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APPENDIX 3

Most frequent left and right lexical collocates in the News Sub-corpus

Tables 1 and 2 show the most frequent left and right lexical collocates of “Nación” in the News section of El Mundo and El País arranged in descending order frequency in El Mundo News. The first and last columns show the total number of occurrences of each collocate within a L5/R5 span. The columns called “El Mundo” and “El País” show the collocate in question separated from the node word (Nación) by a number of *, indicating the distance between the node word and the collocate. The figure between brackets shows the frequency of the collocate in that particular position. MI stands for “Mutual Information” score, measuring the strength of the relationship between the node word and each collocate. MI scores have been calculated with Wordsmith 5.0. It is assumed that a score around 4 or above indicates a strong collocation.

Table 1. Left lexical collocates of “Nación” in Mundo & País News

Tot. M	El Mundo	MI	El País	MI	Tot. P
520	Es * nación (262)	5.059	Es * nación (227)	4.997	446
484	Estado ** nación (380)	6.640	Estado ** nación (388)	6.813	478
440	Cataluña ** nación (180) Cataluña * nación (115)	6.781	Cataluña ** nación (159) Cataluña * nación (239)	7.019	512
252	España ** nación (69) España * nación (58)	4.658	España ** nación (84) España * nación (41)	5.069	272
231	Término nación (216)	9.517	Término nación (185)	9.517	205
170	Gobierno ** nación (136)	3.715	Gobierno ** nación (132)	3.624	164
110	Debate **** nación (91)	6.088	Debate **** nación (137)	6.092	179
82	Concepto de nación (47), concepto nación (20)	8.681	Concepto de nación (37), concepto nación (5)	8.463	55
75	Estatuto * nación (11)	4.781	Estatuto * nación (18)	4.707	101
72	Unidad ** nación (51) Unidad *** nación (15)	6.295	Unidad ** nación (61) Unidad *** nación (12)	6.238	79
60	Somos * nación (45)	7.694	Somos * nación (44)	7.476	52
60	Definición *** nación (30) Definición * nación (20)	9.190	Definición *** (101) Definición * nación (18)	9.590	127
53	Hay * nación (14)	4.183	Hay * nación (20)	4.417	59
49	Euskal ** nación (33)	5.729	Euskal ** nación (11)	5.165	30
49	Herria * nación (33)	6.276	Herria * nación (14)	5.942	30
49	Palabra nación (41)	6.892	Palabra nación (31)	6.545	34
48	Ser * nación (13) Ser ** nación (9)	3.839	Ser * nación (13) Ser nación (6)	3.911	44
48	Sea * nación (21) Sea ** nación (13)	5.009	Sea * nación (29) Sea ** nación (9)	5.292	47
47	Reconocimiento *** nación (11) Reconocimiento ** nación (17)	7.084	Reconocimiento *** (33) Reconocimiento ** (11)	7.037	57
46	País *** nación (11) País ** nación (10)	3.365	País *** nación (10) País ** nación (7)	2.728	58
45	Indisoluble *** nación (26) Indisoluble ** nación (16)	11.36 0	Indisoluble *** nación (33) Indisoluble ** nación (9)	11.20 5	45
44	Presidente **** nación (7) Presidente ** nación (3)	2.679	Presidente **** nación (10) Presidente ** nación (5)	2.280	34

43	Nuestra nación (27)	6.224	Nuestra nación (16)	5.728	27
43	Sólo * nación (45)	3.790	Sólo ** nación (11)	4.267	57
40	Defensa ** nación (36)	5.470	Defensa ** nación (19)	4.891	25
36	Única nación (26)	5.986	Única nación (40)	6.555	54
35	Constitución **** nación (6) Constitución ** nación (5)	4.122	Constitución **** nación (15) Constitución *** nación (11)	5.005	67
33	Vasco ** nación (12)	1.982	Vasco ** nación (8)	1.514	20
31	Euskadi ** nación (12) Euskadi * nación (5)	4.592	Euskadi ** nación (11) Euskadi * nación (8)	3.756	35
30	Pueblo *** nación (10)	4.737	Pueblo ** nación (7)	5.037	33
26	Idea *** nación (8) Idea ** nación (7) Idea * nación (7)	5.904	Idea *** nación (5) Idea ** nación (10) Idea * nación (8)	5.672	23
26	Galicia ** nación (9) Galicia * nación (9)	6.140	Galicia ** nación (12) Galicia * nación (20)	6.806	49
24	Gran nación (21)	4.653	Gran nación (17)	4.606	22
24	Inclusión ** nación (20)	7.930	Inclusión ** nación (19)	8.251	24
23	Dice **** nación (6)	4.195	Dice **** nación (10)	4.662	21
22	Construir * nación (16)	6.935	Construir * nación (11)	6.168	13
21	Defina **** nación (11) Defina * nación (5)	10.05 1	Defina **** nación (8) Defina * nación (4)	9.515	16
21	Reconoce **** nación (7) Reconoce *** nación (5)	6.627	Reconoce **** nación (5) Reconoce **** nación (3)	6.295	19
20	Construcción ** nación (12)	6.738	Construcción ** nación (10)	5.733	15
5	Denominación * nación (15)	6.184	Denominación *** nación (19) Denominación * nación (15)	8.618	36
18	Define *** nación (4) Define **** nación (4)	8.237	Define *** nación (16) Define **** nación (11)	8.828	34
12	Andalucía *** nación (2) Andalucía ** nación (3)	4.723	Andalucía *** nación (7) Andalucía ** nación (5)	5.144	20
14	Defender * nación (5)	4.881	Defender * nación (9)	5.528	20

Table 2. Right lexical collocates of “Nación” in El Mundo and El País News

Tot. M	El Mundo	MI	El País	MI	Tot. P
229	Nación española (210)	7.601	Nación española (220)	7.977	244
103	Nación catalana (92)	6.871	Nación catalana (52)	6.337	58
80	Nación vasca (70)	5.412	Nación vasca (69)	5.317	77
75	Nación ** estatuto (19)	4.781	Nación ** estatuto (22)	4.707	101
70	Nación * naciones (52)	9.130	Nación * naciones (53)	9.119	65
57	Nación **preámbulo (21)	8.849	Nación **preámbulo (20)	8.569	53
57	Nación pero (26)	3.405	Nación pero (23)	3.209	54
53	Nación ** comunidad (13)	5.235	Nación ** comunidad (13)	5.356	53
48	Nación ni (13)	3.814	Nación ni (18)	3.617	39
45	Nación sin (22)	3.385	Nación sin (12)	3.136	35
44	Nación * presidente (14) Nación ** presidente ()	2.679	Nación * presidente (8) Nación ** presidente (6)	2.280	34
43	Nación *** Zapatero (8)	3.543	Nación Zapatero (10)	3.196	31
40	Nación ** derecho (12) Nación * derecho (7)	4.673	Nación *** derecho (15) Nación ** derecho (12)	4.786	39
39	Nación sino (13)	4.421	Nación sino (6)	3.910	23
37	Nación son (7)	3.764	Nación ** son (8)	3.550	28
36	Nación * también (8)	2.804	Nación * también (7)	2.352	24
35	Nación ** Constitución (8)	4.122	Nación ** Constitución (8)	5.005	67

35	Nación dentro (19)	5.586	Nación dentro (18)	5.885	39
34	Nación * tiene (11)	3.437	Nación * tiene (16)	3.817	41
34	Nación * definir (15)	8.413	Nación * definir (13)	8.510	37
29	Nación * patria (22)	8.325	Nación * patria (25)	8.475	35
28	Nación * ciudadanos (16)	4.269	Nación * ciudadanos (11)	3.889	19
28	Nación propia (13)	5.392	Nación propia (3)	4.394	12
27	Nación nacional (4) Nación ** nacional (4)	3.243	Nación ** nacional (6)	4.042	36
27	Nación según (11)	2.623	Nación según (9)	3.023	26
26	Nación **** soberanía (5)	6.034	Nación ** soberanía (4) Nación * soberanía (4)	5.974	25
26	Nación * nacionalidad (7) Nación ** nacionalidad (4)	7.991	Nación * nacionalidad (15) Nación ** nacionalidad (3)	7.829	32
26	Nación **** indivisible (18)	10.81 4	Nación **** indivisible (16)	10.85 5	27
26	Nación *** todos (9) Nación **** todos (5)	2.770	Nación *** todos (15) Nación **** todos (6)	3.067	30
25	Nación plural (20)	7.305	Nación plural (14)	7.031	22
24	Nación debe (6)	3.837	Nación debe (5)	3.585	18
24	Nación dijo (11)	3.067	Nación dijo (4)	2.584	19
23	Nación dice (5)	4.195	Nación dice (1)	4.662	21
23	Nación * puede (6)	3.212	Nación * puede (7)	3.240	21
23	Nación ** común (21)	5.589	Nación ** común (23)	6.063	32
22	Nación libre (14)	6.206	Nación libre (9)	5.770	15
22	Nación **** nuevo (6) Nación ** nuevo (5)	3.212	Nación *** nuevo (6) Nación ** nuevo (9)	3.333	25
22	Nación está (4)	2.441	Nación está (5)	2.941	28
22	Nación ** Estatut (5)	4.985	Nación ** Estatut (0)	0	0
21	Nación añadió (6)	3.786	Nación añadió (0)	2.856	7
21	Nación **** derechos (9)	4.268	Nación *** derechos (5)	3.596	14
20	Nación **** iguales (16)	8.415	Nación **** iguales (8)	7.696	10
20	Nación *** Europa (9)	4.524	Nación ** Europa (5)	5.013	17
43	Nación sólo (11) Nación * sólo (9)	3.790	Nación sólo (12) Nación * sólo (9)	4.267	57
16	Nación *** texto (4)	3.571	Nación ** texto (6)	4.199	25
19	Nación ** articulado (8)	8.077	Nación ** articulado (11)	7.836	23
15	Nación * artículo (4)	4.460	Nación **** artículo (9)	5.079	23
17	Nación Rajoy (7)	3.049	Nación Rajoy (6)	3.410	22
15	Nación *** proyecto (2)	3.445	Nación ** proyecto (5)	3.781	21
18	Nación ** constitucional (2) Nación * constitucional (2)	3.746	Nación *** constitucional (6)	3.758	20
10	Nación aunque (4)	2.082	Nación aunque (7)	3.083	20

APPENDIX 4

Most common phrases associated with candidate nations

Tables 1 to 3 show the most common phrases associated to the different candidate nations grouped according to the following patterns patterns:

A. Candidate nation + PROCESS + nación + (MORE INFO)

B. PROCESS/THING + Candidate nation + como (una) nación + (MORE INFO)

C. PROCESS/THING + [...] nación + Candidate nation + (MORE INFO)

The use of square brackets indicates the possibility of additional elements in the phrasal pattern. The numbers in brackets correspond to the actual number of occurrences found in each case. The middle column shows the Log-likelihood scores for each phrase. A score of 3.84 or above ($p < 0.05$) constitutes strong evidence of unusual frequency differences between El Mundo and El País News.

Table 1. Phraseology: Candidate nation + PROCESS + nación + (MORE INFO)

Mundo News	Log-Likelihood	País News
Cataluña [...] es una nación [...] (128)	+0.01	Cataluña [...] es una nación [...] (114)
Cataluña es una nación [...] (124)	+0.17	Cataluña es una nación [...] (106)
Cataluña sea una nación (7)	-1.35	Cataluña sea una nación [...] (11)
Cataluña no es una nación [...] (10)	+5.03	Cataluña no es una nación [...] (2)
Cataluña se defina como nación (5)	+0.03	Cataluña se defina como nación (4)
Cataluña no se llamará nación (5)	+6.43	
España es [...] nación [...] (57)	-2.42	España es [...] nación (68)
España es una nación [...] (32)	-1.90	España es una nación [...] (40)
España [...] nación de naciones [...] (30)	-1.94	España [...] nación de naciones [...] (38)
España [...] es una nación de naciones (18)	-0.41	España [...] es una nación de naciones (20)
La única nación es España (6)	-0.03	La única nación es España (6)
España es [...] una gran nación [...] (6)	+0.74	España es [...] una gran nación [...] (3)
España no es una nación [...] (18)	+2.99	España no es una nación [...] (8)
España siga siendo una única nación (4)	-3.31	España siga siendo una única nación (10)
Euskadi es una nación [...] (8)	+0.12	Euskadi es una nación [...] (6)
Euskal Herria es una nación [...] (5)	+0.32	Euskal Herria es una nación [...] (3)
El País Vasco es una nación [...] (5)	+1.04	El País Vasco es una nación [...] (2)

Galicia [...] es una nación (8)	-0.04	Galicia [...] es una nación (8)
Andalucía es una nación (3)	-0.02	Andalucía es una nación (3)

Table 2. Phraseology: PROCESS/THING + Candidate nation + como (una) nación + (MORE INFO)

Mundo News	Log-Likelihood	País News
Cataluña [...] como [...] nación [...] (165)	-49.98	Cataluña [...] como [...] nación [...] (292)
Cataluña como nación [...] (109)	-61.79	Cataluña como nación (236)
Cataluña como una nación [...] (27)	-0.27	Cataluña como una nación (28)
España [...] como [...] nación [...] (54)	+0.25	España [...] como [...] nación [...] (44)
España como nación [...] (40)	+1.08	España como nación [...] (28)
España como una nación [...] (6)	-1.46	España como una nación [...] (10)
Euskal Herria como (una) nación [...] (38)	+6.22	Euskal Herria como (una) nación [...] (17)
Euskadi como (una) nación [...] (6)	-0.53	Euskadi como (una) nación [...] (8)
País Vasco como (una) nación [...] (7)		País Vasco como (una) nación [...] (1)
Galicia como (una) nación [...] (12)	-4.74	Galicia como (una) nación [...] (23)
Andalucía como nación (4)	-3.31	Andalucía como nación [...] (10)

Table 3. Phraseology: PROCESS/THING + [...] nación + Candidate nation + (MORE INFO)

Mundo News	Log-Likelihood	País News
La inclusión del término nación [...] (19)	+0.00	La inclusión del término nación [...] (17)
Uso del término nación [...] (10)	+0.06	Uso del término nación [...] (8)
El término nación para definir [...] Cataluña (10)	-0.05	El término nación para definir [...] Cataluña (10)
El término nación para Cataluña (7)	+0.01	El término nación para Cataluña (6)
Término nación en el preámbulo [...] (9)	-0.79	Término nación en el preámbulo [...] (12)
Término nación en [...] Estatuto [...] (8)	+0.12	Término nación en el Estatuto [...] (6)
Término nación en el articulado [...] (2)	-1.65	Término nación en el articulado [...] (5)
Palabra nación [...] en el Preámbulo [...] (8)	+3.27	Palabra nación [...] en el preámbulo [...] (2)

APPENDIX 5

Processes and things associated with candidate nations

Tables 1 to 6 show the PROCESSES and THINGS associated to the different candidate nations appearing in the pattern “X como una nación”. The numbers in brackets correspond to the actual number of occurrences found in each case.

Table 1. PROCESS/THING + [...] Cataluña como (una) nación

Mundo News (165 occurrences)	País News (292 occurrences)
DEFINIR (88): Definición (33); (se) define (14); (PODER) definir(se) (13); (se) define (9); (se) ha definido (8); sea definida (3); haya definido (2); definía (2), (se) definiera (2), definiendo, debe ser definida	DEFINIR (169): Definición (101); (se) define (25); definir (13); (se) define (15); ha definido (8); definía (2); definen; han definido; sea definida (2); se definiera.
RECONOCER (18): Reconocimiento (10), reconoce (5), reconozca (2), reconocer, reconozcan	RECONOCER (51): Reconocimiento (22); (será) (quedará) (se vea) (debe verse) reconocida (10); (se) reconozca (6); reconocer (6); reconoce (5); reconocía; había reconocido.
	DENOMINAR (24): Denominación (18), denominar (5), denominará.
SENTIR (10): Sienten (4), sentimos (4), sienta, no siente	SENTIR (3): Sienten (2), sentimos.
DERECHO (4): Derecho, derechos (2) Derecho de autogobierno	
PRESENTAR (4): Presenta (2), presentó, presentar	
DEFENDER (3): Defender, defiende, defienden	Defensa
CAFIFICAR (2): Calificación, calificar. Autogobierno (2) Futuro (2) (se) Habla de (2)	CALIFICAR (3): Calificar (2), calificación. Autogobierno (5)
IDENTIFICAR (2): Identifica, se identifique.	
Identidad (2).	IDENTIDAD (4): identidad (3), cuestiones identitarias.
Personalidad (2)	
Referencia (2)	Referencia; se hace referencia.
FIGURAR (2): podrá figurar, figure.	
DERECHO (4): Derecho, derechos (2) Derecho de autogobierno	Derecho
Aceptación.	
Afirmación.	
Autoproclamación.	
Argumentario.	
Carácter	Carácter
concepto	Concepto

Condición.	
Confíen en.	
Configuración.	
Consideración.	Consideración (2)
Designación.	
Imagen.	
Realidad nacional.	Realidad
Represente.	
Restablecimiento.	
Puntos más arduos de la negociación	
Sea descrita	
Quedar como	
No han asumido nunca	
Sitúa	
	Especificidad
	Existencia
	Condición histórica
	Legitimidad
	No ha asumido
	Una mayor participación
	Aparece
	Singularidad
	Caracterización
	Se constituye
	Cuestiones identitarias
	Mención
	Sea catalogada

Table 2. PROCESS/THING + [...] España como (una) nación

Mundo News (44 occurrences)	País News (37 occurrences)
Idea (7)	IDEA (5): Idea (4); ideas.
CONCEPTO (6): Concepto (4), conceptos (2).	Concepto (4)
DEFINIR (4): Definición (de Aznar); definió; está definida; hubiera definido.	DEFINIR (9): Definición (2); define (2); Definiendo, definen, definió, definir; está definida
HABLAR DE (4): Hablar de, ha hablado, habla de, habló de.	Hablar de.
Futuro (3)	Futuro.
CONCEBIR (2): Conciben, concebida	CONCEBIR (3): Concepción, concepciones, concibe.
Acabar con (2)	Acabar con.
Ruptura (2)	
VERTEBRAR (2): Vertebrar, vertebración constitucional.	
Considera.	Considera (2).
Defensa.	Defensa (2).
Afirmación.	
Ambiciones.	
Componen.	
Ha terminado con.	
Destrucción.	

Estudios.	
Existencia.	
Alto grado de identidad.	
Mi opción.	
Modelo.	
Presentó.	
No sobrevivirá.	
Reflejando.	
Sentimiento.	
Vean.	
Compromiso.	
Reafirmación	
Calificar	
	Contemplan.
	Carácter.
	Nueva configuración.
	Consolidar.
	Reafirmación irrenunciable.
	Tesis.
	Vía gallega.
	Posición.
	Realidad.
	Refundaba.
	Surgida
	Ser
	Reivindicaron
	Está constituida

Table 3. PROCESS/THING + [...] Euskal Herria como (una) nación

Mundo News (38 occurrences)	País News (17 occurrences)
Existencia (9)	Existencia (6)
RECONOCER (5)	RECONOCER (4)
Reconocimiento (oficial) (4); Sea reconocida	Reconocimiento (político) (3); Reconocer
Construcción (4)	
nacional (2)	
Liquidación (3)	
Estrategia de (2)	
Derechos (3)	Derechos
HABLAR (2)	HABLAR (2)
Habló, aceptaron hablar	Hablar, se hable
El derecho a concebir	
Camino político	
Soberanía	Soberanía
Promover	
Respetar	
Destino	
Se refieren a	
Proyección y difusión internacional	
Se puede edificar	
Hacer desaparecer	
Destruir	Destruir
Puede sobrevivir	
	Identidad

	Presentar
--	-----------

Table 4. PROCESS/THING + [...] Euskadi como (una) nación

Mundo News (5 occurrences)	País News (8 occurrences)
Los derechos	
La posibilidad de definir	
La realidad	
La existencia	
considerar	Sea considerada
	DENOMINAR (3) Denominación (2); proponía denominar
	Concepción
	Desarrollo
	RECONOCER (2): Reconocimiento; reconozca

Table 5. PROCESS/THING + [...] País Vasco como (una) nación

Mundo News (7 occurrences)	País News (1 occurrence)
Reconocimiento (2) De la condición	Se reconozca
Desarrollo	
Existencia	
Ha defendido	
Definiese	
Sienten	

Table 6. PROCESS/THING + [...] Galicia como (una) nación

Mundo News (12 occurrences)	País News (24 occurrences)
DEFINIR (4) Defina (3); Define	DEFINIR (6) Definición (2); definir; se define; sea definida; defina
El despertar (3)	
Triunfo (2)	
Consideración	Consideración
Se reconozca	Reconocer (8): Reconocimiento (7); reconocer
Autogobierno	
	Estatuto
	Referencia
	Singularidad (2)
	Participe
	Exista

APPENDIX 6

Fundación DENAES

Source: <http://www.nacionespanola.org/esp.php?articulo6> (retrieved on 29-12-2009)

¿Quiénes somos?

Viernes 14 de diciembre de 2007

La Fundación DENAES, para la defensa de la Nación Española, tiene desde su origen la pretensión de recuperar e impulsar desde la sociedad civil el conocimiento y la reivindicación de la Nación Española; su realidad histórica, política, social y cultural.

La Fundación DENAES, para la defensa de la Nación Española, se constituye como punto de encuentro de cuantos españoles, hombres y mujeres de cualquier lugar de nuestra geografía, sin perjuicio de sus diferentes planteamientos ideológicos y de sus diversas y peculiares pertenencias o identidades regionales, quieran reivindicar su condición de españoles y su identificación con ese proyecto nacional, histórico, político y cultural de primer orden que se llama España.

España es una de las más importantes y antiguas naciones europeas, y así pues debemos rebelarnos contra el estado de ánimo del pensamiento dominante en algunas zonas geográficas y ambientes políticos que pretende sacrificar la enorme riqueza de este acervo común español por intereses espurios o a razones de oportunismo político.

La Fundación DENAES, para la defensa de la Nación Española, lleva en su seno el ánimo de aunar voluntades, liderar la sociedad civil en defensa de la Nación Española y fortalecer nuestras instituciones políticas y jurídicas comunes, así como reivindicar nuestros símbolos y lazos de unión.

Hoy, en España, el patriotismo está siendo sistemáticamente desacreditado por determinadas ideologías y grupos de interés. Constituye un hecho insólito en el concierto de las naciones civilizadas, casi una anomalía política y social, el abandono y la práctica desaparición del patriotismo en España. Y todo ello a pesar de que se trata no sólo de un sentimiento natural y sano -sólo equiparable a un sentir tan noble como el del amor a la propia familia- sino de una práctica política absolutamente esencial para la pervivencia de cualquier sistema democrático basado en la soberanía nacional. Uno de los valores esenciales de las grandes naciones civilizadas es el patriotismo de sus ciudadanos, que se unen en torno a su profunda conciencia de pertenencia a un proyecto político e histórico común.

La identificación con España no es solo una cuestión emocional. El patriotismo es un proyecto político común en el que todos los españoles nos hemos de sentir integrados y del que hemos de sentirnos legítimamente orgullosos. El patriotismo garantiza que los españoles, vivan donde vivan, sean realmente iguales, que las libertades individuales estén garantizadas, que la integridad de la Nación no se cuestione y que el orden constitucional sea escrupulosamente respetado. El patriotismo de los ciudadanos garantiza la libertad en las naciones soberanas y es por eso un proyecto común de crecimiento y convivencia. En este sentido, el patriotismo comporta también una serie de exigencias: el valor de defender determinados planteamientos, aunque sean políticamente incorrectos; la honestidad en la acción política, la defensa de los intereses de España, la exigencia crítica hacia nuestra propia realidad.

La actitud patriótica se funda en la conciencia de pertenecer a una gran Nación, pero el patriotismo no puede ser completo ni sano sin el ánimo crítico para mejorar nuestra propia Nación.

Sin embargo, resultaría estéril fustigarlos con nuestras insuficiencias y defectos sin defendernos de sus causantes. Es necesario poner en evidencia la obsesión antiespañola promovida por los movimientos separatistas que sistemáticamente niegan y humillan a España como Nación o la reducen, para imbuir de provisionalidad a su existencia, a una estructura meramente jurídica; a un

Estado, a una cáscara. Es esa una actitud de desprecio, cuando no de ignorancia, que no pretende más que la desaparición paulatina de la Nación española y la posterior desaparición del Estado al que la Nación Española otorga existencia. El objetivo de tales grupos antiespañoles es que España deje de existir. Y eso se pretende lograr a través de múltiples estrategias: bien incumpliendo las leyes que emanan de la soberanía nacional española, bien atacando y ocultando los símbolos nacionales, bien cuestionando la igualdad de todos los españoles, bien silenciando a quienes discrepan de la estrategia dominante, o, simple y llanamente, persiguiendo y asesinando a quienes defienden la unidad de la Nación Española, la existencia de sus símbolos o la riqueza de su cultura común expresada a través de la lengua.

Como reacción a los ataques continuados y a los ilegítimos impulsos de aquellos que quieren destruir España, y con la intención de oponerse con firmeza a la indolencia de nuestros gobernantes y a las acciones disgregadoras de algunas elites políticas locales, expresadas hoy del modo más drástico y extremo en el Plan Ibarreche y en la aprobación en Cortes del nuevo Estatuto para Cataluña, tiene su razón de ser la Fundación DENAES, para la defensa de la Nación Española. La intención de este proyecto nacional y cívico es recuperar el proyecto nacional de España, reclamando -en una etapa en la que los caciquismos locales se han disfrazado de nacionalismo- su conveniencia histórica, su vocación de garantizar la libertad y la igualdad de todos los españoles.

Por tanto la Fundación DENAES, para la defensa de la Nación Española, asume como fin principal el articular una ofensiva, en todos los frentes legales, contra quienes han decidido socavar los cimientos de España poniendo a prueba la lealtad de todos los españoles.

APPENDIX 7

COLLOCATES OF *NACIÓN*, MUNDO VS. PAÍS OPINION

Collocates of *Nación*: Candidate Nations

Total	L5-R5	Mundo Opinion	MI	País Opinion	MI	Total
365	R1	Nación española (334)	7.694	Nación española (226)	7.051	258
244	L3 / L2	España ** nación (45) España * nación (58)	5.015	España ** nación (53) España * nación (48)	4.927	204
266	L3 / L2	Cataluña ** nación (97) Cataluña * nación (83)	6.377	Cataluña ** nación (66) Cataluña * nación (49)	5.887	170
1	L3/L2	Catalunya ** nación (1)		Catalunya ** nación (2) Catalunya * nación (2)	4.155	4
81	R1	Nación catalana (71)	6.931	Nación catalana (71)	6.692	77
58	R1	Nación vasca (53)	5.446	Nación vasca (71)	5.686	88
19	L3/L5/L4 R4/L2	Vasco ** nación (5) Vasco **** nación (5) Vasco *** nación (3)	1.846	Nación *** vasco (5) Vasco ** nación (4) Vasco * nación (4)	1.920	18
11	L2/L3	Euskal Herria como nación (5) Euskal Herria ** nación (2)	5.883	Euskal Herria como nación (5)	4.629	9
11	L3/L2 L4/L5	Euskadi ** nación (12) Euskadi * nación (5)	4.592	Euskadi ** nación (4) Euskadi *** nación (3) Euskadi **** nación (3)	3.232	17
13	L3/L2	Andalucía ** nación (4) Andalucía * nación (2)	5.196			
11	L3 / L2 R5	Galicia **** nación (4) Galicia * nación (3)	3.039	Nación **** Galicia (2)		2
6	R1	Nación andaluza (5)	7.121			
2	L1	Nación gallega (2)	NA	Nación gallega (1)	NA	

Collocates of “Nación”: Geography

Total	L5-R5	Mundo Opinion	MI	País Opinion	MI	Total
37	L4 / L3/R3 L2/L3/R2	Comunidad *** nación (8) Comunidad ** nación (5) Nación ** comunidad (5)	5.503	Comunidad * nación (9) Nación ** comunidad (7) Nación * comunidad (5)	5.045	34
14	R5/ R4 & R3/R2	Nación *** Europa (7) Nación **** Europa (3)	4.648	Nación * Europa (4) Nación ** Europa (2) Nación *** Europa (2)	4.025	13
5	R1	Nación europea (3)	3.673	Nación europea (6)	3.837	9
5	L2 & L3/L4	Territorio ** nación (1) Territorio *** nación (1) Territorio **** nación (1)	3.662	Territorio * nación (3) Territorio ** nación (3) Territorio nación (2)	5.045	14

	L5/L1					
	R1			Nación alemana (6)	7.211	9

Collocates of “Nación”: Concept

Total	L5-R5	Mundo Opinion	MI	País Opinion	MI	Total
91	L1	Término nación (82)	8.402	Término nación (65)	7.939	77
12	L1/L2 & L3 L4/L5	Términos nación (3) Términos * nación (2) Términos ** nación (2)	5.004	Términos nación (2) Términos ** nación (2) Términos *** nación (2) Términos **** nación (2)	4.627	14
80	R2	Nación de naciones (67)	8.155	Nación de naciones (112)	8.306	137
275	L1/R1	Estado nación (37) Nación Estado (11)	5.651	Estado nación (99) Nación Estado (8)	6.154	392
67	L2 & L3	Concepto de nación (37) concepto ** nación (10)	7.823	Concepto de nación (29) concepto ** nación (11)	7.796	60
9	L2	Conceptos de nación (6)	6.706	Conceptos de nación (5)	6.582	10
49	R2 & R1 L2	Nación * nacionalidad (25) Nación nacionalidad (9) Nacionalidad * nación (5)	8.688	Nación * nacionalidad (20) Nación nacionalidad (10) Nacionalidad * nación (10)	8.143	58
34	L4 & L2	Definición *** nación (20) Definición * nación (8)	7.856	Definición *** (32) Definición * nación (12)	7.545	51
61	R1	Nación sin Estado (13)		Nación sin Estado (5)		60
18	R4/R3 R2/R5	Nación *** nacionalidades (8) Nación ** nacionalidades (4)	7.021	Nación * nacionalidades (6) Nación *** nacionalidades (6) Nación **** nacionalidades (6)	6.263	25
22	L1	Palabra nación (21)	5.277	Palabra nación (15)	5.554	21
29	L2/L3/L4	Idea ** nación (8) Idea * nación (10) Idea *** nación (6)	5.509	Idea *** nación (22) Idea ** nación (10) Idea * nación (38)	6.498	83
17	L3/L4	Concepción ** nación (9) Concepción *** nación (5)	6.920	Concepción ** nación (6) Concepción *** nación (5)	6.385	14
25	R2	Nación * patria (10) Nación ** patria (3)	6.156	Nación * patria (17) Nación ** patria (9)	6.597	37
28	L3/ R1	Dentro ** nación (12) Nación dentro (7)	4.994	Nación dentro (6) Dentro ** nación (4)	4.321	16
21	L1	Estados nación (12)	5.767	Estados nación (24)	5.886	31
21	R2-R4	Nación * ciudadanos (12) Nación de ciudadanos (11)	3.617	Nación de ciudadanos (6) Nación *** ciudadanos (17)	4.361	41
	R4	Nación de ciudadanos libres e iguales (7) Nación de individuos libres e iguales (1)	6.246			
	R3	Nación de ciudadanos libres e iguales (7) Nación de individuos libres e iguales (1)	5.977			
25	R1	Nación política (9)	2.256	Nación política (40)	3.628	72

30	R3 / R4 R2	Nación ** nacional (8) Nación *** nacional (4)	3.771	Nación ** nacional (7) Nación * nacional (3)	4.154	29
12	R2/R3	Nación * realidad nacional (3) Nación ** realidad nacional (3)	3.226	Nación * realidad nacional (2) Nación ** realidad nacional (1)	4.154	25
16	R3 & R2	Nación ** sujeto (7)	7.176	Nación * sujeto (3)	6.000	10
17	R3 & L4	Nación ** sentido (7)	3.846	Sentido *** nación (5)	3.604	18
18	L3/ R1 L1	Propia ** nación (4) Nación propia (3)	4.257	Propia nación (8) Nación propia (3)	3.811	15
6	L2 & L4	Carácter * nación (6)	4.085	Carácter *** nación (4) Carácter * nación (3)	4.332	11
10	R1	Nación cultural (5)	5.149	Nación cultural (29)	6.637	44
7	L2/L1 L4/L5	Denominación * nación (4) Denominación nación (1)	7.178	Denominación nación (3) Denominación *** nación (1) Denominación **** nación (1)	6.167	5
13	L3/L2	Nombre ** nación (5) Nombre * nación (3)	4.415	Nombre ** nación (13) Nombre * nación (4)	5.421	27
11	R5	Nación **** regiones (5)	5.865	Nación **** regiones (10)	5.503	15
10	R2	Nación sin cabeza (5)	4.682			
14	L2-L3/R2 R3	Pueblo * nación (3) Nación * pueblo (3) Nación ** pueblo (3)	3.608	Pueblo * nación (10) Pueblo ** nación (9) Nación ** pueblo (8)	5.263	41
14	R4/L3/ R1/R2/ L5/L2	Nación *** histórica (3) Histórica ** nación (3) Nación histórica (2) Nación * histórica (2)	4.803	Nación histórica (3) Histórica * nación (2) Histórica ** nación (2) Histórica **** nación (2)	4.404	12
9	L2/L3 R1/R2	Étnica * nación (3) Étnica ** nación (3)	7.630	Nación étnica (7) Nación * étnica (1)	7.547	14
10	L4/L5 & L2	Sentimiento **** nación (3) Sentimiento *** nación (3)	5.723	Sentimiento * nación (3) Sentimiento **** nación (2)	5.442	11
8	L5/L2	Palabras **** nación (3) Palabras * nación (2)	3.005			
5	L2	Título * nación (4)	4.340			
	L2	Sinónimo * nación (4)	7.340			
11	R3/L2	Nación ** proyecto (3) Proyecto * nación (1)	3.279	Nación ** proyecto (5) Proyecto * nación (4)	4.046	20
9	R3/L2 L1/L3	Nación ** fórmula (3) Fórmula * nación (2)	5.301	Fórmula nación (2) Fórmula ** nación (2)	4.353	7
6	R1/R2	Nación asociada (3) Nación * asociada (2)	8.687			
6	L3	Imagen ** nación (3)	3.930			
6	L3	Atributos ** nación (3)	8.243			

6	L3 & L5	Significado ** nación (3)	5.418	Significado **** nación (2)	5.285	6
7	L1/R2 R3/R2	Región nación (2) Nación * región (2)	5.931	Nación ** región (6) Nación * región (3)	7.256	21
5	L5	Pueblos **** nación (2)	4.289	Pueblos **** nación (3)	4.189	6
5	L4 & L3	Cuerpo *** nación (2)	4.560	Cuerpo ** nación (3)	4.840	5
	R1			Expresión nación (10)	4.904	16
	L2/L5			Distinción * nación (8) Distinción **** nación (2)	6.625	11
	L3			Alma ** nación (6)	6.143	7
	R1			Nación cívica (5)	6.076	7
	L3			Jurídico ** nación (3)	4.674	7
	L2			Condición de nación (5)	3.421	6
	R1			Nación imaginada (4)	8.789	6
	L2			Secundario * nación (3)	7.612	6
	R4			Nación *** cultura (3)	3.978	11
	L3			Seno ** nación (3)	5.103	6
	L3			Primario ** nación (3)	7.657	5

Collocates of “Nación”: Issues

Total	L5-R5	Mundo Opinion	MI	País Opinion	MI	Total
275	L3	Estado ** nación (133)	5.651	Estado ** nación (150)	6.154	392
54	L5	Debate **** nación (41)	5.756	Debate **** nación (30)	4.835	40
58	L4 & L3	Unidad ** nación (38) Unidad *** nación (10)	6.108	Unidad ** nación (25) Unidad *** nación (10)	5.495	40
80	R3-R4	Nación ** Constitución (21)	4.988	Constitución *** nación (7) Constitución ** nación (5)	3.311	29
38	L4/ L2 L4/L3	Reconocimiento **** nación (13) Reconocimiento * nación (11)	7.117	Reconocimiento *** nación (6) Reconocimiento *** nación (9)	5.319	23
37	R4/L3/ R2 R1/R3/R4	Nación *** soberanía (7) Nación * soberanía (4) Soberanía ** nación (6)	6.299	Nación soberanía (6) Nación ** soberanía (6) Nación *** soberanía (6)	5.747	29
25	R4/R3/L4 L5	Nación *** estatuto (6) Nación ** estatuto (5) Estatuto *** nación (5)	3.501	Estatuto *** nación (3) Estatuto **** nación (3)	2.587	13
16	L3	Construcción ** nación (14)	6.161	Construcción ** nación (13)	5.830	22
23	L4/L3	Existencia *** nación (9) Existencia ** nación (8)	6.184	Existencia *** nación (3) Existencia ** nación (3)	4.379	10
18	R5/ R3 & L5	Nación **** preámbulo (6) Nación **preámbulo (5)	7.515	Nación **preámbulo (4) Preámbulo **** nación (2)	7.110	11

15	L3	Símbolos ** nación (10)	6.201	Símbolos ** nación (3)	5.131	5
14	L3/L4	Defensa ** nación (10) Defensa *** nación (2)	4.210	Defensa ** nación (7)	3.507	7
22	L5/R4 L4/L3	Nación ****constitucional (7) Constitucional ****nación (5)	3.892	Constitucional *** nación (6) Constitucional ** nación (5)	3.700	24
20	L3/L1 R3/R4	Lengua ** nación (5) Lengua nación (4)	4.739	Nación ** lengua (7) Nación *** lengua (6)	5.343	37
13	L3/L4	Futuro ** nación (8) Futuro *** nación (3)	3.695	Futuro *** nación (6) Futuro ** nación (3)	3.699	15
23	R5/R4 R2/R4	Nación **** derecho (7) Nación *** derecho (4)	3.526	Nación * derecho (7) Nación *** derecho (6)	3.247	20
14	L3/L5 R4	Identidad ** nación (3) Identidad **** nación (3)	5.137	Identidad ** nación (7) Nación *** identidad (3)	4.652	17
13	L3/L2	Fin ** nación (6) Fin * nación (1)	3.408			
9	L3/L4 L5	Liquidación ** nación (6) Liquidación *** nación (2) Liquidación **** nación (1)	6.687			
7	L5	Ensayos **** nación (7)	8.061			
13	R5/R4 L3	Nación **** derechos (4) Nación *** derechos (2)	3.762	Nación *** derechos (6) Derechos ** nación (5)	3.819	18
11	L3/L4	Supervivencia *** nación (4) Supervivencia ** nación (4)	6.948			
13	L3/L5 R5/L4	Historia ** nación (4) Historia **** nación (3)	2.964	Nación **** historia (4) Historia *** nación (3)	2.293	15
11	L3/R5 L5	Discurso ** nación (3) Nación **** discurso (3)	3.786	Discurso **** nación (2) Discurso ** nación (2)	3.445	8
12	R4/R3	Nación *** libertad (3) Nación ** libertad (2)	2.987			
10	R3	Nación ** régimen (5)	4.027			
9	L4/L3	Vida *** nación (4) Vida ** nación (2)	2.701	Vida ** nación (4) Vida *** nación (3)	3.160	12
8	R3 & L5	Nación ** texto (4)	3.535	Texto **** nación (5)	3.258	7
7	L5	Camino **** nación (4)	3.235			
8	R4	Nación *** competencias (3)	3.940			
6	L3	Fuerza ** nación (4)	3.156			
7	R4	Nación *** libertades (3)	4.049			
8	R5/R L4/R1/R4	Nación **** financiación (3) Nación *** financiación (2)	4.410	Financiación **** nación (2) Financiación *** nación (2) Nación financiación (2) Nación *** financiación (2)	3.964	9
6	L3/L5	Intereses ** nación (3)	3.849	Intereses ** nación (3)	3.662	7

	& L4	Intereses **** nación (2)		Intereses *** nación (2)		
7	L5	Estatut **** nación (3)	4.839			
6	L3	Integridad ** nación (3)	6.308			
6	L4	Tradición *** nación (3)	4.973			
6	R4	Nación *** igualdad (3)	4.592			
5	L3	Continuidad ** nación (3)	5.167			
6	R4/R2 L5/L2/R3	Nación *** artículo (3) Nación * artículo (2)	2.767	Nación **** artículo (3) Nación * artículo (3) Artículo ** nación (3)	3.882	14
8	L5/R3 L4/R3	Voluntad **** nación (2) Nación ** voluntad (2)	3.385	Voluntad *** nación (5) Nación ** voluntad (5)	4.488	23
6	L5/R5 L4/R4	Tiempo **** nación (2) Nación **** tiempo (2)	1.811	Tiempo *** nación (4) Nación *** tiempo (2)	2.504	10
9	L3/L4/L5	Independencia ** nación (2) Independencia **** nación (2)	3.937	Independencia ** nación (3) Independencia *** nación (1) Independencia **** nación (1)	3.491	8
	L3/L4/L5			Pertenencia ** nación (6) Pertenencia *** nación (1) Pertenencia **** nación (1)	6.040	9
	L3/L5			Inclusión ** nación (6) Inclusión **** nación (1)	7.040	9
	L3/L4			Afirmación ** nación (5) Afirmación **** nación (2)	5.309	9
	L3			Uso ** nación (5)	5.157	13
	L3/L4			Nacimiento ** nación (5) Nacimiento **** nación (1)	6.297	7
	L5			Estatutaria **** nación (4)	5.630	8
	L3			Tema ** nación (4)	3.919	7
	L3/R5			Autogobierno ** nación (3) Nación **** autogobierno (3)	4.549	11
	L4/R4			Problema *** nación (3) Nación *** problema (3)	2.551	8
	L3/L4			Representación ** nación (4) Representación *** nación (2)	4.751	8
	L4/L2			Patriotismo *** nación (3) Patriotismo * nación (2)	5.268	8
	L4/L3/ L2/L5			Articulación *** nación (3) Articulación ** nación (1) (1) Articulación * nación (1) Articulación **** nación (1)	6.173	6
	L3			Religión ** nación (3)	5.010	8
	L5			Propuesta **** nación (3)	2.791	7
	L3			Desarrollo ** nación (3)	3.454	5
	L4			Relación *** nación (3)	2.880	5

	R5			Nación **** homogeneidad (3)	7.027	5
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Collocates of “Nación”: Participants (people & institutions)

Total	L5-R5	Mundo Opinion	MI	País Opinion	MI	Total
139	L3	Gobierno ** nación (120)	4.105	Gobierno ** nación (100)	4.128	114
28	L5 /I3	Presidente **** nación (13) Presidente ** nación (3)	3.035	Presidente **** nación (3) Presidente ** nación (2)	2.294	9
15	L3	Parlamento ** nación (10)	3.546			
16	R1 & L4	Nación Zapatero (4)	1.809	Zapatero *** nación (2)	1.896	5
9	L5	Derecha **** nación (4)	3.323			
11	L5	PP **** nación (4)	1.067	PP **** nación (3)	0.830	7
8	L3/L4 R5/L5	Nacionalistas ** nación (3) Nacionalistas *** nación (3)	1.772	Nación **** nacionalistas (4) Nacionalistas **** nación (3)	2.287	15
7	L4	Congreso *** nación (4)	2.698			
6	L3	Izquierda ** nación (4)	2.067			
11	L5/R2	ETA **** nación (3) Nación * ETA (3)	0.265			
8	L5/L3	Instituciones **** nación (3) Instituciones ** nación (2)	3.513			
5	L3	Enemigos ** nación (4)	4.710			
7	R5	Nación **** rey (3)	3.101			
7	L5	Maragall **** nación (3)	2.436			
6	L5	Comunidades **** nación (3)	2.854			
6	L4	Autónomas *** nación (3)	3.831			
	L5/R4			Partido **** nación (4) Nación *** partido (4)	2.285	15

Collocates of “Nación”: Processes

Total	L5-R5	Mundo Opinion	MI	País Opinion	MI	Total
457	L2	Es * nación (165)	4.079	Es * nación (156)	4.140	431
78	L4/L3/L2/ L1	Ser *** nación (22) Ser * nación (16)	4.021	Ser ** nación (10) Ser nación (15)	4.007	84
46	L2 & L3 L2/R1	Sea * nación (16) Sea ** nación (9)	4.322	Sea * nación (9) Nación sea (6)	3.690	29
40	R3/R1 L2	Nación ** son (12) Nación son (5)	3.259	Nación son (8) Son * nación (8)	3.167	36

55	L2-L1	Hay * nación (22)	3.688	Hay nación (11)	3.604	45
40	R2/R1	Nación * está (10) Nación está (7)	3.081	Nación está (8) Nación * está (2)	2.584	20
32	R2/R1	Nación * tiene (12) Nación tiene (6)	3.129	Nación tiene (9) Nación * tiene (6)	3.590	35
20	L2	Construir * nación (16)	6.928	Construir * nación (17)	6.753	25
18	L2/L3	Somos * nación (12) Somos ** nación (4)	5.804	Somos * nación (10)	5.445	17
21	L2	Existe * nación (11)	5.242	Existe * nación (6)	4.555	15
19	L4 /L5/ L2	Define *** nación (9) Define **** nación (3) Define * nación (3)	7.636	Define *** nación (2) Define **** nación (1) Define * nación (1)	6.461	8
21	R2 & L5 L4	Nación * decir (6)	3.369	Decir **** nación (4) Decir *** nación (2)	3.123	16
19	R2/L4/L5 L3	Nación * forma (5) Forma *** nación (4) Forma *** nación (4)	3.524	Forma *** nación (5) Forma ** nación (3) Forma * nación (2)	3.857	24
18	R1/R2/R3 L2/R1	Nación era (4) Nación * era (3) Nación ** era (3)	2.834	Nación era (6) Era * nación (6)	3.211	21
16	L4/L2 L3/ L5	Reconoce *** nación (7) Reconoce * nación (3)	6.586	Reconoce ** nación (2) Reconoce *** nación (1) Reconoce **** nación (1)	5.148	6
17	R3/R2	Nación ** sido (6) Nación * sido (3)	2.718	Nación ** sido (5) Nación * sido (3)	2.880	19
16	L3/L2	Quieren ** nación (5) Quieren * nación (4)	4.517	Quieren ** nación (2) Quieren * nación (2)	4.542	9
42	R1-R2	Nación puede (8)	3.315	Nación * puede (12)	3.449	45
8	R1/R2	Nación parece (5) Nación * parece (2)	2.423	Nación parece (3) Nación * parece (2)	2.684	11
15	L4/L5 & L3	Definir *** nación (4) Definir **** nación (4)	7.226	Definir ** nación (5) Definir **** nación (4)	6.286	11
14	L2/L5	Defender * nación (4) Defender **** nación (4)	4.684			
16	L5	Dice **** nación (4)	3.774	Dice **** nación (4)	3.434	9
14	R2/L1 L2	Nación * será (4) Será nación (3)	3.663	Será * nación (3) Nación * será (2)	3.367	10
14	R2/R3	Nación * llamada (4) Nación ** llamada (3)	5.772			
13	R1-R2	Nación fue (4) Nación * fue (1)	2.188	Nación fue (5) Nación * fue (4)	3.024	22
13	L4/R3 L1/L3	Hacer *** nación (4) Nación ** hacer (3)	2.595	Hacer nación (3) Hacer ** nación (3) Hacer *** nación (3)	2.834	14
13	R3/R4 L3	Nación ** poder (3) Nación *** poder (2)	2.755	Poder ** nación (4) Nación *** poder (4)	2.823	14
11	R3 & L5/L4	Nación ** quiere (4)	3.154	Quiere **** nación (3) Quiere *** nación (2)	3.246	7
10	R2/L3	Nación * integrada (4)	8.113	Nación integrada (5)	7.574	10

	R1/R3	Integrada ** nación (3)		Nación ** integrada (3)		
6	R1/R2	Nación constituida (3) Nación * constituida (2)	8.630			
11	R1/R2	Nación debe (3)	2.649	Nación debe (5) Nación * debe (4)	3.516	18
11	L4	Dijo *** nación (4)	3.722			
7	R3	Nación ** seguir (4)	3.169			
10	L3/R3	Significa ** nación (3) Nación ** significa (2)	5.009			
9	L5	Reconocido **** nación (4)	6.871			
9	L3	Creen ** nación (4)	5.191	Creen ** nación (3)	5.523	8
9	L2/L4 L5 & L3	Defina * nación (4) Defina *** nación (2) Defina **** nación (2)	10.009	Defina ** nación (2) Defina * nación (2)	8.950	7
7	L5	Convertir **** nación (4)	5.106	Convertir **** nación (2)	4.882	6
5	L2	Definirse * nación (4)	7.424			
7	L2	Crear * nación (4)	4.762			
5	R3	Nación ** sustenta (4)	6.820			
6	L2/L5	Destruir * nación (3) Destruir **** nación (2)	5.973			
8	R2	Nación * decidir (3)	4.991			
8	L3 & R5	Pretende ** nación (3)	3.932	Nación **** pretende (2)	3.694	5
7	L3 & L2	Hablar ** nación (3)	3.246	Hablar * nación (2) Hablar ** nación (1)	3.454	7
7	R2	Nación * supone (3)	4.006			
7	L2	Definida * nación (3)	7.968			
7	R1	Nación va (3)	1.716			
5	R1	Nación tendrá (3)	3.635			
5	L4	Aspiran *** nación (3)	6.528			
5	L5/L4/L2 & L3	Formar **** nación (3) Formar *** nación (1) Formar * nación (1)	4.667	Formar *** nación (5) Formar ** nación (4)	5.501	9
5	L2	Liquidar * nación (3)	6.692			
11	L3 & L2	Siendo ** nación (3)	3.873	Siendo * nación (3)	3.797	9
5	L3 & L5 L4	Considera ** nación (2)	4.007	Considera **** nación (5) Considera *** nación (4)	5.709	17
7	R1/R2	Nación sería (2) Nación * sería (1)	2.467	Sería * nación (6) Nación sería (3)	2.971	12
8	R2/L4 & L3	Nación * pueden (2) Pueden *** nación (2)	2.935	Nación * pueden (3) Pueden ** nación (2)	3.310	11
6	L5/R3 L4	Tenemos **** nación (2) Nación ** tenemos (2)	3.679	Nación ** tenemos (3) Tenemos *** nación (2)	3.881	7
9	L4/L5	Dicho **** nación (2)	3.452	Dicho **** nación (3)	2.993	6

		Dicho *** nación (2)				
5	L3/L2 & L5	Habla ** nación (2) Habla * nación (1)	3.614	Habla **** nación (5) Habla ** nación (4)	5.263	12
7	L2/L3	Constituye * nación (2) Constituye ** nación (1)	5.286	Constituye * nación (3)	4.671	7
6	L3/L4 & R2	Pretenden ** nación (2) Pretenden *** nación (1)	4.859	Nación * pretenden (3) Pretenden ** nación (1) Pretenden *** nación (1)	5.113	6
7	R1/R3 R4	Nación tener (1) Nación ** tener (1)	2.605	Nación ** tener (4) Nación *** tener (1)	3.049	8
	R3/R1 R2			Nación ** resulta (4) Nación resulta (3) Nación * resulta (2)	3.361	10
	L2			Entender * nación (4)	3.805	6
	L3/L4/L5			Cree **** nación (2) Cree *** nación (2) Cree ** nación (2)	5.406	8
	R1/R2			Nación entendida (3) Nación * entendida (2)	7.505	9
	R2/R1			Nación * implica (3) Nación implica (2)	5.323	8
	R4			Nación *** corresponde (3)	4.879	8
	R2			Nación * hablan (3)	5.614	8
	L3			Pertenecer **** nación (4)	7.448	7
	L3/L4			Consideran *** nación (3) Consideran ** nación (3)	4.895	7
	R1			Nación decía (3)	4.210	6
	R3			Nación ** pasaría (3)	7.295	5

Collocates of “Nación”: Qualities

Total	L5-R5	Mundo Opinion	MI	País Opinion	MI	Total
36	L4/L3	Indisoluble *** nación (24) Indisoluble ** nación (10)	10.331	Indisoluble *** nación (19) Indisoluble ** nación (3)	10.180	26
35	L1	Gran nación (24)	4.328	Gran nación (17)	4.305	27
43	L1/R1	Única nación (21) Nación única (6)	6.028	Única nación (8) Nación única (10)	5.569	30
32	R2	Nación plural (23)	7.262	Nación plural (15)	5.765	21
21	R2	Nación * posible (16)	4.113	Nación * posible (3)	2.736	10
15	L1	Una sola nación (13)	6.049	Una sola nación (8)		14
18	R1/R3	Nación democrática (11) Nación ** democrática (1)	4.683	Nación democrática (5) Nación ** democrática (2)	3.576	13
17	R5/R3	Nación **** indivisible (11) Nación ** indivisible (3)	9.133	Nación **** indivisible (10) Nación *** indivisible (2)	9.540	18
20	R3	Nación ** común (9) Nación común (2)	4.804	Nación ** común (11) Nación común (8)	5.499	38
11	L1/R1	Nueva nación (8) Nación nueva (1)	3.476	Nueva nación (8) Nación nueva (1)	3.825	14

16	R4/R5	Nación *** discutible (7) Nación **** discutible (5)	7.596			
14	R2/R3	Nación * discutido (6) Nación ** discutido (5)	8.825			
15	L1/R1	Vieja nación (6) Nación vieja (2)	6.409	Vieja nación (6)	5.733	8
10	R1/R3	Nación soberana (7) Nación ** soberana (2)	7.980	Nación soberana (5)	7.585	6
11	R1	Nación independiente (6)	6.172	Nación independiente (5)	5.449	
10	R1/R2 L1	Nación moderna (6) Nación * moderna (3) Moderna nación (1)	6.536	Nación moderna (5) Moderna nación (1)	6.192	10
15	R3/R1	Nación ** libre (4) Nación libre (2)	4.344	Nación libre (7) Nación ** libre (1)	4.503	10
9	R2/R1 L1	Nación * antigua (3) Nación antigua (2) Antigua nación (2)	6.756			
8	L1/R1	Pequeña nación (4) Nación pequeña (1)	6.080	Nación pequeña (4) Pequeña nación (1)	6.250	7
6	R1/R2	Nación unida (3) Nación * unida (1)	4.803			
5	R1	Nación plena (3)	4.556			
6	R1	Nación grande (1)	4.930	Nación grande (3)	4.989	5
	R1			Nación real (13)	4.749	15
	R5/R4			Nación **** plurinacional (5) Nación *** plurinacional (4)	6.552	13
	R1			Nación unitario (3)	6.279	6

Collocates of “Nación”: Deictics

Total	L5-R5	Mundo Opinion	MI	País Opinion	MI	Total
60	L1	Nuestra nación (37)	5.679	Nuestra nación (14)	4.070	23
44	L1	Esta nación (16)	3.574	Esta nación (6)	2.866	24
25	L1	Esa nación (15)	3.060	Esa nación (17)	3.164	30
24	L1	Otra nación (8)	3.527	Otra nación (16)	4.137	38
34	L1	Toda nación (7)	4.486	Toda nación (14)	4.339	26
19	L3/R1 L3/L1	Misma ** nación (6) Nación misma (3)	4.258	Misma ** nación (5) Misma nación (4)	4.284	23
8	L1	Aquella nación (5)	4.246	Aquella nación (5)	4.596 on	10
16	R1 & L1	Nación tal (5)	3.296	Tal nación (5)	2.707	11
6	L1	Ninguna nación (4)	3.034	Ninguna nación (6)	4.034	10
5	L1	Mi nación (4)	2.513	Mi nación (3)	3.631	14
11	L1	Cada nación (3)	2.643	Cada nación (10)	3.240	17
15	L1	Cualquier nación (3)	3.257	Cualquier nación (6)	3.682	22

Collocates of “Nación”: Partitives

Total	L5-R5	Mundo Opinion	MI	País Opinion	MI	Total
34	L1	Toda la nación (16) Toda una nación (4)	4.486	Toda la nación [...] (2) Toda una nación (1)	4.339	26
24	R3/ L3 R4	Nación ** conjunto (7) Conjunto ** nación (6)	5.757	Nación *** conjunto (5) Conjunto ** nación (4)	4.959	19
8	L1	Media nación (6)	4.715			
8	R1	Nación entera (5)	6.679			
6	L3	Resto ** nación (5)	3.164	Resto ** nación (3)	3.310	6
10	L3	Mayoría ** nación (4)	2.626			

APPENDIX 8

COLLOCATES OF “ESPAÑA” MUNDO VS. PAÍS OPINION

Collocates of España, Concept

L5-R5	Mundo Opinion	MI	L-L	País Opinion	MI
L2	Idea * España (131) Idea de España (129)	6.077		Idea * España (112) Idea de España (111)	5.523
R1/R2 R3	España * nación (58) España ** nación (43) España nación (9)	5.045		España ** nación (53) España * nación (48) España nación (12)	4.927
R1	España plural (102)	7.270		España plural (199)	7.402
R1	España constitucional (72)	4.228		España constitucional (31)	3.327
R1	España democrática (57)	5.250		España democrática (75)	4.611
R3	España ** autonomías (37) España de las autonomías (31)	4.776		España de las autonomías (26)	3.842
L2 R3	Reino * España (31) Reino de España (30) España ** reino (9)	5.965		Reino de España (8) España ** reino (8)	5.199
L1	Palabra España (28)	3.958		Palabra España (17)	3.575
L2	Nombre de España (23)	4.057		Nombre de España (20)	3.878
R1	España autonómica (22)	4.621		España autonómica (27)	4.659
L2/L3/ L5	Concepto * España (18) Concepto **** España (4)	4.785		Concepto * España (13) Concepto ** España (13)	5.136
R1	España invertebrada (15)	8.564		España invertebrada (10)	7.940
L2/L3	Visión de España (10) Visión ** España (6)	4.953		Visión de España (15) Visión ** España (13)	5.178
L2/L3	Concepción * España (10) Concepción ** España (7)	5.174		Concepción * España (4) Concepción ** España (8)	4.638
R1	España federal (12)	4.326		España federal (23)	5.249
R1	España oficial (12)	4.331		España oficial (13)	4.476
R1	España plurinacional (12)	7.274		España plurinacional (19)	6.850
R1	España eterna (12)	6.443		España eterna (15)	6.881
R1	España contemporánea (9)	5.979		España contemporánea (34)	6.979
R1	España real (9)	3.533		España real (30)	4.347
R1	España roja (9)	5.713		España roja (10)	6.986
R1	España negra (9)	5.140		España negra (8)	5.711
R1	España imperial (9)	6.426		España imperial (7)	5.874
R1	España republicana (8)	3.820		España republicana (10)	4.391
R2/R3	España * patria (8) España ** patria (4)	4.418		España * patria (4) España ** patria (4)	3.738

R3	España ** transición (8)	3.721		España ** transición (9)	3.218
L2/L4	Sentido * España (7)	2.664		Sentido *** España (3)	1.107
L2/L3	Definición de España (7) Definición ** España (2)	4.287		Definición de España (9) Definición ** España (2)	3.763
R1	España liberal (7)	4.188		España liberal (6)	4.094
L3/L2 L5	Estructura ** España (6) Estructura * España (3)	4.054		Estructura ** España (8) Estructura **** España (3)	4.207
R1	España profunda (6)	3.920		España profunda (9)	4.473
R1/R3	España ** católica (5) España católica (4)	5.323		España católica (6) España * católica (3)	4.526
L2	Esencia de España (5)	3.994		Esencia de España (7)	4.772
L1	Anti España (17)	5.019	-13.37	Anti España (42)	7.470
R1/R4	España centralista (5)	5.631		España *** centalista (5)	4.305
R2	España * tierra (5)	3.751			
L1	Tercera España (4)	3.167		Tercera España (8)	4.013
R1	España franquista (3)	3.706		España franquista (9)	4.172
L2	Carácter * España (2)	1.640		Carácter ** España (12)	3.085

Collocates of España, People & Institutions

L5-R5	Mundo Opinion	MI	L-L	País Opinion	MI
L1	Gobierno * España (220) Gobierno de España (211)	3.188		Gobierno * España (150) Gobierno de España (133) Gobierno legítimo de España (7)	3.031
L2	Pueblos de España (40)	5.514		Pueblos de España (77)	6.152
L4	Presidente *** España (37)	2.403		Presidente *** España (14)	2.686
L2	Rey * España (37) Rey de España (34)	4.199		Rey de España (26)	4.031
L2	Banco de España (37)	6.740		Banco de España (21)	7.033
R4/R5	España **** ETA (31)	2.050		España *** ETA (22)	1.421
R2/R3	España * Aznar (28)	2.944		España ** Aznar (9)	2.460
L3/L4	Partido ** España (27) Partido *** España (16)	2.567		Partido *** España (9) Partido *** España (22)	2.438
L3/L4/ L5	PP ** España (23) PP **** España (19)	2.259		PP **** España (14) PP *** España (5)	1.667
R2/R3 L4/L3 L5	España * Zapatero (19) Zapatero *** España (14) Zapatero ** España (12)	2.497		España ** Zapatero (6) Zapatero **** España (10) Zapatero *** España (3)	2.786
R3/R4	España *** españoles (17)	3.151		España ** españoles (16)	3.136
L2	Gobiernos * España (15)	3.836		Gobiernos * España (14)	3.606
L5/L4	Derecha **** España (12)	3.219		Derecha *** España (8)	3.133

				Derecha **** España (6)	
L2	Corona * España (12)	4.508		Corona * España (3)	3.669
L2	Enemigos de España (12)	4.206		Enemigos ** España (4) Enemigos de España (2)	3.645
L4/L3 L2	Socialistas *** España (11)	2.369		Socialistas * España (5) Socialistas ** España (4)	1.891
L2	Comunista * España (11)	4.212		Comunista * España (6)	4.003
L2	Reyes * España (11)	5.174		Reyes * España (5)	4.362
L3/L2	Monarquía ** España (10) Monarquía * España (9)	5.013		Monarquía * España (8) Monarquía ** España (4)	4.122
L2	Ciudadanos * España (10)	2.535		Ciudadanos * España (11)	2.566
R2/R3	España ** PSOE (10)	1.924		España * PSOE (7)	2.237
L4/L5	Izquierda **** España (9)	2.944		Izquierda **** España (5)	2.320
L2	Trono * España (9)	5.362		Trono * España (3)	5.396
R2/R3	España * Franco (8) España ** Franco (3)	3.760		España * Franco (11)	4.203
R3/L3	España ** Ibarretxe (8) Ibarretxe ** España (6)	1.875		Ibarretxe ** España (5) Ibarretxe ** España (5)	1.285
L2	Embajador * España (7)	5.493		Embajador * España (8)	6.212
L5/L4/ L3	Nacionalista **** España (6) Nacionalista *** España (4)	2.977		Nacionalista **** España (5) Nacionalista ** España (4)	1.390
L3	Maragall ** España (6)	2.354		Maragall ** España (13)	3.499
L1/L5	Arzalluz España (6)	2.140		Arzalluz **** España (3)	1.754
L1	Príncipe de España (6)	3.403		Príncipe de España (3)	3.703
R3	España ** OTAN (6)	5.415		España ** OTAN (3)	4.514
L1/L2/ L5	Pujol España (5) Pujol * España (4)	2.964		Pujol **** España (6)	2.484
L4/L5	PNV *** España (5) PNV **** España (4)	0.534		PNV **** España (8)	0.359
L2	Enemigo * España (5)	3.567		Enemigo * España (3)	3.642
R2/R3	España ** partidos (4)	1.647		España * partidos (5)	1.008
R3	España ** UE (4)	4.197		España ** UE (9)	4.571
L3/L5	González **** España (3)	2.011		González ** España (10)	3.574
R3/R4/ R5	España **** gente (2) España *** gente (2)	2.953		España ** gente (11)	2.742

Collocates of España, Issues

L5-R5	Mundo Opinion	MI	L-L	País Opinion	MI
L2	Historia * España (238) Historia de España (236)	5.508		Historia * España (250) Historia de España (247)	5.403
L2	Unidad * España (213) Unidad de España (212)	6.101		Unidad de España (172)	5.884

L2	Futuro * España (45) Futuro de España (44)	4.486		Futuro * España (24) Futuro de España (20)	3.682
R1	España Modelo de Estado (43)	4.973			
R1/R2/ R3	España Elecciones (37)	3.305		España ** elecciones (2) España * elecciones (2)	1.842
L2	Territorial * España (33)	5.067		Territorial * España (45)	5.018
L2	Política * España (32)	2.518		Política * España (59)	2.758
L2	Nacional * España (32)	3.716		Nacional * España (32)	3.415
L2	Problema * España (30) Problema de España (25)	4.321		Problema * España (41) Problema de España (32)	4.507
L2	Democracia * España (29)	3.912		Democracia * España (45)	3.686
R1	España Pulso al Estado (28)	5.374			
R1	España El discurso de la semana (26)	3.926			
L2	Ruptura * España (23) Ruptura **** España (7)	4.303		Ruptura * España (17) Ruptura **** España (14)	4.090
R1	España Alto el fuego (23)	3.267			
L2/L3	Proyecto * España (22) Proyecto ** España (17)	4.013		Proyecto * España (13) Proyecto ** España (20)	3.743
L3	Realidad ** España (22)	3.609		Realidad ** España (27)	4.026
L2	Político * España (21)	2.697		Político * España (23)	2.181
L2	Odio * España (21) Odio a España (19)	5.095		Odio * España (5) Odio a España (4)	4.271
L5	Constitución **** España (20)	3.266		Constitución **** España (17)	3.071
L2/L3	Intereses * España (20) Intereses ** España (3)	4.036		Intereses * España (10) Intereses ** España (5)	3.204
L2 R3/R3	Símbolos de España (20) Símbolo de España (5) España *** símbolos (5)	5.067		Símbolos de España (3) Símbolo de España (3) España ** símbolos (4)	4.606
L2	Histórica * España (19)	3.721		Histórica * España (16)	3.664
L2/L3	Identidad * España (19) Identidad de España (17) Identidad ** España (10)	4.470		Identidad ** España (6) Identidad *** España (5)	3.098
L2	Banderas de España (19)	4.908		Banderas de España (2)	3.687
L2	Liquidación de España (19)	5.979			
L2	Caso * España (18)	2.461		Caso * España (13)	2.435
L2	Existencia * España (18) Existencia ** España (3)	4.286		Existencia * España (6) Existencia ** España (2)	2.854
L2	Gobernabilidad * España (18)	5.428		Gobernabilidad * España (14)	5.000
R2	España * antiterrorista (17) España Lucha antiterrorista (8) España Crisis antiterrorista (7) España Política	2.910		España ** antiterrorista (1)	1.608

	antiterrorista (2)				
R3/R4 L2/L3 L4	España *** libertad (16) España ** libertad (14) Libertad * España (13) Libertad ** España (8)	3.578		España *** libertad (4) España ** libertad (3) Libertad *** España (6) Libertad * España (4)	2.515
L2/L3 L5	Problemas * España (15) Problemas **** España (5)	3.844		Problemas * España (11) Problemas ** España (7)	3.448
L2/L4 L5	Relaciones * España (14) Relaciones *** España (5)	4.264		Relaciones * España (11) Relaciones **** España (10)	4.224
R1	España referéndum (15) España Referéndum en Cataluña (14)	4.085			
L2	Balkanización de España (14)	7.072		Balkanización de España (4)	
L4	Peligro *** España (13)	4.654		Peligro *** España (9)	4.448
L2/L3	Cohesión * España (13) Cohesión ** España (3)	4.989		Cohesión ** España (8) Cohesión * España (6)	4.272
L2/L5	Destrucción de España (13)	5.015		Destrucción **** España (2)	3.679
L5/L2	Defensa **** España (12) Defensa * España (8)	3.308		Defensa **** España (9) Defensa * España (5)	3.234
R1	España La Polémica Nacional (12)	3.845			
L3/L2	Modelo ** España (11) Modelo * España (8)	4.973		Modelo ** España (4) Modelo * España (4)	2.825
L1	Menos España (10)	2.885		Menos España (3)	2.669
L5/L4/L2 L1	Paz * España (10) Paz España (10) Paz *** España (8)	2.471		Paz **** España (15) Paz ** España (3)	1.871
L2/L3	Estabilidad * España (10)	5.029		Estabilidad ** España (3) Estabilidad * España (2)	3.154
L2/L3	Integridad ** España (10) Integridad * España (10)	6.065		Integridad ** España (11) Integridad * España (5)	6.347
L2	Mapa de España (10)	5.091		Mapa ** España (5)	4.711
L2/L3	Imagen * España (10) Imagen ** España (9)	3.918		Imagen * España (13) Imagen ** España (12)	4.715
L2/L3	Interés ** España (10)	3.522		Interés * España (5) Interés ** España (5)	3.347
L2	Terrorismo * España (9)	2.331		Terrorismo * España (7)	1.974
L2/L3	Vida * España (9) Vida ** España (7)	2.349		Vida * España (7) Vida ** España (12)	2.465
L5/L4 L3	Civil *** España (9)	2.710		Civil **** España (4) Civil ** España (4)	3.114
L4/L2	Social *** España (9) Social * España (5)	2.443		Social * España (28) Social *** España (10)	3.395
L2/L3	Internacional * España (9)	3.647		Internacional * España (15) Internacional ** España (8)	3.556
L2/L4/	Separación * España (9) Separación **** España (4)	5.513		Separación * España (5) Separación *** España (5)	5.006

L5					
L2	Modernización * España (9)	6.198		Modernización * España (12)	5.861
L2/L4	Relación * España (9) Relación *** España (6)	3.637		Relación * España (20) Relación *** España (12)	4.229
L2	Entrada * España (9)	4.046		Entrada * España (8)	3.791
L1/L4	Social *** España (9) Social de España (3)	2.443		Social de España (28) Social *** España (10)	3.395
L2/L4	Independencia * España (8) Independencia *** España (5)	3.673		Independencia * España (14)	3.288
L5/L3 R3/R5	Estatuto **** España (8) Estatuto ** España (8) España ***** Estatuto (5)	1.630		Estatuto **** España (11) Estatuto ** España (4) España ** Estatuto (11)	2.237
L2/L3	Pluralidad * España (8) Pluralidad ** España (6)	5.015		Pluralidad * España (11) Pluralidad ** España (11)	5.259
L2/L3	Destino * España (8)	4.251		Destino ** España (3)	4.315
L2	Gobernación * España (8)	5.955			
L2	Asociado * España (8)	5.213		Asociado * España (7)	5.370
L2	Asociación * España (8)	3.554		Asociación * España (6)	3.868
L2	General * España (8)	2.266		General * España (11)	2.955
R3	España Diario de Campaña (8)	2.765		España ***** campaña (4)	1.396
L2/L3/ L4	Discurso ** España (7) Discurso *** España (4)	3.926		Discurso ** España (17) Discurso * España (6)	3.583
L2/L3	Situación * España (7) Situación ** España (7)	3.084		Situación * España (2) Situación ** España (16)	2.997
L2/L3	Vertebración * España (7) Vertebración ** España (4)	7.341		Vertebración * España (9) Vertebración ** España (4)	6.770
R2/R3/ R5	España * nacionalismo (7) España ** nacionalismo (5)	2.161		España ***** nacionalismo (8) España ** nacionalismo (7)	1.764
L2	Democrático * España (7)	3.113		Democrático * España (11)	2.731
L2	Amor * España (7)	4.879		Amor * España (4)	4.122
L2	Institucional * España (7)	3.377		Institucional * España (6)	2.346
L2	Traición a España (7)	4.147			
L3/L2	Convivencia ** España (7) Convivencia * España (6)	3.732		Convivencia ** España (10) Convivencia * España (5)	3.227
R1/R2	España * grande (7) España grande (5)	4.333		España grande (11) España * grande (10)	5.843
R3/R4	España *** unión (7)	3.781		España ** unión (9)	4.079
R3/R5	España ** soberanía (7)	3.300		España ***** soberanía (5)	4.064
R1	España vuelta a las armas (7)	3.801			
L2/L3 R3/R5	Histórico * España (6) Histórico ** España (6) España ** histórico (6)	4.387		Histórico * España (9) Histórico ** España (5) España ***** histórico (5) España ** histórico (4)	4.177
R3/R4	España ** libertades (6)	3.645		España *** libertades (2)	2.198

L2	Hora * España (6)	3.156		Hora * España (5)	2.535
L4/L2	Políticas *** España (6)	2.122		Poíticas * España (6)	2.049
L5-L4	Objetivo **** España (6)	3.173		Objetivo *** España (9)	2.520
R1/R5	España Tregua (6)	2.136		España **** tregua (3)	0.421
L2	Secesión de España (6)	5.131			
L2/L3/L4	Integración * España (6) Integración ** España (3)	4.670		Integración * España (10) Integración *** España (5)	4.469
L1/L5	Encaje * España (6) Encaje **** España (5)	5.713		Encaje * España (5) Encaje **** España (9)	5.720
L2	Himno de España (6)	4.007		Himno de España (3)	
L3/L4/ L5	Etapas **** España (6)	3.485		Etapas ** España (3) Etapas *** España (3) Etapas **** España (3)	3.637
L2/L3	Enfrentamiento * España (6)	3.667		Enfrentamiento ** España (3)	3.646
L2	Pertenencia * España (6)	4.093		Pertenencia * España (10)	4.667
L2	Desintegración de España (6)	5.827		Desintegración de España (5)	6.381
L3/L4 L5	Sistema *** España (6) Sistema ** España (5)	2.528		Sistema **** España (3) Sistema ** España (3)	1.577
L1/L3/L4 L5	Libro **** España (6) Libro ** España (4)	4.024		Libro España (6) Libro * España (3)	3.655
R3/R5	España ** reforma (6)	1.906		España **** reforma (8)	2.143
L3/L5 R2/R3/ R4	Electoral **** España (5) Electoral ** España (4) España ** electoral (5) España * electoral (4)	2.352		Electoral **** España (6) Electoral ** España (4) España *** electoral (2)	1.479
L4/L5	Grave *** España (5)	3.227		Grave **** España (3)	2.349
R3	España ** prueba (5)	3.288		España ** prueba (3)	2.646
L2/L3/ L5	Peor * España (5) Peor ** España (5)	3.028		Peor **** España (3)	2.450
L5 R2/R3/ R5	Dictadura **** España (5) España * dictadura (5) España ** dictadura (5)	4.143		Dictadura **** España (2) España **** dictadura (5) España * dictadura (3)	2.885
L2/L3/ L4	Soberanía * España (5)	3.300		Soberanía *** España (13) Soberanía ** España (7)	4.064
R3/R5	España ** debate (5)	2.343		España **** debate (16)	2.896
R1/R3	España ** sociedad (5)	0.829		España sociedad (14)	1.574
L2/L5	Presencia * España (5)	3.311		Presencia **** España (4)	2.741
R2/R3	España ** alianza (5)	3.863		España * alianza (2)	2.541
R2/R3	España * voz (5) España ** voz (3)	3.094			

L2	Separatista * España (5)	4.585			
L2/L4	Económico * España (5)	3.156		Económico *** España (4)	3.156
L3/L4	Moral ** España (5)	3.227		Moral ** España (2) Moral *** España (2)	2.181
L5	Solidaridad **** España (5)	3.696		Solidaridad **** España (4)	3.150
L3	Referéndum ** España (4)	4.085		Referéndum ** España (8)	2.587
L2/L3	República ** España (4) República * España (3)	3.518		República ** España (5) República * España (4)	3.342
L2	Papel * España (4)	3.230		Papel * España (6)	3.122
L4/L5	Militar *** España (4)	3.546		Militar **** España (5)	2.548
L2/L3/ L4	Pueblo *** España (4) Pueblo * España (3)	2.079		Pueblo ** España (7) Pueblo *** España (4)	2.255
L2/L3	Lengua ** España (4)	2.483		Lengua ** España (5) Lengua * España (3)	2.272
L2	Cultural * España (4)	3.645		Cultural * España (6)	3.389
L2	Bueno * España (4)	3.306		Bueno * España (9)	4.045
L2/L3/ L5	Diversidad **** España (4) Diversidad de España (3)	5.471		Diversidad ** España (8) Diversidad **** España (3)	4.539
L3/L4/ L5	Fuerzas *** España (4) Fuerzas **** España (4)	1.785		Fuerzas ** España (10)	2.123
L2/L3/ L5	Continuidad * España (4) Continuidad ** España (4)	4.363		Continuidad **** España (2)	2.136
L2/L3	Representación * España (4)	3.253		Representación ** España (6) Representación * España (2)	3.226
L2/L3	Posición de España (4)	2.592		Posición de España (7) Posición ** España (6)	3.281
L2/L3	Transformación * España (4) Transformación ** España (2)	5.090		Transformación ** España (5) Transformación * España (3)	5.277
L2/L3 L4	Autonómico * España (4)	2.255		Autonómico * España (6) Autonómico *** España (5)	2.722
L2/L3 L5	Nacionales **** España (4)	2.610		Nacionales * España (5) Nacionales ** España (5)	3.607
L2	Lingüística * España (4)	3.306		Lingüística * España (9)	3.363
R3/R4	España ** millones (4)	2.984		España *** millones (5)	2.839
L2/L3	Organización * España (3) Organización ** España (3)	2.072		Organización ** España (6)	1.907
L3/L5	Muerte ** España (3)	2.213		Muerte **** España (4) Muerte ** España (3)	2.567
L2	Lenguas * España (3)	3.818		Lenguas * España (12)	4.228
L2/L3/ L5	Construcción **** España (3) Construcción ** España (2)	3.564		Construcción ** España (12) Construcción * España (11)	4.470

L2/L3 L4	Conflicto * España (3) Conflicto ** España (3)	3.475		Conflicto * España (6) Conflicto *** España (5)	2.944
R2/R3	España ** cultura (3)	2.412		España * cultura (13)	2.932
L2	Agua * España (3)	2.994		Agua * España (5)	4.067
L2	Cambio * España (2)	2.738		Cambio * España (7)	2.850
L2/L3	Articulación * España (2) Articulación ** España (1)	5.600		Articulación * España (8) Articulación ** España (6)	5.648
L4/L2	Nacionalidades *** España (2)	4.476		Nacionalidades *** España (12) Nacionalidades * España (4)	4.554
L3/L4	Aislamiento *** España (2)	3.920		Aislamiento ** España (6)	4.412
L3	Público ** España (2)	1.170		Público ** España (12)	3.193
L2/L3/ L5	Enseñanza ** España (2) Enseñanza **** España (2)	2.483		Enseñanza **** España (15) Enseñanza * España (2)	3.944
L1	Marca España (2)	3.151		Marca España (7)	4.316
L2	Amable * España (2)	4.798		Amable * España (8)	5.969
L3/L4	Identidades *** España (1) Identidades **** España (1)	4.600		Identidades **** España (3) Identidades *** España (2)	3.987
L4				Coste *** España (10)	4.441
L4				Gasto público sanitario * España (8)	5.349
L2				Europeización * España (6)	7.177
L2				Bienestar * España (5)	3.478
R2/R3	España * revolución (2)	3.321		España ** revolución (5)	4.099

Collocates of España, Issues/ Process: Threat

L5-R5	Mundo Opinion	MI	L-L	País Opinion	MI
L1	Contra España (45)			Contra España (15)	
L2	Odio * España (21) Odio a España (19)			Odio * España (5) Odio a España (4)	
L2	Liquidación de España (19)				
L1/L2	Destruir España (15) Destruir * España (2)				
L1	Separarse de España (15)			Separarse de España (6)	
L2	Balkanización de España (14)			Balkanización de España (4)	
L1/L2	Romper España (13) Romper * España (9)			Romper España (4)	
L4	Peligro *** España (13)			Peligro *** España (9)	
L2/L5	Destrucción de España			Destrucción **** España	

	(13)			(2)	
L1	Puta España (13)				
L2	Enemigos de España (12)			Enemigos ** España (4) Enemigos de España (2)	
L1	Menos España (10)			Menos España (3)	
L2/L4/ L5	Separación * España (9) Separación **** España (4)			Separación * España (5) Separación *** España (5)	
L2/L3	Acabar con España (7) Acabar con la España (3)				
L2	Traición a España (7)				
R1	España rota (6)			España rota (12)	
R2/R3	España ** rompe (6) España * rompe (4)			España ** rompe (6) España * rompe (6)	
L2	Al margen de España (6)			Al margen de España (4)	
L2	Secesión de España (6)				
L2/L3	Enfrentamiento * España (6)			Enfrentamiento ** España (3)	
L2	Desintegración de España (6)			Desintegración de España (5)	
L4/L5	Grave *** España (5)			Grave **** España (3)	
L2/L3/ L5	Peor * España (5) Peor ** España (5)			Peor **** España (3)	
L1	Perder España (4)				
L3/L5	Muerte ** España (3)			Muerte **** España (4) Muerte ** España (3)	
L1/L2	Cargarse a España (3) Cargarse España (2)				
L1/L2/ L4	Salvar *** España (2)			Salvar * España (4) Salvar España (3)	

Collocates of España, Issues/ Process: Symbols

L5-R5	Mundo Opinion	MI	L-L	País Opinion	MI
L1	Bandera * España (74) Bandera de España (73)			Bandera * España (11) Bandera de España (10)	
L2 R3/R3	Símbolos de España (20) Símbolo de España (5) España *** símbolos (5)			Símbolos de España (3) Símbolo de España (3) España ** símbolos (4)	
L1	Puta España (13)				
L3	Santiago y cierra España (11) Santiago Matamoros y cierra España (1)			Santiago ** España (8) Santiago y cierra España (6)	
L2	Himno de España (6)			Himno de España (3)	
L1	Arriba España (6)			Arriba * España (7)	

Collocates of España, Issues/Concepts: History

L5-R5	Mundo Opinion	MI	L-L	País Opinion	MI
L2	Historia * España (238) Historia de España (236)			Historia * España (250) Historia de España (247)	
L2	Histórica * España (19)			Histórica * España (16)	
R1	España contemporánea (9)			España contemporánea (34)	
R1	España imperial (9)			España imperial (7)	
L2/L3 R3/R5	Histórico * España (6) Histórico ** España (6) España ** histórico (6)			Histórico * España (9) Histórico ** España (5) España **** histórico (5) España ** histórico (4)	
L5	Dictadura **** España (5)			Dictadura **** España (2)	
L2/L3	República ** España (4) República * España (3)			República ** España (5) República * España (4)	
R2/R3	España * siglo (18) España ** siglo (14)			España * siglo (27) España ** siglo (15)	
R2/R3	España * Franco (8) España ** Franco (3)			España * Franco (11)	
R1	España republicana (8)			España republicana (10)	
R1	España liberal (7)			España liberal (6)	
R1	España franquista (3)			España franquista (9)	

Collocates of España, Space/Time

L5-R5	Mundo Opinion	MI	L-L	País Opinion	MI
R2	España * hoy (57)	4.129		España * hoy (60)	4.368
R1	España actual (41)	4.243		España actual (33)	3.816
L2	Fuera de España (32)	3.851		Fuera de España (32)	3.858
L2	Dentro de España (30)	4.093		Dentro de España (19)	3.939
R3/R4	España *** años (26)	3.224		España ** años (18)	2.952
R2/R3	España * siglo (18) España ** siglo (14)	4.770		España * siglo (27) España ** siglo (15)	4.717
R1/R2	España siempre (14) España * siempre (11)	3.147		España siempre (7) España * siempre (7)	2.848
R1	España tras (18)	2.330		España tras (11)	2.552
R1	España después (14)	2.661		España después (14)	2.976
R3	España ** últimos (13)	3.263		España ** últimos (11)	3.096
R1	España antes (12)	2.626		España antes (9)	2.505
R4/R3	España *** momento (8)	2.602		España ** momento (13)	2.481
R1/R2	España todavía (5) España * todavía (3)	3.169		España todavía (1)	2.851
				España a comienzos (5)	4.636

Collocates of España, Geography/Places

L5-R5	Mundo Opinion	MI	L-L	País Opinion	MI
L3/L2	Cataluña ** España (67) Cataluña * España (45)	4.603		Cataluña ** España (43) Cataluña * España (85)	4.875
R2	España * Francia (50)	5.861		España * Francia (43)	6.171
R2/R3	España ** Europa (22) España * Europa (13)	5.016		España ** Europa (50) España * Europa (31)	5.453
L2	Capital de España (25)	5.169		Capital de España (9)	4.112
L2	Lugares * España (19) Lugar * España (16)	5.673		Lugares * España (9) Lugar * España (18)	4.824
L5/R2/ R3	Euskadi **** España (15) España * Euskadi (16) España ** Euskadi (16)	4.179		Euskadi **** España (27) España * Euskadi (9) España ** Euskadi (19)	4.194
L2/L3 L5	Vasco * España (14) Vasco ** España (13)	2.986		Vasco **** España (39) Vasco * España (32)	2.790
L2	Partes de España (14)	3.899		Partes de España (16)	4.255
R3	España ** Gran Bretaña (12)	5.675		España ** Gran Bretaña (2)	5.122
L2	Puntos de España (11)	3.691		Puntos de España (2) Puntos ** España (2)	2.875
R2	España * Marruecos (10)	4.863		España * Marruecos (12)	5.852
L2	Calles * España (9)	4.024		Calles **** España (3)	3.516
L2	Tierras * España (8)	4.749		Tierras * España (8)	4.733
L2	Ciudades * España (8)	4.126		Ciudades * España (2)	3.461
L4/L3	Madrid *** España (7)	2.169		Madrid ** España (37)	3.829
L2/L3	Territorio * España (7)	3.551		Territorio ** España (2)	2.128
L2/L3/ R3/R4	Gibraltar * España (6) España ** Gibraltar (7)	4.863		Gibraltar ** España (5) España *** Gibraltar (4)	5.309
R1	España árida (7)	8.926			
L5/L4	Comunidad **** España (6) Comunidad *** España (6)	3.112		Comunidad **** España (6) Comunidad *** España (6)	2.755
L2	Comunidades * España (6)	2.994		Comunidades * España (3)	2.675
L3/L5	Navarra ** España (6)	2.926		Navarra **** España (3)	1.586
L2/L3	Regiones * España (6)	4.224		Regiones ** España (12) Regiones * España (8)	4.393
R2/R4	España *** Castilla (5)	4.258		España * Castilla (5)	4.662
R2	España * Portugal (4)	5.185		España * Portugal (15)	6.595
L2/L5	Vasca **** España (4)	1.106		Vasca * España (6) Vasca **** España (6)	1.640
R2	España * América (4)	4.251		España * América (6)	5.477
L2/L3	Territorios * España (2) Territorios ** España (3)	3.528		Territorios * España (8) Territorios ** España (4)	3.375

L2	Zonas * España (2)	5.199		Zonas * España (7)	4.730
L2	Interior * España (2)	1.678		Interior * España (9)	3.009
				Catalunya ** España (8)	4.677
				Catalunya * España (7)	
				Herria * España (5)	3.615

Collocates of España, Partitives/ Number

L5-R5	Mundo Opinion	MI	L-L	País Opinion	MI
L2	Resto * España (298) Resto de España (296)	6.720		Resto de España (319)	7.033
L1	Toda España (288)	5.660		Toda España (219)	5.506
L1	Una España (272)	3.572		Una España (304)	3.525
L1	Media España (92)	6.328		Media España (12)	4.853
L2	Conjunto * España (78) Conjunto de España (77)	5.590		Conjunto de España (111)	5.801
L2	Parte * España (64) Parte de España (62)	3.669		Parte de España (28)	3.183
R1	España entera (53)	7.305		España entera (17)	6.598
L3	Mayoría ** España (5)	1.823		Mayoría ** España (2)	1.662

Collocates of España, Reference (deipsis)

L5-R5	Mundo Opinion	MI	L-L	País Opinion	MI
L1	Esta España (55)	3.062		Esta España (33)	2.741
L1	Esa España (39)	3.257		Esa España (24)	2.888
L1	Otra España (17)	3.488		Otra España (21)	3.255
L1	Aquella España (15)	3.871		Aquella España (10)	4.023
L1/L4 R1	Nuestra España (7) España nuestra (13)	2.800		Nuestra *** España (9) Nuestra España (7) España nuestra (1)	2.960
L1	Propia España (8)	2.950		Propia ** España (8) Propia España (7)	3.116
R1	España junto (6)	3.356		España junto (4)	3.381

Collocates of España, Qualities

L5-R5	Mundo Opinion	MI	L-L	País Opinion	MI
L1	Nueva España (24)	3.944		Nueva España (6)	3.230
L3	Libre ** España (20)	4.233		Libre ** España (10)	4.319
R2/R3	España * gran (19) España ** gran (18)	3.759		España ** gran (11) España * gran (6)	3.570
R1	*España moderna (15)	5.939		*España moderna (21)	5.930
L1	Vieja España (12)	5.179		Vieja España (11)	5.431

R2/R3	España ** fuerte (7) España * fuerte (6)	4.252		España * fuerte (2)	2.555
R1/R2/ R3	España ** diferente (6) España * diferente (4)	5.218		España * diferente (5) España diferente (3)	4.012
R1/R2	España unida (5) España * unida (5)	4.496		España unida (4) España * unida (3)	4.242
R1/R3	España ** diversa (5)	6.848		España diversa (6) España ** diversa (6)	6.749
R3	España ** abierta (4)	3.575		España ** abierta (5)	3.602
R1				España plurilingüe (8)	7.667
				España tradicional (5)	3.618

Collocates of España, Processes of Being

L5-R5	Mundo Opinion	MI	L-L	País Opinion	MI
HERE R1/R2	España es (400) España * es (149)	3.363		España es (314) España * es (115)	3.117
R1	España como (275)	3.407		España como (265)	3.308
R1/R2	España está (77) España * está (32)	3.438		España está (54) España * está (19)	3.350
R1/R2	España tiene (52) España * tiene (27)	3.301		España tiene (47) España * tiene (18)	3.367
R1/R2	España era (42) España * era (14)	3.326		España era (43) España * era (12)	3.420
R1/R2	España hay (36) España * hay (20)	3.155		España hay (29) España * hay (15)	3.092
R1/R2	España sea (38) España * sea (7)	3.434		España sea (18) España * sea (12)	2.544
R1	España va (31)	3.216		España va (40)	3.920
R1	España son (29)	2.624		España son (34)	2.622
R2/R3	España * siendo (21) España ** siendo (6)	4.228		España ** siendo (7) España * siendo (6)	3.315
R2/R3	España * sido (21) España ** sido (7)	4.228		España * sido (25) España ** sido (14)	2.891
R1/R2	España fue (19) España * fue (10)	2.696		España fue (26) España * fue (14)	2.997
R1/R2	España parece (15) España * parece (10)	2.912		España parece (10) España * parece (5)	2.609
R1/R2	España sigue (15) España * sigue (5)	3.450		España sigue (10) España * sigue (3)	3.163
R1/R2	España necesita (15) España * necesita (6)	4.599		España necesita (7)	3.565
L1	Viva España (20)	5.718		Viva España (5)	5.233
R1-R2	España había (13) España * había (11)	2.974		España había (15) España * había (21)	3.413
R1/R2	España sería (13) España * sería (7)	2.942		España sería (10) España * sería (7)	2.575
R1/R2	España fuera (12) España * fuera (4)	3.850		España fuera (4) España * fuera (1)	3.802

L2	Tenemos * España (12)	3.865		Tenemos * España (6)	3.990
R1/R2	España * existe (11) España existe (6)	4.220		España * existe (13) España existe (6)	6.870
R1/R2	España haya (11) España * haya (5)	2.876		España haya (7) España * haya (4)	2.427
R1/R2	España estaba (11) España * estaba (3)	3.046		España estaba (7)	3.027
L1	Tenido España (11)	3.506		Tenido España (4)	3.472
R1/R2/ R3	España están (10)	2.615		España * están (5) España ** están (5)	2.199
R1/R2	España será (10) España * sera (1)	3.030		España será (5) España * sera (4)	2.826
R1/R2	España tenía (8) España * tenía (7)	3.402		España tenía (5)	3.095
L2	Queda * España (8)	3.530		Queda * España (4)	2.594
R1	España siga (8)	4.113		España siga (2)	3.551
L4/L3	Forma *** España (8)	3.069		Forma ** España (12)	2.595
L2/L3 L4	Será ** España (7) Será *** España (5)	3.030		Será ** España (5) Será * España (4)	2.826
L2/L2/ R2/R3	Seguir ** España (6) Seguir * España (5) España * seguir (7)	3.085		Seguir * España (4) Seguir ** España (3) España ** seguir (3)	2.339
R1	España tendría (7)	4.039		España tendría (3)	2.313
R2	España * acabar (7)	3.653			
R1/R2	España tenemos (6) España * tenemos (2)	3.865		España tenemos (9) España * tenemos (3)	3.990
R2	España * tenido (6)	3.506		España * tenido (8)	3.472
L1	Vive España (6)	5.046		Vive España (1)	3.419
R2/R3	España * constituye (6)	3.755		España ** constituye (6)	3.605
R1	España resulta (6)	1.862		España resulta (4)	2.262
R2/R4	España * marcha (6)	2.540		España *** marcha (2)	4.260
L2	Pasando * España (6)	3.694			
L2/L4/ L5 R1/R2 R3	Tienen * España (5) España ** tienen (5) España tienen (4)	2.369		Tienen *** España (4) Tienen **** España (4) España tienen (5) España * tienen (4)	2.144
R1/R2	España habría (5) España * habría (5)	2.862		España * habría (6) España habría (3)	2.556
R1	España tenga (5)	2.987		España tenga (7)	3.251
R2/R5	España **** viene (5)	3.224		España * viene (3)	2.482
L2	Vivir * España (5)	3.289		Vivir * España (2)	3.546
R1	España pasa (5)	3.095		España pasa (2)	2.857

R1/R3	España ** somos (5)	3.258		España somos (2)	2.896
R1	España deje (5)	3.868			
L2/L4/ L5 R1/ R2/R3	Tener **** España (4) Tener *** España (3) España ** tener (7) España tener (3)	2.470		Tener **** España (8) Tener * España (4) España * tener (5) España ** tener (4)	2.735
R1	España vive (6)	5.046		España vive (1)	3.443
R3	España ** convertido (4)	3.279		España ** convertido (6)	2.970
L2	Pasa * España (4)	3.095		Pasa * España (5)	2.843
R1	España empieza (4)	3.587		España empieza (5)	3.794
L2	Viven * España (1)	3.433		Viven * España (5)	4.170
R1	España tuvo (1)	1.869		España tuvo (5)	3.394
R2	España * corresponde (2)	3.499		España * corresponde (5)	3.907
				Integran España (10)	5.067
				Componen España (9)	5.682
				Existente * España (7)	4.326
				Existentes * España (6)	4.256
R1				España aparece (6)	4.369
R2				España * convirtió (6)	4.071

Collocates of España, Processes of Doing

L5-R5	Mundo Opinion	MI	L-L	País Opinion	MI
L2	Hacer * España (24)	3.233		Hacer * España (13)	2.504
L2	Defender * España (23)	4.624		Defender * España (8)	3.882
L1/L2	Gobernar España (21) Gobernar * España (3)	4.213		Gobernar España (17) Gobernar * España (4)	4.258
L1/L2	Destruir España (15) Destruir * España (2)	5.790			
L1	Separarse de España (15)	7.166		Separarse de España (6)	5.825
L1	Cierra España (14)	6.054		Cierra España (6)	5.258
L1/L2	Romper España (13) Romper * España (9)	4.586		Romper España (4)	3.402
L2/L3 L4 R1/R2	Hecho * España (11) Hecho ** España (10) España ** hecho (11) España * hecho (9)	2.772		Hecho ** España (8) Hecho *** España (8) España ** hecho (7) España * hecho (5)	2.578
L2/L1	Gobierna * España (11) Gobierna España (6)	5.501		Gobierna España (8) Gobierna * España (5)	5.077
L2/L3	Pretende * España (9) Pretende ** España (8)	3.449		Pretende * España (2) Pretende ** España (2)	2,198
R2	España HABER dejado (10)	3.116		España HABER dejado (9)	3.681

L2&L3	Representa * España (8)	4.481		Representa ** España (4) Representa * España (2)	3.733
L2	Construir * España (8)	4.330		Construir * España (8)	4.269
L2/L3	Acabar con España (7) Acabar con la España (3)	3.653			
L2	Volver * España (7)	3.433		Volver * España (5)	2.523
R2/R3	España ** rompe (6) España * rompe (4)	5.487		España ** rompe (6) España * rompe (6)	5.701
R1	España rota (6)	6.221		España rota (12)	7.289
L1	Cambiar España (6)	3.522		Cambiar España (2)	3.541
R1	España defender (5)	4.624		España defender (8)	3.882
R1	España vuelve (5)	3.562		España vuelve (2)	3.736
L1	Perder España (4)	3.218			
L1/L2	Pensar * España (4)	2.524		Pensar España (4) Pensar * España (3)	3.085
L1/L2	Cargarse a España (3) Cargarse España (2)	5.781			
R1	España hizo (2)	2.262		España hizo (8)	2.972
L1/L2/ L4	Salvar *** España (2)	3.585		Salvar * España (4) Salvar España (3)	4.745
				Producido * España (7)	4.153
R1				España votó (5)	5.256

Collocates of España, Processes of saying

L5-R5	Mundo Opinion	MI	L-L	País Opinion	MI
L1	Llamamos España (21)	6.977		Llamamos España (20)	6.938
L2/L3	Hablar * España (20) Hablar ** España (6)	3.539		Hablar * España (9) Hablar ** España (6)	3.180
L1	Llamada España (19)	4.425		Llamada España (7)	4.396
L1	Llama España (12)	4.113		Llama España (9)	4.277
L3/L2/ L1	Decir ** España (17) Decir * España (12) Decir España (11)	3.316		Decir * España (16) Decir ** España (6) Decir España (10)	3.065
L1/L2	Llamado España (8)	3.044		Llamado * España (6)	3.409
L5/L4/ L3	Habla **** España (7)	3.279		Habla ** España (4) Habla *** España (4)	4.094
R1	España dijo (6)	2.886		España dijo (3)	3.061
R1/R2	España significa (6)	3.502		España * significa (3)	3.036
L1	Lllamar España (2)	3.682		Lllamar España (5)	3.983
				Titulado España (5)	5.012

Collocates of España, Processes of sensing

L5-R5	Mundo Opinion	MI	L-L	País Opinion	MI
L1	ODIAR a España (28) Odio a España (21) Odiar a España (4) Odia a España (3)			ODIAR a España (6) Odio a España (5)	
L3/L5	Quiere ** España (19)	3.815		Quiere **** España (11)	3.856
L2/L3	Quieren * España (16) Quieren ** España (15)	3.917		Quieren * España (6) Quieren ** España (1)	3.109
L5/L2	Ver **** España (7) Ver * España (5)	2.427		Ver * España (4)	2.172
L2	Creer * España (7)	3.590		Creer * España (4)	3.612
R1/R3/ R5	España ** sabe (6) España sabe (3)	2.488		España **** sabe (2) España sabe (1)	1.057
L3/L5	Creo ** España (6)	3.371		Creo **** España (3)	2.537
L1	Duele España (6)	6.067		Duele España (2)	5.977
L1/L2	Entender España (4) Entender * España (2)	2.725		Entender España (3) Entender * España (4)	3.138
L2	Considera * España (1)	2.821		Considera * España (7)	3.251
R1				España entendida (5)	5.184

Collocates of España, Modals

L5-R5	Mundo Opinion	MI	L-L	País Opinion	MI
R1/R2	España * puede (29) España puede (26)	2.825		España * puede (28) España puede (17)	2.681
R1/R2	España debe (16) España * debe (12)	3.069		España debe (23) España * debe (10)	3.282
R1/R2	España podría (12) España * podría (3)	2.971		España podría (8) España * podría (6)	2.837
R1/R2/ R3	España debería (8) España ** debería (4)	2.863		España debería (6) España * debería (3)	2.507
R1/R2	España pueda (5) España * pueda (3)	2.794		España pueda (4) España * pueda (4)	2.233
R1	España deberá (5)	4.368			

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